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Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have in recent years become a very popular 
instrument for the alleviation of poverty and vulnerability in developing countries. CCTs 
address the lack of investment in human capital among those in poverty by providing cash 
benefits that are conditional upon households complying with a number of specific 
behavioural requirements, such as sending children to school and/or bringing them to 
health centres for regular check-ups. However, the actual role played by the behavioural 
conditions in CCTs is still a topic of widespread debate in academic and policy-maker 
circles. In this thesis, I take advantage of the social assistance context in Ecuador to 
compare the effectiveness of a traditional CCT programme (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) 
and an alternative anti-poverty programme that provides accumulated payments without 
any attached conditions (Crédito de Desarrollo Humano). The results suggest that the 
impacts of the unconditional cash transfers are markedly superior in terms of welfare 
promotion, human capital investment and income generation. Overall, the findings of this 
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Most developing countries have introduced large-scale programmes of direct transfers 
with the intention of reducing poverty and vulnerability. Most of these programmes 
deliver monetary resources to poor households, provided that they comply with certain 
conditions associated with improving the human capabilities of their children. The 
dominant political discourse has been that it is necessary to help the poor in decision-
making in order to break the inter-generational transmission of poverty. However, the 
great popularity that conditional cash transfer programmes have achieved contrasts with 
the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating the specific contribution of conditionality. 
It seems that policymakers have preferred to focus on the practical benefits of conditions, 
rather than worrying about their actual effectiveness.   
This research seeks to analyse critically conditionality in antipoverty programmes, 
which I consider important for the future development of improved forms of social 
assistance in developing countries. More specifically, it compares the effectiveness (in 
terms of welfare generation, human capital investment and labour supply) of two 
completely different cash transfer programmes offered in Ecuador: one with the typical 
conditional structure (Bono de Desarrollo Humano) and a recently implemented 
programme in which households receive a lump-sum payment without attached 
conditionalities (Crédito de Desarrollo Humano). For this purpose, I use different quasi-
experimental methods together with two specific impact evaluation designs, which 
represent a significant methodological contribution to an evaluative literature where 
experimental methods have predominated. The analysis is based on linear, probit and 
ordered logistic regression models. 
Theoretical concepts pertaining to social protection and social assistance in 
developing countries, as well as the different theoretical perspectives about cash transfers, 
and the arguments for the inclusion and exclusion of conditions, frame the research 
questions and the interpretation of results. This research draws on the household- and 
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 x 
individual-level data from the Ecuadorian Registro Social 2008 and 2014 databases, which 
compile surveys applied to families in areas with a high incidence of poverty.  
The empirical analysis shows that the non-conditional programme Crédito de 
Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Credit) has consistently superior effects on 
overall welfare, the average educational attainment of the households and the housing 
conditions, when compared to the conditional programme Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
(Human Development Bonus). Surprisingly, the conditional programme has no effects (or 
even small negative effects) on these outcome variables. This points to the low importance 
of conditionality in practice, which seem to play a secondary (or even harmful) role in 
generating welfare among the poor, in comparison with other constituent elements of the 
programmes (such as the amount of transfers and complementary policies). Therefore, the 
evidence clearly suggests that the presence of conditionalities in social assistance is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure that families overcome poverty in a sustainable 
manner reaching higher levels of well-being, increasing their human capital and 
improving their living conditions. 
Moreover, neither programme has a significant impact on the probability of school 
enrolment/attendance of the first-born child. Although some statistically significant 
effects were estimated, their magnitudes are very small. Therefore, the findings indicate 
that conditionality is not sufficient to guarantee that parents invest in the human capital of 
their older children. Probably, conditions should be accompanied by constant awareness 
campaigns or better control and verification mechanisms. However, conditionality seems 
to be necessary for this purpose since the unconditional cash transfers had no effect on the 
parent’s behaviour, which is by itself an interesting and important result, since there is the 
idea that this programme –which promotes the generation of productive enterprises– could 
be causing at the same time an increase in child labour. 
Finally, neither of the two social assistance programmes negatively affects the 
probability of being unemployed. Both the beneficiaries of the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano programme and the beneficiaries of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano are 
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equally likely to be unemployed than poor individuals who do not receive any kind of 
benefit. At least in this case, welfare programmes are not generating disincentives to work 
among those in poverty. Overall, the analysis suggests that cash transfer programmes can 
achieve better results if they leave conditionalities aside and opt for the productive 
inclusion of the poor by linking cash transfers to interventions/policies that aim to directly 
increase household productivity. Through elements such as mutual trust and training, 
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Since the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were designed and 
launched in 2000, a lot of academic and policy work has gone into trying to meet them. 
The MDGs have captured the world's attention on the importance of reducing poverty and 
vulnerability more than any other global initiative in the past (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008). 
As a result, during the last eighteen years, development-related institutions, poor and rich 
country governments and different policy researchers have emphasized the role of social 
protection, poverty eradication and, above all, the struggle for greater equality as key 
ingredients in building democratic, fair and prosperous societies (CEPAL, 2010). 
Specifically, they have highlighted the importance of implementing actions that, on 
different fronts, allow moving towards greater degrees of social inclusion, equality and 
respect for the principles of human rights.  
Despite these significant efforts, billions of people in developing countries and 
emerging economies are still completely at the mercy of such risks as unemployment, 
poverty and illness (BMZ, 2008; UN, 2014).1 In the past, development policy has 
emphasized the necessity of positive interventions in the state's supply of public goods 
and services by providing sufficient schools, health clinics and other basic infrastructure 
(Rawlings & Rubio, 2005). However, merely expansion of the supply side failed to 
sufficiently increase service utilization. Part of the reason for this could be that even when 
service costs are kept low or are removed completely, supply-side improvements tend not 
to be effective in modifying long-term patterns of use because resource constraints faced 
by poor households do not allow them to pay the basic private costs associated with the 
                                                             
1
 According to the UN (2014) Human Development Report, over 2.2 billion people, representing more than 
15 percent of the world population, are near or in multidimensional poverty. At the same time, more than 
1.5 billion people —nearly half of all workers—are in informal or precarious employment. Moreover, 
nearly 80 percent of the global population lack comprehensive social protection and 12 percent (842 
million) suffer from chronic hunger. 
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use of public services, which include transportation costs and the opportunity costs of time 
(Maluccio & Flores, 2004). 
The main challenge for the developing world today is the appropriate design and 
implementation of social policies that address -from a multidimensional perspective- the 
complex edges of exclusion, vulnerability, inequality and poverty. As part of such 
policies, the international community has recognized the necessity of strengthening social 
protection systems in those parts of the world where they do not exist or are very fragile. 
It is important to note that more than half of the world’s population lacks reliable 
protection against the effects of hazards like diseases, unemployment or old age (UN, 
2012).  
A number of factors clearly indicate the prominence of social protection as the 
political framework employed to fight poverty and vulnerability in developing countries 
over the last two decades (Barrientos, 2010). First, more and more governments are 
developing and implementing social protection policies and programmes within their 
national poverty reduction strategies (Barrientos & Holmes, 2007). Second, international 
organizations (such as the World Bank and the United Nations), the European Union and 
different developed countries have shown their willingness to increase support in setting 
up adequate social protection systems in the developing world, which can help maintain a 
social balance, sustainable poverty reduction and social development, especially in 
countries where inequality is a growing concern.2 Finally, there is also a growing interest 
in the issue of social protection among academics and development research institutions 
in general (Barrientos, 2010). 
The Ecuadorian government has among its priorities the fight against poverty and 
inequality in the country through the implementation of different social assistance 
practices (MIES, 2013b). As in other Latin American countries, one of the most used 
                                                             
2
 For example, German development cooperation shares its experience in adequate social protection 
systems with about 30 partner countries throughout the world and assists them in implementing 
sustainable solutions for their own systems’ problems (BMZ, 2008).  
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strategies has been the delivery of cash transfers as a mechanism to smooth consumption 
and promote well-being among households in vulnerable situations. My research seeks to 
compare the effectiveness of two completely different social assistance programmes 
offered in Ecuador: one with the typical structure (i.e. cash transfers attached to 
conditionalities) and a recently implemented programme of unconditional (and lump-sum) 
monetary transfers.  
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) is a monthly cash benefit of 50 US dollars 
designed to help those in poverty to pay for their most basic costs of living (like rent, 
clothes and transportation). This programme falls into the category of traditional 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) because the monetary benefits are subject to compliance 
with conditionalities related to investing in human capital development (i.e. health and 
education of children). The BDH cash transfers are delivered to households (preferably to 
the mothers) living in extreme poverty (i.e. those in the first poverty quintile) or 
vulnerability. On the other hand, the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano (CDH) programme 
provides unconditional monetary benefits (accompanied by technical assistance) that seek 
to generate financing facilities for the poor, as well as to establish formal mechanisms and 
economic incentives to support their productive investments. The CDH cash transfers of 
600 US dollars represent one year of accumulated BDH transfers. They can be requested 
annually only by those in vulnerable conditions (i.e. potential BDH beneficiaries, people 
with disabilities and senior citizens without social security). 
 
Contextualizing this Research 
The recent increased attention to the topic of social protection in the fields of social 
development and more generally in development studies was by all means necessary, but 
also somewhat belated. Although the study of social development emerged significantly 
in the 1950s, neither policy-makers nor academics working in the field had previously 
given to social protection policies and programmes the importance that they might deserve 
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(Midgley, 2013). These practices and policies were merely associated with improvements 
in consumption levels rather than activities that facilitate the socio-economic development 
of the most vulnerable, and therefore they were viewed in the political and academic 
spheres as more suitable for Western world countries.  
It was commonly thought that social protection goes far beyond the primary 
interests of social development, which are basically related to national social planning, 
participatory community development programmes, poverty reduction, gender projects 
and improvements in nutrition, health and education (Midgley, 1995; Seers, 1969). In fact, 
income transfers and social security, for example, were widely understood as costly and 
unnecessary luxuries to which less-developed countries could not have access 
(MacPherson, 1982). Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the issue of social 
protection programmes in the developing world was given little priority in previous social 
development literature, since they were considered a mere consumption expenditure that 
diverts important resources from more appropriate interventions that require large 
economic and social investments.  
However, the situation has changed drastically in recent years. Different social 
protection projects and programmes designed to help those in poverty have become very 
popular in the developing world (Barrientos, 2010). The introduction of direct cash 
transfer schemes in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, the rapid expansion of social 
insurance coverage in Thailand, the launching of the Minimum Living Standards 
Guarantee Scheme in the Republic of Korea, the introduction of mixed provision health 
insurance systems in rural China, the creation of the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme in India and the introduction of the Child Support Grant as well as 
universal old-age pensions in South Africa have all contributed to the growing interest in 
the issue of social protection. Moreover, significant technical and institutional innovations 
to social protection practices, such as cash transfers combined with services and non-
contributory social pensions, have been consistently implemented in countries as diverse 
as Ecuador, India, South Africa and Brazil. These recent innovations have helped to 
expand the level and quality of coverage well beyond that achieved by traditional safety 
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net programmes; and they have increasingly attracted academic and political interest all 
over the world. 
An important feature of social protection in developing countries has been the 
widespread implementation of programmes offering direct assistance to households in 
poverty. Among them, programmes providing cash transfers to households contingent on 
certain behaviour or performance (like school attendance and healthcare utilization) have 
been certainly the most popular. A common presumption, although without the sufficient 
empirical or theoretical evidence, is that CCT programmes are a more effective way to 
break the intergenerational transmission of poverty by encouraging poor households to 
invest in the human capital of their children (World Bank, 2009).   
 
Research Aims and Contributions 
The main objective of this project is precisely to look critically at the issue of 
conditionality in antipoverty programmes. More specifically, I intend to provide useful 
empirical evidence on this topic, in order to make a significant contribution to the ongoing 
debate about the role played by conditions in social protection initiatives. The persistent 
use of conditions in social assistance programs raises several questions regarding their 
true value and convenience that need to be answered to improve our understanding of 
poverty and its determinants. As a consequence, the role of conditions has attracted a great 
deal of attention from researchers and policy makers. In this thesis, I try to make a 
comprehensive assessment on the issue of conditionality in cash transfer programmes, 
which I consider important for the future development of improved forms of social 
assistance in developing countries.  
I pursue this objective mainly by conducting impact evaluations that compare the 
effectiveness (in terms of welfare generation, human capital formation and labour supply) 
of the two most important cash transfer programmes offered in Ecuador: one with a 
standard design based on conditions and a recently implemented programme that provides 
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lump sum payments without explicit conditionalities attached. These impact evaluations 
are based on three different quasi-experimental methods (i.e. natural experiment, 
instrumental variable and difference-in-differences) and programme-specific evaluation 
designs, which by themselves represent an important methodological contribution to an 
evaluative literature on social assistance programmes where experimental methods have 
prevailed. In fact, it is striking that the majority of evaluations of this type of programmes 
in developing countries are conducted using randomized control trials (RCTs), which –
besides being expensive and difficult to implement– raise considerable ethical concerns 
because they imply arbitrarily denying access to the programmes to many people who 
need and are entitled to receive cash transfers. 
A large number of experimental studies have examined the effectiveness of 
traditional CCT programmes. However, to the best of my knowledge, no comparisons 
have been made between the outcomes of a programme with the common basic structure 
(namely, the BDH) and a programme that provides an unconditional lump-sum payment 
empowering poor families not only with money, but also with trust (namely, the CDH), 
all this within the same country and in the same period of time. Therefore, this research 
attempts to make a significant empirical contribution to the existing political and academic 
debate on the actual effectiveness of both types of programmes and on the independent 
benefits that their simultaneous implementation could have for the poor populations. This 
debate has intensified in Ecuador in recent years mainly because both programmes have 
coexisted for a long time and the unconditional CDH programme has not had important 
impact evaluations so far, when it has been nearly a decade since its implementation.     
The different theoretical perspectives on cash transfers as an effective means of 
social assistance to overcome poverty, as well as the theoretical arguments for both 
inclusion and exclusion of conditions in the design of these programmes, are reviewed in 
depth as part of this research project. This initial analysis is intended to frame the 
investigation, help in the interpretation of the results, and establish whether (and why) 
conditions are actually considered the "keystone" of progressive social policy and 
effective social protection. Moreover, I also descriptively analyse the most important 
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social assistance programmes offered in Ecuador, with special emphasis on the innovative 
features that the CDH programme presents (apart from setting aside conditionality), such 
as the lump-sum cash transfers and the technical support received by beneficiary 
households to start their own businesses. In order to draw the right conclusions, it is 
important to understand first the main characteristics and the mechanisms through which 
new forms of social assistance are thought to be facilitating the productive inclusion of 
the poor and their sustained escape from poverty. 
Ultimately, by linking the empirical results to the theoretical framework, this 
investigation tries to find out if conditionality has been a necessary and/or a sufficient 
element to guarantee the success of cash transfer programmes in Ecuador, and if it could 
be effectively replaced by other elements of a much positive nature (such as mutual trust 
between the parties involved). The attempt to answer these questions constitutes the main 
theoretical contribution of this thesis to the growing literature on cash transfer 
programmes, and more specifically to the long-standing social policy discussion about the 
role of conditions in social assistance practices. 
This study quantitatively examines whether there are significant improvements in 
the welfare level, human capital investment and labour supply of the poor populations in 
Ecuador due specifically to the social benefits received by beneficiaries of the traditional 
BDH programme, as well as by those who opted at some point for the non-conditional 
CDH initiative. The research enquiry is driven by the following general research 
questions: Do the BDH and CDH cash transfer programmes affect the levels of well-being, 
schooling and unemployment of those in poverty? Does conditionality make a difference 
in terms of the efficiency of the programmes? Is it effective to set aside conditionality and 









































The great popularity that conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have achieved, 
especially in Latin American countries in the last twenty years, seems to indicate that the 
‘Solomonic decision’ they have found in the political and academic spheres to put an end 
to the long-standing debate about the effectiveness of income transfer initiatives has been 
the implementation of programmes with attached conditionalities. It is believed that the 
presence of conditions guarantees in some way the correct decision-making of the 
beneficiaries and avoids the possibility of generating dependency among those in poverty 
(Fiszbein et al., 2009). However, far from reaching a consensus, this has led to another –
even more intense– discussion about the necessity and relevance of the element of 
conditionality in social assistance practices.  
There is a widespread perception that CCTs are “a magic bullet in development” 
and a more effective way of compelling poor households to invest in human capital 
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compared to unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) (The Economist, 2005; Adato & 
Hoddinott, 2007). The basic premise for the inclusion of education and health-related 
conditionalities is that they are necessary to achieve programmes’ objectives in terms of 
human capital formation due to the assumed inability of the poor to invest in their children 
(Bastagli, 2008; Maluccio & Flores, 2004). Proponents of conditionality argue that pure 
income transfers or UCTs will make beneficiary households more able to access basic 
services; but the transfers attached to behavioural conditions will have significant 
additional effects (Barrientos, 2011). This is because parents’ decisions regarding the 
human capital of their children (e.g. school enrolment) are not socially or privately optimal 
(especially in the case of “marginal” children –like girls, young children, or those with 
lower ability) (Akresh et al., 2013).   
Another typical argument in favour of conditionality is that conditions may be 
included to facilitate political and public support for social assistance programmes in 
developing countries, acting as a legitimate response to the usual political constraints 
faced by policymakers (Barrientos, 2011). In other words, conditionality makes 
redistribution to the poor politically more palatable to the non-poor. Basically, conditions 
provide a signal to concerned taxpayers that transfers will be associated with 
improvements in the human capital (or labour supply) of beneficiaries. Therefore, 
according to many scholars and politicians, conditions are essential to legitimate cash 
transfer programmes (Adato & Hoddinott, 2007). This premise receives support from 
some empirical evidence about the politics of conditions in Brazil and Mexico (Lindert & 
Vincensini, 2008; Levy, 2006).   
Although the arguments in favour of the inclusion of conditions are supported by 
a good amount of empirical evidence that demonstrates the positive results of CCT 
programmes (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005; Danvers, 2010); it is very difficult to verify that 
these outcomes are due specifically to the presence of conditions and that, if not for them, 
the results would be different. It could also be argued that conditionalities are redundant 
because the majority of those in poverty would have, for example, sent their children to 
school or healthcare centres even in the absence of conditions relating to education and 
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health. In fact, there is a significant amount of evidence showing that UCTs have also 
large positive impacts on human capital accumulation (De Carvalho, 2008).  
Thus, concerns about the effectiveness of conditionality are due to the fact that 
most of the existing impact evaluations do not show the counterfactual and independent 
effects of conditions (i.e. income effects vs conditionality effects).3 This is mainly because 
measuring the impact of the same cash transfer programme with and without conditions 
is extremely challenging in the absence of experimental data, given the evident ethical and 
technical difficulties involved in such an experiment (Barrientos, 2011). In addition, the 
costs associated with the implementation, verification and compliance of conditions are 
also an issue of strong concern, since these costs represent an additional burden on the 
usually limited national budgets to fight poverty and because many times the costs of 
compliance cannot be faced by households with limited resources (Myamba & Ulriksen, 
2016). Consequently, further research is necessary in order to definitely conclude whether 
conditions provide any significant additional effects, so that it is worth implementing them 
considering the high costs to be incurred (i.e. determine whether conditions are both 
effective and cost-effective).  
Drawing on a review of the literature, this chapter provides a conceptual and 
theoretical framework by addressing topics such as poverty, social protection, social 
insurance, social assistance and minimum labour standards in developing countries. First, 
the definition, characteristics and types of cash transfer programmes are presented. Then, 
this chapter reviews the different theoretical perspectives on cash transfers as effective 
means to reduce poverty in developing countries. Finally, the current social policy debates 
on the effectiveness of cash transfers initiatives and the actual need to include an element 
of conditionality are discussed in depth. These themes together constitute the theoretical 
basis for the further development of this thesis. 
                                                             
3
 Two important exceptions are Todd & Wolpin (2003) and Bourguignon, Ferreira & Leite (2003) who used 
data on the Mexican Progresa and the Brazilian Bolsa Escola programs to simulate the impact of 
conditional and unconditional cash transfers.  
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1.2 Social Protection: Concept and Practice 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has developed a 
description of social protection as referring to “policies and actions which enhance the 
capacity of poor and vulnerable people to escape from poverty and better manage risks 
and shocks” (OECD, 2009, page 2). Social protection has also been associated in the work 
of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) with all private and public initiatives that 
“provide income or consumption transfers to those in poverty, protect the vulnerable 
against livelihood risks, and improve the social status and rights of the marginalized” 
(Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004, page 9). In general, basic social protection refers to 
a variety of public institutions, benefits and programmes that protect individuals and their 
households from contingencies threatening well-being standards, independent of whether 
they have made an initial payment or belong to a specific community within the country 
(Barrientos, 2010). 
Social protection policies encompass different types of measures that could be 
grouped into three main categories: social insurance, social assistance and minimum 
labour standards.4 Social insurance consists of programmes that help individuals to 
smooth variations in consumption and income over time by contributing to a pool or fund, 
which is then used to pay benefits in the event of life-course or work-related contingencies 
such as old age, maternity, injury/illness, natural disasters, death (funeral insurance), or 
unemployment (Norton et al., 2001; Barrientos, 2010). Like all forms of insurance, it is a 
mechanism for pooling social and financial risks among individuals. Social insurance has 
represented one of the most important instruments through which social protection 
systems operate; however, it plays a more significant role for people in developed 
countries since poor households in less-developed nations, with limited and variable 
incomes, cannot always afford to make regular insurance payments (DFID, 2011). 
Although existing social insurance systems in developed countries have achieved 
                                                             
4
 Social protection might also include the provision of basic social services, such as health care and 
education. 
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reasonably high population coverage, this has not been the case in developing countries 
commonly characterized by informal economies and high rates of formal unemployment.  
Labour and employment standards involve regulations and laws to ensure a decent 
working environment by setting and enforcing norms for minimum acceptable conditions 
at work, as well as imposing extended rights to organization and voice of employees (ILO, 
2009; DFID, 2011). They range from fundamental rights (i.e. freedom from forced labour 
and child labour) to more specific rights, such as health and safety, maternity leave and 
minimum wages. These kinds of institutions have been fully established in developed 
countries after centuries of efforts and struggles. On the other hand, the development of 
adequate minimum labour standards in developing countries has been uneven because of 
different economic and political issues and controversies, such as affordability of 
providing a minimum wage and capability of ensuring its enforcement in vast informal 
sectors (Singh & Zammit, 2004). 
The last, but not least, category of social protection is social assistance, which is 
generally described as support for those in poverty and extreme poverty. This support 
comes in the form of direct, regular and predictable social transfers to eligible individuals 
and households. Social assistance has a strong focus on poverty reduction, and it is the 
component of social protection where change, innovation and expansion have been more 
visible at least during the last 20 years in developing countries (Barrientos, 2010). A key 
feature of social assistance programmes is that they are usually fully financed with taxes, 
which means that -unlike social insurance- they are non-contributory (i.e. not financed 
from contributions by workers). 
 
1.3 Social Assistance in Developing Countries 
Barrientos (2010) argues in Social Protection and Poverty that social assistance plays a 
more important role within social protection strategies in developing countries, compared 
to its secondary role in developed nations. Social assistance in the developed world is 
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mostly set up as a safety net aimed to ensure minimum consumption levels to a small 
portion of individuals, but only when all the other (already well-developed) components 
of social protection (namely, social insurance and labour market regulations) have failed 
(Gough et al., 1997). The circumstances are completely different in low- and middle-
income nations, where typically social insurance is insufficient, labour market regulations 
are weak, and access to basic services is highly stratified. Different factors (such as the 
extensive informality in the labour market) have complicated the development of social 
insurance as a poverty prevention measure in the Global South. Therefore, social 
assistance is called to become the main component of social protection and the key 
instrument to fight poverty and vulnerability in these countries. 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, significant changes in priority 
given to different components of social protection in developing countries can be seen. 
These changes range from simple reforms of social insurance systems to the rapid 
introduction/expansion of innovative social assistance programmes (Barrientos, 2013). 
Most countries in the less developed regions of the world have introduced large-scale 
programmes of direct income transfers with the intention of reducing poverty and 
vulnerability. The rapid expansion of innovative social welfare programmes that 
incorporated income transfers to households and individuals, along with the significant 
reduction in global poverty over the last decade, has called special attention to what can 
be achieved by transferring resources directly to those in poverty.5  
Generally speaking, direct income transfers may take the form of cash transfers, 
in-kind transfers (e.g. vouchers, food for work, school meals, etc.), or free access to goods 
and services (e.g. exemptions from education or health user fees). These transfers are 
targeted to a specific group of people based on their poverty situation measured through 
the income approach, multidimensional poverty indices or some other criteria. Receipt 
                                                             
5
 Global poverty and extreme poverty have declined significantly over the last few decades. According to 
recent poverty assessments completed at the World Bank, the number of people living under the extreme 
poverty line of $1.25 per day has halved since 1990, reaching around 1 billion people in 2011 (World Bank, 
2014).   
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may be unconditional (i.e. pure income transfers) or conditional on certain behaviours 
(such as school or clinic attendance) or school/labour performance (for instance, based on 
school test scores). This research project focuses exclusively on cash transfer programmes 
(both conditional and unconditional), one of the most studied forms of development 
intervention, which, it is argued, have the potential to strengthen household productivity 
and their capacity for income generation (Arnold et al., 2011).   
In the last decade, a new generation of integrated social assistance programmes in 
low- and middle-income countries –such as Uganda’s Youth Opportunities, Chile’s 
Ingreso Ético (Ethical Family Income) and Ecuador’s Crédito de Desarrollo Humano– 
have adopted an alternative approach to facilitate the sustained escape from poverty 
through the productive inclusion of the poor, which is defined as a household’s permanent 
engagement with the economy. On the basis that this engagement allows for a steady 
return that permits households to escape poverty in a sustainable way. According to 
Mariotti, Ulrichs and Harman (2016), these programmes represent a substantial change in 
social protection practices and they are based on the acknowledgement that merely 
investing in human capital –through traditional education and health-related conditions 
attached to cash transfers– may not help poor households to sustainably overcome 
poverty.  
Nevertheless, the authors note that achieving productive inclusion requires first an 
“enabling economic environment” that offers sufficient and reachable opportunities for 
those in poverty, and this is sought through the combination of different public-sector 
policies or interventions. Overall, the results obtained by these new types of social 
assistance programmes have been positive, opening new paths in the fight against poverty 
and vulnerability in the developing world (Mariotti et al., 2016). The question then arises: 
what are the main design characteristics of these programmes that seek to help poor people 
through facilitating their productive inclusion?   
The first and most basic feature of these programmes is that they provide cash (or 
asset) transfers, which can be regular or lump-sum (i.e. accumulated). Regular (smaller) 
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cash transfers are received over a longer period of time, while lump-sum (bigger) transfers 
are one-off payments that allow beneficiaries to use the money in something more 
productive in the long term than simply satisfying their immediate consumption needs. 
The periodic and cumulative delivery of cash transfers, in some cases specifically 
designed for investment in productive activities, is a way of turning them definitively into 
(non-reimbursable) productive micro-credits and, thus, give those in poverty access to 
financial products/services that have long been denied by the restrictive policies of private 
banks in the developing world. 
However, productive inclusion is not achieved simply by facilitating the access of 
the poor to financial products. In other words, it may not be just about giving money to 
the people living in poverty. The poor have other important unmet basic needs (or 
deprivations) apart from access to credit, such as access to healthcare, education and 
technology. They are not on ‘equal terms’ with the rest of the population (mainly due to 
ignorance, ill health, lack of social services and shortage of financial resources) and, 
therefore, those in poverty do not have the same opportunities to develop their potential 
capabilities to the full extent (Sen, 2001). According to Sen's capability approach, poverty 
is merely understood as the deprivation or shortfall of basic capabilities. It seems at least 
difficult to change this common structural reality with just a simple cash transfer, no 
matter how big it is. 
Therefore, a true productive and social inclusion requires to cover the unmet needs 
of the poor and offer opportunities with complementary practices that provide them with 
the necessary tools so that they can be self-sufficient, making the most of their capacities 
and resources (Sen, 2001; Mariotti et al., 2016). Recent innovations in social assistance 
may combine the cash transfers with parallel and customized policies aimed at improving 
household productivity and entrepreneurship, such as asset and skills transfers, 
connections to income-generating activities and financial services. For instance, the Youth 
Opportunities programme in Uganda combines a one-off enterprise grant with vocational 
training. The most appropriate combination of interventions depends of course on the 
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context: the local economy, the target population, the labour market and institutional 
capacity. 
 It seems that it has finally been understood that in order to effectively reach and 
help the poorest and most vulnerable social groups, a personalized approach is required. 
For example, poor individuals with labour constraints (i.e. the elderly or disabled) will 
need a specific type of assistance for a longer (or even permanent) period of time, while 
the unemployed poor may simply need access to financial products and services or a ‘leg 
up’ to boost their participation in productive and better paid economic activities. In 
addition, for the first time, special emphasis is given to gender inequality issues through 
the design and implementation of gender-sensitive programmes that address the long-
standing barriers women face in sexist societies when trying to get involved in productive 
activities and labour markets (Mariotti et al., 2016).  
By linking income transfers in cash (or in-kind) with interventions that seek to 
break down the structural barriers that socially excluded people commonly face (instead 
of with conditionalities focused on improving their human capital), social assistance can 
be a powerful driver of sustained poverty escapes. Therefore, this new generation of 
integrated programmes is located within broader development strategies and stronger 
social protection systems, where typical social assistance practices are always linked to 
and complemented by the provision of strategic services (e.g. education, health, technical 
assistance, financial services). These social services must, of course, be specifically 
designed to meet the needs of those in poverty so that they can be more productive and 
reduce the risks inherent in their means of subsistence. 
Even the main advocates of traditional CCT programmes, which have always 
placed greater emphasis on the role of conditionalities, have at some point recognized the 
importance of complementing cash transfers with public sector policies or practices. They 
have acknowledged that just giving money to the people living in poverty (even with 
conditions attached) is not the solution to all their problems (World Bank, 2009). Fiszbein, 
Schady and Ferreira (2009) note that while cash transfers are an effective way to 
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redistribute income among the poor, even the best designed and managed programme may 
not meet all the needs of an integrated system of social protection. For instance, the fact 
that children attend school more (due to conditionalities) does not necessarily imply that 
they learn more. In order to improve learning, CCTs should preferably be 
accompanied/complemented by better quality education and health services that provide 
children with a real advantage, be it through better nutrition or school programmes 
(Fiszbein et al., 2009). The problem has been that due to the very structure of CCT 
programmes, any complementary service is seen as an additional intervention that requires 
additional efforts (political and economic), so these practices have not been frequently 
carried out in developing countries. 
Finally, a frequent (but not always present) feature of the new generation of 
integrated social assistance programmes is trust in the poor. The government’s confidence 
in the capacities of its citizens is expressed through cash (or asset) transfers without 
attached conditionalities, which provide those in poverty with the possibility of doing with 
the transfer what they consider most appropriate for them.6 The delivery of unconditional 
transfers is aligned with the rationalist perspective  (based on rational choice theory) and 
combines in some way what could be considered an altruistic practice with the doctrine 
of economic liberalism. The idea behind this approach is that the best way to end poverty 
is simply by giving money to the poor since they can make their own decisions much 
better than a group of bureaucrats (Anderssen, 2010). On the other hand, this goes against 
the paternalistic perspective, according to which it must be controlled what is done with 
taxpayers' money and the government should at least try to influence poor households so 
that they adopt certain behaviours commonly related to better lifestyles.7 
                                                             
6
 Note that the opposite is not always true: the absence of conditionality does not necessarily imply 
confidence on the part of the government, it could simply be lack of budget. 
7
 The rationalist and paternalistic perspectives on cash transfers will be analysed in depth later in this 
chapter. 
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In recent times, research on trust has become an area of great interest and 
importance in business management, behavioural economics and the social sciences in 
general. Nevertheless, providing a universal definition of trust remains a very complicated 
task, which is why much of the academic literature on trust focuses on definitional issues 
and philosophical debates. In any case, academics seem to agree on certain fundamental 
issues related to trust: it is not simply a behaviour (e.g. collaboration) or a choice (e.g. 
taking a risk) that involves perceived probabilities, or a set of positive expectations and 
beliefs (Bhattarcharya et al. 1998). Rather, trust is “the willingness to be vulnerable under 
conditions of risk and interdependence” (Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006, p. 307); it is an 
underlying psychological condition or state of mind “comprising the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another” 
(Rousseau et al., 1998, 395). Trust implies an affective attitude (Jones, 1996), an emotion, 
even a passion (Flores & Solomon, 1997). 
Bachmann and Zaheer (2006) claim in The Handbook of Trust Research that trust 
permeates all levels of society. Indeed, individuals can trust one another. They may also 
trust an institution, as when parents trust a school to provide competent education to their 
children. And individuals can trust society, as when people trust society to assist them 
when a natural disaster strikes. Similarly, institutions may trust individuals, other 
institutions, and society in general. Finally, society may trust citizens, public and private 
institutions, and even other societies. However, building a relationship of trust is not easy 
to achieve, since it depends on several factors, actors and circumstances. Bachmann and 
Zaheer (2006) list the conditions they consider necessary to establish a trusting 
relationship:  
ü Interdependence: at least one of the parties in a trust relationship must depend 
on the other party for the achievement of an objective.  
ü Vulnerability: at least one of the parties in a trust relationship is vulnerable to 
the opportunistic behaviour of the other party.  
ü Risk: as a result of this vulnerability, the interests of at least one of the parties 
in the relationship are at risk.  
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Note, therefore, that there is an ethical component in any trust relationship, which 
arises from the vulnerability condition of the trusting party in the relationship to the 
goodwill of the other party. A trustworthy party in a relationship is one that will not 
unfairly exploit the other party’s vulnerabilities. According to the authors, “ethics enters 
the picture when we need to decide what accounts as an unjust or unfair exploitation of 
the vulnerability of one of the parties in the trust relationship” (Bachmann & Zaheer, 
2006).   
Hence, the arbitrary choice to eliminate certain rules (or conditions) resulting from 
a rational calculation or based on experience, does not necessarily imply the subsequent 
generation of trust. In terms of social protection, for example, it could be the case that an 
unconditional programme is implemented, not because of the conviction and willingness 
of the policy-makers, but because of the lack of resources to control and monitor 
compliance with the conditions. When this occurs, it is easy for programme beneficiaries 
to perceive the absence of trust in the decision and act accordingly (as could be also 
explained by game theory models). On the contrary, when the decision to remove 
conditionalities is clearly voluntary and based on positive expectations, it is probably 
much easier to build a trusting relationship between programme implementers and 
beneficiaries.  
By trusting the poor and their capabilities what is sought is to accept conditions of 
vulnerability and interdependence to make them aware that, ultimately, they are the only 
ones capable of changing their situation of poverty and vulnerability; and also signal them 
that, even when there are positive expectations about their intentions, they are the only 
ones responsible for decision-making that affects their quality of life. In other words, what 
is sought is to treat those in poverty as capable and responsible adults.  
Evidently, the new generation of integrated social assistance initiatives have not 
yet reached their full potential as mechanisms to sustainably escape from poverty. Along 
the way, they have encountered different constraints, such as tight budgets, the scarce 
availability of resources (economic and human), the lack of political will and, quite often, 
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the lack of support from taxpayers who do not welcome alternative (and unconditional) 
cash transfer initiatives. Therefore, social assistance programmes of this kind must 
continue to improve and, for this to happen, it is important to evaluate their results on 
poverty reduction. Empirical evidence is necessary, for example, to be able to justify the 
argument that the option of productive inclusion is more effective than traditional 
conditions. Only through scientific research, is it possible to design more and better 
integrated social assistance programmes that can meet the different needs of the poor and, 
subsequently, help more people to escape from poverty in a sustainable and profitable 
way.  
 
1.4 Cash Transfer Programmes: Definition, 
Characteristics and Arguments in Favour and Against 
As mentioned above, cash transfers are a specific form of social assistance consisting of 
direct, regular and reliable non-contributory payments with the aim of reducing poverty 
and vulnerability (Arnold et al., 2011). Cash transfer programmes could be unconditional 
(i.e. without conditions or strings attached) or conditional on a certain action, performance 
or behaviour (such as regularly accessing maternal and child health care services and/or 
sending children to school) (Doetinchem et al., 2008; Arnold et al., 2011). The 
beneficiaries of these programmes are typically the poorest households in a country and 
also those sectors of the population considered vulnerable, such as older people, disabled 
and orphans (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011).  
The fundamental assumptions behind these popular practices are that those in 
poverty can be empowered and entrusted to make effective/productive use of the monetary 
resources available and that, despite the multidimensional condition of poverty, low and 
variable income is a key element of this problem (Lister, 2004; Arnold et al., 2011). The 
money inflows are intended to raise and smooth households’ incomes (and consumption) 
in the short-term and to facilitate human capital accumulation in the medium- and long-
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term (Bourguignon et al., 2003). Through investments in health, education and nutrition, 
it is thought that poor households can break the intergenerational transmission of poverty. 
There are some arguments both for and against giving money directly to the poor. 
Cash transfer programmes are generally criticized on the basis that people make irrational 
or uninformed decisions, and therefore they should not be entrusted with public resources 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2012). In other words, according to this claim, the poor should not 
be trusted with cash transfers because they normally make incorrect life decisions. 
Moreover, some argue that the implementation and development of these programmes is 
expensive and not sustainable in the long term (McCord, 2009). Finally, once money 
becomes a determining factor in a relationship, this could negatively change its power 
dynamics. The relationship between the beneficiaries and the state could be affected if 
individuals become, to some extent, dependent on the economic aid that they receive from 
the government (Blank, 2003).  
On the other hand, there are also strong arguments in favour of the implementation 
of cash transfer initiatives. It is claimed that this form of social assistance allows 
households to build human capital and accumulate assets over time, without the need to 
take on debt (Barrientos, 2010). The formation of human capabilities is considered a key 
factor for sustainable development and progress in every society (OECD, 2001). 
Substantial evidence suggests that higher levels of education, training and other forms of 
human capital have positive and significant effects on individuals’ earnings and, therefore, 
they can be seen as reasonable ways to escape poverty (Barro, Caselli, & Lee, 2013). In 
addition, cash transfers may also help to overcome cost barriers (e.g. transportation costs) 
that restrict access to essential public services. Thus, these programmes might weaken 
social exclusion, allowing more participation of those in poverty in their communities and 
societies (Arnold et al., 2011). In general, these arguments can be summarized in the 
various ways in which money inflows can help the poor (i.e. protecting household 
consumption, strengthening productive capacity and promoting asset accumulation). 
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Most of the impact evaluations carried out have been in favour of the efficacy of 
cash transfer programmes (Fiszbein et al., 2009; Arnold et al., 2011; Robertson et al., 
2013). The empirical evidence suggests that cash transfers are successful facilitators of 
investments in human capital (Adato & Hoddinott, 2011). As a result, and despite the 
theoretical debate about their real effectiveness, these programmes have been extensively 
adopted in the last two decades as innovative forms of social assistance for those in 
poverty – especially the type of programmes that provide money to households contingent 
on certain behaviours (i.e. CCTs). In fact, as of 1997, most Latin American countries have 
implemented and evaluated different CCT programmes with health and education 
components. Subsequently, and in the light of the outcomes obtained, many developing 
countries in other regions of the world also introduced cash transfer programmes with 
similar characteristics (Cecchini & Madariaga, 2011; Khan et al., 2016). 
Traditional CCT programmes (i.e. those with human development conditions) 
have been considered for years, by policymakers and important non-governmental 
organizations (like the World Bank), as the most effective social assistance instruments to 
fight poverty by better tackling the underinvestment in human capital (Fiszbein et al., 
2009; World Bank, 2009). The stated reason for such consideration –apart from their novel 
and attractive design– is the common belief/theory that poor households lack full 
information on the benefits of healthcare and education (Arnold et al., 2011). Therefore, 
it is thought that the use of conditions is necessary to commit them to send their children 
to school and/or bring them to health centres for regular check-ups, prenatal care and to 
receive infant nutritional supplementation (for example, minimum school attendance rates 
of 85 percent are required in Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and a similar restriction applies in 
Mexico’s Oportunidades).  
Note that CCTs represent an attempt to steer a middle way between arguments in 
favour and against the implementation of cash transfer programmes in developing 
countries. Interestingly, the inclusion of the element of conditionality allowed reaching a 
kind of consensus on the heated debates pro- and contra- giving money to those in poverty. 
The notion behind CCTs is that even if the basic assumption behind giving money to the 
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poor (i.e. that people make effective use of available monetary resources) is not satisfied, 
cash transfer programmes are still attractive if they are attached to a certain bundle of 
conditions that encourage individuals to pursue “desirable” actions (Cecchini & 
Madariaga, 2011). 
 
1.5 Different Theoretical Perspectives on Cash 
Transfers 
 
1.5.1 Rational Choice Theory 
The idea of using monetary transfers to smooth consumption, increase demand for public 
services, and ultimately to encourage investment in human capital, has its roots in a well-
known premise of traditional economic theory: the notion that individuals always make 
logical and prudent choices that provide them with the greatest benefit or satisfaction and 
that are in their highest self-interest (Bassett, 2008). In other words, the economic 
principle of rational choice is clearly the core theory underpinning the most basic type of 
cash transfer programmes with no strings attached (i.e. UCTs) (Arnold et al., 2011).   
Rational choice theory –also known as rational action theory or just choice theory– 
is the most common theoretical framework for understanding and formally modelling 
economic and social behaviour (Blume & Easley, 2008). It is generally used to describe 
the way individuals think in conventional economic theory and in most microeconomic 
models, where it is interpreted as “wanting more rather than less of a good”. It is 
noteworthy that the notion of rationality described by choice theory is different from both 
the conventional and the more philosophical usages of the word. While in colloquial 
language rationality means "sane" or "in a lucid and reflective manner”, choice theory 
uses a more precise and narrow definition of rationality to mean that agents maximize 
their utility (i.e. happiness) taking into consideration all costs and benefits associated with 
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each decision they take (Friedman, 1953). In choice theory, to be rational means to be 
capable of assessing one’s own best interests, even when others do not agree with those 
assessments.  
If this rationality assumption holds, one may expect that all the money received 
through transfers will be employed in the most effective manner (i.e. the one that 
maximizes a household’s utility function) because individuals’ decisions are made on the 
basis that perceived benefits outweigh perceived costs. Additionally, when poor families 
receive monetary incentives, their cost-benefit considerations regarding important 
decisions are going to change, which, in turn, will affect their decision-making calculus. 
For instance, a cash transfer might reduce the opportunity cost of enrolling children in 
school (namely, the money they earn if they go to work instead), making the benefits of 
this decision compensate the costs (Bassett, 2008). Therefore, the arguments in favour of 
cash transfers as an effective social assistance policy are clearly supported on the basis of 
this theoretical perspective. In other words, rational choice theory clearly supports the 
implementation of the transfer programmes, and more specifically the unconditional ones 
since only the ‘freedom of choice’ guarantees that the monetary and human resources will 
be used in the most efficient way for the beneficiary.  
Hanlon, Barrientos, and Hulme (2010) rely on the idea of rationality to argue in 
their book Just Give Money to the Poor that the biggest problem faced by people living in 
poverty is a basic lack of cash and not the lack of motivation or knowledge. Thus, simply 
transferring money to them –no conditions attached– may be the most favourable 
approach not just for reducing poverty, but for promoting long-term economic growth and 
human development. The authors are fully convinced that poor people should be trusted 
in their knowledge and ability to make decisions that promote their own well-being, and 
also that the government or the external donors will continue making incorrect/inefficient 
decisions on behalf of the poor. 
This trust-based perspective on cash transfers can be explained using concepts, 
principles and theories from different social sciences, including of course rational choice 
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theory. In economics and sociology, for example, trust can be seen as an "economic and 
social lubricant" that reduces the costs of transactions and enables new forms of 
cooperation among individuals as well as societies (Morgan & Hunt, 1994). Moreover, 
from the perspective of game theory, trust can provide an explanation for moving from 
the Nash equilibrium to the socially optimum equilibrium. As a result, trust has been 
considered by many social scientists as an important form of social capital and its process 
of creation and distribution is a recurrent theme of research.  
There is some empirical evidence in developing countries that supports the idea of 
trusting on the decision-making ability (or rationality) of the poor by showing that UCTs 
do not increase purchases of so-called "temptation goods" (such as alcohol, narcotics, and 
cigarettes), but rather this money is mainly spent on productive investment, education, 
and food. Popova and Evans (2014) conducted a comprehensive review of 19 quantitative 
studies on the impact of different types of cash transfers on consumption levels of 
temptation goods. Almost none of these studies concluded that expenditures on this type 
of goods increased with the implementation of social assistance programmes. On the 
contrary, the evidence points out clearly that there are significant negative effects in most 
of the cases (i.e. expenditures on temptation goods actually declined). Remarkably, no 
significant differences in the effects were found between programmes with attached 
conditions and programmes without them.   
Another recent major review of the experience of cash transfers in low- and 
middle-income countries was performed by Blattman and Niehaus (2014). They took into 
account various studies on the economic behaviour of people receiving money through 
cash transfer programmes in countries as diverse as Uganda, Ghana and Sri Lanka. These 
studies consistently indicate that beneficiaries normally make good decisions about the 
use of transfers. More specifically, the evidence shows that in most cases the money that 
poor people receive is not used to buy luxury or temptation goods, but rather invested in 
productive activities and used to cover basic household needs, such as food, clothing, and 
healthcare.  
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 27 
Moreover, Devereux (2009) conducted two different controlled experiments in 
Malawi and Namibia and he found that unconditional basic-income grants positively 
affected children's school attendance and nutrition practices. Similarly, Ozler, Mcintosh 
and Baird (2010) found no difference between the effects of conditional and unconditional 
cash transfers on school attendance of girls in Malawi. This important study was one of 
the first to challenge the rationale for CCTs by suggesting that conditions are not the 
determining factor. 
 But perhaps one of the most striking studies that have been done in recent years 
on this subject is the one conducted by Haushofer and Shapiro (2013). Using a randomized 
controlled trial, they analyse the response of poor rural households in rural Kenya to large 
temporary income changes caused by unconditional cash transfers of at least 404 US 
dollars. They find that households receiving transfers experienced an increase of 58 
percent in durables, and a reduction of 30 percent in the likelihood of having gone to bed 
hungry. Additionally, they do not find evidence of increased expenditure on temptation 
goods. Together, these results suggest that cash transfer programmes without conditions 
have significant impacts on consumption, food security, investment and psychological 
well-being of the poor in developing countries.  
However, despite these efforts, there are still not sufficient research studies 
evaluating the effectiveness of UCTs, especially in middle-income Latin American 
countries with well-developed public services, perhaps because in most of these countries 
the CCT programmes have been the most widely accepted and popularized initiatives. 
Therefore, most scientific efforts aimed at assessing social assistance practices have 
focused on this other type of programme. Besides, there is also some evidence suggesting 
that UCT initiatives have had only a limited success (Fiszbein et al., 2009; Arnold et al., 
2011). This has led academics and policymakers to doubt the potential of unconditional 
transfers to achieve the long-awaited eradication of poverty. 
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1.5.2 Welfare Trap Theory 
The notion that people behave in a rational and self-interested manner can be, however, 
interpreted in a completely opposite way. In fact, the notion of rationality is also frequently 
used to support the idea that poverty is caused by the very efforts to alleviate it. This 
perspective, which is evidently against all forms of social assistance including cash 
transfers, was developed by George Gilder (1981) and it is usually referred to as welfare 
dependency or welfare trap theory. The premise of this neoclassical theory of economics 
is that welfare programmes cause poverty because, once they are implemented, a 
guaranteed income is created that can incentivise the poor to make the ‘rational’ decision 
to avoid work; while, at the same time, an equivalent tax is imposed on workers that can 
also create a disincentive to continue working (Blank, 2003; Jung & Smith, 2007). 
In consequence, also using rational choice, it can be argued that most of the time 
those in poverty would prefer more welfare (and leisure) and less work (Fiszbein et al., 
2009). Proponents of this hypothesis argue that recipients of cash transfers develop a 
"culture of dependency", which means that government’s social assistance programmes 
supposedly undermine values, beliefs and attitudes (like the desire to find a job and escape 
poverty), since welfare recipients get used to the state providing for them. The main 
arguments against the implementation of cash transfer programmes are clearly based on 
this theoretical perspective, which has become a recurring theme of analysis and 
evaluation in a significant number of published papers on poverty and the welfare state. 
One of the most classic and frequently cited articles is Kasarda and Ting's (1996) 
study of skills mismatch and spatial mismatch in post-war American cities. The authors 
argue that the poor are smart (or rational) people who are capable to seek public assistance 
and realize that a combination of social benefits will produce a higher salary than the one 
offered by the typical low-paid work positions. People living in poverty have access only 
to these jobs due to a combination of two phenomena: 1) lower-income residential districts 
are producing a surplus of high-skilled jobs that most urban welfare recipients cannot 
obtain because they do not have the appropriate skills; 2) low-skilled jobs have moved out 
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to the sub-urban locations, where recipients cannot afford to live. Therefore, reductions in 
structural poverty and welfare dependence would rely on significant changes in policies 
related not only to economic development and social assistance, but also to housing (e.g. 
decentralize affordable housing) and transportation (e.g. improve transit options). 
It is noteworthy that, while there is some agreement about the nature of welfare 
dependency, there are still many doubts about the scope of the detrimental effects of 
welfare programmes on the willingness to work (i.e. the size of the disincentive) (Jung & 
Smith, 2007). Actually, there is no conclusive evidence of the causal link between social 
benefits and labour supply. A survey by Danziger, Haveman and Plotnick (1981) looks at 
the case of the former Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programme in 
the United States that provided financial assistance to children whose families had low or 
no income. They estimated that the AFDC programme created an incentive to avoid work 
in at least 10 per cent of the welfare recipients. On the other hand, Moffitt (1992) 
conducted a complete review of all the literature related to the AFDC welfare programme 
from 1965-1985 and he found no strong evidence that benefits have a detrimental effect 
on labour force participation. Although most studies showed consistent evidence of 
negative correlation between welfare benefits and labour supply, the author argues that 
the results cannot be interpreted as causal. 
Surprisingly, there is not much empirical evidence about the disincentive effects 
of welfare programmes on adult labour supply in developing countries. Most studies about 
the impact of cash transfers on adult work decisions have focused on high-income 
countries like the US, UK and Canada. However, an important exception is Bourguignon, 
Ferreira and Leite (2003), which uses ex-ante micro-simulation to analyse the income 
effect of the Bolsa Escola programme on adult labour supply in Brazil. Even though they 
find negative effects on labour supply, these are statistically and economically 
insignificant. 
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1.5.3 Paternalistic Theory 
The two different perspectives about cash transfers discussed above, although contrary, 
are mainly based on the same economic principle (i.e., rational choice). There is another 
point of view opposed to the idea that poor people are capable of making rational 
decisions, which is supported by the notion of paternalism and the wider framework of 
behavioural economics. 
Paternalism is defined as the unconsented interference of a state with a person or 
group of persons, motivated or under the argument that the interfered-with person(s) will 
be in a better position and protected from harm (Dworkin, 2014). In the context of social 
assistance, the premise of the paternalistic theory is that those in poverty are anything but 
rational when it comes to important choices about their lives. This could be due to an 
innate condition of human beings or because the poor do not have complete information 
on the long-term benefits of certain decisions (such as investment in education and health) 
(Arnold et al., 2011). In any case, according to the paternalistic view, poor households are 
unable to look out for themselves because they usually make decisions that negatively 
affect their own well-being, wealth or happiness. Therefore, people living in poverty 
cannot be trusted with money from tax-payers without authorities making some decisions 
for them, forcing them to comply with certain rules, and urging them to do the “right 
things”. In other words, this theory suggests that policy-makers need to build a kind of 
“choice architecture” to help ensure that the poor choose correctly (Hanlon et al., 2010). 
Note that this anti-neoclassical perspective takes into account some of the 
arguments for and against the delivery of cash transfers. On the one hand, it recognizes 
the importance of assisting those in poverty with public monetary resources and at least 
acknowledges in them some individual capacity to spend the money from transfers. On 
the other hand, this approach considers essential the role played by the government by 
guiding the budgetary expenditure of families and modifying their behaviour, so that they 
make optimal investment decisions in human capital and labour supply, while at the same 
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time reducing the possibility of generating dependency on these programmes. If so, what 
are the visible implications of the paternalistic perspective on social assistance policies? 
Every rule, policy or action in a society may be enacted for various reasons and, 
therefore, may have different justifications. However, when a policy is justified merely 
stating that the affected people would be better off due to such intervention, and 
individuals are imposed upon regardless of their will, we have an instance of paternalism 
(Dworkin, 2014). This is exactly the case of conditions attached to cash transfers, which 
constitute a clear example of a commonly adopted paternalistic measure in antipoverty 
programmes. Therefore, paternalistic theory does not preclude the application of cash 
transfers as a tool for poverty alleviation, provided that these programmes are 
accompanied by a set of specific requirements usually related to “desirable” behaviours 
among the poor. In other words, this theoretical approach supports the implementation of 
monetary transfers, but only if they are linked to the fulfilment of certain conditions.  
There has been a powerful trend in academic and policy-maker circles all over the 
world towards the acceptance of the paternalistic perspective with respect to welfare 
programmes. This tendency is clearly reflected in the widespread implementation of CCTs 
in many developing and developed nations (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005; Behrman et al., 
2010). They are currently present in over 30 developing countries, primarily in Latin 
America, but also in Africa and Asia. According to the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, eighteen out of twenty Latin American countries have at least 
one CCT programme currently operating, and they cover as many as 25 million families 
(about 129 million beneficiaries), which represents the 20 percent of the total population 
in the region (CEPAL, 2010).   
An important reference of the paternalistic perspective is Fiszbein et al. (2009), 
who argue in their book Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future 
Poverty that those in poverty maintain incorrect ideas about the profitability of investing 
in the human capital of their children; and also, they emphasize the positive outcomes of 
CCT programmes in developing countries. This famous book –called by IRIN (2010) as 
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the World Bank’s Bible on CCTs– provides a detailed summary of existing programmes 
and the most important impact evaluations, as well as a thorough economic justification 
for investing in programmes with attached conditions over other social investments on the 
supply side. Thus, although the authors acknowledge that there is limited evidence on the 
feature of CCTs that matters most (either cash transfers or conditions), they are fully 
convinced that conditionality is a key policy mechanism to help the poor make better 
decisions and that conditions play a very important role in the design of more efficient 
programmes. 
A growing number of recent studies have assessed the effectiveness of most of the 
CCT programmes in Latin America through rigorous impact evaluations. They 
consistently find significant positive effects of CCTs on income poverty reduction, health 
and education (measured through school enrolment and educational attainment) 
(Rawlings & Rubio, 2005; Danvers, 2010). Moreover, they also show that increases in the 
level of instruction of children are usually accompanied by decreasing child labour supply. 
In Ecuador, for example, school enrolment of children whose families are around the first 
quintile of the country’s poverty index increased by about 10 percentage points in 
response to the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) conditional programme (Schady & 
Araujo, 2006). Besides, paid and unpaid labour supply declined by around 15 percentage 
points among youths (Edmonds & Schady, 2012). Finally, benefits from CCT 
programmes have been reported in gender equality (Soares & Silva, 2010). Overall, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the adoption of paternalistic measures regarding social 
assistance has been successful and has had positive and promising results in many 
developing countries. 
 
1.5.4 Behavioural Intervention Approach  
As one can realize from the previously explained perspectives about social assistance 
programmes, monetary incentives might play an important role in modifying human 
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behaviour. Though, the scope and magnitude of the effects that incentives may have on 
behaviour depend on various economic, social, political, and psychological factors. This 
gives rise to a completely different approach to understand and ultimately justify the 
implementation of cash transfers, which is based on the emerging literature about 
incentives in behavioural interventions. 
The use of (monetary and nonmonetary) incentives to foster desired behaviours 
among individuals has been a topic of relatively recent analysis by different social 
sciences and, as a result, it has provoked an interesting debate about the effectiveness and 
ethics associated with these practices. The advocates of using incentives in behavioural 
interventions support their arguments in the so-called "law of behaviour", which states 
that higher incentives will lead to more effort and consequently higher performance. On 
the other hand, those opposed to such practices argue that using incentives in sensitive 
areas (like education, health, etc.) could be counterproductive, given that external 
incentives may displace internal (or personal) motivations that are essential to achieve 
individually and socially desirable behaviours (Gneezy, 2011). This phenomenon is 
known as the crowding-out effects of monetary incentives. 
The scientific interest on the mechanisms through which monetary incentives may 
increase or reduce effort and motivation to undertake a task (i.e. price effects versus 
crowding-out effects) has been present in the fields of psychology and economics since 
the early 1970s (Gneezy, 2011). Some important conclusions may be drawn from the 
empirical research on this topic. First, it seems to be that incentives contain information 
(or signals), which are transmitted indirectly from the principal to the agents, triggering 
unexpected effects on behaviour once the agents draw conclusions from the existence, 
sustainability and the size of the incentives (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997).8 Second, 
explicit incentives may break well-established social norms and cause large crowding-out 
effects (Titmuss, 1970). For example, monetary incentives do not necessarily increase 
                                                             
8
 Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) show that by offering unexpectedly large cash compensations to the 
members of a community for the presence of a nuclear plant, the principal signals to the agents that the 
risks are high, and in consequence people may be even less willing to accept the presence of the plant. 
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voluntary contributions to public goods (such as donating blood or protecting the 
environment); in fact, they may have the opposite effect. Finally, if the size of the 
incentive is large enough, the standard price effect will surpass the crowding-out effect (at 
least for some time), and therefore, the incentivized behaviour will be more attractive for 
the agent. However, if the incentives are too large, the opposite may happen because 
people can “choke under pressure” (Ariely et al., 2009). 
In the context of CCT programmes, which are basically monetary incentives 
designed to encourage human capital investment among those in poverty, a potential 
conflict arises between the direct extrinsic effect of the social benefits and the previously 
explained crowding-out effects. On the one hand, extrinsic incentives provide immediate 
returns that aim to compensate the usually high opportunity and transportation costs of 
sending children to school. Additionally, the money delivered to the parents may give 
children an extra motivation to study. On the other hand, monetary incentives may crowd 
out important intrinsic motivations to go to school and invest in children’s education. In 
other words, cash transfers may displace more important underlying reasons for pursuing 
education, such as improving skills, expanding the knowledge base, obtaining better 
career opportunities, successfully entering the labour market and personal satisfaction. 
Therefore, the effect of cash transfers will depend on the way agents perceive the 
incentives, the characteristics of the programme, and the size and frequency of the 
benefits. 
A number of recent studies have assessed the use of cash transfers in behavioural 
interventions using field experiments in schools. Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer (2006) 
look at two programmes in Colombia (Familias en Acción and PACES) that randomly 
assigned vouchers partially covering the costs of secondary school in exchange for school 
attendance and academic progress. The authors find that voucher-holders were about 10 
percent more likely to finish the school year obtaining slightly better scores on 
achievement tests. Moreover, Bettinger (2010) studies behavioural responses to monetary 
incentives in primary schools in Ohio (US), where a private foundation sponsored cash 
transfers of 100 US dollars for improvements in academic performance (measured through 
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test scores). Using a stratified randomization method, he finds that direct incentives for 
higher grades increased scores in concrete subjects, such as math; but did not improved 
academic performance in more conceptual subjects, like social sciences or reading.  
Overall, most of the existing empirical evidence about the effectiveness of 
monetary incentives in modifying human behaviour shows that: 1) cash transfers have 
positive effects on different education-related outcomes, like school attendance or 
academic performance; and 2) the size of the effects depends on the programme's design 
and how the extrinsic incentive interacts with intrinsic and social motivations (Gneezy, 
2011). Therefore, according to the behavioural intervention approach, conditional (or 
incentive-based) cash transfer programmes (when properly designed) have the potential 
to be effective in modifying the behaviour of people living in poverty. However, there are 
certain values considerations and ethical concerns about this type of practices that could 
undermine the effects. In addition to going against principles of freedom and equality, the 
use of conditions (or incentives) could be counterproductive if, for example, the individual 
loses sight of the fundamental reasons for educating their children or seeking work, such 
as the spirit of personal growth and the value of knowledge. 
In conclusion, the different theoretical perspectives about cash transfers reviewed 
in this section raise a number of interesting issues relating to our understanding of human 
behaviour, incentives, the role of the government, the importance of social assistance and 
poverty in general. The apparently simple concept of cash transfers overlies a great deal 
of complexity. The difficulty of addressing social assistance comes from multiple reasons, 
such as the multidimensional nature of poverty, the complexity of human behaviour and 
the ethical considerations that emerge from these practices. Therefore, social assistance 
policies should be studied from different perspectives and a multidisciplinary approach 
becomes a necessity for this purpose. Although the debate on whether poor households 
should be given cash transfers (with or without conditions) as a social safety net to 
alleviate poverty has been around for decades, existing theoretical frameworks and 
empirical evidence provide some important insights about when and why cash transfers 
are more likely to succeed in developing countries. 
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1.6 The Element of Conditionality 
As discussed in the previous section, the different perspectives on cash transfers also offer 
distinct approaches for the inclusion of an element of conditionality in social assistance 
programmes. However, as noted by Clasen and Clegg (2007), welfare programmes are 
always conditioned to a certain extent since they require some input from potential 
beneficiaries (e.g. citizenship, residency or registration documentation). For that reason, 
the authors develop a framework to analysing conditionality in social policy that 
distinguishes between three possible levels of adjustment that conditions have for the 
provision of social benefits: conditions of category, conditions of circumstance and 
conditions of conduct. In this thesis, the main focus is on the conditions related to the 
conduct of the beneficiary households, specifically the behavioural requirements that have 
to do with their human development (i.e. education and health). Therefore, the following 
sub-sections will refer to this third and final level of conditionality that has stood out in 
recent welfare state discourse (Clasen & Clegg, 2007). Some important aspects of work-
related conditions/eligibility criteria (i.e. second-level circumstance conditions) are 
briefly reviewed in the last sub-section. 
 
1.6.1 The “Default Position” for Cash Transfers: Well-
Functioning Markets 
Even the strongest advocates of conditionality recognize that if transfer beneficiaries are 
well-informed and rational actors, markets are well-functioning, and governments are 
benevolent to their citizens, the “theoretical default position” for cash transfers should be 
in favour of payments with no strings attached (Fiszbein et al., 2009). In order to 
understand this assertion, it is necessary to comprehend each of the listed conditions under 
which UCTs are considered the ideal form of social assistance. The theoretical framework 
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behind agent’s rationality (i.e. choice theory) was already analysed in the previous section 
(see page 24). It is now the turn of the well-functioning markets condition. 
In neoclassical economics, a perfect market is one in which competition reaches 
its highest possible level and thus produces the best results for consumers and society. 
According to the theory of perfect markets, the set of collective decisions of individuals –
who behave like rational actors trying to maximize their own well-being– is the key 
element to create “the invisible hand” of the market. Figuratively speaking, this invisible 
hand distributes goods and services in the most efficient manner (Mas-Colell, 1995). The 
structure of a perfect market is known as pure or perfect competition. This type of 
competition is characterized by the fulfilment of some well-known theoretical conditions 
that include the following:  non-intervention by governments; perfect market information; 
no barriers to entry or exit; no participants with market power to set prices; profit 
maximization; equal access to factors of production; and no externalities (Mankiw, 2012).  
Evidently, markets in the real world are never perfect and the conditions for perfect 
competition are not possible to fulfil in practice. However, some basic structural 
characteristics can be approximated for real world markets to be considered at least “well-
functioning”, which is the closest thing to perfect markets: a large number of consumers 
and producers with the willingness and ability to buy/sell products at a certain price; all 
agents have equal access to relevant information with which to make a decision (i.e. 
perfect information); and the costs or benefits of an activity do not affect third parties (i.e. 
no externalities). 
Therefore, if individuals behave rationally, the government does not make 
decisions based on its own benefit, and the mentioned conditions for well-functioning 
markets are satisfied, the best way to assist those in poverty must be with unconditional 
cash transfers. The intuition behind this argument is that –under such circumstances– for 
any given amount of aid, an individual can achieve either the same or higher utility with 
an unconditional cash transfer than when the same transfer is given in-kind with a no-
resale condition or when the same budget is used to subsidize a specific good or service. 
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Note that a cash transfer that is conditional on the purchase of a good or the use of a service 
(e.g. education or healthcare) is equivalent to such a subsidy (Tresch, 2008; Fiszbein et 
al., 2009). 
 
The Revealed Preferences Model 
At this point it seems important to theoretically prove that –under certain strong 
conditions– unconditional programmes are the most efficient form of social assistance 
and, therefore, they should be the default position of cash transfers. This can be done by 
what economists refer to as a standard revealed preferences model. The underlying 
assumptions of the model are, of course, that individuals behave rationally and that 
markets meet the conditions to be well-functioning. Suppose there are many rich people 
(R), and one poor person (P). There are just two goods, food, F, and one other commodity 
that serves all other purposes, Z. P receives utility from his own consumption of the two 
goods: !" = !"(%",'"). (See Figure 1)  
Suppose the rich worry about P’s utility and they think that he has inadequate 
amounts of necessary goods and services, such as food, education, medical care, housing, 
etc. They conclude that his problem is merely that he lacks the income necessary to have 
an adequate standard of living. Since the rich care about P’s well-being, their utility 
function is	!* = !*(%*, '*, !"(%",'")). +,,	+-, and +. are three of P’s indifference curves 
for Z and F. His budget constraint without any assistance is represented by JK, and its 
slope equals the relative price of the two goods. The original equilibrium is at point A, 
where the indifference curve	+, is tangent to the budget line. Figure 1 illustrates this 
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A food subsidy (or an in-kind transfer of food) only rotates the budget line to JL. 
The new equilibrium is at point B, where the indifference curve	+- is tangent to the new 
budget constraint. The beneficiary of the subsidy consumes	('/, %/). He spends DE on 
food out of his own resources and receives a subsidy of EB from the government.  
Now, suppose that instead of the subsidy he receives an unconditional cash transfer 
of GH. The increased income shifts the budget constraint out parallel to JK. The new 
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clearly seen in the figure, he consumes more food with the subsidy than with the cash 
transfer, however, as expected, he is better off with the cash. According to the notion of 
revealed preferences, when he bought ('0, %0) with the monetary transfer, he could have 
bought	('/, %/), but when he bought ('/, %/) with the food subsidy, he could not have 
bought	('0,%0). Consequently, ('0, %0) is revealed as preferred to	('/, %/).  
The reason why this happens is that any kind of subsidy (or condition) constrains 
the poor, while the opposite occurs with the unconditional monetary transfers. Notice that 
in the explained model, P had to bias his purchases towards food when he received the 
subsidy, whereas with cash grants (without strings attached) he could buy whatever he 
prefers. It is thus this freedom of choice that allows beneficiaries to maximize their utility 
functions. The overall lesson learned from the revealed preference model is consistent 
with the argument that if individuals make rational decisions in a well-functioning 
competitive market, and the government really cares about the overall well-being of those 
in poverty, cash transfers should be unconditional.  
Therefore, it is in the rational choice theory –and in the theory of well-functioning 
markets– that a large part of the arguments against the presence of conditions are 
supported. Samson, Van Niekerk and Macquene (2006) argue that the conditioning of 
cash transfers (presuming that the poor will not make rational choices) generates 
unnecessary distortions in the market (undermining household autonomy) and limits the 
capacity of the beneficiaries to maximize their utility. In addition, according to Barrientos 
(2011) and Hanlon et al. (2010), conditions may not be necessary since, in their absence, 
those in poverty would spend the money on food or investing in the human capital of their 
children and, if some of the money remains, they would invest it in productive activities 
that improve their income-generating capacity. They believe that poverty is fundamentally 
based on the lack of money, but it is not a matter of stupidity. If these arguments are true, 
conditionalities may not always have the positive results expected by their advocates and 
could even have counterproductive effects. This reasoning, which calls into question the 
true effectiveness of conditions in anti-poverty programmes, constitutes precisely the 
main theoretical argument for not conditioning a cash transfer. 
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There are other compelling theoretical arguments against conditionality, which are 
related to the actual cost-effectiveness of this policy mechanism. First, it could be argued 
that the financial and opportunity costs of complying with human development conditions 
are typically high for people living in poverty (Barrientos, 2011). Thus, even if the 
presence of conditionality were effective in some degree or had some positive effects, the 
costs of compliance for the beneficiary households should also be considered to determine 
if conditions are worth being implemented. It could be the case that poor households find 
conditions too difficult/expensive to comply with (for example, the schools might be too 
far away from home or the transaction/transportation costs might be too high), and 
therefore they may choose to give up the benefits that they need. In other words, if 
beneficiaries behave rationally, conditions can exclude some poor people from 
participating in social assistance initiatives. 
Moreover, conditions might not work when public services are scarce or 
inefficiently provided. For instance, it may be that schools are low-quality (or hospitals 
are overcrowded), in which case conditionality represents a waste of resources for both 
the government and the beneficiaries. The government would be spending money from 
the anti-poverty budget in implementing and monitoring conditions that cannot be met, 
while beneficiaries would be wasting their time instead of healing, working or studying at 
home (Myamba & Ulriksen, 2016). Therefore, poor people may be making bad decisions 
due to conditionality because, as the rationalist perspective suggests, only ‘freedom of 
choice’ allows households to maximize their utility. 
 
1.6.2 Conditioning Cash Transfers: Why Is It Necessary? 
In spite of the arguments against conditionality, CCTs have been widely adopted as 
innovative forms of social assistance in developing countries (as discussed in page 26). 
However, there is no conclusive empirical evidence supporting the idea that the addition 
of conditions results in better programme performance. So, what justifications can be 
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given for conditioning a cash transfer? In the literature, there are at least three compelling 
theoretical arguments to believe that the inclusion of conditions is necessary in antipoverty 
programmes. 
The first and perhaps the most important argument is that, as explained by the 
paternalistic approach (see page 30), poor households (and human beings in general) do 
not always behave rationally and they lack full information on the long-term benefits of 
education and health (Fiszbein et al., 2009). Research in behavioural economics suggests, 
for example, that people’s everyday behaviour is not consistent with their own thoughts 
about the future (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). This supposedly irrational behaviour and 
the presence of imperfect information may cause poor households' investment in human 
capital to be too low, compared with the level of investment considered “optimal” for 
them (Maluccio & Flores, 2004; Fiszbein et al., 2009). 
If private decisions made by individuals in poverty situation are not adequate due 
to lack of capacity and information, then this supports the notion that policymakers and 
authorities must make decisions for them – because the government “knows better” what 
is good for the poor than those in poverty themselves. Therefore, it is argued that the 
presence of conditions is required to achieve the programme objectives and maximize the 
human development impact of cash transfers (Barrientos, 2011). In other words, the 
alleged inability of the poor justifies the presence of conditions as a policy mechanism to 
promote their “correct” decision-making and, at the same time, to prevent dependence on 
cash transfers (addressing the main concern of the welfare trap theory) through the 
introduction of a sense of ‘co-responsibility’ among those in poverty. Supposedly, 
conditioning the delivery of transfers prevents people from getting used to the state 
providing them money without asking anything in return, which –according to the ideas 
of welfare dependency– distorts the values and attitudes of people with respect to work or 
education. 
The second theoretical argument for making cash transfers conditional is related 
with the almost unavoidable presence of market failures, and particularly, human capital 
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externalities. Some make the point that certain types of investments in human capital (e.g. 
education and health) generate positive externalities (also known as spill-overs) to 
societies (Fiszbein et al., 2009). These positive spill-overs arise when the activity of one 
agent impacts the performance of the others, leading to higher levels of human capital and 
well-being (or production) at the aggregate level. According to Adato and Hoddinott 
(2007), poor households do not take into account these externalities when making private 
decisions about human capital investment, and thus the aggregate level of human capital 
in the society might not be the socially optimal. Put another way, even if poor households’ 
decisions about human capital investment are privately optimal, these might not be 
socially optimal because people do not consider possible spill-over effects. 
The possible presence of positive externalities could justify governments’ 
intervention conditioning cash transfers as an effective means of increasing human capital 
investment. There is some empirical evidence that supports the idea of spill-over effects 
in education and health. For instance, Moretti (2004) evaluates the magnitude of human 
capital investment externalities among industries in the same city. Using different 
measures of economic distance, he finds significant spill-over effects of education that are 
much larger when industries are more economically closer. However, it is necessary to 
mention that there is no conclusive evidence on the size of human capital externalities, as 
well as whether CCTs are the best way to correct for them and promote socially optimal 
investment decisions (Fiszbein et al., 2009). 
Finally, the third theoretical argument for conditioning cash transfers is related to 
the political economy decisions required to fund redistributive policies and increase their 
public support (Myamba & Ulriksen, 2016). Since social assistance programmes need to 
be approved and financed by tax-payers (or international institutions), governments must 
make well-thought-out policy decisions to make them viable and well-endowed. These 
decisions are not taken by generous policy-makers; rather they are the result of usually 
difficult political economy processes. Besides, it is conceivable that income transfers 
targeted to the poor tend to receive limited political and public support, since only a small 
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share of the population enjoys the benefits, while the costs are borne by all taxpayers 
(Fiszbein et al., 2009).    
In this context, it is likely that politicians and voters are more willing to accept 
transfers to those in poverty who are seen to be assisting themselves (through investments 
in their children’s health or education) than to other poor people considered lazy or 
thoughtless. Thus, conditionality has the potential to overcome the possible stigma 
associated with social assistance payments since human development conditions are 
considered part of a social contract between beneficiaries and the government (Adato & 
Hoddinott, 2007). More specifically, conditioning cash transfers on certain behaviours 
considered socially desirable among the poor (such as investment in human capital) may 
increase public support for such programmes, which in turn increases the budget for 
income redistribution and makes possible the implementation of better social assistance 
practices. In fact, there is some evidence in the behavioural economics literature on 
fairness judgments suggesting that people are prepared to experience financial losses to 
reward behaviour perceived as socially fair or to punish behaviour perceived as unfair 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000). 
This political economy argument receives support from the empirical evidence on 
the politics of conditions in Brazil. Lindert and Vincensini (2008) find that most media 
criticism of the Bolsa Familia programme in Brazil is focused on the potential welfare 
dependency effect among those in poverty (i.e. welfare trap theory), and these critics are 
usually accompanied with reports that conditions are not being monitored properly by the 
government. However, they point out that most people who consider that the programme 
is not creating dependency; also think that the conditions attached to the programme are 
the main reason for this. The authors conclude that conditions played a major role in 
Brazil, acting as a legitimate response to the usual political constraints faced by 
policymakers and increasing public support among taxpayers. 
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1.6.3 The Conditionality Debate 
Admittedly, there are quite convincing theoretical arguments both for and against the 
inclusion of conditions in human development income transfer programmes. As a result, 
the discussion on this topic in the field of social protection is far from over and, on the 
contrary, it has intensified with the passage of time. The debate on 'global CCTs' is now a 
very large and important strand of the social policy in developing countries scholarship 
(Adato & Hoddinott, 2007; Arnold et al., 2011). This is the case because, although there 
is a powerful tendency towards paternalism, the idea of conditionality remains highly 
controversial in principle and its actual effects in practice are still questionable. In fact, 
conditionalities are often seen as examples of policy mechanisms where moral ideas or 
principles (e.g. freedom and human dignity) may conflict with practical concerns (e.g. 
improve efficiency, prevent welfare dependency and safeguard political support). 
A remarkable resource on the current ‘conditionality debate’ is that of Samson et 
al. (2006), Designing and Implementing Social Transfer Programmes. Based on a South 
African perspective, the authors recognize that designing effective conditionalities could 
be a very difficult task and for this purpose they provide a comprehensive guide. Although 
Samson et al. (2006) emphasise the value of conditions from a political and social 
perspective, they also acknowledge that it is critical to carefully evaluate all the possible 
consequences of conditionality in order to provide social benefits that exceed social costs. 
Another more recent contribution that squarely fits on these issues about conditionality is 
Myamba and Ulriksen (2016), who critically assess the presence of conditions in anti-
poverty programmes using examples of social protection development and the current 
policy debate in Tanzania. According to the authors, conditionality has been firmly 
entrenched for a long time as a necessary policy mechanism in cash transfer programmes, 
but only to ensure the required political support while deliberately ignoring important 
principled and practical concerns, around which the debate on this topic takes place.  
In the first place, the debate on conditionality has raised a number of ethical and 
moral concerns. Some make the point that the idea of conditioning a cash transfer is in 
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clear opposition to the fundamental principles of human freedom and dignity. This ethic-
based perspective, commonly known as the principled opposition to conditionality, has 
been partly analysed in the emerging literature about behavioural interventions (see page 
32). Seen from a basic perspective of human rights, given that all people are born equal in 
dignity and rights, we should have all the same freedoms and the same right to access 
welfare benefits whenever we need it. In fact, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that everyone has the right to social security and social protection (UN General 
Assembly, 1948). If the delivery of a social benefit is conditioned, it would be threatening 
to deprive the neediest of that ‘universal right’ if they fail to comply with certain 
conditions, and it would be acting directly against the individual liberties of the people to 
do what they see fit and spend their money as they wish. 
In addition, the simple act of trying to influence the behaviour of social assistance 
beneficiaries implies that they are considered incapable or unwilling to make “good” 
decisions and spend the money “well”, something that apparently can be perfectly done 
by other people (i.e. those who are not poor). In other words, there is an implicit 
understanding that the poor are not equal to the non-poor and, therefore, they should be 
treated differently by subjecting them to certain rules or restrictions in case they wish to 
access social protection (Myamba & Ulriksen, 2016). Supporters of the ‘principled 
opposition’ to conditionalities consider that, even if the implementation of conditions had 
positive outcomes for those in poverty (which is quite questionable), this widespread 
policy mechanism should not continue to be placed above the fundamental rights of the 
human being. 
Apart from the principled concerns mentioned above, the conditionality debate has 
largely focused on important practical concerns about the effectiveness and convenience 
of attaching conditions to cash transfers. The basic idea of conditionality that the state 
knows better than its citizens what is the best way to use its scarce resources is indeed a 
very dubious assumption (Freeland, 2007). Until now, the true effects of linking 
conditions to anti-poverty programmes remain uncertain. Although there is a large amount 
of evaluative literature on CCT programmes, which mostly shows that the outcomes have 
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been positive for the beneficiaries (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005; Behrman et al., 2010), it is 
difficult to separate the effect of conditions from the effect of cash transfers (that is, the 
income effect versus the conditionality effect). The lack of sufficient empirical evidence 
in this regard makes it challenging to determine, for example, whether the same, better, or 
worst results could have been achieved without the presence of conditions (Freeland, 
2007; Barrientos, 2013). Besides, this uncertainty over the effectiveness of conditions is 
reinforced by the fact that well-being improvements are also observed in places where 
cash transfers are made unconditional (Devereux, 2009; Ozler et al., 2010). 
Despite all the academic interest in the relative effectiveness of conditionality, the 
empirical literature directly comparing CCTs and UCTs is surprisingly very limited. The 
first studies of this type were based on natural experiments (originated by failures in the 
implementation of conditioned programmes) or on structural models of household 
behaviour (Bourguignon et al., 2003; Schady & Araujo, 2008; Paxson & Schady, 2010). 
The great majority of these non-experimental evidence coincided in concluding that 
behavioural conditions play an important role when it comes to obtaining better human 
capital outcomes, specifically in terms of schooling. It was only a few years ago that a 
series of controlled experiments, designed to identify the specific marginal contribution 
of conditionality, were performed with relative success. By assigning households to two 
different treatment groups (one that receives conditional cash transfers and another that 
receives unconditional transfers) and a control group (which does not receive transfers), 
different randomization-based studies found heterogenous results on the actual effects of 
conditions associated with the programmes implemented in some less-developed African 
countries (Devereux, 2009, Ozler et al., 2010, Haushofer & Shapiro, 2013). 
Although separately there are some quite extensive and detailed reviews of the 
existing evidence in the literature, both on conditional cash transfers (Parker et al., 2008, 
Fiszbein & Schady, 2009, Adato & Bassett, 2012) and on unconditional transfers (Hanlon 
et al., 2010), there are very few revisions that attempt to systematically and jointly 
compare the two types of programmes. Given how important and extremely useful it 
would be for policymakers to have such systematic reviews of the different CCT and UCT 
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interventions, it is rather surprising that there is currently a shortage of (direct or indirect) 
comparative studies. There is, however, one fairly comprehensive review of both types of 
cash transfers that is worth mentioning and discussing in depth below. 
Baird, Ferreira, Ozler and Woolcock (2013) aim to synthesize and complement the 
existing studies –both experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations– on the relative 
effectiveness of conditional and unconditional cash transfer programmes in improving 
schooling outcomes in developing countries. More specifically, they conduct a systematic 
review of the evidence in order to assess the overall impact of each type of intervention 
on school-enrolment, -attendance and performance (i.e. test scores). Along with this main 
objective, the authors also intend to contribute to a better understanding of the role played 
by the different dimensions of cash transfer programmes, such as the intensity of 
conditionalities, the size of the transfer, the enrolment rate before the intervention and the 
level of coverage of the programme. 
In principle, it seems quite likely that beneficiaries of CCT and UCT programmes 
spend their cash transfers differently and, therefore, obtain different schooling outcomes 
as well. One could expect, for example, that the beneficiaries of conditional transfers 
spend a greater percentage of the transfer money investing in the human capital (i.e. health 
and education) of their children, since they are forced to do so due to the presence of 
conditionalities. Obviously, this would imply the existence of an important market failure, 
by which households are not sufficiently capable of giving education the value it deserves. 
This failure would be corrected to some extent by transfers attached to behavioural 
conditions, which would encourage higher spending on education than unconditional 
transfers. On the contrary, it is also possible that the beneficiaries of both types of 
programmes have previously spent little on the education of their children simply because 
they did not have the necessary economic resources, in which case one would expect quite 
similar spending patterns and schooling outcomes in the households that received 
conditional transfers and those that received unconditional transfers. 
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In order to test which of these two hypotheses best fits the existing evidence, the 
comprehensive review by Baird et al. (2013) included data from 35 studies in developing 
countries (26 on CCTs, five on UCTs and four studies that directly compare conditional 
with unconditional transfers). Eligible studies included both experimental and quasi-
experimental designs in different languages (i.e. English, Portuguese and Spanish).9 Their 
main finding is that both types of programmes (i.e. conditional and unconditional) have a 
significant effect on school enrolment and attendance. For example, CCTs improve the 
likelihood of a child being enrolled in school by 41 percent (confidence interval: 27 to 56 
percent) and UCTs increase the probability by 23 percent (confidence interval: 8 to 41 
percent). This is, of course, when compared to children who do not receive transfers (i.e. 
control group). Although the effect sizes on the schooling outcomes seem to be always 
larger in average for CCTs compared to UCTs, the difference is not statistically significant 
(i.e. overlapping confidence intervals).10 These results suggest that, irrespective of the 
type of programme, beneficiary households are not only using the transfers for smoothing 
consumption and satisfying basic subsistence needs, but also for investment in the human 
capital of their children. Moreover, the evidence shows that cash transfers could also 
modify households' behaviours without the need of conditions.         
However, the authors realize that categorizing the programmes just into CCTs or 
UCTs overlooks the fact that "there is a great deal of variation in the intensity of the 
conditionality" (Baird et al., 2013, p. 7). Therefore, in order to effectively capture the 
diversity of programme designs, they grouped the conditionality variable into three 
categories: (i) no conditionalities, (ii) some conditions, but no enforcement or monitoring, 
(iii) explicit, monitored and enforced conditions. Their findings indicate that type (i) 
transfers positively affect the likelihood of a child being enrolled in school by 18 percent 
(confidence interval: 5 to 33 percent), type (ii) transfers increase the probability by 25 
                                                             
9
 The sample was limited to publications after 1997 (i.e. year in which the Progresa/Oportunidades 
programme was implemented in Mexico). 
10
 A meta-regression was carried out to assess differences between the effects of conditional and 
unconditional cash transfers. Although a small difference was estimated, it turned out to be statistically 
non-significant (p-value=0.18). 
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percent (confidence interval: 10 to 42 percent) and type (iii) transfers by 60 percent 
(confidence interval: 37 to 88 percent). The 95 percent confidence intervals (CI) for type 
(i) and (ii) transfers overlap, showing that UCTs and programmes with conditions that are 
not enforced or monitored have statistically similar effects (i.e. the difference is not 
statistically significant). On the other hand, the 95 percent CIs for type (i) and (iii) transfers 
are the only ones that do not overlap, showing that the impact on schooling outcomes of 
programmes with monitored and enforced conditions is higher than that of UCTs. 
In the light of the evidence, Baird et al. (2013) conclude that the intensity of the 
conditions may play an important role with respect to the effect size on schooling 
outcomes. More specifically, when conditionalities are properly monitored and applied, 
the positive effects of CCTs on school enrolment and attendance would be slightly higher 
than those of the UCTs. Thus, they strongly suggest that the force with which 
conditionality is imposed determines in turn its measured level of effectiveness. 
Interestingly, apart from the intensity of the conditions, none of the other dimensions of 
cash transfer programmes (e.g. the size of the transfers) has a significant impact on the 
magnitude of the effect on educational outcomes. In addition, unlike what happens with 
respect to school enrolment and attendance, the effectiveness of both types of programmes 
to improve academic performance is apparently null. However, according to the authors, 
new and better research is needed that also takes into account medium and long-term 
educational results, such as test scores or the approval of the school year. Similarly, they 
consider that more research is necessary on UCTs since a clear limitation of their study is 
the few existing rigorous evaluations of this type of programmes. 
As a result, there are still very different points of view about the effectiveness of 
attaching conditions to cash transfers. According to the rationalist perspective, people 
would achieve even better results if they could act freely (i.e. without conditions or 
constraints), since individuals (more than governments) know best how to use their own 
money and resources (Sen, 2001; Hanlon et al., 2010). On the other hand, the paternalistic 
perspective maintains that poor people make bad decisions and that they cannot take care 
of themselves, so the best way to achieve the desired results is by having the authorities 
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make decisions for them – that is obliging them to comply with conditions (Bastagli, 2008; 
Fiszbein et al., 2009). Although the practical value in terms of effectiveness of 
conditionalities (i.e. the degree to which conditionality is successful in producing the 
desired results) is still unclear, this has been a topic of debate that policymakers commonly 
overlook when designing policies and implementing social protection programmes. 
Finally, the debate has revolved around practical concerns about the convenience 
(i.e. cost-effectiveness) of conditionality, considering not only the costs of compliance for 
beneficiaries, but also the high administrative/opportunity costs that the enforcement and 
control of conditions represent for the government (along with the poor quality of social 
services in developing countries). One might think that conditional programmes are much 
more difficult to administer than unconditional ones, and that the establishment of control 
mechanisms can be very expensive (Samson et al., 2006). There is also the common 
consideration that it is the most vulnerable who will find it more expensive to comply with 
the conditions; and that the areas typically inhabited by the poorest are often those where 
public services are most precarious (Freeland, 2007). 
 Note that if the financial and opportunity costs for people living in poverty are too 
high, human development conditions may not even be effective in modifying people’s 
behaviour and they could deprive of benefits to those most in need (Myamba & Ulriksen, 
2016). According to the rationalist perspective, people may prefer to forego transfers if 
the cost of sending their children to school (taking into account transportation and the loss 
of a key source of income) exceeds the value of the promised monetary benefits. On the 
other hand, if (due to ignorance or irrationality)11 those in poverty decide to modify their 
behaviour so as not to renounce the transfers, anyway the short-term expected outcomes 
(i.e. increase and smooth households' income level) would not be achieved and the 
conditions would end up worsening their current income situation. 
Even assuming that initially the costs perceived by the poor are low and that 
conditions are effective in modifying beneficiaries’ behaviour (be they rational or 
                                                             
11
 As the paternalistic perspective suggests.  
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irrational), this does not guarantee at all that conditioned decision-making will always be 
privately or socially optimal, given the frequent presence of important negative 
externalities (e.g. scarce supply of public services). If poor households have problems 
accessing public services or if these services are of low quality, additional financial and 
opportunity costs are generated that parents would not be considering when making 
human capital investment decisions. In this sense, it is important to consider that the 
desired result of conditionalities is not (or at least should not be) simply to modify the 
behaviour of people according to an obviously subjective criterion. It is assumed that 
changes in behaviour are only a means for people to make “good” decisions, which could 
not be made if they are induced to perform certain actions (e.g. send their children to 
school) when the provision of public services is inadequate (e.g. classrooms are 
overcrowded because there are not enough teachers). Thus, conditionality not only does 
not guarantee good decision-making by those in poverty, but, in some cases, it could be 
the reason why they make incorrect investment decisions (in education or health) or 
choices that are not in their best interest. 
In the case of many developing countries, it is almost a fact that social assistance 
beneficiaries' access to public services is seriously affected by their scarce or inadequate 
supply. In fact, there are some qualitative studies suggesting that beneficiaries of social 
programmes often try to comply with the conditions, but that they cannot access education 
or health-care services due to their inadequate provision (Myamba & Ulriksen, 2016). 
Therefore, it is very likely that –at least in low-income countries– it is preferable to invest 
more money in improving the provision of social services, instead of spending it on 
controlling compliance with conditions. In other words, spending money from the tight 
anti-poverty budget in enforcing conditions may not be justified when social services 
offered by the government are insufficient. As Davis, Gaarder, Handa and Yablonski 
(2012) argue, conditionality requires a significant administrative investment that could be 
better capitalised in building up educational and health-care resources. The low quality of 
public services could be a more serious problem than the fact that the beneficiaries of 
social assistance do not use them as they apparently should. 
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The extent and intensity of the debate on conditionality contrasts deeply with the 
enormous popularity of CCT programmes in developing countries. In fact, over the last 
twenty years, conditions have been firmly rooted in the social protection policies of most 
Latin American countries. A possible explanation may be that policymakers often prefer 
to focus on the supposed and promising practical benefits of CCT programmes (i.e. 
generate human capital externalities, obtain political support and prevent welfare 
dependency), rather than worrying about moral ideas, ethical principles and unresolved 
effectiveness concerns. Myamba & Ulriksen, (2016) argue that in developing countries’ 
policy debates it is uncommon to address the issue of conditionality from the more 
intricated perspectives of cost-effectiveness, freedom of choice and human dignity. On 
the other hand, concerns related to the political economy of financing these redistributive 
policies are always present. 
For this reason, it is not surprising that –at the time of making welfare policy 
decisions– the inclusion of conditionalities is not only little questioned but is often 
considered necessary to obtain funding resources and political commitment. In this sense, 
policy recommendations and financing offers formulated by multilateral organizations, 
which have traditionally favoured the implementation of CCT programmes, have a great 
deal of influence. In fact, international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, are 
considered the main defenders of the ideas in favour of conditionalities (Freeland, 2007). 
Tina Rosenberg, the Pulitzer Prize-winning writer for the New York Times, said during a 
debate at the World Bank that: “part of the reason why these (conditional) programmes 
are becoming popular is the support of institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank” (World Bank, 2009) 
Through comprehensive institutional reports and carefully designed impact 
evaluations, international development organizations argue that those in poverty maintain 
incorrect ideas about the profitability of investing in the human capital of their children; 
and also, they emphasize the positive outcomes of CCT programmes around the world 
(Fiszbein et al., 2009). In consequence, they consider beneficial and strongly recommend 
conditioning cash transfers to the use of specific health and education services by the 
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beneficiaries. This is in addition to offering technical assistance and financial support to 
the developing countries for the implementation of this type of programmes exclusively. 
For example, Axel van Trotsenburg, Vice President of Financing for Development at the 
World Bank, said in 2008 that they would financially support the Colombian CCT 
programme with a large loan, but, above all, they will be actively involved in the design 
of the programme, in its control and even in its evaluation (World Bank, 2009). In the 
words of Freeland (2007), “the term conditional (in CCTs) is redolent of the 
conditionalities imposed by IMF, World Bank and other donors when making loans or 
implementing budget support programmes”. 
For many years, the dominant discourse in policy debates has been that it is 
necessary to “help” those in poverty in their decision-making, break the inter-generational 
transmission of poverty and reduce the possibility that transfers are generating 
dependency through the permanent implementation and control of conditions. However, 
as discussed in this chapter, there are still serious doubts regarding the veracity of these 
theoretical benefits and the supposed effectiveness of conditionality. Therefore, the only 
certainty about this issue is that, in practice, concerns related to the political economy of 
funding cash transfer initiatives –and political calculations seeking taxpayers’ support– 
tend to be placed above concerns about fundamental human principles, programmes’ 
efficiency, and even the most stylized economic theories (Arnold et al., 2011; Myamba & 
Ulriksen, 2016). At least in the design of social protection policies in Latin America, the 
presence of conditionalities as a “necessary” policy mechanism has been taken for granted 
for too long. 
Meanwhile, the social policy debate on conditionality has intensified worldwide 
in recent years, especially in the academic spheres, where the idea of conditioning cash 
transfers continues to be highly controversial. There is no absolute truth or an indisputable 
argument on this topic since the design of social programmes responds to the 
characteristics and scope of poverty in each particular context. Decisions on conditions 
should be considered carefully and, even if conditionality were shown to work in some 
environments, it is very unlikely that it will do so in different places or at other times 
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(Freeland, 2007). An interesting case to exemplify this long-standing policy discussion is 
that of Ecuador, where conditional and unconditional cash transfer programmes have 
coexisted for about a decade, demonstrating that even the policymakers of the same 
government have not yet been able to reach an agreement on the structure and 
characteristics that social assistance practices must have to be more effective and, in this 
way, be able to lift more people out of poverty. 
 
1.6.4 Work-related Conditionalities 
As discussed throughout the chapter, there has been a broad debate in academic and policy 
circles about the appropriateness, nature (i.e. conditional or unconditional) and generosity 
(i.e. amount of the transfers) of social transfers for the poor and vulnerable that should be 
put in place in developing countries, but also indeed, across the world. For now, CCTs 
have taken the lead as the most popular anti-poverty programmes globally. Apart from the 
traditional CCT programmes, whose conditions are related to health and education, there 
are also cash transfer programmes that impose conditions related to work – mainly due to 
the strong concerns of policy-makers and academics about possible reductions in adult 
labour supply that can result from social assistance practices. 
Although economic theory predicts that income transfers will have an impact on 
the labour supply of beneficiaries, the possible effects are difficult to predict, especially 
in the context of anti-poverty cash transfers (Barrientos & Villa, 2013). In fact, there is 
still much controversy about the scope of the work disincentive effects and whether work-
related conditions are necessary or not (Jung & Smith, 2007). As a result, there is a wide 
range of policy logics and policy instruments to address these potential issues of social 
assistance. The selected approach can change very quickly even within a given country 
(sometimes it just takes a change of government). Broadly speaking (and with the sole 
intention of being illustrative), we can note that developed and less-developed countries 
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have adopted two opposing choices/approaches with respect to work-related conditions in 
the last few decades. 
In the United States, for example, the perception that traditional CCT programmes 
encouraged inactivity among those in poverty and promoted dependency on public 
assistance inspired the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 
(PRWORA) and the implementation of transfers that are exclusive to the working poor 
(Fiszbein et al., 2009). These transfers impose work-related requirements, strengthened 
eligibility conditions and time limits (Scholz and Levine, 2001). In contrast, most Latin 
American and some continental European countries continue to rely heavily on traditional 
programmes, which are almost always unconditional to work, time-unlimited, and not 
specifically targeted at households with children (Bargain & Doorley, 2011).  
Like in the United Stated before 1996, traditional CCT programmes in developing 
countries have been accused –especially by those in favour of the paternalistic and welfare 
trap approaches– of creating strong work disincentives (World Bank Group, 2015; 
Barrientos & Villa, 2013). This may occur as consequence of reduced job search intensity 
of transfer recipients or less willingness to accept a job if the expected wage is only 
marginally higher than the social transfers (Blank, 2003; Guzi, 2013). According to the 
welfare dependency perspective, poor people can become completely dependent on 
benefits, with little or no hope of self-sufficiency (see page 28). On the other hand, the 
paternalistic approach would point to work-related conditionalities as a necessary element 
to ensure that welfare programmes have desirable effects on labour supply. Considering 
these ideas, it is not surprising that the impact of CCTs on labour market participation has 
become a key research topic and, therefore, has received enormous attention in recent 
years (World Bank Group, 2015). 
The available evaluative literature of the programmes implemented both in 
developing and developed economies emphasizes the various potential impacts on the 
labour market engagement of the beneficiary households. Therefore, it is important to 
keep a close eye on the specific ‘labour supply’ effects because their accurate estimation 
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is key to the correct evaluation of any income transfer programme. According to 
Barrientos & Villa (2013, p.3), “antipoverty programmes are not welfarist. […] An 
antipoverty income transfer leading to a proportional reduction in labour supply, and 
therefore income, could well be welfare enhancing, but would be considered a failure in 
its own, non-welfarist, terms”.  
Numerous methods have been used to estimate the disincentive effects of social 
assistance programmes (with and without work-related conditionalities) on labour market 
behaviour. The evaluative literature is vast for programmes implemented in the developed 
world and most of the research has focused on the cases of the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Moffitt, 1992; Krueger & Meyer, 2002). The methods used by 
academics include structural approaches (e.g., Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001), controlled 
experiments (e.g., Bloom & Michalopoulos, 2001) and natural experiments that have 
exploited important tax-benefit reforms to identify behavioural parameters (e.g., Blundell 
et al., 1998). Overall, the size and significance of the estimated work disincentive effects 
have been quite heterogeneous in developed countries (Moffitt, 1992; Jung & Smith, 
2007; Fiszbein et al., 2009).  
There is much less evidence available for traditional CCT programmes (which are 
unconditional to work) in developing countries and even continental Europe. Besides, due 
to the lack of major reforms in this matter, most of the evidence in these countries comes 
from estimates of controlled experiments and structural models –which are necessarily 
based on strong distributional assumptions and have not often been validated against 
natural experiments (Bargain & Doorley, 2011). Skoufias and Di Maro (2006) study the 
effects of Mexican Oportunidades on adult work and they do not find evidence of a 
negative impact. Similarly, Edmonds and Schady (2012) suggest that the Ecuadorian BDH 
had no disincentive effects on labour force participation. In general, the estimated effects 
of CCTs on adult work in developing countries appear to be only marginal (both positive 
and negative) or inexistent (Fiszbein et al., 2009). One of the few exceptions is Maluccio 
and Flores (2004), who report that male adult labour supply was significantly and 
negatively affected by the RPS programme in Nicaragua, although there was no effect on 
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women. Another important paper is that of Barrientos and Villa (2013), who relying on a 
regression discontinuity design, find that a CCT programme in Colombia had considerable 
positive effects on labour supply outcomes.  
 
1.7 A Guide for Enquiry: Research Questions 
A series of key concepts from social protection theory and different theoretical 
perspectives about the issue of conditionality have been presented. These will be used to 
frame the effectiveness comparison of the two most important cash transfer programmes 
–in terms of coverage and budget– offered in Ecuador: the one with a traditional standard 
design and the recently implemented programme in which families receive a lump sum 
payment without attached conditionalities. Building on the above theoretical pillars, as 
well as the empirical research literature and social assistance policy developments 
reviewed throughout this chapter, this final section outlines a linked sequence of three 
research questions which guide the enquiry of this research: 
Q.1 Do the BDH and CDH cash transfer programmes affect the levels of well-
being, schooling and unemployment of those in poverty?  
Q.2 Does conditionality make a difference in terms of the efficiency of the 
programmes?  




















In spite of the large number of cash transfer programmes available in many developing 
countries, surprisingly, there is very little variation in their structure (J-PAL, 2012; Arnold 
et al., 2011). Most programmes are inspired by the Mexican model -first known as 
Progresa and now as Oportunidades- and have maintained the same basic configuration: 
families in poverty or extreme poverty, which have one or more minor children, receive 
monthly monetary or in-kind benefits if and only if their children receive regular medical 
check-ups and meet specific attendance targets at school (Levy & Rodríguez, 2005).  
Certainly, while conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have become an 
important tool for poverty alleviation in less developed nations, the challenge today is to 
make these programmes evolve into more efficient mechanisms that take more poor 
households out of poverty and provide them with social and economic independence, 
making more people self-sufficient (Sadoulet & de Janvry, 2004). As an attempt to 
achieve this goal, some important variations to the typical structure of cash transfer 
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programmes have been implemented in the South American country of Ecuador over the 
last decade.   
Ecuador is a lower-middle income country, characterized by high levels of poverty 
and inequality. In 2011, its per capita GDP was 1,870 US dollars (constant 2000 US 
dollars). According to data from the Ecuadorian Central Bank, around 16 percent of the 
population lives under the extreme poverty line, and more than 35 percent lives under the 
poverty line (BCE, 2012).12 Even though, poverty in Ecuador has actually decreased over 
the last decade, inequality has not presented significant changes. The Gini coefficient 
registered in 2008 was 0.49, while in March 2012 it was around 0.45. From 2000 to 2011, 
the richest 20 percent of the population concentrated more than 50 percent of the national 
GDP, whereas the poorest 20 percent not more than 5 percent of it (BCE, 2012; INEC, 
2012). 
According to the available data from the World Bank’s Atlas of Social Protection 
- Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE) database, Ecuador's total social public 
expenditure maintained a growing trend in the first decade of the 21st century, reaching 
about 9.6 percent of the country’s GDP in 2010.13 Amongst this public spending, one of 
the components that grew the most was the spending on social assistance programmes, 
going from 0.6 percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.8 percent in 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, 
Ecuador incurred an (average) expenditure on social assistance programmes of around 
1.45 percent of GDP, which at that time placed this developing Latin American country 
above the average expenditure among the countries in its region (i.e. 1.3 percent of 
regional GDP).14 Appendix A examines the evolution of Ecuador’s public spending on 
social assistance programmes and its performance in terms of poverty and inequality 
reduction (see page 399). 
                                                             
12
 The poverty threshold, or poverty line, is the minimum level of income deemed adequate in a given 
country. In Ecuador, the poverty line and the extreme poverty line have been around 2 and 1 US dollars a 
day respectively. 
13
 This percentage includes public spending on education, health and social assistance. 
14
 More information about ASPIRE database available at http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire/home. 
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The institutional structure of the Ecuadorian welfare state has recently shifted from 
a fragmented system of social protection to a more integrated network within the 
Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social (MIES) (Gutierrez et. al., 2013). Over the 
past 15 years, the Ecuadorian Government has been trying to help the most vulnerable 
people in the country by developing a comprehensive strategy called Programa Red de 
Protección Social (PRPS) (Social Protection Network Programme), which has a 
traditional CCT programme –known as the Bono de Desarrollo Humano– as its main 
component.  
The Ecuadorian social protection network accompanies and assists all groups in 
situation of vulnerability or exclusion by delivering different types of monetary transfers. 
These transfers have been consolidated under three kinds of interventions: (i) 
unconditional cash transfers (e.g. Crédito de Desarrollo Humano programme); (ii) 
conditional cash transfers (e.g. Bono de Desarrollo Humano programme); and (iii) 
interventions of economic inclusion and contingency to different risks (e.g. Retirement 
Bonus programme). The main goal of the Ecuadorian PRPS is to ensure the rights of 
vulnerable social groups (such as access to basic services, education and health) so that 
the families that receive this assistance can improve their quality of life and can get out of 
poverty (PRPS, 2013).  
In order to achieve these objectives, the MIES –through its social protection 
agenda– offers cash transfers through five specific programmes: Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH), Crédito de Desarrollo Humano (CDH), Cobertura de Protección Familiar 
(Family Protection Coverage), Pensión para Adultos Mayores (Pension for Older Adults) 
and Pensión por Discapacidad (Disability Pension). The last two programmes were 
implemented only a few years ago and are the ones with the lowest coverage levels. The 
purpose of the Pensión para Adultos Mayores programme is to protect the elderly 
population without access to social security or any other kind of insurance, while the 
Pensión por Discapacidad programme is aimed at people with disabilities and does not 
impose an age limit for beneficiaries. According to data handled by the Ecuadorian 
government, these programmes covered 600,000 older adults and 115,000 disabled people 
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respectively in 2013.15 Moreover, the BDH and CDH are the most important cash transfer 
programmes in Ecuador; and are the focus of this thesis. 
One of the key elements for the integration of these social assistance programmes 
into an effective social protection network has been the standardization of their databases, 
giving rise to a true complete and focused information system that provides more timely 
data (Gutierrez et al., 2013). In this way, it has been possible to effectively monitor, both 
individually and at the household level, any potential beneficiary of the cash transfers. 
Additionally, this has allowed the same beneficiary family to access more than one 
programme at a time, thus protecting it from various social risks (including living in 
poverty, poor health, old age, disability and those associated with natural disasters).  
Note in this regard that, speaking in general terms, social assistance programmes, 
service networks and social protection systems should always have good information, 
registration and monitoring systems that can be used to compare the initial and present 
situation of the (current and potential) beneficiaries, monitor progress and coordinate 
responses among policy providers (Jara et al., 2013). Therefore, the development of more 
integrated information systems, together with more efficient operational models, represent 
some of the basic conditions that Ecuador and other developing countries must meet 
before non-contributory social security systems can be implemented in a future. 
However, perhaps the most important changes in Ecuador have to do with the 
structure and characteristics of the cash transfers interventions. More specifically, there 
have been significant variations in relation to the typical element of conditionality and the 
target populations of the different programmes offered in the country. Cash transfers in 
Ecuador have incorporated in recent years various types of beneficiaries normally not 
considered eligible for such programmes in other developing countries (Cecchini & 
Madariaga, 2011). Nowadays, access to benefits is possible for more categories of people 
in a situation of poverty and vulnerability, such as unemployed adults, people with 
                                                             
15
 See MIES (2013) for a more detailed explanation of the different social assistance programs offered in 
Ecuador.     
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disabilities, older adults, and poor families without minor children. In addition, as will be 
analysed in depth later, a social assistance programme has been implemented a few years 
ago that provides unconditional lump-sum (non-refundable) monetary transfers for 
productive investments, which represents one of the first interventions of this kind in the 
entire region and possibly in the world. 
 
2.2 The Bono de Desarrollo Humano Programme 
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Bonus), commonly known as 
BDH, was officially launched in 2003 and is the social assistance programme in the 
country with the highest level of coverage.16 The BDH is mainly a direct subsidy that 
provides 50 US dollars cash transfers per month to families in extreme poverty. Unlike 
other programmes in the region, households without minor children or teenagers are also 
eligible to receive the benefits. 
The targeting mechanism of the BDH is a proxy means test of welfare level (i.e. 
Welfare Index), an indirect method to measure the income of families, that is estimated 
based on the socioeconomic household information of the Sistema de Información del 
Registro Social (SiiRS), which is managed by the Ministerio Coordinador de Desarrollo 
Social (MCDS) (Ministry Coordinator of Social Development). This household 
information is collected through questionnaires, applied directly at home or at strategic 
points in some particular cases (due to geographical issues), as part of a national survey 
of potential programme recipients called Registro Social (Registro Oficial, 2009). The 
BDH target population at the moment are only families around the first quintile of the 
Welfare Index, known also as the SELBEN (Sistema de Selección de Beneficiarios de 
Programas Sociales) Index or poverty index. 
                                                             
16
 In 2013, this cash transfer programme reached a coverage level of about 31 percent of the total 
population, which meant that at that time the BDH programme was the social assistance initiative with 
the highest level of coverage in the region (Gutierrez et al., 2013).  
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The BDH programme seeks, in the short term, to guarantee a minimum level of 
consumption in poor families, and in the medium and long term, to promote investment 
in human capital of those under 18 years of age to prevent the inter-temporal transmission 
of poverty (VAMS, 2014). In order to achieve these goals, the BDH provides cash 
transfers to the most vulnerable households in exchange for compliance with certain 
conditionalities in education and health. Therefore, in theory this programme maintains 
the same basic structure as traditional CCTs. It provides monthly payments on the 
condition that beneficiary families take children under 5 years old to at least one health 
check per year (to ensure their normal growth and development) and send children 
between 6 and 18 years old to school on a regular basis (to ensure continuous school 
attendance and reduce child labour) (Schady & Araujo, 2006; MIES, 2013). 
Although the BDH programme clearly establishes the ‘co-responsibilities’ or 
conditionalities that families must meet and the penalties for non-compliance, according 
to different programme evaluations and institutional reports, during the early stages of the 
programme, the process of monitoring and controlling conditionalities was only partially 
carried out and the sanctions established by the rules of operation were rarely applied 
(Martinez & Rosero, 2007). According to the institution in charge of the BDH, the control 
of compliance with the conditions has hardened considerably since the beginning of this 
decade (MIES, 2013b). 
During its first ten years of implementation, the BDH programme can be said to 
have continued to evolve positively: improving the targeting mechanisms, reducing 
focalization problems, increasing the level of coverage and expanding the target 
population (i.e. households qualified as eligible) (Gutierrez et. al., 2013). Since 2014, this 
important CCT programme –originally aimed at all poor households in the country (i.e. 
those in the first and second poverty quintiles)– adjusted its target population only to 
households living in extreme poverty (i.e. those in the first poverty quintile). The reasons 
for this significant change in the eligibility conditions are not so clear, but could be due to 
cuts in social assistance spending (see Appendix A) and to the fact that, according to the 
MIES, some leakage problems were detected (Martinez et al., 2017). In any case, a 
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significant amount of beneficiaries (about 60 percent) were withdrawn from the 
programme in late 2014.17 
The BDH has been established as the cornerstone of a comprehensive social 
protection network that addresses several dimensions of social risk, and not just the issue 
of poverty. In addition to the delivery of a monthly cash transfer to each beneficiary 
household, the programme provides non-contributory pensions to those households with 
elderly and disabled persons. Between 2008 and 2014, the usual number of BDH 
beneficiary families had oscillated between 1 million and 1.2 million. In fact, the BDH 
Programme Report issued in 2013 indicates that the programme at that time covered about 
1.1 million Ecuadorian households with an annual government investment of 484 million 
dollars (MCDS, 2013). Nowadays, the BDH still covers about 450,000 Ecuadorian 
households (2.7 million people) with an annual government investment of about 403 
million US dollars, which represents about 0.4 percent of the GDP (Martinez et al., 2017).  
Considering that the BDH was at some point one of the largest CCT programmes 
in Latin America in terms of percentage of beneficiary population (i.e. 31 percent of the 
total households in 2013) and the percentage of GDP that its budget represented (i.e. above 
the regional average until 2010), it is not surprising that it has attracted the attention of a 
number of researchers. In fact, due to its high incidence in the development of social 
policies in the country and the percentage of social assistance spending that it represents, 
the BDH has been one of the most studied social programmes in the region. The results 
of the main impact evaluations suggest that the programme has had some important 
positive outcomes such as the reduction of monetary poverty (León et al., 2001), the 
increase of school enrolment (Schady & Araujo, 2006; Oosterbeek et al., 2008), the 
reduction of child labour (Martinez & Rosero, 2007; Schady & Araujo, 2006; Dobronsky 
& Rosero, 2007) and the reduction of the cognitive development gap between 
                                                             
17
 Note that recent changes in the eligibility conditions do not affect in any way the results of this thesis, 
since the individual- and household-level data (with which the impact evaluations are carried out) 
correspond to the Registro Social surveys of 2008 and 2013-14. 
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disadvantaged children and higher-resource peers (Paxson & Schady, 2007; Ponce & 
Bedi, 2008). 
Schady and Araujo (2006) employ an experimental method on a sample of 1,391 
households to estimate the effects of the programme on school enrolment and child 
employment. The sample included children of school age (from 6 to 17 years of age), who 
were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. The baseline survey was 
collected in 2003 and the follow-up survey in 2005. That is, the impact was evaluated after 
a period of around two years. The authors show that the BDH had a positive impact on 
school enrolment and a negative impact on child employment. Specifically, the findings 
suggest an 8.6 percent increase in school enrolment for children belonging to beneficiary 
families. Moreover, the beneficiary households experienced a reduction in child labour of 
about 17 percent. The authors emphasize that the estimated results are better than those of 
other conditional transfer programmes in the region.  
Similarly, Oosterbeek, Ponce and Schady (2008) also examine the impact of the 
BDH on school enrolment, but using a regression discontinuity design. The data for the 
estimation were obtained from the same baseline and follow-up surveys collected by the 
Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador between 2003 and 2005. Therefore, the sample 
consisted of a similar number of children than the previous study (i.e. 3,004 children 
belonging to 1,309 families). The authors show that for the first poorest quintile, the 
increase in school enrolment was of between 75 and 85 percent, while there is no clear 
effect for the second quintile. 
On the other hand, the estimated impacts of the BDH programme on child 
malnutrition (León & Younger, 2007), food consumption (Ponce, 2008), attendance at 
health centres (Paxson & Schady, 2007) and children’s general health conditions (Paxson 
& Schady, 2007) have been somewhat limited. Paxson and Schady (2007) evaluate the 
results of the BDH on infant health (haemoglobin levels, height and fine motor control). 
The authors used a randomized experiment on a sample composed of 1,479 children aged 
3 to 7 years belonging to 1,124 families. The baseline survey was conducted in 2004 and 
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the follow-up survey in 2007. Their results suggest positive (but small) BDH effects on 
the health status of the children. For example, for the fine motor control variable, the 
results improved by 16 percent of a standard deviation for the treatment group versus the 
control group. In addition, it was found that the impact of the BDH was greater in the 
poorest families, and also that it increased the possibility that children had better nutrition 
and received medical treatment in case of stomach infections. However, no effect on 
attendance at health centres was demonstrated in the study. Moreover, Ponce (2008) finds 
that families around the eligibility cut (between the quintiles two and three) receiving 
BDH transfers spend on average 25 percent more on food than families who do not receive 
the transfers.    
Remarkably, most of the existing impact evaluations have analysed the effects of 
the BDH programme using experimental methods or regression discontinuity designs with 
experimental data. In the evaluative literature, there are not many important studies that 
have used alternative quasi-experimental methods with secondary data, nor that evaluate 
the impact of the BDH on the overall welfare level or labour supply of the poor. In 
addition, almost all the evaluations were carried out with data from the first half of the 
previous decade, despite the fact that the most significant changes in the programme –
with respect to the amount of the transfers and the number of beneficiaries– have occurred 
in the last decade. In fact, for the most recent periods there are no evaluations on the 
effectiveness of the programme. Appendix B presents a complete list of the main impact 
evaluations of the BDH (see page 411).  
 
2.2.1 Evolution of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
Until the late-1990s social protection practices in Ecuador were restricted to the services 
that the State provided on social security (namely, pensions and healthcare for formal 
workers), in addition to the traditional systems of education and health. At that time, these 
services were not constituted as a real network of social protection (or safety net) that: i) 
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would have been useful as a means to alleviate poverty; and, ii) would have served to 
mitigate the effects of the continuing economic crisis and natural disasters that affected a 
large part of the Ecuadorian population during those years (Martinez & Rosero, 2007).   
It was only in 1998, within a context of pre-crisis, that the Ecuadorian Government 
incorporated a compensatory policy due to the elimination of important subsidies on 
cooking gas, gasoline, diesel fuel, and electricity. Specifically, a programme of direct cash 
transfers (called Bono Solidario) was implemented for the first time in the country. This 
programme was not initially conceived a mechanism for promoting human development 
and improving social protection, and, much less, as way to encourage investment in human 
capital (Schady & Araujo, 2006). Quite the opposite, the Bono Solidario programme was 
originally intended merely as a temporary compensatory measure for poor households due 
to the elimination of gas and electricity subsidies (Larrea, 2013).  
However, given the deep economic crisis that Ecuador was going through in the 
period 1999-2000, which also constituted the main cause of the official dollarization of 
the economy, the Bono Solidario programme became the second most important 
component of social expenditure in the country (after expenditure in education), and the 
main tool to fight the effects of the crisis and protect the most vulnerable people -due to 
the loss of purchasing power of the wages and the high levels of unemployment during 
those years (Martinez & Rosero, 2007).18 
The Bono Solidario functioned as a pure income transfer programme in which the 
State delivered monthly payments equivalent to 15 US dollars to three population groups: 
i) mothers with at least one child under 18, whose monthly family income did not exceed 
1 million sucres (40 US dollars) and who were not affiliated to social security; ii) people 
over 65 years old, whose monthly family income did not exceed the equivalent to 40 US 
dollars and did not perceive a fixed monthly salary; and iii) people between 18 and 65 
                                                             
18
 The Bono Solidario represented up to 11 percent of the total social expenditure in those years.  
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years who had a degree of disability of at least 70 percent, according to the state's disability 
classification standards (Vos et al., 2003).19  
The mechanism of beneficiary selection was based on self-targeting, but 
“surprisingly”, there was no information about errors of focalization (namely, leakage and 
under-coverage) in the initial programme documentation (Martinez & Rosero, 2007). 
Actually, it was not until 2000 that the Bono Solidario was finally audited by 
governmental and academic institutions. The study of Vos, Ponce and León (2003) 
concluded that the self-targeting mechanism used, although progressive, suffered from 
under-coverage problems regarding the poor and leakage problems to the non-poor (about 
42 percent of the transfers was channelled to middle income households). Moreover, an 
audit conducted between August 2000 and July 2001 revealed late payments to 
programme beneficiaries, a substantial surplus of cash intended to reach poor households 
still in the banks, and even the receipt of transfers by deceased people (De la O, 2015).   
Most of these irregularities could be explained by the fact that there was no 
institution responsible for monitoring the quality of the information. As a result of this 
lack of control, the programme database was full of inconsistencies and some of the 
poorest families in the country were not even enrolled in the programme (De la O, 2015). 
Therefore, once the national economy somewhat improved in 2003, and since this 
programme assisted a large part of the Ecuadorian population (about 45 percent of the 
total families), the Bono Solidario was ultimately replaced by the current Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano. By combining the Bono Solidario and the Beca Escolar programme, 
an important shift occurred in the conceptual structure of social assistance practices in 
Ecuador.20 According to Martinez and Rosero (2007), the axes on which this 
transformation was based were the following: 
                                                             
19
 Until the moment it was replaced by the BDH programme (that is, from 2003), the Bono Solidario 
programme covered more than 1 million beneficiary families (Vos et al., 2003).  
20
 The Beca Escolar programme was the first attempt in Ecuador to offer monthly cash transfers to poor 
families with children –between 6-15 years– old in exchange for families enrolling their children in school 
and keeping them attending classes. (Martinez & Rosero, 2007). 
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a. Re-focalization of the programme through the beneficiary selection system 
known as SELBEN. 
b. Application of formal conditions for the delivery of cash transfers, which are 
related to the behaviour of families in terms of education and health of their 
children. 
c. Inclusion of an evaluation component that was designed by programme 
administrators in conjunction with the World Bank.21 
This process of transformation and re-focalization of the CCT programme, which 
took place mostly in 2003, represented a key expansion of the social protection apparatus 
in Ecuador. It allowed the improvement of the targeting mechanisms and the continuous 
growth of the coverage level of the BDH programme (and other social assistance 
initiatives) for several years afterwards.  
 
2.2.2 Target Population and Targeting Mechanism 
In the context of public policy, targeting is the act of directing public resources, in the 
form of subsidies or transfers, to specific population groups in order to achieve certain 
policy objectives. Normally, subsidies and transfers provided by governments as part of 
different social programmes are targeted to those in poverty, but there are also 
programmes that select their beneficiaries based on other criteria, such as gender or ethnic 
origin. According to the literature on this topic, there are some different methods for 
targeting subsidies. For example, they can be targeted on the basis of specific individual 
(or group) characteristics, or by simple self-selection of beneficiaries. Therefore, in 
practice, the selection of the most appropriate targeting method will depend, among other 
                                                             
21
 The internal validity of this official impact evaluation was compromised by government’s decisions and 
involuntary mistakes. Only 78 percent of the treatment group (and 42 percent of the control group) 
received the cash transfers because the information on beneficiaries’ assignment was not received by the 
programme operational staff on time (Schady & Araujo, 2006).  
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things, on the costs of implementation, administrative viability and political feasibility 
(Bitrán & Muñoz, 2000). 
Note that it is important to consider both the target population of the BDH 
programme and its targeting mechanism when constructing the sample used for the 
programme’s impact evaluations (see page 189). Only in this way, one makes sure to take 
into account only the beneficiaries and the potential beneficiaries of the programme for 
their comparison (leaving aside people who are not entitled to receive the cash transfers). 
In addition, it is necessary to consider the changes in the beneficiaries selection criteria 
that occurred in 2003 and 2014, since these define the target population during the 
evaluation period (i.e. 2008 to 2014). As will be seen in Chapter 5, individuals in the 
sample are selected bearing in mind the modifications in the BDH beneficiary 
identification process that are explained below. 
As previously mentioned, the instrument used for targeting and selecting 
beneficiaries of the programme is the Registro Social process, which collects 
individualized socio-economic information and also serves to identify potential 
beneficiaries of other social assistance programmes and projects offered by the 
Ecuadorian government. The targeting process is carried out by the MCDS in two main 
stages.22 The first is a geographic identification of the poorest census sectors or districts 
in the country, while the second phase consists of conducting household-level surveys in 
the previously identified census sectors (Martinez et al., 2017). 
The selection of the poorest census sectors is carried out using the cartographic 
division of the country designed by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC) 
(National Institute of Statistics and Census)23 together with the Index of Unsatisfied Basic 
Needs (UBN, or NBI from the Spanish acronym) developed by the Andean Community 
                                                             
22
 The coordinating ministries in Ecuador (e.g. MCDS) have a higher rank than the other ministries and 
were established with the purpose of joining efforts in strategic areas of development, such as the fight 
against poverty. 
23
 Most official and non-official surveys use this division to achieve national representativeness (INEC, 
2013) 
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of Nations.24 Specifically, the selected census sectors are those where the incidence of 
poverty (i.e. percentage of poor households) is greater than 50 percent. For example, in 
the last survey of socioeconomic information -made prior to the 2013 Registro Social-, 
24,482 poor census sectors were identified from a total of 42,649 sectors into which 
Ecuador is currently divided (MCDS, 2016b).  
Once the poorest census sectors have been selected, the second stage consists in 
conducting household- and individual-level surveys to build a complete registry for each 
family that resides in the chosen areas. This is done with the final purpose of objectively 
(or quantitatively) qualifying their level of welfare (or current economic situation) and, 
subsequently, identifying the potential BDH beneficiaries. Special attention is given to 
verifying the accuracy of the information provided by families during the Registro Social 
survey process. The household information is later cross-referenced with data from the 
social security administration, the public electricity company, and the national credit 
bureau to ensure that people with formal and stable jobs of relatively high salaries, with a 
consumption of energy higher than the limit set for programme eligibility, with active 
loans granted by private banks, or people who own a vehicle, are not prioritized when 
selecting programme beneficiaries (De la O, 2015). 
The implementation of the surveys is carried out in three different ways depending 
on the number of households in each census sector and on their geographical location. In 
most cases, families are visited and surveyed in their own homes. In some less frequent 
cases, families are summoned through a local authority to go to a public place where the 
surveys are applied in groups. Additionally, the MIES allows families to voluntarily 
register their interest in becoming future programme beneficiaries. This can be done by 
phone, in person or in the official web page of the Registro Social (MIES, 2013).25 
                                                             
24
 The UBN methodology establishes that a household is considered poor when at least one of five different 
basic needs is not satisfied. These basic needs are related to housing materials, access to basic services, 
level of overcrowding, economic dependence and school attendance (Feres & Mancero, 2001). 
25
 For more information about the Registro Social process, more specifically the methods used by the 
MCDS to identify census districts and collect household information, see Chapter 4, page 152.  
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The socioeconomic information collected through the surveys is then integrated 
into the Sistema de Información del Registro Social (SiiRS). The SiiRS is the database 
used to estimate the Welfare Index for each of the surveyed households, which fulfils the 
function of targeting mechanism (i.e. beneficiary selection mechanism) of the BDH 
programme. The Welfare Index is merely a proxy means test (PMT) that uses the statistical 
technique of non-linear main components, which consists of combining 34 variables to 
build a weighted average and, as a result, generate a household welfare proxy (MCDS, 
2016). The information used to build the proxy is related, for example, to the housing 
characteristics, access to basic services, availability of assets, family composition, 
educational attainments, etc. Consequently, the Welfare Index takes values that range 
from 0 to 100, where 100 is the highest level of well-being.26 
The selection criteria used to choose the potential beneficiaries of the BDH 
programme is based on targeting households that have a score equivalent to or less than 
28.20 in the Welfare Index. This includes extremely poor households located in the first 
quintile of the welfare distribution (i.e. 24.07 points) plus a margin of 4 points that serves 
to reduce possible exclusion errors (MIES, 2013c). However, since the BDH programme 
implementation in 2003, the process of identifying potential beneficiaries has been 
modified twice –both after the socio-economic data collection by the Registro Social– that 
is, once in 2008 and once in 2014. 
Initially, in 2003, the targeting mechanism was the PMT called SELBEN Index 
with its specific calculation methodology. The target population was those families that 
were in the first and second quintiles according to the values of the index (i.e. poor 
households). Later, in 2008, the methodology used to calculate the SELBEN Index was 
changed and the index was formally renamed as the Welfare Index, while the target 
population stayed the same. Finally, in 2014, both the targeting mechanism (that is, the 
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 For a more detailed explanation of the Welfare Index, its statistical technique and the variables used for 
its construction, see Chapter 4, page 157. 
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PMT methodology) and the target population were modified (Martinez et al., 2017).27 The 
following table summarizes the most important changes in the BDH potential beneficiary 
identification process that should be considered when selecting the sample for the impact 
evaluations:   
 
































Quintiles 1 and 
2 (up to 36.5 
index points) 
Quintiles 1 and 
2 (up to 36.5 
index points) 








2.1 million 2 million 2.1 million 
Source: Own elaboration based on MCDS (2016) and Martinez et al. (2017).  
 
                                                             
27
 The Welfare Index with the 2008 methodology is the one used in this thesis to estimate the impact of 
the BDH and CDH programmes. Fortunately, in 2014, different indexes were constructed using the two 
available methodologies to facilitate their comparison. 
28
 Note that the number of households surveyed in each Registro Social is not equivalent to the number of 
BDH beneficiaries. 
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Once the potential beneficiaries of the programme are objectively identified using 
the Welfare Index, the public institution in charge of the BDH proceeds to select those 
individuals who will effectively receive the cash transfers (MIES, 2013). Although in 
theory all individuals living in poverty have the same right to receive these monetary 
benefits, throughout the implementation of the programme not all of them have been able 
to be covered for strictly budgetary reasons (Gutierrez et al., 2013). Therefore, according 
to the bases of the BDH and to the principle of equal rights among individuals, the final 
selection of beneficiaries should and apparently takes place through a strictly random 
process, in which all potential beneficiaries have the same probability of being chosen 
(Calvas, 2010; MCDS, 2013). This last statement is key to justify the validity of the natural 
experiment proposed in this thesis as one of the methods used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the BDH programme, which is described in detail in Chapter 3. However, at this point 
it is necessary to mention that there are some considerable reasons to believe that the 
selection of BDH beneficiaries might not be as random as it seems.  
In the first place is the geographical issue, that is, the territorial location of the 
households surveyed by the Registro Social. As mentioned above, the survey process 
focuses mainly on the census sectors with the highest incidence of poverty (i.e. percentage 
of poor households over 50 percent). Therefore, those individuals or families in extreme 
poverty who are not located in the pre-selected sectors are arguably less likely to be 
visited, surveyed and subsequently chosen to receive BDH cash transfers. Note that in 
order for these families to be able to be selected, they must first personally request the 
visit of the MIES staff within the established deadlines (MIES, 2013). Second, there are 
political factors or interests that could in some way affect the beneficiary selection 
process. Ultimately, the decision to grant transfers to a particular household or group of 
households could be largely political and, therefore, is likely to be subject to value 
judgments, electoral interests, circumstantial issues and even internal negotiations 
(McCord et al., 2016). It is possible, for example, that the government prefers to benefit 
certain social sectors that are more organized or that have greater political representation. 
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Finally, there are socio-economic and cultural factors that could indirectly affect 
the chances of a household in extreme poverty being chosen to receive BDH cash 
transfers. The levels of education, income and access to technology (and information) play 
an important role when households need to exercise the right to social assistance and 
acknowledge a broad range of other social rights (such as the rights to education, health, 
social security, leave, employment and pensions) (Sepúlveda, 2014).29 In the case of the 
BDH programme, the potential beneficiaries are responsible for updating their data and 
verifying if they have been chosen at the end of the selection process (Martinez et al., 
2017). Therefore, illiteracy, long distances, limited access to basic public services and 
Internet service, and the lack of an adequate ‘technological culture’ are some of the factors 
that could arguably reduce for some people the possibility of being a beneficiary. 
Although some of these socio-economic factors are observable, there are others that are 
not, raising serious doubts about the theoretically random selection of beneficiaries. 
Unfortunately, there is no adequate and specific review of the aforementioned 
points in the existing literature on the BDH. The only argument mentioned quite 
frequently is that all individuals in extreme poverty have the same right to be chosen to 
receive the benefits of the BDH programme (Calvas, 2010; Gutierrez et al., 2013; MCDS, 
2013). However, it is necessary to take into account the existence of geographical, political 
and socio-economic factors  that clearly raise the possibility that the process of selecting 
beneficiaries is not completely random. In other words, there could be internal selection 
biases (i.e. the presence of observable and non-observable differences between groups) 
that must be taken into account when evaluating the programme, that is, when comparing 
BDH beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries (as will be explained thoroughly in Chapter 3). 
In any case, whether the selection process of BDH beneficiaries has been completely 
random or not, the evidence shows that this process has been sufficiently efficient so that 
the programme's targeting results have been quite successful over time (Gutierrez, 2016). 
                                                             
29
 In Ecuador, as in other Latin American countries, the incorporation of a rights approach in the design of 
its integrated social protection system is the outcome of the legal and institutional development required 
by its constitution (Sepúlveda, 2014). 
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It is said that a government is successful in its targeting effort if all or most of the 
benefits reach those who need them most. This would mean that the programme is 
progressive in the sense that its subsidies (or transfers) are concentrated mainly on the 
target population. The higher the percentage of benefits reaching the target population, the 
more progressive is the programme. On the contrary, the government’s effort is not 
successful if a significant portion of the target population is not benefitting (i.e. under-
coverage problems), or there is a significant loss or leakage of subsidies (or transfers) to 
other groups (i.e. leakage problems). The latter would also mean that the programme is 
regressive (Bitran & Munoz, 2000). 
Some evidence suggests that the BDH programme has been progressive since its 
implementation, given that cash transfers have been concentrated mainly on the target 
population (i.e. first all those in poverty and then only those in extreme poverty). 
Specifically, until 2013, close to 30 percent of the benefits reached the extremely poor 
households (1st quintile), while close to 35 percent were concentrated in the moderate poor 
households (2nd quintile) (Gutierrez et al., 2013). Evidently, the changes in eligibility 
conditions that occurred in 2014 modified this distribution and somewhat improved the 
progressivity of the BDH programme. In 2016, only the households in the first quintile 
represented about 42 percent of the total beneficiary households (Gutierrez, 2016). 
The existing evidence also indicates that there have been small but persistent 
filtering and sub-coverage problems, which were not completely solved despite the 
changes in the eligibility conditions of the beneficiaries. In fact, these changes 
considerably increased the sub-coverage level of households living in extreme poverty. 
More specifically, the coverage of households in the first quintile went from 63 percent in 
2013 to 41 percent in 2016 (Gutierrez, 2016). Therefore, in the last few years, very high 
levels of exclusion of potentially eligible households are estimated. This has meant that 
Ecuador has gone from being one of the countries in the region with a CCT programme 
with the lowest level of sub-coverage (of households in extreme poverty), to have sub-
coverage levels close to the regional average and much higher than those of Chile, Bolivia, 
Uruguay and Mexico.   
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On the other hand, in terms of leakage problems, there is a significant reduction 
after 2014 –without this important issue being completely solved. Specifically, it was 
estimated that, in 2013, close to 35 percent of benefits reached the population above 
moderate poverty level (2nd quintile) (Gutierrez et al., 2013). While, according to more 
recent estimations, “only” 20 percent of the benefits reached families above the second 
quintile in 2016 (Gutierrez, 2016). Undoubtedly, there is a great need to develop more 
sophisticated targeting strategies so that CCT programmes, such as the BDH, can 
effectively reach their target populations and solve the persistent filtering and sub-
coverage problems. This is an important challenge not only for Ecuador, but for other 
countries in the region that use similar targeting mechanisms. The seeming progressive 
nature of the BDH programme makes us think that there should not be serious leakage 
problems in the sample used in this thesis for the impact evaluations. In other words, those 
who belong to the BDH treatment group should actually be poor. Of course, this will be 
confirmed later in Chapter 5. 
 
2.2.3 Structure and Payment Mechanisms of the Cash Transfers 
Unlike other CCT programmes, there is no registration process for the BDH in which the 
selected beneficiaries must present some documentation in order to receive the payments. 
Basically, once the MCDS identifies the potential beneficiaries, this information is sent to 
the MIES which, as the institution responsible for executing the programme, applies the 
selection criteria, prepares a database of selected households and activates the payments. 
Moreover, there is no direct mechanism of notification (e.g. email or postal service), since 
it is the families who are responsible for finding out if they were chosen. However, 
massive radio and television campaigns are carried out by the government to inform 
families of the mechanisms to verify if they were selected (i.e. call centre, Registro Social 
website and the MIES local offices).  
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The structure of the BDH cash transfers is the same as that of most CCTs in Latin 
America, that is, it consists of a payment of 50 US dollars delivered every month of the 
year.30 Initially, the programme assisted poor households with 100,000 Ecuadorian Sucres 
(equivalent at that time to 15 US dollars), later in 2009 the cash transfer was fixed at 35 
US dollars, and finally in January 2013 it was increased to 50 US dollars (see Table 2). 
The monthly payments are administered mainly by the National Banking System 
(BANRED) together with other private financial institutions that also provide 
transactional services but with less relevant participation (MIES, 2013).  
 
Table 2: Changes in the Monetary Value of the BDH 








      Source: MIES (2013).  
 
One of the most important characteristics of the BDH payments is that the 
programme presents a clear gender perspective in the delivery of benefits by providing 
cash transfers primarily to the woman of the household (in approximately 99 percent of 
households). This perspective is based on the belief that the woman usually has the 
greatest responsibility for purchasing decisions, preparation of food, health care of 
                                                             
30
 This amount represents about 13 percent of the total monthly income for a family in the first quintile of 
the Welfare Index (which is around 366 US dollars). 
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children and monitoring the attendance of children to school (Martinez & Rosero, 2007). 
The idea that children do better when their mothers control a larger fraction of family 
resources is supported on a vast literature on the dynamics of intra-household allocation 
of benefits (Lundberg et al., 1997). 
It is important to note that in addition to the conditional cash transfers, families 
receive no other complementary intervention to help them overcome poverty and improve 
their living conditions, such as nutritional assistance and talks, nutritional supplements or 
any other kind of incentives to change the usual behaviour of the beneficiary families. 
However, any family in extreme poverty can participate in other MIES cash transfer 
programmes apart from the BDH. These programmes include a pension for elders and a 
pension for people with disabilities, which also provide families with 50 US dollars a 
month. In these cases, the person receiving the benefits is the elderly or the member of the 
household with disability and not necessarily the woman (MIES, 2013). 
Regarding the payment mechanisms of the transfers, the BDH is one of the few 
programmes in the region that do not issue electronic payments in a systematic manner 
(for example, using a debit card issued by a bank) and in which the beneficiary families 
do not necessarily require a bank account.31 For that reason, the BDH programme 
developed a wide network of payment points both in urban and rural areas, which include 
private networks of non-bank correspondents and several public and private financial 
institutions. In December 2015, the BDH payment network had 9,740 payment points. 
(Martinez et al., 2017).   
Another alternative, although much less used, to collect cash transfers is through 
ATMs. In order to do so, beneficiaries must request a magnetic card called MIES Bono 
Rápido, which is not linked to a bank account and which allows ATMs to identify the 
BDH beneficiaries. However, this initiative, which ultimately seeks the modernization of 
                                                             
31
 However, when BDH beneficiaries apply for the CDH programme, it is necessary that they have a savings 
account to receive the transfer. As explained in detail below, the CDH programme is a non-reimbursable 
credit for investments that only BDH beneficiaries can access.  
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the payment mechanisms, has not had the expected reception in the beneficiaries of social 
assistance programmes (Martinez et al., 2017). This may have been mainly due to the fact 
that the majority of beneficiaries are not used to employ this type of financial instruments, 
added to the lack of knowledge and the lack of ATMs, especially in rural areas. According 
to the MIES official information, 593,000 people requested the card when it was 
implemented in 2013, but only about 10,000 cards were still active 4 years later. It is 
important to note that the initial high demand of the magnetic card shows that there is 
actually a lot of interest in the use of this alternative, but the technological limitations have 
prevented this initiative from replacing the collection in payment points as the preferred 
payment mechanism. 
Finally, the BDH beneficiaries also have the option of receiving the cash transfers 
directly in their savings accounts. This payment mechanism was recently implemented to 
facilitate transactions. Despite the notable advantages of using this alternative, especially 
in relation to the high transaction costs assumed by the government, there are also some 
disadvantages that are worth mentioning. In the first place, the beneficiaries need to open 
an account and assume the costs of managing, which are normally charged by the banking 
entities. In addition, only the payment points (or ATMs) that belong to the financial 
institution that issues the account can be used for collecting the money without incurring 
an additional cost. 
 
2.2.4 Conditionality of the Programme  
In theory, a cash transfer scheme is conditional on education and health if minimum 
thresholds of school attendance and health check-ups are required and there are well-
established protocols for verifying conditionalities (De la O, 2015). Since its 
implementation, the BDH was conceived in accordance with its operational rules as a 
programme of conditional benefits involving two types of conditioning. 
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First, the programme establishes a series of conditions related to the health of the 
beneficiary families. If the household has children under 5 years old, the transfer is 
conditional on children going to health check-ups at least twice a year. Therefore, mothers 
of beneficiary families must present a vaccination card every month to ensure that they 
are taking their children to medical controls in order to prevent health problems and 
malnutrition. In the case of pregnant women and children under one year of age, they must 
complete five or six health consultations per year. In addition, members of the household 
of childbearing age must attend an annual talk on family planning (Martinez et al., 2017). 
Table 3 summarizes the series of health-related conditions that are theoretically imposed 
by the BDH programme. 
 
Table 3: Heath-related Conditions of the BDH Programme According to the 
Member of the Household and the Age of the Children. 
Member of the household Necessary health check-ups per year 
Pregnant women 
2 check-ups in the first four-month period 
2 check-ups in the second four-month 
period 
1 check-up at the end of pregnancy 
Children under 1 year of age 
2 consultations (0 to 4 months of age) 
2 consultations (5 to 8 months of age) 
2 consultations (9 to 12 months of age) 
Children between 1 and 5 
years of age 
Minimum 2 medical consultations 
People of childbearing age Attend a talk on family planning 
 
Source: Martinez et al. (2017). 
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In the case of non-compliance with the previously described health-related 
conditions, the BDH programme establishes clear sanctions with progressive severity. 
That is, after the first breach of one of the conditions, the beneficiary family receives only 
a formal warning. The second breach implies a reduction of 20 percent of the value of the 
cash transfer, while the third causes a considerable reduction of 40 percent. After the 
fourth breach, the payment should be permanently suspended according to rules 
established by the MIES.  
Second, the BDH programme also establishes conditions related to the education 
of the children. If the beneficiary household has children between 5-18 years old, the 
transfer is conditional upon all children being enrolled in a general basic education school 
or high-school32, and attending at least 80 percent of school days in accordance with the 
academic calendar. Thus, in order to receive the transfer, mothers must submit an original 
certificate indicating that their children are enrolled and regularly attending their schools, 
or instead they must submit the official grades/report card of their children (MIES, 2014).  
As with the health-related conditions, the MIES formally established sanctions for 
non-compliance with the conditionalities related to children's education of the beneficiary 
households. Specifically, according to the rules of the BDH programme, a child not 
formally enrolled in school implies a 50 percent reduction of the cash transfer, while a 
child not regularly attending classes entails the complete suspension of the payment. 
However, in practice, some operational challenges and budgetary constraints –
combined with high turnover among the programme’s technical staff– prevented for many 
years the efficient verification of compliance with conditionalities (Martinez & Rosero, 
2007). In the early stages of the programme, government officials claimed that it was not 
financially possible to impose the requirements because the administrative burden and 
costs of monitoring school and health facilities attendance are very high (Ponce & 
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 In Ecuador, general basic education comprises ten school grades: a first grade of preparatory education 
for children of 5 years of age, three grades of elementary education, three grades of intermediate 
education and three grades of secondary education. Once the general basic education is completed, the 
children goes to the baccalaureate or high-school that comprises other three grades. 
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Enriquez, 2013). In fact, verifying that conditionalities are met is usually a complex and 
expensive process that involves staff at the programme’s head office, active participation 
from schools and health centres, and a municipal associate, who is typically the 
representative for the programme in the local government (De la O, 2015). As a result, for 
about ten years (i.e. from 2003 to 2011), no follow up measures or monitoring tools were 
implemented to ensure compliance with the requirements and co-responsibilities 
demanded by the BDH programme.33 
It was only at the beginning of this decade that the MIES and MCDS reported that 
they have begun to randomly monitor the compliance among beneficiary families (MIES, 
2013b). Specifically, a partially systematic process has been implemented (and different 
pilot tests performed) to monitor compliance with the conditionalities, although there have 
been no officially reported suspensions of payment to those beneficiaries who do not 
comply with them (Martinez et al., 2017). Nevertheless, although there is no complete 
systematic process for the verification of the formal conditions, the BDH beneficiaries 
have been continually informed about the “co-responsibilities” or conditionalities that 
must be met through communication campaigns.  
Interestingly, despite the fact that no requirement was monitored or enforced for 
many years, according to the perception of a substantial portion of potential beneficiaries, 
the BDH was a conditional programme from the beginning (Oosterbeek et al., 2008).34 In 
other words, there has been a common perception that transfers have been conditioned in 
a large proportion of the target population. This could be explained by the first indications 
that programme officials gave families during the registration processes and also because 
of the chain of communication carried out by the programme at the beginning of the BDH. 
                                                             
33
 Different evaluation reports conducted in the previous decade indicate that the BDH programme had 
no formal mechanisms to verify attendance at school and health care centres (Paxson & Shady, 2007; 
Schady & Araujo, 2006). 
34
 Recent surveys conducted by Oosterbeek et al. (2008) indicate that at least one third of the beneficiaries 
believed that the transfers were conditional since the programme’s implementation in 2003.  
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Actually, evaluation reports have pointed out that a possible reason for this 
common belief among programme beneficiaries is that before the actual implementation 
of the BDH programme –specifically at the time that people were enrolling to receive cash 
transfers– there was a massive media campaign, which stressed the importance of 
schooling and health care. As part of this campaign in the media, programme 
administrators explicitly stated on radio and television that parents are responsible for 
school attendance and health of their children and discussed how this is linked to the 
benefits of BDH (Paxson & Shady, 2007; Schady & Araujo, 2006). In consequence, most 
households believed that there were enrolment requirements that were going to be 
monitored after the implementation of the programme or in the near future. 
Finally, it is important to point out that the health- and education-related conditions 
that BDH beneficiaries must meet –and the consequences of their non-compliance– were 
first established in 2003 along with the implementation of the programme, but then they 
were drastically modified in 2013. In the past, health controls did not adjust to children’s 
age or the progress of pregnancy, nor were there requirements related to family planning. 
Nowadays, the conditions attached to the programme are much stricter than those initially 
established (Martinez et al., 2017). 
The MCDS recently implemented more conditionalities related to the housing 
conditions of beneficiary households, child labour and child begging. In this sense, 
families are required not to building their houses in areas prone to flooding or landslides, 
and the invasion of land is strictly prohibited. Besides, they must keep their houses and 
their neighbourhoods in acceptable hygiene conditions. Moreover, parents are committed 
to the programme not to send children under 15 years to work or beg. Formally, the penalty 
for non-compliance with any of these conditions is the temporary or definitive suspension 
of the cash transfers. 
Given that the BDH is (at least in theory) a conditional programme and that the 
beneficiaries have the perception that non-compliance with these conditions can lead to 
the withdrawal of benefits, one would expect the results of the impact evaluations –in 
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terms of human capital generation– to be positive. Otherwise, it would mean that the 
programme is not reaching one of its main objectives and would raise serious doubts about 
whether the MIES is effectively verifying and controlling compliance with the conditions. 
Moreover, it is necessary to consider that changes in conditionalities, making them much 
stricter, began only one year before the last Registro Social survey, so that their effects on 
individuals’ behaviour still would not be reflected. 
 
2.2.5 Coverage of the Programme  
The number of beneficiary households of the BDH programme increased significantly and 
almost continuously from 2006 to 2010, as shown in Figure 2. The relatively constant 
upward trend was consolidated since 2008 mainly due to the approval of the new 
Ecuadorian Constitution, which gives priority in terms of rights and attention to vulnerable 
groups of the population. As stated in Article 35 of the Constitution, people in situations 
of vulnerability or poverty, the elderly, children, pregnant women, persons with 
disabilities, persons deprived of liberty and those suffering from terminal illnesses must 
receive priority attention and specialized care in the public and private sectors 
(Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008). 
From 2011 until 2013, a slight decrease can be observed in the level of coverage 
that responds mainly to the political decision to reduce public spending on social 
assistance programmes (Gutierrez et al., 2013). Figure 2 shows, for example, that from 
December 2012 to June 2013 there was a reduction of 145,088 beneficiary families. 
However, until that time the BDH programme still covered a significant portion of the 
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Figure 2: Beneficiary Families of the BDH at the National Level 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on MIES (2013b) and Martinez et al. (2017).  
 
The most significant reduction in the number of beneficiaries happened as of 2014. 
This decrease is mainly due to the new system that, according to the MIES, has been used 
in recent years to improve the targeting mechanisms of the programme and to debug the 
database of beneficiaries by solving persistent leakage problems (MIES, 2013b).35 From 
this process of re-targeting and adjustment of the eligibility criteria, a large number of 
families have left the programme. In total, 748,000 households that received the BDH 
were excluded between April 2013 and April 2015 (Martinez et al., 2017). 
 
                                                             
35
 Since 2013, the SELBEN database is cross-referenced with data from the social security administration, 
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2.3 The Crédito de Desarrollo Humano Programme 
Arguably the most innovative welfare programme to date in Ecuador, which comprises 
the more significant variations with respect to traditional CCTs, was announced in 2007 
and fully launched at the end of 2008. This programme was called the Crédito de 
Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Credit) and it consists of an unconditional 
lump-sum payment (equivalent to twelve BDH cash transfers) to households living in 
poverty who ask for it voluntarily in order to invest the money in productive ventures. In 
this sense, the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano, commonly known as CDH, could be 
defined as a non-reimbursable productive microcredit designed for those who are willing 
to promote projects that favour productive or self-employment activities (Martinez et al., 
2017). 
The CDH has its predecessor in the Crédito Productivo Solidario (CPS) 
programme implemented in 2001 and also aimed at households receiving BDH transfers. 
This programme was based on the idea that the poorest households would overcome 
poverty with the support of the government, but mostly because of their own efforts 
(Castillo et al., 2017). The government provided small loans of up to 840 US dollars to a 
maximum term of up to 2 years and those in poverty contributed with their productive 
capacity to improve their income (Registro Oficial, 2001). Therefore, the CPS was a 
reimbursable microcredit not linked to the BDH cash transfers, interest rates were agreed 
based on market conditions and payment guarantees were requested.36 However, as should 
have been expected, this programme did not reach the desired levels of coverage and 
acceptance among vulnerable groups of the population, due in large part to the high 
interest rates in the national financial market, and also to the fact that poor people have 
many difficulties to provide a guarantee of payment. 
                                                             
36
 See <http://http://www.inclusion.gob.ec/credito-productivo-solidario/> for a detailed explanation of 
the requirements to access the CPS programme (02/04/2018). 
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After this failed attempt to promote inclusive microcredit, it could be said that the 
lesson was learned and a totally new programme was designed with terms and conditions 
of credit much more suitable for vulnerable populations. Actually, the only formal 
requirement of the CDH programme is to be a beneficiary or at least a potential beneficiary 
of the BDH programme at the time of application. Thus, people who participate in this 
alternative programme have the advantage of accumulating the BDH cash transfers for a 
full year and use this capital to start or strengthen their own businesses. The usual payment 
is up to 600 US dollars (one year of accumulated monthly transfers), personal guarantees 
are not required, and -unlike traditional microcredits- any kind of repayment is necessary 
(MIES, 2013b).37 At the moment when a potential beneficiary family requests the CDH 
micro-credit, the MIES simply processes the payment of the accumulated transfers and 
deposits it in a bank account. 
The main purpose of the CDH programme is to improve the quality of life among 
the poorest families in the country by providing access to financial products that 
strengthen and promote their economic capacity, while boosting the national economy 
through the efficient allocation of capital to productive investments (Maldonado & 
Moreno, 2011; MIES, 2013b). Moreover, the CDH programme aims to facilitate access 
to knowledge through expert advice, technical support and links to other existing social 
services. According to the Instituto de Economía Popular y Solidaria (IEPS), the CDH 
programme was designed to meet the following specific objectives: create opportunities 
for local development, expand the market for micro and small businesses, encourage the 
creation of micro joint venture projects, improve credit policies in the country and ensure 
the sustainability of micro productive enterprises (IEPS, 2013, page 2). In order to meet 
these objectives, the CDH is based on three fundamental axes: productive inclusion, 
associativity and sustainability. 
Productive inclusion is sought by promoting the generation of autonomous income 
and the increased social participation of the poor populations, while associativity is 
                                                             
37
 In some cases, a small annual interest rate (normally 5 percent) is retained at the time of disbursement.  
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fostered by financing collective and self-managed work opportunities (IEPS, 2013). 
Although most families who apply for the CDH alternative already run small businesses 
and microenterprises -engaged in the production of goods, trade or services- there is also 
the possibility of applying for the CDH programme through the elaboration of a simple 
business proposal or a productive investment project, which has to be previously assessed 
and approved by the programme administrators. Thus, previous business experience is 
desirable but not necessary to be eligible to participate in this innovative scheme of cash 
transfers (IEPS, 2014). 
Moreover, business sustainability is sought by accompanying the ventures with 
training and assistance in different topics to ensure that they remain profitable over time 
(IEPS, 2013). It has been established previously that –apart from financial products– a 
true productive inclusion requires an enabling economic and social environment that 
offers opportunities for those in poverty (see page 16). For this reason, the CDH 
programme accompanies the lump-sum cash transfers of a series of complementary 
policies (related to effective micro-entrepreneurship and personal development) that seek 
to improve the capacities of beneficiaries and break down the structural barriers that they 
commonly face. The continuous support of the Ecuadorian government to the CDH micro-
entrepreneur, through technical advice and capacity-building activities, is thought to be 
important for families to start their own businesses and be successful. 
At this point, it is useful to clearly identify the expected medium- and long-term 
results of the CDH programme and the pre-conditions necessary (according to the 
Ecuadorian Government) for it to be effective. This information will be used in the 
evaluation design process since it allows to understand the workings of the programme, 
as well as the causal effect relations between inputs and outputs. The theoretical-approach 
to the impact evaluation is made in a later chapter through the description of the CDH 
Theories of Change (ToC) (see page 270). The IEPS (2014) indicates that the expected 
results of the programme are the following: 
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• Declines in income poverty at national and local level, specifically in the areas 
where there is a higher concentration of CDH beneficiaries. 
• Increased partnership activities aimed at the development and improvement of 
production in different industrial and strategic sectors. 
• Significant reductions in unemployment and underemployment throughout the 
country. 
• Improvements in welfare and living standards of the most vulnerable 
population. 
 
Moreover, the MCDS (2010) in its Implementation Guide of the CDH Training 
Plan formally identified the series of activities that were required for the correct 
implementation and subsequent development of the CDH programme. First, a 
comprehensive and timely record of the potential beneficiaries of the programme was 
generated. This registry of people living in poverty is periodically updated by the Registro 
Social system. Second, the programme was widely socialized through the media and 
people were encouraged to consider working in partnership as a valid form of productive 
enterprise. Third, the creation of micro-enterprises was promoted not only as a measure 
of subsistence, but also as a way of personal development. Specifically, the government 
used different success stories in productive investments, setting them as an example for 
the general population of how entrepreneurship can be translated into individual and social 
progress. Finally, trained personnel were hired to provide technical support to the 
beneficiary families, identifying problems and proposing solutions. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that these pre-conditions may have been necessary, but by no 
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2.3.1 Target Population and Targeting Mechanism 
As previously mentioned, the CDH programme is in some way linked to the BDH to the 
extent that only the potential beneficiaries of conditional monthly transfers can access the 
productive microcredits. This means that both the target population and the targeting 
mechanism are initially the same for the two programmes. More specifically, the 
accumulated CDH cash transfers are aimed at families around the first quintile of the 
Welfare Index (i.e. households that have a score equivalent to or less than 28.20 index 
points); while the process to identify these potential beneficiaries is through the socio-
economic information of the Registro Social.38 Therefore, in order to grant the 
microcredits, the same eligibility criteria are used as for the BDH cash transfers.  
However, it is important to emphasize for the subsequent impact evaluation of the 
CDH programme in this thesis that, once the families are already identified as potential 
beneficiaries of the BDH and CDH programmes, the only possible targeting mechanism 
of the CDH programme is through self-selection (or self-targeting) as there are no 
additional formal requirements. In other words, unlike the BDH programme, the final 
selection of CDH beneficiaries is not random. It is the families themselves who ultimately 
decide to opt for the lump-sum payment instead of the monthly transfers (MIES, 2013b).  
 
2.3.2 Structure and Payment Mechanisms of the Lump-Sum Cash 
Transfers  
The CDH cumulative (or lump-sum) cash transfers are structured as periodic payments, 
equivalent to twelve regular BDH cash transfers, that give those in poverty the possibility 
of developing a productive process while linking to the formal economy. Thus, this 
                                                             
38
 Recall that until 2014 potential BDH and CDH beneficiaries also included families around second quintile 
of the Welfare Index (i.e. households that have a score of up to 36.5 index points).  
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innovative form of cash transfers can be also seen as annual (non-reimbursable) micro-
credits (MIES, 2013b). 
The application process of the CDH programme is simple and is carried out in the 
first instance by telephone and then in person. Specifically, households interested in 
requesting the microcredit must first contact the MIES call centre to inquire about the 
availability of credits and apply for the programme. By telephone, it is verified that the 
household is enrolled in the BDH programme or at least qualifies as a potential 
beneficiary. In addition, it must be confirmed that the household does not have access 
restrictions due, for example, to the non-fulfilment of any of the conditionalities that have 
been registered in the past. Once the telephone operator verifies compliance with these 
basic requirements using a computer system, a personal appointment is scheduled at the 
MIES agency that is most convenient for the applicant (Martinez et al., 2017). 
The key element for the efficient operation of the application process for CDH 
lump-sum cash transfers is precisely the MIES integrated computer system, which allows 
managing the demand for microcredits and facilitates the attention to the applicants in a 
timely manner. This system collects and integrates information from different databases 
and from different sources. For example, the Banco Nacional de Fomento and several 
private credit cooperatives continually inform MIES about the number of people that can 
be attended and the number of credits that can be issued in each agency, according to the 
availability of resources in each financial institution. 
There is only one payment mechanism of the CDH cash transfers and it requires 
the opening of a bank account in case the applicant does not have one at the moment of 
the application. Normally, all financial institutions and credit cooperatives charge a certain 
amount for the opening of the required savings account, which must be covered in full by 
the applicant. Once this last requirement has been met, the applicant must attend the 
agreed appointment and present the necessary documentation that includes the personal 
and banking information of the household. Then, the MIES operator proceeds to the 
approval of the CDH microcredit and its deposit through the beneficiary's savings account. 
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In general, the payment process, understood as what happens between the approval of the 
credit and the deposit of the money in the savings account, takes two business days 
(Martínez, 2014).  
The CDH micro-credits are thought to fulfil a very important mission considering 
that access to credit by vulnerable groups (i.e. the poor, people with disabilities and older 
adults) in Ecuador has traditionally been constrained by private banks. There are more 
than 50 financial institutions in the country (cooperatives, NGOs and specialized banks) 
that provide microfinance products, but the majority of Ecuadorians do not easily access 
these services. According to the National Network of Development Financial Institutions, 
60 percent of people in the country have their own businesses, but 92 percent of them do 
not have access to credit, so they have to start their ventures with their own capital or with 
an informal loan (Zumba, 2017).   
There are a number of reasons that cause the institutionalized exclusion to financial 
products/services of those in poverty. Some of them are related to the lack of guarantees, 
the considerable financial expenses, the lack of external funding, the internal cost of 
reaching remote locations, the apparently unattractive financial returns, and the long 
distances between potential customers. In consequence, inequalities in access to credit 
have been accentuated over time and have diminished the opportunities that these 
population segments require to enter the productive sectors and improve their living 
conditions. Undoubtedly, a key short-term policy challenge in Ecuador is to design more 
specialized financial products that cover the credit needs of these populations that, 
although generally have few economic resources, in volume represent an attractive 
market. In this sense, the CDH programme might play an important economic and social 
role, attending a market segment that private banks have left aside for many years. 
The CDH programme offers four different alternatives or types of credit, which 
differ in the amount of the transfer, the type of recipient, and the purpose of the credit. 
The most popular type of CDH transfer is the individual credit that is granted to finance 
self-employment activities or new ventures dedicated to production, commerce or 
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services. Its maximum amount is 600 US dollars and the interest rate withheld is 5 percent. 
Another type of CDH is the business credit, which is granted to already established 
businesses. Its maximum amount is 840 US dollars and the interest rate retained is the 
same as the individual one.  
In third place is the articulated CDH credit whose purpose is to help and encourage 
beneficiaries to join a collective project or programme managed by the IEPS. Its maximum 
amount is 900 US dollars (1 year and a half of accumulated transfers) and the interest rate 
is maintained. Finally, the associative CDH credit is granted to those collective productive 
organizations registered in the IEPS and it is accompanied by specific training that 
promotes associativity and strengthens group dynamics. Its maximum amount is 1200 US 
dollars (2 years of transfers) and the interest rate is 5 percent. 
 
Table 4: Amounts and Terms of Each Type of CDH 
 Individual Business Articulated Associative 








Interest Rate 5 percent 5 percent 5 percent 5 percent 











Source: IEPS (2014).  
 
Although in the impact evaluation of the CDH programme conducted as part of 
this research project it will not be possible to distinguish between the type of credit granted 
to each beneficiary, it seems important to make this distinction so that the reader 
understands the level of customization/adjustability of the CDH initiative. By developing 
productive inclusion strategies tailored to each beneficiary of social assistance, the 
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programme manages to cover a greater number of unmet needs, which are different for 
each individual. Undoubtedly, this is a desirable feature that the new generation of 
integrated social assistance programmes are taking into account. 
 
2.3.3 Complementary Policies/Practices 
In order to achieve the productive inclusion of those in poverty, the CDH programme 
combines cash transfers with different public sector policies. Perhaps the most distinctive 
and innovative design feature of the CDH is that it offers free-of-charge technical support 
and assistance in capacity-building to the new entrepreneurs as an integral part of the 
programme (MIES, 2017). These complementary interventions are intended to guide and 
develop the productive capacities of the beneficiary households. More specifically, they 
are implemented with the intention that beneficiaries acquire some of the general 
knowledge and basic skills needed to start and run successfully their own small businesses. 
Therefore, the CDH programme –apart from providing cash transfers– seeks to promote 
the formation of human capital and minimize the financial and social risks to which 
beneficiaries are exposed (i.e. loss of BDH social protection benefits and destabilization 
of consumption over time). 
Expert technicians from the Economic Inclusion Unit of the MIES continuously 
monitor the CDH micro-enterprises in different productive sectors (e.g. agricultural, 
textile, industrial). They are in charge of helping beneficiaries to solve problems and of 
promoting partnership between them as a desirable business strategy. Attending different 
training workshops (e.g. strategic partnering and performance consulting), CDH 
beneficiaries gain knowledge about the effective management of resources for handling 
savings, investments, interest, operational costs and household expenses.39 According to 
the MIES (2017), these practices have allowed an important segment of the population, 
                                                             
39
 See <http://www.siise.gob.ec/siiseweb/PageWebs/Accion%20Social/ficacc_OS035.htm> Integrated 
System of Social Indicators for a detailed explanation of the programme's more distinctive features 
(15/04/2015). 
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which was traditionally excluded from the financial market, to access complementary 
services and use their money in productive initiatives that subsequently allow them to 
improve their income levels, decrease dependence on social assistance and improve their 
quality of life. 
In addition to providing CDH entrepreneurs with knowledge in business 
management, the MIES professional advisors also help them develop certain individual 
skills to be successful in their personal life and in the business world: flexibility, 
dynamism, creativity and persistence. These skills play a very important role since the 
entrepreneurship projects made by people living in poverty face all kinds of difficulties, 
relatively superior to those of any other venture, because they are made by people in 
conditions of vulnerability. The professional assistance offered by the government seeks 
to promote the social inclusion of people with learning, so that they are able to adapt to 
changing and unfavourable circumstances, minimizing the risks of their investments 
(Martínez & Mariño, 2013). 
However, according to some researchers, it is still necessary to strengthen these 
complementary policies/practices so that the ventures are truly successful and the 
beneficiaries get more out of them. Martínez and Mariño (2013) conducted surveys to 
CDH beneficiaries in the city of Latacunga to find out their perception about the 
programme and the use they have made of the transfers. Regarding the complementary 
services, the majority of beneficiaries indicated that they only received one visit per year 
from the MIES, which was aimed to help them start the business. The authors maintain 
that, although it is true that the MIES (through the Institute of Popular and Solidarity 
Economy) monitors CDH beneficiaries for two years, the visits are not frequent enough 
and it is necessary to improve training on certain technical aspects (such as, market 
management and strategic planning for business growth).  
For this reason, these researchers recommend increasing the number of visits and 
counselling sessions for programme beneficiaries, as well as, more support in the 
commercialization of their products. In addition to the assistance provided to those in 
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poverty, better monitoring and training practices for beneficiaries would be an alternative 
way of verifying the appropriate use of the transfers. Moreover, they suggest the 
implementation of evaluation processes that allow entrepreneurs to know their weaknesses 
and strengths, which could help them make better business decisions in the future. In any 
case, despite the great efforts made by the government, it is undeniable that there is still 
much to be done in relation to these complementary policies (Martínez & Mariño, 2013). 
 
2.3.4 Coverage of the Programme  
As can be seen in Figure 3, the number of CDH credits granted increased annually since 
the implementation of the programme in 2007 until 2010. In 2007, 19.9 million US dollars 
were allocated to the programme and 58,421 CDH transfers were delivered. One year 
later, in 2008, there was a significant growth in the volume of transfers (41.72 percent) 
and 28.09 million US dollars were allocated to the programme. In 2009, there was a 
growth of 42.63 percent in the number of credits requested with respect to the previous 
year and 43.93 million US dollars were placed (MCDS, 2015). 
The year 2010 is the fastest growing period of the CDH, as the number of credits 
increased by 391 percent and 360 million dollars were allocated. Note that, while in 2007 
approximately 58,000 credit operations were carried out, in 2010 this figure was eight 
times higher. In fact, the CDH alone became the fourth largest participant in the national 
microcredit market in that year (IEPS, 2014). This growing trend goes hand in hand with 
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Figure 3: Number of Annual Credits Granted by the CDH 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on MCDS (2015). 
*CDH credits granted until September 2015.  
 
However, the number of productive microcredits granted by the CDH was 
considerably reduced as of 2011. This decline was mainly due to the fact that several of 
the credits delivered in 2010 were requested at 24 months and that there was a significant 
reduction in public spending on social assistance programmes that has been maintained 
since that year (see Appendix A). In 2012, the coverage level of the CDH programme had 
an important rebound, but it only lasted for two years because of the changes in the 
eligibility criteria for welfare programmes (see page 74). 
In the period between 2007 and 2015, the CDH programme provided around 1.4 
million productive microcredits (MCDS, 2015). This represents an average of 155,000 
credits per year, which means that a significant percentage of BDH beneficiaries applied 
for the CDH credit instead of the monthly transfers, especially after the changes in the 
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households that have benefited from the programme is lower than the number of credits 
granted, since many of them requested CDH transfers more than once. Currently, the 
volume of microcredits delivered by the CDH programme exceeds 100,000 credits per 
year.  
Between 2007 and 2012, the CDH microcredits were allocated mainly to 
households in the urban area, where 746,651 transfers (72.8 percent) were recorded. On 
the other hand, in the rural area only 278,697 transfers (27.2 percent) were made during 
the same period. In monetary terms, during the first 6 years of implementation, 424,64 
million US dollars were allocated for the urban area and only 154,73 million US dollars 
for the rural area. Similarly, five provinces account for 62 percent of the total transfers 
along this period: Guayas (29 percent), Manabí (13 percent), Los Rios (9 percent), 
Pichincha (6 percent), and Esmeraldas (5 percent). Four of these provinces belong to the 
coastal region, while only one of them belongs to the Andean region (IEPS, 2014).  
According to the IEPS (2014) figures, the main economic activities to which CDH 
transfers were allocated are: commerce (65.1 percent), agriculture and fishing (31.1 
percent), manufacturing (3.4 percent), services (0.3 percent), construction (0.1 percent). 
Most of these transfers were requested by beneficiaries (and potential beneficiaries) of the 
BDH (89.4 percent). While the elderly and people with disabilities requested 10.6 percent 
of the credits, which shows that some of them are economically active. 
Moreover, the type of CDH credit with the highest participation is the Individual 
CDH with a total of 872,133 transfers, representing 85.1 percent of the total amount of 
transfers. Since 2008, the Business CDH transfers have been registered with a total of 
143,283 credits, which represent 14 percent of the total. Finally, the modalities of 
Associative and Articulated CDH account for approximately 1 percent of transfers during 
this period of analysis. However, in 2013, the Associative CDH had an interesting upturn 
compared to previous years. Specifically, 19,904 associative credits were delivered 
nationwide, which represented an investment of more than 22 million US dollars. With 
these cash transfers, 771 productive projects were generated (IEPS, 2014). 
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2.3.5 The Local Policy Debate on the Crédito de Desarrollo 
Humano 
Government officials have persistently argued over the last years that the CDH 
programme has had good results in building capacities and opportunities to overcome 
poverty in a sustainable manner (MIES, 2013b).40 More specifically, through different 
institutional reports, the Ecuadorian government states that the CDH programme helps 
those in poverty to access preferential credit and use it in productive initiatives that allow 
them to improve their income, decrease their dependence on social benefits and subsidies 
and, consequently, improve their quality of life (IEPS, 2014). 
These assertions have been supported by perception studies such as that of 
Martínez and Mariño (2013), which indicates that 56.7 percent of the beneficiaries 
consider that the CDH programme substantially improved their living standards. 
Additionally, in terms of revenue, 64.9 percent said they had somewhat improved their 
income with their new microenterprises, while 35.1 percent said they had made very 
significant income improvements. Remarkably, this study indicates that all the 
beneficiaries surveyed claimed to have used their credits to start a new venture or expand 
their current business. Most of them focused their ventures in the agricultural and livestock 
sector (which are the main economic activities in the rural area of the province of 
Chimborazo). Specifically, 79.7 percent used the CDH to invest in businesses dedicated 
to animal husbandry and agriculture. However, it is also important to note that the majority 
of respondents consider the amount of the CDH transfer insufficient for the creation of a 
productive microenterprise. As a result, they have had to partner with other beneficiaries 
to work together, which represents a clear example of a socially desirable outcome 
obtained perhaps in an inappropriate and involuntary way.  
                                                             
40
 See <http://www.inclusion.gob.ec/?s=credito+de+desarrollo+humano> Ministerio de Inclusion 
Economica y Social (23/03/2015). 
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Similarly, Coba and Diaz (2014) made visits to a sample of 261 beneficiaries of 
the CDH in the province of Tungurahua to study their economic activities, their level of 
satisfaction and how much they improved their income. Through the use of observation 
forms, they found that 74.3 percent of the credits have been invested in livestock activities, 
13.8 percent in manufacturing activities, 0.4 percent in footwear raw materials, 0.4 percent 
in rabbit breeding and the rest in other activities such as the trade. In addition, the authors 
indicate that 156 microenterprises (60 percent) have had excellent or good results 
(additional average monthly income of 85 US dollars or more) and 44 microenterprises 
(17 percent) have had regular results (additional average income between 50 and 85 US 
dollars). However, 23 percent of the projects show poor results, because these 
beneficiaries have additional income that does not exceed the value of 50 US dollars per 
month equivalent to the BDH transfers. The economic activities that obtained the highest 
average income were those related to footwear raw materials, pork production, agriculture 
and manufacturing. Interestingly, 97 percent of the projects were carried out by women. 
Although there is some empirical evidence to support the government's arguments 
in favour of the CDH, some academics and politicians (mainly from right-wing opposition 
parties) have instead argued against the implementation of this programme. Generally, 
typical arguments are repeated against the delivery of cash transfers to the poor (see page 
21) or in favour of conditionalities (see page 41). They have claimed, for instance, that 
poor people are not capable enough to handle lump-sum transfers and even less to manage 
their own businesses. Besides, from the beginning, one of the biggest concerns has been 
that it may be that a significant part of the money is not actually being used for investments 
in productive activities; and that this programme may be incentivizing those in poverty to 
work less and depend on the government. In fact, it is probable that many of the credits 
were destined for family consumption, which was in some way justified and even 
promoted mainly in 2008, when the financial crisis in the developed countries began to 
have consequences in the Ecuadorian economy and generated a contraction in domestic 
demand, which caused a small recession afterwards (Bermeo, 2013). 
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Therefore, the majority of criticisms made to the CDH programme have been 
based on the paternalistic and welfare dependency perspectives on cash transfers. These 
arguments are supported by studies such as Castillo, Salazar and Espinoza (2017), who 
analyse the creation of new microenterprises through CDH cash transfers. The data was 
collected through visits made by university students to 153 beneficiaries in the province 
of Guayas. Among the main results, they found that 30 percent used the entire CDH credit 
for entrepreneurship, 32 percent used it partially, and 38 percent did not use the credit to 
start a business but in personal expenses. That is, a good part (around half) of the CDH 
transfers was not invested in productive activities. Among the people who did start 
businesses, most did selling clothes, meals, or setting up small stores.   
In addition to the theoretical arguments against the implementation of the CDH, 
there are also some practical concerns about its operability and efficiency: i) there are still 
weaknesses and lack of clarity in the guidelines of the credit, ii) there is no evaluation 
process for credit assignment, iii) beneficiaries need more and better training in order to 
undertake sustainable productive activities, and iv) now that the accumulated cash 
transfers are delivered one (or even two) years in advance, there are no possible 
mechanisms to control and enforce children’s attendance in school and in health care 
centres (Maldonado & Moreno, 2011). Therefore, contrary to what programme 
administrators claim, it has been strongly suggested in academic and political spheres that 
social outcomes may not have improved in terms of overall well-being, human capital 
formation and productivity, which are the most important targets of social assistance 
programmes. 
According to Ponce (2013), for example, the CDH programme completely 
changes the meaning of traditional CCTs (such as the BDH), that is, the way in which 
social assistance practices are commonly understood in the developing countries.41 In fact, 
he suggests that the CDH is actually a microcredit programme and stops working as a 
                                                             
41
 Although Ponce (2013) considers this a criticism of CDH transfers, it could actually be one of the most 
important contributions of the programme. 
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human capital generation programme.42 More specifically, given that the CDH leaves 
aside conditionalities in health and education, it is no longer necessary for beneficiaries to 
send their children to school/health-centres to receive the money, which could lead to a 
decrease in school enrolment/health-status among those in poverty. Additionally, since 
the CDH consists in the advance delivery of a transfer, there would be no practical way to 
enforce that the money is being used in productive ventures (i.e. absence of control 
mechanisms). Finally, even if the beneficiaries productively invest the transfers, the 
businesses undertaken by people living in poverty are normally so precarious that they 
could promote child labour. 
As can be seen, there is some empirical evidence that supports both the arguments 
in favour and the arguments against the implementation of this innovative programme. 
Nevertheless, the CDH has received great government support and its acceptance among 
those in poverty has grown fast (MCDS, 2015). In fact, as previously discussed, it reached 
very high levels of coverage only a few years after its launch and its share of social 
assistance spending has increased significantly over time. The main problem that the 
Ecuadorian government has faced, when it comes to justifying spending on this 
unconditional programme and obtaining the necessary political support for its 
continuation, has been the lack of conclusive evidence about its efficiency (i.e. its real 
effect on different social outcomes). 
There are currently no significant impact evaluations on the CDH, mainly due to 
the lack of experimental data. It is not very clear if this was due to the ethical 
considerations involved in carrying out an experiment of this type, or to a planning error 
on the part of the institutions responsible for implementing the programme. One could 
think that it was a combination of both reasons; however, only a few months ago it was 
announced that a project called “Impact Evaluation of the CDH”, presented by the MIES, 
was one of the 6 winners of the First International Call for Impact Evaluations for Better 
                                                             
42
 Ponce's (2013) criticism refers to the unconditional nature of the CDH, but omits, among other things, 
the fact that the complementary CDH policies (e.g., training and technical assistance) seek to develop the 
individual capacities of the beneficiaries. 
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Public Management convened in 2017 by the Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF)–
Development Bank of Latin America. 
Leaving aside any ethical considerations, this project consists of experimentally 
evaluating the impact of a pilot programme, which will introduce reforms to the current 
CDH programme, on indicators related to the level of well-being (labour income, welfare 
index, living conditions, employment status, consumption patterns) and on outcome 
variables related to the productivity of the enterprises (time of operation, number of 
employees, level of investment, etc.). For this to be possible, the CAF will provide 
technical support to the MIES throughout the evaluation process. The main objective of 
this future study is to provide rigorous evidence on the effects of the CDH programme 
(CAF, 2018). 
It is also important to mention that for several years it was not even considered the 
option of conducting a quasi-experimental evaluation of the CDH, mainly due to the lack 
of qualified personnel to carry out this kind of study in most Ecuadorian public 
institutions. This has changed only 3 years ago when, as a result of training provided by 
the Eurosocial Programme of the European Commission, the only existing impact 
evaluation of the CDH was carried out using one of the quasi-experimental methods 
proposed in this thesis.43 
The Eurosocial technical advice took place in March 2015, when a training 
workshop on quantitative methods of impact evaluation for the analysis of public policies 
was carried out. Thirty civil servants participated in this workshop, both from the 
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo (National Secretariat for Planning and 
Development) and from the Ministerio de Finanzas (Ministry of Finance). The final aim 
of this cooperation activity was to provide the methodological tools for the effective 
                                                             
43
 Eurosocial is a cooperation programme between Latin America and the European Union which seeks to 
contribute to improving social cohesion, as well as to institutional strengthening through support to their 
processes for design, reform and implementation of public policies (Eurosocial, 2018). 
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evaluation of different strategic programmes in Ecuador, including the CDH programme 
(Eurosocial, 2018). 
To the best of my knowledge, the results of this evaluation have not been officially 
published. However, thanks to the support of the MCDS –institution with which I had a 
direct communication throughout the development of this thesis and those who have 
provided me with the data used in it– I had access to the final report of the Eurosocial 
training with respect to the CDH, as well as to the constructed database used for its 
evaluation. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, they found a positive effect of the 
CDH on the Welfare Index. In fact, it was also shown that the intensity of CDH treatment 
plays an important role in determining the magnitude of the effects of this intervention on 
the level of well-being among individuals in poverty. More specifically, at higher intensity 
(i.e. more CDH credits granted to a given household), the positive impact is greater.  
The main limitation of the government’s evaluation is that it only takes into 
account a very small sample of individuals and its national representativeness is 
questionable. On the other hand, the main advantage of this evaluation is that it considers 
the intensity of treatment – through the integration of data from the MIES registers on the 
number of credits granted to each person. Given that the government’s impact evaluation 
of the CDH conducted in 2016 uses one of the quasi-experimental methods (i.e. diff-in-
diff) and one of the outcome variables (i.e. Welfare Index) that I proposed (around three 
years before) to the MCDS and the Secretaria Nacional de Estudios Superiores Ciencia y 
Tecnología (SENESCYT) (National Secretary of Superior Studies Science and 
Technology ) as part of my research project,  I would like to think that this thesis has 
already positively influenced Ecuadorian policy-makers to understand the importance of 
promoting the culture of impact evaluation in this area and the possibility of employing 
alternative quantitative methods in the absence of experimental data.44 
                                                             
44
 This research project was presented to the Ecuadorian government for approval and funding (through 
the SENESCYT scholarship programme) at the end of 2013. 
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Thus, it will be a core contribution of this thesis to assess and compare the impact 
that the two most important social assistance programmes in Ecuador have had on overall 
well-being, human capital investment and labour supply of beneficiary families in recent 
years– and also evaluate how the design of more integrated cash transfer initiatives could 
contribute to poverty eradication in Ecuador, and possibly elsewhere. For this purpose, I 
propose the use of different quasi-experimental methods together with two specific impact 






































Methodological Alternatives for Evaluating 




The empirical evaluation of the impacts of cash transfers represents an important 
methodological challenge. Generally speaking, the allocation of monetary transfers (as 
well as in-kind transfers, or free access to goods and services) across households is 
(almost) never random, but is typically based on socio-economic characteristics such as 
wealth, living conditions, individual effort, employment status, or other selective 
mechanisms. Hence, the same individual features that determine the probability of 
receiving any kind of cash transfers are perhaps correlated with the outcomes of interest. 
Since some of these individual features are unobservable, this correlation creates a 
selection problem that normally prevents the accurate estimation of the effects of welfare 
programmes such as monetary transfers to poor families (Rawlings & Rubio, 2005; 
Arnold et al., 2011). 
In other words, due to the common absence of random assignment of individuals 
to treatment and control groups in cash transfers initiatives, simple comparisons of pre-
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 110 
treatment and post-treatment outcomes are likely to be contaminated by individual 
characteristics (or events) affecting the outcomes under study, since both might be 
correlated (or occurring at the same time). This recurrent impact evaluation difficulty is 
normally referred to as the selection problem. For instance, the human capital outcomes 
(education and health) of individuals participating in a cash transfer programme cannot 
just be compared with those who did not participate in the programme if the selection of 
beneficiaries is not random, but rather based on reported income levels. The reason is that 
it is possible that the results are mostly driven by the same specific characteristics used as 
a mechanism of selection (such as income in the previous example), because these 
characteristics may be correlated with human capital as well. As a consequence, 
differences between treatment and control groups might be due to factors other than the 
cash transfer programme itself (Brewer & Picus, 2014).           
The following sections of my methodological chapter address this selection 
problem in the impact evaluation of cash transfers by exploiting first a natural experiment 
and then two different quasi-experimental designs. In general, these types of research 
designs are applied in a wide variety of studies that resemble randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs), but that lack the researcher control or the random assignment characteristic of a 
true experiment (McKenna & Morrison, 2009). Moreover, natural- and quasi-experiments 
come in many forms, including before-after comparisons, group-to-group comparisons, 
or a combination of both known as difference-in-differences (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).    
According to Remler and Ryzin (2010), there are a number of reasons why natural- 
and quasi-experiments are important and widely used in social research literature. First, it 
is often not possible (or correct) to carry out randomized experiments in social and policy 
research due to practical or ethical constraints (i.e. absence of experimental data). Second, 
quasi-experimental studies can be conducted on a larger scale or in more realistic 
environments than RCTs, improving their generalizability and their relevance for policy 
or management decision-making. Finally, the evaluator can perform quasi-experimental 
studies more easily and with a lower budget.  
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In view of these important advantages offered by quasi-experimental methods, it 
is at least surprising that the majority of impact evaluations of cash transfer programmes 
in developing countries are carried out through RCTs that –in addition to being costly and 
difficult to implement– raise considerable ethical and methodological concerns (Devereux 
et al., 2013).  The very idea of randomized assignment is antithetical to social protection 
programmes because it means that a group of poor people who genuinely need assistance 
(i.e. the control group) will intentionally be deprived of cash transfers, even when they 
have the right to receive government support. Besides, it has been argued that although 
RCTs may be robust in terms of ‘internal validity’ (i.e. the extent to which a causal 
conclusion is warranted), they are weak in terms of ‘external validity’ (i.e. the extent to 
which the results can be generalized and replicated) (Ravallion, 2009).   
Given that the experimental evaluations are commonly carried out and financed 
by the same international organizations that promote the implementation of conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programmes, it is likely that their popularity will be explained by the 
same reasons why conditionality has become entrenched in social protection in the 
developing world (i.e. greater concern for political support and funding sources than for 
ethical considerations). The evaluation of cash transfer programmes is generally carried 
out by the multilateral institutions that finance them and, although the reasons are arguably 
not clear, it is a fact that institutions such as the World Bank or the BID have preferred 
the application of experimental methods for this purpose. A possible logical explanation 
could be the lack of secondary data or efficient information systems, but this has not 
always been the case. 
Of course, it is important to note that although natural- and quasi-experiments have 
many well-known advantages, they also have significant shortcomings. The main one is 
that usually these studies exhibit less robustness than random experiments in terms of 
demonstrating causation (i.e. establishing a cause-effect relationship) (Dinardo, 2008). All 
the same, they are still very popular because of their versatility, and also because -like 
most quantitative research designs- their fundamental purpose is to estimate the causal 
impact of an intervention on the outcomes under study using inferential statistics to 
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generalize findings from a sample to a population (Remler & Ryzin, 2010). These 
alternative methodological approaches, along with their implicit assumptions and an 
overall assessment of their validity, are discussed in more detail below as they will be 
used to evaluate the impact of the BDH and CDH programmes on different outcome 
variables. 
    
3.2 Natural Experimental Design 
Natural experiments are observational studies which help to overcome some of the 
common difficulties researchers face when assessing the outcomes and impacts of policy 
interventions. They are typically situations which can be exploited to better answer a 
research question, rather than experiments that researchers have influenced or designed 
by themselves (Dunning, 2008). 
Therefore, unlike in randomized controlled trials, researchers do not have the 
possibility to assign subjects to the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups in advance. However, 
noticeable divergences in law, policy or practice offer the opportunity to study populations 
just like they had been part of a randomized or true experiment (McKenna & Morrison, 
2009). Essentially, a non-controlled portion of the population is affected by an 
intervention or event, while the other is not. This event is considered “natural” in the sense 
that it was not planned. As will be acknowledged later in this chapter, the validity of any 
natural experiment depends on the key assumption that the assignment of treatments to 
participants is random, or more precisely, “as if” random.        
According to Sekhon and Titiunik (2012), these naturally occurring experiments 
share some important characteristics with RCTs. Nevertheless, the authors argue that there 
are fundamental differences between the two types of designs that give rise to conceptual 
and inferential problems, which are usually overlooked in the existing research literature. 
In a natural experiment, the mechanism that assigns treatments to subjects is not known 
with certainty to be random. Rather, an unplanned event occurs in the world that affects 
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some individuals but not others, and the researcher assumes –supported by some 
theoretical or empirical evidence- that the treatment was assigned as-if randomly. This 
assumption of as-if randomness is frequently referred to by scholars as exogeneity of the 
explanatory variable (treatment).  
In most studies, researchers put a lot of effort in verifying that this assumption is 
satisfied. The concept of exogeneity implies that treatment assignment is not influenced 
by factors associated with the outcome of interest (i.e. confounders). Thus, the treatment 
and control groups, created by the experiment in a “natural” way, should be similar in 
terms of all observed and unobserved characteristics that may somehow affect the 
outcome, with the clear exception of the treatment and confounding factors controlled by 
the researcher in the estimation model. Only when the two groups are alike in this way, is 
it possible to consider that the design is valid and, thereby, the actual treatment effect 
could be properly estimated (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Moreover, natural experiments differ from randomized controlled trials in another 
fundamental way, which in turn is the cause of their most difficult problems to overcome. 
Since the naturally occurring intervention or event affects some subjects but not others, it 
is usually possible to define several different treatment and control groups. However, only 
some of these groups are similar in the way described above, and therefore, valid to be 
compared. The problem is that in most cases it is not immediately obvious which groups 
are comparable, leading researchers to frequently compare the wrong groups (Sekhon & 
Titiunik, 2012).  
In other words, the artificially constructed treatment and control groups sometimes 
may not be comparable, even when it is assumed that the treatment allocation was random. 
Additionally, even if we are confident that the design is valid (because the chosen groups 
have similar characteristics), this comparison may not estimate the true causal effect of 
the intervention, but the effect of an omitted variable or an event that coincidentally 
happened at the same time. Although to be fair, this last issue is not exclusive to natural 
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experiments, but common to all quasi-experimental research designs (as will be discussed 
later in this chapter).    
At this point it is important to mention that, despite the well-established 
shortcomings described above, natural experiments have become a major component of 
scientific research in recent years. In fact, they have been widely used by researchers in a 
broad array of topics and fields, such as public health (Friedman et al., 2001; Lindahl, 
2002), educational psychology (Bronzaft & McCarthy, 1975), political participation 
(Brady & McNulty, 2004; Lassen, 2005), development economics (Kudamatsu, 2011), 
comparative politics (Keefer & Khemani, 2011), and social policy (Pickard, 2012). It is 
undeniable that among the social sciences, economics and epidemiology are the leading 
fields to exploit the natural experimental approach in their research, but political science 
and interdisciplinary fields like social policy are also well represented (Dunning, 2008). 
In order to get a better idea of how to recognize a natural experiment, it is useful to briefly 
examine some examples of the way this type of design has been used by social scientists 
to help make causal inferences. The examples presented below -although not directly 
related to the topic of this thesis- are intended to complement the previous explanation by 
describing two studies in which the exploited "natural" interventions arise from very 
different circumstances, yet in both cases treatment allocation is considered equally 
random. 
In a recent study, Pickard (2012) was interested in assessing the relationship 
between formal and informal care for older people, and the impact of changes in social 
policy in Britain. According to the author, the time period between 1985 and 2000 
provides the necessary conditions for a natural experiment. Certainly, during the late 
1980s/early 1990s, there was a rapid increase in long-stay residential care, which suddenly 
came to an end in the mid 1990s. Pickard’s article uses General Household Survey data to 
examine whether the increase in institutional care led to a decline in co-resident care by 
adult children for their older parents. 
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In this natural experiment, the treatment was assigned to one cohort (exposure 
group) and not to the other (non-exposed group) because it varies through a “naturally” 
occurring event (application of different policies over time) that happens to be exogenous 
to the outcome under study. The overall findings suggest that, between 1985 and 1995, 
care in nursing homes/hospitals did replace family care in many cases. Indeed, the number 
of people aged 80 and over in long-stay residences doubled around those years, while 
there was a fall by around a half in informal care by adult children. On the other hand, 
between 1995 and 2000, there was a significant increase in provision of family care due 
to changes in the community care system that affected the chances of moving to an elderly 
care institution. 
Altogether, this study argues that, after controlling for disability and age, there is 
considerable evidence of substitution between formal care and co-resident care for older 
people. A key policy implication of these results is that an expansion of publicly funded 
long-term care for the elderly might lead to a significant increase in demand, which would 
be accompanied by the decline of informal care. It is useful to note that in this natural 
experiment, the researcher does not need to depend on a priori reasoning or empirical 
evidence to defend the exogeneity assumption, as she only takes advantage of a true 
randomization of the intervention generated by divergences in policies throughout time: 
it is an “unplanned” event what randomly assigns subjects to treatment and control groups 
(exposed and non-exposed groups). In other words, this natural experiment is merely a 
cohort study in which exposure groups are assumed to be, on average, the same as would 
have been obtained with true randomization. 
Nonetheless, most natural experimental designs in the social sciences involve 
interventions considered “as if” randomly assigned to subjects, rather than treatments that 
are allocated by using a true randomization method. A paper by Keefer and Khemani 
(2011), for example, assumes random treatment assignment to examine how radio access 
improves public service outcomes in Benin. The potential effect of mass media on 
education and health outcomes seems somewhat obvious, as media provide important 
information for many people, including of course those in poverty. In fact, strong evidence 
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suggests that radio access improves private benefits from government welfare 
programmes (Stromberg, 2004; Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). Accordingly, donors have 
made significant efforts to set-up and support community radio stations in many less-
developed countries.45 However, before Keefer and Khemani's paper (2011), there was 
little rigorous evidence of the channels for such association.    
It had been widely hypothesized that the effects of media on public service 
outcomes arise because increased information facilitate collective action of citizens to 
extract greater benefits from their government. Until that, using household data from 
Benin, Keefer and Khemani (2011) find that greater access to community radio is indeed 
associated with an increase in usage of education facilities; but the impact actually came 
from changes in household behaviour, which lead to a higher take-up of government 
programmes. According to the authors, the appropriate radio programming seems to 
persuade people to invest more into the health and education of their children.  
The analysis rests on survey data of more than 4,000 households and 210 villages, 
spread across 32 communes in northern Benin. These villages exhibit substantial variation 
in access to community radio, which is driven by the limited signal strength of 
broadcasters and the geographical differences between villages. Thus, the necessary 
conditions are given to take advantage of a natural experiment in which the treatment 
under study (access to radio stations) varies through some unplanned or naturally 
occurring event that happens to be exogenous to observed and unobserved village 
characteristics.  
In particular, Keefer and Khemani (2011) find significant evidence that the media 
effect does not operate through government responsiveness: "Schools in villages with 
greater access to community radio exhibit no differences with respect to either government 
inputs (such as books and teachers) or the efficiency with which inputs are utilized (such 
                                                             
45
 Unlike other types of media, community radio promotes the importance of human capital and 
prioritizes the broadcast of public-interest programming on a wide range of subjects, such as democratic 
values and human rights.   
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as lower teacher absenteeism)" (p. 7). Instead, the evidence largely supports the 
proposition that the impact of media on public outcomes operate through changes in 
parental behaviour: "Instrumenting for household listenership of community radio with 
village access to radio, we find that listening leads households to purchase more books 
and to pay tuition for children's education" (p. 8). In other words, households with greater 
media access are more likely to make financial investments in their children's education. 
Overall, these findings are consistent with both the idea that mass media plays an 
important role in development, and the belief that parental behaviour matters for children's 
participation in schools (Fraja et al., 2010). 
 
3.2.1 Natural Experiments in the Ecuadorian Cash Transfers 
Now, with a better understanding of the concept of natural experiment and how to apply 
it in research, I will focus on the first type of design presented in my thesis. Note that, in 
general, when we talk about cash transfers, a natural experiment occurs only when the 
selection (or self-selection) of beneficiary families for the programme is not based on 
observable and unobservable socio-economic characteristics, but it is haphazard and 
possibly random (just like winning the lottery). In this case, I take advantage of a natural 
experiment arguably occurring in the assignment of two different types of cash transfers 
(treatments) to some of the poorest households in Ecuador.  
Since 2003, when the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) was launched, the 
Ecuadorian Government has made great efforts to better target the monetary transfers 
towards those in poverty. As discussed in the previous chapter, one major step was the 
development of a composite welfare index known as SELBEN. In theory, until 2014, the 
40 percent of Ecuadorian families —those poorest according to the SELBEN score— were 
eligible for the 50 US dollars monthly transfers or the accumulated benefits offered by the 
Crédito de Desarrollo Humano (CDH) (see page 74). However, the limited budgets of the 
programmes and their operational mechanisms have been insufficient to cover all 
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households in the first and second poverty quintiles, so expansion of coverage by the BDH 
and CDH has been rather gradual and apparently based on an as-if random selection of 
beneficiaries (see page 75). This assumption of as-if randomness constitutes the basis for 
the natural experiment identification strategy thoroughly developed below. 
I seek to identify the effects of two different cash transfer programmes (i.e. BDH 
and CDH) on several outcome variables exploiting a natural experiment in the allocation 
of benefits. In this natural experiment, like in any randomized trial, there is a control group 
that estimates what would have happened to the treated group in the absence of the 
programme, but nature or other exogenous forces (such as budget constraints) determine 
treatment status instead. Thus, the validity of the control group depends on treatment 
status being exogenous with respect to the outcomes under study. I take advantage of two 
important elements characterizing cash transfer programmes in Ecuador since their early 
stages: i) mainly due to BDH budget constraints, families around the first two quintiles of 
the SELBEN index have been as-if randomly selected to participate in the programme; 
and ii) only beneficiaries of the BDH are allowed to switch to the CDH programme. These 
two facts combined allow us to think that the beneficiary selection process in both 
programmes was exogenous to the characteristics of the eligible recipients. 
In other words, the identifying assumption for my natural experimental design is 
that the assignment to treatment and control groups is “as if” random for both 
programmes. Like many other policy interventions that constitute the basis of credible 
natural experiments in the social sciences, the starting point for the evaluation of the BDH 
and CDH is that these programmes involve treatments that are assigned only as-if at 
random, rather than through an actual randomizing device. Therefore, the type of natural 
experiment that arguably took place in the case of the Ecuadorian cash transfers is a 
standard natural experiment with as-if randomization. 
However, although these interventions could in principle provide the basis for 
plausible natural experiments, it is also possible that the allocation of transfers is actually 
the product of the interaction of actors in the social and political spheres. Since it is 
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somewhat difficult to simply assume that these interventions are independent of the 
characteristics of the beneficiaries, or that they are performed in a way that does not allow 
individuals to self-select into the treatment and control groups, it is necessary to 
complement the previously mentioned theoretical arguments (on which the assumption of 
as-if randomness in the allocation of treatments is based) with some type of empirical 
verification of the assumption. 
Note that in this case the identifying assumption could be verified, at least 
partially, only by comparing each one of the treatment groups (i.e. BDH and CDH) to the 
control group in terms of their observable pre-intervention characteristics, which should 
be reasonably similar in order to support the hypothesis. Of course, this empirical 
verification of the key assumption will be performed in this thesis as part of the proposed 
natural experimental evaluations in Chapters 5 and 7. Once there are sufficient theoretical 
and empirical grounds to believe that treatment status is exogenous (or as-if randomly 
assigned), estimation of average treatment effects (ATEs) is straightforward. As part of 
this natural experiment, I will use two different econometric techniques: a simple 
difference-of-means test and regression model analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Difference-of-means Test 
The difference-of-means test (t-test) is used to determine if two population means are 
equal by comparing two independent samples (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989). A common 
experiment design is to have two groups (one control and one treatment) that share the 
same pre-treatment characteristics, and therefore, initially they differ only in that one of 
them will receive the specific treatment and the other will not. A dependent variable (or 
set of variables) must be chosen on which the mean of the two groups is expected to differ 
as a direct consequence of the treatment. 
Therefore, in this type of design there will always be two variables: 
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 120 
• A quantitative one (dependent variable that is going to be compared) 
• Another qualitative/dichotomous (independent variable) 
 
The idea is to verify if the quantitative variable depends on the dichotomous 
variable, that is, to calculate the means of the continuous variable for the two groups of 
the qualitative variable and create a contrast to determine whether there are significant 
differences or not between the means of the two independent samples (Laguna, 2014).   
The significance of differences between two sample means can be assessed using 
a two-sample t-statistic calculated as part of the t-test. Note, however, that the t-test 
procedure is only appropriate when the following conditions are met:  
ü The sampling method should be simple randomization (or probed to be as-
if random).46   
ü The two samples are independent. 
ü The sampling distribution is approximately normal, which is generally the 
case if the sample size is large enough (i.e. greater than 40, without 
outliers).47   
 
Now, the two-sample t-statistic can be simply thought of as a scaled difference 
between the two means, where the absolute difference is rescaled using an estimate of the 
variability of the means. The reference distribution for the t-statistic is the t-distribution, 
which shape varies slightly as a function of the samples size for n < 30, and strongly 
resembles the standard normal distribution. Since the t-distribution considers the size of 
the sample, there is a different t-statistic for each sample size, that is, for each number of 
degrees of freedom. As the sample is larger (n> 100), it is almost equivalent to use the t-
distribution or the normal distribution. In other words, for a high number of degrees of 
freedom, we can approximate N (0, 1) (Laguna, 2014).      
                                                             
46
 There is however no requirement that the two samples should be of equal size (Evans et al., 2000). 
47
 It has been shown that minor departures from normality do not affect the t-test (Moore et al., 2009). 
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of the variability of the difference between the means. More specifically, first a pooled 
variance estimate is calculated as the weighted average (because the two samples are of 
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Note from the previous equations that the degrees of freedom that define this two-
sample t-distribution is given by  
LM = @- + @. − 2 
 
3.2.3 Regression Model Analysis 
The second part of my natural experimental design consists of analysing the separate 
effects of the BDH and CDH programmes on several outcome variables Y by estimating 
different versions of the following base regression model:   
NO = P + QRSTO + UVSTO + 52O + WO	,                    (1) 
 
                                                             
48
 In this case, population variances are assumed to be equal (i.e. homoscedasticity).  
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where N is any of the outcomes under study, and Q and U are the parameters of interest, 
which capture the causal effects of BDH and CDH (dummy variables that equals 1 for the 
poor households receiving cash transfers from a given programme, and 0 otherwise) on 
the outcome under consideration. 2 is a vector of individual and household level 
characteristics, and W is the error term. 
Specifically, I estimate different versions of Equation (1) via ordinary least squares 
(OLS), probit or logit regression models, depending on the type of explained variable	N.49 
The outcome variables are several, and they are evidently related to the programmes’ main 
objectives in terms of poverty reduction and human capital. They include a broad range 
of observable indicators such as living conditions, school enrolment, educational 
attainment and labour supply.  
Since I am examining the independent effects of two mutually exclusive 
programmes (BDH and CDH), the predictor variable of interest is a categorical variable 
with 3 levels or groups (one control and two treatment groups), which is examined along 
with other independent variables that are referred to as controls.50 In the case of categorical 
variables with more than 2 groups, it is necessary to construct a series of “dummy” or 
“indicator” variables. Dummy variables take the values 0 or 1, and I need to have enough 
variables that each group has a different combination, which requires k − 1 variables if I 
have k groups (i.e. 2 dummy variables in our model). Table 5 below shows that I can use 
two dummy variables to determine which one of the three groups (control, BDH or CDH) 
an observation belongs to. 
 
 
                                                             
49
 The outcome variables of interest could be continuous or categorical or ordinal, and different statistical 
models need to be used to analyse different types of explained variables.  
50
 In natural experiments controls are only included to improve efficiency, but their omission would not 
bias the estimates of the parameters of interest (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  
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Table 5: Use of Dummy Variables to Identify Different Groups 
Group Dummy 1 Dummy 2 
Control 0 0 
BDH 1 0 
CDH 0 1 
 
Hence in the model specified in Equation (1), P is the expected value of N when 
LXYYZ1 = 0 and		LXYYZ2 = 0, i.e. the expected value of N in the control group. On 
the other hand, Q represents the change in N as	LXYYZ1 = 1, i.e. the difference between 
control group and BDH group. Finally, U represents the change in N as		LXYYZ2 = 1, 
i.e. the difference between control group and CDH group. Note that this base model should 
be estimated as a single regression equation only in the case that I want to compare each 
one of the treatments (i.e. BDH or CDH) to the control group. However, it is also possible 
to compare any pair of the three sample groups separately. In fact, the model could be 
decomposed into three different versions just by restricting the sample in such a way that 
includes only the specific groups that I want to compare. Table 6 describes how to restrict 
the sample depending on the desired comparison and, therefore, the type of evaluation that 
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Table 6: Sample Selection for a Two-group Comparison 
Groups Sample Selection 
BDH vs Control  
Potential BDH beneficiaries not affected by other social 
assistance programmes  
CDH vs Control  
Actual CDH beneficiaries and those not affected by any 
of the two programmes at all 
BDH vs CDH Potential CDH beneficiaries51 
 
It is important to note that in this case it is possible to employ a natural 
experimental design due to the singular features presented by cash transfer programmes 
in Ecuador. However, normally finding a good natural experiment is not an easy task. 
Actually, it is comparable to look for a needle in a haystack (Remler & Ryzinn, 2010). 
Moreover, in practice the premise behind all natural experiments (namely, that treatment 
assignment is random or “as if” random) can be difficult to be tested, so that I should try 
to determine the degree of randomness that can be assumed, as well as any factor that may 
induce bias. In fact, according to McKenna and Morrison (2009):  
As with other quasi-experimental designs, natural experiments will never 
unequivocally determine causation because the researcher cannot exert control 
over the situation.  However, they provide a useful and important inferential tool 
and may provide help with a research question that may not be obtainable in any 
other way, perhaps due to practical or ethical considerations. (p. 11) 
That said, I must point out that when studying particularly the effects of the BDH 
programme, a fundamental issue is that the selection of beneficiaries may not be as random 
as it seems. As explained in the previous chapter, there might be geographic, political and 
socio-economic factors that, to a certain extent, may affect the targeting process of the 
                                                             
51
 Recall that only BDH beneficiaries are entitled to self-select themselves to participate in the CDH 
programme.  
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programme, generating considerable selection biases (see page 76). In other words, there 
could be non-observable differences between the treatment and control groups (e.g. in 
terms of incidence of poverty in the territorial location of the households, political 
negotiation and mobilization capacities, political representation and participation, and 
access to public services, technology and information), which in turn might be associated 
with the outcomes of interest. If this were true, the assumption of exogeneity of the 
explanatory variable (i.e. treatment) would be violated and, therefore, the validity of the 
proposed natural experimental design would be questionable (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Moreover, when studying the effects of the CDH programme, there is a latent 
concern for a potential self-selection bias —due to the fact that ultimately poor families 
are the ones who decide whether they will switch programmes (i.e. self-selection among 
beneficiaries). It is possible that this switching decision is based on households’ own 
motivations or interests, which are reflected in observable socio-economic factors (such 
as wealth, educational attainment, or health status). If this were the case, the allocation of 
the CDH transfers would not be entirely “as if” random (as I certainly assumed in the 
natural experimental design) and the exogeneity condition would not be satisfied.  
In defence of the natural experiment that arguably takes place in the case of the 
BDH and CDH, it can be argued that in a non-controlled experiment (like this one) it is 
almost never known with certainty that the mechanism that assigns treatments to 
individuals is random (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). This is why it is necessary to assume 
(as in most studies of this type) –with the support of some empirical and theoretical 
evidence– that the treatment was assigned as-if randomly. In addition, it would be 
advantageous to complement the previous natural-experimental approach with some 
alternative estimation methods that actually take the possible selection biases and self-
selection problems into account. Specifically, an instrumental variable (IV) strategy and 
a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation are employed and described in detail below. 
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3.3 Two Alternative Quasi-Experimental Designs: 
Instrumental Variable and Diff-in-Diff 
Before I focus on the alternative quasi-experimental designs presented in this thesis, it is 
useful to lay some theoretical grounds to better understand the methodological challenges 
inherent to this type of research. Recall that, according to the economic theory, any model 
deals with two kinds of variables: endogenous and exogenous (Barro, 2007). The 
endogenous variables are the ones that we want the model to explain, and therefore, their 
values are determined in the model. For example, the endogenous variables in the 
previously introduced natural experimental design include welfare level, educational 
attainment, school enrolment, living conditions and labour supply. 
On the other hand, the exogenous variables are the ones considered external shocks 
to the system, so the model takes their values and behaviour as given (i.e. determined 
outside the model). Some common examples of exogenous variables include weather 
conditions, available technologies, price of commodities, natural phenomena and wartime 
situations. Note also that, throughout the first part of this chapter (i.e. the natural 
experiment), I have been treating the allocation of cash transfers from both programmes 
(BDH and CDH) as exogenous –given the assumption that treatments were assigned as-if 
randomly. 
The main purpose of any model is to show how the exogenous variables affect the 
endogenous ones (Kanodia, 2015). As illustrated in Figure 4, exogenous variables (left 
box in the diagram) come from outside the model and serve as the input, whereas the 
endogenous variables (right box in the diagram) are determined inside the model and 
represent the output. Basically, the model tries to tell us how to go from one side to the 
other. Thus, the model may be a list of equations or graphs, or a set of conceptual ideas, 
which are used to predict how changes in the exogenous variables affect the endogenous 
variables. 
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Figure 4: The Workings of a Model 
 
    
Now, as mentioned in the previous section, the validity of any natural experiment 
depends largely on the exogeneity assumption, which states that the treatment allocation 
to participants is considered as an exogenous variable. Therefore, if there is enough 
evidence supporting the idea that the CDH treatment is assigned randomly (i.e. 
exogenously), I could consistently and efficiently estimate the parameters of interest in 
Equation (1) via ordinary least squares (OLS), probit or logit regression models. However, 
if there are reasons to believe that the treatment status is endogenous (i.e. determined 
within the system); such estimates would be inappropriate and lead to inconsistent results. 
This is often referred to as the endogeneity problem (Hill et al., 2011). 
The possible presence of endogeneity is one of the most major challenges of 
contemporary empirical studies in social sciences (Bech & Hillier, 2015). In statistical 
terms, an endogeneity problem occurs when there is a correlation between an independent 
variable (e.g. treatment) and the model error term (Wooldridge, 2015). The error term 
represents all those factors that affect the dependent variable but are not taken into account 
explicitly. So, in the broadest sense, an endogeneity problem arises when there is a "factor" 
related to the dependent variable that is also related to the independent variable under 
study, yet is unaccounted for in the model. Note that this factor is not necessarily a third 
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The fact that endogeneity has such a broad meaning, suggests somehow that there 
are several sources of endogeneity problems in applied econometric work (Aizenman & 
Pinto, 2005). Actually, the three most common causes or circumstances under which 
endogeneity issues can arise are the following: i) omitted variable bias, that is, there is 
another variable that we cannot observe that affects both the independent variable and the 
outcome variable; ii) simultaneous causality bias, that is, the independent variable is 
jointly determined with the outcome variable (e.g. CDH causes	N, N causes CDH); and 
iii) errors-in-variables bias, that is, the independent variable is measured with error. In 
addition, it is noteworthy that, since the concept of endogeneity covers different types of 
problems, solutions to these problems can also be quite different (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009). 
The omitted variable bias (OVB) is the most common illustration of endogeneity 
and the major difficulty to overcome with the estimation of causal effects from 
observational data (Anyalezu, 2015). In the simplest terms, OVB occurs when one or more 
important variables are left out of a model that, therefore, is incorrectly specified 
(Wooldridge, 2015). The bias appears in a regression analysis when the parameters are 
estimated, since the model compensates for the missing factors by over- or 
underestimating the impact of one of the independent variables. As an example, suppose 
I want to know if holding a postgraduate degree has an effect on wages. In order to see 
the correct picture, I need to take into account the effects of other factors, such as intrinsic 
ability. The ability of subjects may influence the likelihood of obtaining a postgraduate 
degree as well as the wages they are paid. If the model does not account for other important 
factors, such as inherent ability or individual effort, then the analysis would lead us to 
overestimate the impact of educational attainment.    
Unfortunately, not all sources of OVB are easy to deal with. This is precisely the 
case when omitted variables endogeneity is caused by self-selection of subjects into the 
different subsamples. In fact, self-selection bias (SSB) is one of the most common threats 
to the internal validity of the empirical work being done in the behavioural and social 
sciences (Wooldridge, 2010). In technical terms, the self-selection problem arises when 
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subjects select themselves into a group, generating a biased sample with a non-probability 
sampling52 —given that people who self-select are probably very different from the target 
population that the researcher attempts to analyse (Strong, 2015).53   
Self-selection based endogeneity clearly makes determination of causality more 
difficult, especially in research about the effects of programmes or policies on different 
socio-economic groups (known as impact evaluation or outcome evaluation). For 
example, consider the following research question: Does private education have an impact 
on the academic performance of students? Initially, one could just compare the scores on 
standardized tests between students in private schools with those in public schools. 
However, it would be a mistake to assume that this simple difference reflects the 
"treatment" of private education. Due to self-selection, there might be a number of 
differences among students who choose to enrol in one or the other type of school, such 
as own motivation, socio-economic status, or parental influence. In other words, the 
decision of the students regarding where to attend school (i.e. treatment assignment) is not 
random, and therefore there may be differences in test scores that are not explained by the 
effect of private education. Consequently, it is necessary first to understand the choice 
(i.e. the observed and unobserved factors that lead to self-selection) before understanding 
the impact of that choice on the outcome of interest (Belfield & Levin, 2003). 
Of course, one standard solution would be simply to control for all the observed 
factors that might lead to self-selection among individuals, which are certainly available 
through observational data. The problem with this solution is that it is unlikely to take 
fully into account all the important factors influencing the selection process, because some 
                                                             
52
 Non-probability sampling is a subjective (i.e., non-random) method of selecting units from a population. 
A common example of non-probability sampling is quota sampling. The problem with this method is that 
it is not clear whether it is possible to generalize the results from the sample to the population (Ferrell et 
al., 2014).  
53
 In a way, the self-selection bias is closely related to the non-response bias, which occurs when a 
significant number of individuals in the survey sample fail to respond and have relevant characteristics 
that differ from those who do respond (Dillman, 2000).  
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of the variables associated with this process are probably unobserved. In the words of 
Wooldridge (2015):  
We know that multiple regression analysis can, to some degree, alleviate the self-
selection problem. Factors in the error term … that are correlated with … [the 
independent variable] can be included in a multiple regression equation, assuming, 
of course, that we can collect data on these factors. Unfortunately, in many cases, 
we are worried that unobserved factors are related to … [the independent variable], 
in which case multiple regression produces biased estimators. (p. 230) 
Heckman (1979), for instance, was among the first who realized that comparing the wages 
of management trainees with those of non-trainees can result in biased parameter 
estimates, since there are unobserved characteristics of individuals (e.g., persistence, 
innate intelligence, effort, etc.) which may influence both the self-selection into different 
training programmes and future wages. Therefore, no amount of controls will address 
completely the endogeneity problems caused by SSB, because there are perhaps an infinite 
number of unobservable variables that could make the observed relationship endogenous. 
This raises the need for different and more effective solutions to endogeneity in 
general and to self-selection bias in particular. The most popular way of dealing with these 
key impact evaluation problems is using quasi-experimental designs (QED) (Remler & 
Ryzin, 2010). Like all quantitative research designs, quasi-experiments are empirical 
studies that can estimate the effect of an intervention on a particular outcome of interest. 
They share many similarities with traditional experimental designs (i.e. randomized 
control trials) and natural experiments but have proven to be more useful in real-world 
evaluation, where the element of random assignment to treatment or control groups is not 
always feasible (Dinardo, 2008). 
There are many different types of quasi-experimental designs -each with its own 
strengths and weaknesses- which have a number of applications in specific contexts 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). These designs include, among others, instrumental variables, 
difference-in-differences, interrupted time series, propensity score matching and 
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regression discontinuity. All these elaborate names are helpful to emphasize that quasi-
experiments use well-defined comparison groups as an attempt to increase the internal 
validity of their assessments. Given that the field of QED is very large and active, I will 
focus only on the two types of designs that are relevant for the purposes of this thesis, 
namely, instrumental variables (IV) and difference-in-differences (DID) estimation.  
Recall from the last paragraphs of the previous section that since I am interested 
in finding the effects of a cash transfer programme with unique features (i.e. CDH) –such 
as the self-selection of beneficiaries– I should be aware that there are compelling reasons 
to believe that in this case treatment assignment is endogenous (i.e. not random). More 
specifically, the alleged self-selection problems in the proposed natural experiment (where 
observed agents endogenously choose to be part of the treated group) could be considered 
a potential source of omitted variable bias. Therefore, in order to cope with the possible 
biases arising from the issues described above, I first follow an instrumental variable 
identification strategy as an alternative research design. 
 
3.3.1 Instrumental Variable Technique  
The method of instrumental variables (IV) is commonly used to estimate causal 
relationships in contexts in which controlled experiments are not available or when a 
treatment is not successfully delivered to all intended subjects in a (sometimes naturally 
occurring) randomized experiment (Imbens & Angrist, 1994). This type of QED is one of 
the most widely used approaches to address classical endogeneity problems in empirical 
economic analysis. In statistical terms, the IV method allows consistent parameter 
estimation when the explanatory variable (also referred to as covariate) is correlated with 
the error term of a regression model, either because of an omitted variable, measurement 
error, or simultaneity.54 If knowledge, experience or statistical tests suggest the presence 
                                                             
54
 As already discussed, omitted-variable bias is a common endogeneity problem and may affect the results 
of this study due to self-selection. For further explanation on measurement error or simultaneity refer to 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Wooldridge (2015). 
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of endogeneity, ordinary linear regression usually leads to biased and inconsistent 
estimates (Hill et al., 2011). Nevertheless, if the appropriate instrument is found, reliable 
unbiased estimates can still be produced. 
An instrument is a variable that causes the endogenous explanatory variable to 
change but does not affect the outcome in any way, other than through the same 
explanatory variable (Remler & Ryzin, 2010). In this sense, instruments do not themselves 
belong in the main equation (i.e. are exogenous sources of variation) and they are used to 
explain the independent variables suspected of being endogenous. The earliest known 
introduction to the concept of instrumental variables (as a solution to the identification 
problem in econometrics) appears in the appendix of a book written by Philip G. Wright, 
The Tariff on Animal and Vegetable Oils, published in 1928.55 The biggest breakthrough 
of the author was demonstrating for the first time that an instrumental variable can be used 
to estimate the coefficient on a regressor when we are not able to rule out the presence of 
endogeneity. 
In technical terms, if I want to get the causal effect of an endogenous predictor X 
on an outcome N, I need to look for an instrument Z  that is correlated with X  (known as 
the relevance condition) and also exogenous to N —or uncorrelated with the error term W 
(known as the exogeneity condition). The first condition requires that there is some 
association between the instrumental variable and the regressor being instrumented, 
whereas the second condition excludes the instrument from being an explanatory variable 
in the model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). If this relationship holds, then Z is said to be a 
valid instrument and the IV estimator will be consistent. Figure 5 illustrates graphically 
both instrumental variable conditions in a directed acyclic graph (DAG).       
 
 
                                                             
55
 For a comprehensive review of the history of instrumental variable methodology, see Stock and Trebbi 
(2003), "Retrospectives: Who Invented Instrumental Variable Regression?" 
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Figure 5: Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of Instrumental Variable Conditions. 
 
 
In mathematical notation, the basic reasoning to understand the consistency of the 
instrumental variable (IV) estimator is as follows.  
Consider the basic relationship between output variable N and regressor X:  
NO = Q, + Q-2O + WO 
Since there are reasons to believe that 2O is endogenous, it is not possible to trust 
in the OLS estimate of 	Q-. However, I can still get an IV estimation of the parameters of 
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If Z is a valid instrument, then V`a(W, %) = 0, and therefore:  
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The intuition behind this method is that by using valid instruments, which are 
orthogonal (i.e. uncorrelated) to a structural error component in a regression model, and 
exploiting this orthogonality as moment conditions for slope parameters of interest, it is 
possible to reliably estimate the slope parameters for endogenous regressors (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009). Note here that this standard solution to endogeneity problems is suitable 
only if the researcher can convincingly argue that the employed instrumental variables 
fully satisfy the aforementioned conditions of relevance and exogeneity —based perhaps 
on common sense or economic theory. Consequently, the selection of appropriate 
instruments represents a crucial element for the credibility of the study.56 
The instrumental variable approach is best illustrated with an example. The 
relationship between fertility and labour supply has been subject of very active research 
for decades. Empirical analyses provide substantive evidence of a negative correlation 
between number of children and female labour participation (Nieuwenhuis, 2014). 
However, the existing correlation does not necessarily imply that having more children 
affects negatively women's labour market attachment because other variables may affect 
both fertility and labour supply (i.e. omitted variable bias), or because women with low 
labour market attachment decide to have more children precisely for that reason (i.e. 
reverse causality). This self-selection into larger families among women who have lower 
inclination to work could create a spurious negative correlation between fertility and 
employment (Karbownik and Myck, 2012). Therefore, it seems clear that fertility is not 
exogenously determined, but rather endogenous to the labour supply of an individual. 
Since it is impossible to conduct controlled experiments about fertility in the 
general population, empirical research aims to solve the self-selection problem by 
exploiting some exogenous source of variation in family-size decisions. Angrist and Evans 
(1998) estimate the effect of fertility on labour supply, using the preferences of American 
                                                             
56
 One of the best ways to determine a valid instrumental variable is to say aloud: “Z only affects Y through 
its effect on X”—but substitute the variables names for X, Y, and Z. For example, “Cigarette taxes only 
affect birth weight through their effect on maternal smoking.” (Remler & Ryzin, 2010) 
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families for mixed-sex siblings as an instrument.57 The authors look at women who have 
at least two children and estimate the marginal effect of having a third child on women´s 
labour supply. They use child’s gender to construct an instrument based on the sex 
composition of siblings. This same-sex instrument is a binary variable equal to zero, if the 
first two children of an individual are of different sex, one boy and one girl. While it is 










Angrist and Evans (1998) claim that their instrument is valid because it is virtually 
randomized by nature and independent of mothers’ characteristics.58 The choice of the 
instrument also explains the reason why the authors restrict their data to individuals with 
at least two children. Overall, the estimation results for all women as well as married 
women indicate a negative causal effect from fertility to labour supply. American women 
who have a third child, because the first and second born are same sex siblings, decrease 
their labour supply by approximately 20-30 percent.59 These IV estimates can be 
interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE) or as an average treatment effect 
for the American women with at least two children who comply with the instrument. 
However, note that there are also women in the sample who have a third child irrespective 
to the sibling sex composition and others who would never have an additional child -and 
                                                             
57
 Data comes from the Census PUMS in 1980. There are 355,356 observations in the sample, of which 
302,730 women are married. 
58
 The authors address all assumptions that are needed in order to estimate a local average treatment 
effect and provide some evidence. Yet, as is always the case with empirical work, their assumptions can 
be challenged. 
59
 Moreover, the results also suggest that there is no impact of having a third child on the labour supply of 
husbands. 
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the estimated results cannot easily be applied to these groups of women. Thus, broadly 
speaking, the generalizability of the IV estimates is reduced and often unclear.   
It is useful to employ the previous example to explain some of the limitations of 
the IV treatment effect estimation. In particular, the instrumental variable approach neither 
identifies an average effect on the treated (ATET) nor does it identify an average effect 
for the whole population (ATE). An average effect on the treated (ATET) would describe 
the average causal effect of having a third child on labour supply for those women who 
actually have a third child. However, families with three children can be subdivided into 
two groups, always-takers and compliers. Compliers are the ones who have a third child 
because the first and second born are same sex siblings. The ATET, hence, is a weighted 
sum of the average effect of both groups. To be precise, the weights would be the shares 
of always-takers or compliers in the whole population of families with three children 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Yet, the ATET cannot be normally identified by the 
instrumental variable approach. Although the local average effect is estimated, the average 
effect on always-takers remains unknown. 
A similar argument holds for the average effect on the non-treated (ATENT). In 
this setting, this would be the causal effect for families with two children. The non-treated 
can be distinguished into never-takers and compliers. Compliers are the ones who have 
no additional child, because the first and second born are mixed-sex siblings. Hence, the 
weighted sum of the average effect for never-takers and compliers cannot be determined, 
because the instrumental variable approach does not reveal the average effect for never-
takers. 
Finally, the average treatment effect (ATE) would be given by a weighted sum of 
the average effect on the treated and the non-treated. Again, the weights are equal to the 
share of treated and non-treated in the whole sample. Consequently, the instrumental 
variable approach does not allow any prediction on the average treatment effect, because 
neither of both average effects are identified (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Therefore, the 
IV estimate presented by Angrist and Evans (1998) is a local average treatment effect 
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(LATE) which does not allow making any prediction on a randomly chosen family in the 
whole population. 
Now, in order to explain the specific IV estimation proposed in this study, it is 
useful to start by characterizing identification strategies from a general perspective. After 
that, I will focus on the instruments, implicit assumptions and econometric technique that 
will be used to explore the effects of the CDH cash transfers on the outcomes of interest. 
Following Angrist and Kruger (1999), the term identification strategy is used to describe 
the manner in which researchers employ observational data (i.e., data not generated by a 
randomized trial) to approximate real experiments. Any appropriate identification strategy 
consists of two parts: a clearly labelled source of identifying variation in a causal variable; 
and a particular econometric procedure to exploit this information. 
I start by addressing the first part (i.e. source of variation in treatment status). As 
described above, when assessing the impact of CDH cash transfers on socio-economic 
outcomes, the major difficulty is the potential endogenous-treatment issue (see pages 129-
131). To overcome this problem and eventually obtain an unbiased estimate, I need to find 
a source of sufficient variation in the decision to opt for the CDH (explanatory variable), 
but independent of the poverty and human capital outcomes under study (explained 
variables). This implicitly exogenous source of variation will be the instrumental variable 
that I use for inducement into the “treatment”. According to the instrumental variable 
conditions, in order for a variable Z to serve as a valid instrument for CDH-treatment 
status, the following must be true: i) the instrument must be exogenous, that is, 
uncorrelated with the error in the structural equation	(V`a(%, W) = 0); and ii) the 
instrument must be correlated with the self-selection decisions of agents embodied in the 
endogenous explanatory variable X	(V`a(%, 2) ≠ 0).  
Since it is likely that being a CDH beneficiary comprises both a random 
component (because only the randomly selected BDH beneficiaries are eligible) as well 
as a self-selection component (because ultimately the switching decision is made by 
families themselves), it will be necessary to restrict the sample to only those treated by 
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any kind of cash transfer (i.e. BDH and CDH treatment groups) in order to identify the 
causal effects of making the decision to change to the CDH programme.  
In this thesis, CDH treatment status is instrumented using an indicator of “previous 
credit experience” (constructed by dichotomizing the “access to credit” variable, say 1 if 
any member of the household received cash loans or commercial credit in the twelve 
months before the 2008 survey wave, and 0 otherwise). In notation terms the instrumental 









The instrumental variable approach exploits exogenous variation in CDH-
treatment status in order to identify the causal effect. An additional variable is therefore 
added to the empirical model, the instrument Z. Since the instrument is a binary variable, 
then 2,O and 2-O denote the potential treatment assignments, where 2,O captures the 
switching decision of household c for	%O = 0, and 2-O shows the potential decision if	%O =
1, respectively. Hence, the observed CDH-treatment status of an individual can be written 
in a potential treatment framework (Angrist, 2004): 
2O = 2,O + (2-O − 2,O)%O 
 
The underlying assumption will be, therefore, that those families with any kind of 
credit experience before 2008 are more likely to prefer the CDH programme anytime 
between 2009 and 2014, apparently without that this past credit involvement alone having 
had a significant direct effect on their current socio-economic conditions. It seems logical 
that families who have received some credit in the past will be more willing to receive 
accumulated cash transfers, since they might have a greater knowledge about productive 
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investments. Moreover, it is possible to assume there is no direct effect on the recent 
outcomes because households received these credits around 2008 and even at that time 
they were in the first quintiles of the poverty index. Besides, access to credit before 2008 
doesn’t seem like an important determinant of current poverty status or human capital 
compared with other individual characteristics such as the level of education. In other 
words, previous credit participation might affect household’s decision of switching 
programmes, without having any direct impact on the outcome variables under study. This 
main hypothesis can be decomposed into several assumptions that have to be made in 
order to allow for a consistent estimation of the causal effect. First of all, the instrument 
has to be 'as good as randomly assigned'. Formally, 
 
{N,O, N-O, 2,O, 2-O} ⊥ %O 
 
This assumption requires the instrument to be independent from potential 
treatment and potential outcome. Furthermore, the instrument has to fulfil the exclusion 
assumption. This condition requires that the instrument does not affect human capital and 
poverty outcomes directly, but only indirectly through its effect on	2O. In this setting, the 
exclusion restriction requires outcomes to be determined by CDH treatment, irrespective 
of the instruments realization. 
Secondly, the instrument has to affect household’s decision to change 
programmes. The 'first-stage' assumption asks the instrument to manipulate the 
probability of treatment, which means the probability of being a CDH beneficiary. 
Formally, 
p(2O|%O = 1) ≠ p(2O|%O = 0) 
 
The left-hand side of this equation shows the participation rate of CDH programme 
for families with	%O = 1, whereas the right-hand side shows the participation rate for 
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households with	%O = 0. Since the participation rates differ, the instrument affects the 
probability of treatment (Angrist, 2004). 
Monotonicity is the third assumption. Monotonicity requires all subjects that are 
affected by the instrument, to be affected in the same direction. Formally, either	2-O >
2,O∀c or vice versa. Without loss of generality, assume	2-O > 2,O∀c, then subjects who 
would change to CDH if %O = 0 still change programmes if %O = 1 and some subjects who 
would not prefer the CDH if %O = 0 will change their decision and switch programmes 
if	%O = 1. Notice that subjects are heterogeneous with respect to their response to the 
instrument and, therefore, households can be divided into three subsamples:  
Always-takers are the ones who will switch programmes irrespective whether %O =
0 or	%O = 1:	2-O = 2,O = 1. Never-takers neither change to the CDH if 	%O = 1 nor if	%O =
0: 2-O = 2,O = 0. Finally, the group of compliers will prefer the CDH programme if 	%O =
1 and will not if	%O = 0: 2-O = 1 and	2,O = 0. Thus, compliers treatment decision is 
determined by the instrument. To conclude, the monotonicity assumption, as specified 
here, does not allow for defiers. Defiers are subjects who decide to switch programmes if 
	%O = 0 and will not if	%O = 1: 2-O = 0  and	2,O = 1.  
The resulting IV estimates can be interpreted as an average treatment effect from 
CDH to poverty and human capital for the Ecuadorian households that are beneficiaries 
of cash transfer programmes and comply with the instrument. These are the families who 
have decided to switch programmes, because they have previous credit experience that 
can be tapped. However, as explained above, there are also households in the sample who 
changed to the CDH programme regardless of the history of credit access (or level of 
experience) and others who would never switch programmes. Thus, although the results 
are internally valid, external validity and generalizability do not necessarily apply. In other 
words, the IV estimates cannot be easily applied to the entire study sample or population 
as heterogeneity in the treatment effect is possible. For this reason, the instrumental 
variable estimator is commonly referred to in the technical literature as a local average 
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treatment effect (LATE), because the average effect is only measured for the 
subpopulation of compliers and therefore applies only locally (Imbens & Angrist, 1994).60  
The following equation shows that the Wald estimator on the left-hand side is 
equal to the LATE, the effect of treatment on those whose treatment status is manipulated 
by the instrument (Angrist, 2004):  
Q^_ =
t(NO|	%O = 1) − t(NO|	%O = 0)
t(2O|	%O = 1) − t(2O|	%O = 0)
= t(N-O − N,O|	2-O > 2,O) 
 
Note, however, that if there is heterogeneity in the CDH treatment effect, then this 
result is uninformative for the group of always-takers and never-takers (Angrist, 2004).61 
The LATE parameter measures the effect of the CDH treatment on individuals that move 
from the non-treated group to the treated group as the instrument Z changes. In this case, 
the LATE focus on a significant subpopulation of individuals and, therefore, it may 
provide an important measure of the effect of the CDH programme. 
In a standard IV application, the researcher first selects a set of (assumed) 
exogenous variables (i.e. instruments) and then uses two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) or 
similar econometric techniques to estimate the coefficients in the regressions (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010). Once the instruments have been found and their validity has been well 
established, it is time to analyse the econometric procedure used to exploit this information. 
Representing the second part of my identification strategy, I will estimate different versions 
of the instrumental variable (IV) two-stage regression model described below.  
Consider the following two equations:  
                                                             
60
 In particular, the instrumental variable (IV) approach neither identifies an average effect on the treated 
(ATET) nor does it identify an average effect for the whole population (ATE). See Harris and Remler (1998) 
for a relatively accessible explanation of the generalizability of instrumental variables estimates.  
61
 Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) extend this approach to the evaluation of quantile treatment effects. 
The goal is to assess how different parts of the outcome’s distribution are affected by the policy. 
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NO = Q-uO + Q.2O + WvO	,                   (2) 
2O = w-uO + w.%O + WxO	,                   (3) 
 
where N is any of the outcome variables under study; X is a binary variable representing 
the CDH treatment status (i.e. a dummy variable that equals 1 for poor households who 
took the decision to switch to the CDH programme); Z is the instrumental variable of 
previous credit experience; u is a vector of individual- and household-level 
characteristics; Q′? and w′? are parameters to be estimated; and WvO and WxO are random 
errors that are uncorrelated with each other and with their respective independent 
variables. 
One method of estimating the parameters of interest in Equations (2) and (3) is to 
use the fact that Z is an instrumental variable for X. First, I estimate (3) as a logistic or 
probit regression model (because the dependent variable is dichotomous) and, using the 
estimated equation, I calculate expected values for X:   
t(2O|uO, %O) = 2z{ = w|-uO + w|.%O 
 
Then, in a second stage of the estimation, I replace 2 with 2| in Equation (2) and 
estimate this equation by a method suited to the measurement of Y according to the type 
of dependent variable (for example, ordinary least squares if the dependent variable is 
continuous, ordered logistic if it is an ordinal discrete variable, probit if it is a binary, etc.)  
This method consistently estimates Q- and Q. under the assumption that WvO and WxO are 
uncorrelated with each other and with W and Z.  
Finally, it is important to stress that the instrumental variables (IV) method is quite 
convenient in cases where you have strong arguments to believe in the validity of the 
instrument. As previously noted, this method works correctly only under the assumption 
that Z affects X  but not Y; otherwise 2| would be an exact linear combination of variables 
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already in (2) and Q. would not be consistently estimable. In addition, for the method to 
yield precise estimates, Z and X should be strongly associated. 
In research practice, however, suitable instruments are often difficult to find. This 
has led to a kind of “degradation” of the method using the so-called weak instruments, 
which are only moderately correlated with the regressors, and where the exogeneity 
assumption may be dubious. In these cases, it is possible to obtain a slightly more accurate 
estimate when samples are large (Stock & Watson, 2003). However, even then, the use of 
weak instruments does not definitely solve the problem, but rather redirects the discussion 
from the suspected endogeneity of the independent variable to the actual validity of the 
instrument. Therefore, IV estimation should always be used as a complement to, rather 
than a substitute for linear models; and if you still have reason to think that the 
instrumental variable conditions are not met, alternative quasi-experimental methods 
(such as DID estimation) should be considered.   
 
3.3.2 Difference-in-Difference Method 
A different quasi-experimental design that also seems feasible is to use a Difference-in-
Difference strategy, exploiting the fact that the Registro Social process is repeated every 
6 years and that I have access to two different databases (2008 and 2014). The data are 
not panel-type; therefore, respondents are not exactly the same in both datasets and this is 
an obstacle. However, the Registro Social is so large (around 9 million people) that 
certainly a lot of the respondents will be repeated in both databases. This is even more 
likely to happen considering that an important part of the target population is around the 
first and second quintile of the welfare index.  
It is necessary to point out that it is possible (although somewhat difficult) to 
identify repeated respondents using the identity number reported in both databases. Since 
I have information at two different times, both for the treatment and control groups, it is 
possible to isolate the externalities and correct for potential self-selection bias and 
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endogeneity problems (associated with the CDH programme implementation) in order to 
calculate the real effect of the CDH treatment among BDH beneficiaries (Munoz, 2010).  
The diff-in-diff strategy can be summarized in four crucial steps. First, it will be 
necessary to merge the databases (based on unique characteristics, such as the identity 
number complemented by age) to obtain a unique sample of individuals registered in both 
datasets. Second, I will construct sub-samples of people with similar characteristics (i.e., 
people living in poverty) that were never treated by the BDH or CDH programmes (control 
group). Similarly, I can construct two sub-samples of individuals treated by each one of 
the cash transfer programmes before 2014 (treatment groups). Note that in this step I will 
take into account the BDH and CDH programmes individually. Finally, I compare the 
BDH treatment group with the control group –and the CDH group with the BDH group– 
before and after the intervention in order to find the specific effect of a given programme 
on the living conditions of poor households.  
This econometric approach is optimally used when there are two periods of data 
and a distinct treatment and control group (Munoz, 2010). This method aims to capture 
separately not only the differences between both groups, but also the changes over time 
(i.e. trends). Specifically, it compares changes over time in a group affected by the 
treatment intervention to the changes over time in a group unaffected by the treatment, 
and attributes the “difference-in-differences” to the effect of the intervention. As a result, 
it provides unbiased estimates of the effects if the trend over time would have been the 
same between the treatment and control groups in the absence of the intervention (Stuart 
et al., 2014).        
Formally, we would have a treatment (} = 1) and a comparison (} = 0) group for 
both the before (1 = 0) and after (1 = 1) time period. Thus, the estimated regression 
model is the following:  
NO~









 is the level of the outcome variable of a given individual c in group } at 
time	1. Ä is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1, if the observed person belongs 
to the treatment group, and takes value equal to 0, if the person is in the control group. u~ 
is another dummy variable, which takes a value equal to 1 in the post-treatment period; 
and 0 otherwise. The diff-in-diff estimator is Å, the coefficient of the interaction between 
Ä and u~. Note that this interaction term is also a dummy variable, which takes a value 
equal to 1, only for the treatment group in the post-treatment period. Lastly, 2O~
  is a set of 
control variables and WO~
  is the error term.  
The other terms in Equation (4) are the coefficients (Q,, Q-, Q., Å, QÉ)	of the diff-
in-diff regression model. This regression is useful in deriving the treatment effects, 
namely, whether a given programme made a difference to NO~  in the treatment group after 
the intervention. The regression coefficients help in deriving different effects for the 
treatment and control groups. For example, if Q-	(i.e. the coefficient for the time dummy 
variable) is statistically significant, this means that part of the (presumed) differences 
between the treatment and control groups is explained by the passage of time; and 
therefore, in the absence of treatment both groups would have evolved over time anyway. 
Moreover, if Q. (i.e. the coefficient for the group dummy variable) is statistically 
significant as well, this suggests that there are intrinsic differences between the treatment 
and control groups, which are therefore not explained solely by the treatment itself but by 
other causes (e.g. unobserved factors).     
However, the most important coefficient is the one that captures the differences 
between before and after treatment, as well as the innate differences of the treatment group 
with the control group, that is the parameter Å (i.e. the coefficient for the interaction 
variable). If Å is statistically significant, after controlling for the independent effects of 
time and group, this means that there are differences between both groups caused 
exclusively by the treatment. In other words, the interaction coefficient shows the actual 
impact of the treatment. Mathematically, the estimate of Å would be the difference 
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between mean of N	after minus mean of N before for the treatment group, and mean of N 







Note that to estimate this coefficient, it is necessary to restrict the model so that, 
t[NO
-|c, 1] = t[NO
,|c, 1] + Å. 
 
Therefore, the rationale for this double-differencing strategy can be also explained 
in terms of conditional mean functions for potential outcomes. It is important to note, 
however, that the main threat to this method is the possibility of interactions between 
group and time even in the absence of the intervention.62 
In this methodological chapter, I have discussed the advantages and disadvantages 
of the natural- and quasi-experimental research designs proposed in this thesis. These 
quantitative methods are used to evaluate the impacts of the BDH and CDH cash transfer 
programmes on different outcome variables. Given that the identifying assumption of my 
natural experimental design is an “as if” random treatment assignment for both 
programmes, there is a latent concern for a potential self-selection bias. Therefore, it is 
necessary to address the possible endogeneity problems by using an IV approach and DID 
estimation. Now, it is time to focus on the data from the Registro Social, the necessary 





                                                             
62
 See Angrist and Kruger (1999) pp. 21. 










The Ecuadorian Registro Social Data: 
Constructing a Panel-Type Database   
  
4.1 Introduction 
This thesis focuses on the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano (CDH) and the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano (BDH) programmes, which grew out of a much earlier programme 
known as the “Bono Solidario”. The Bono Solidario was the first large-scale social 
assistance programme in Ecuador. However, as explained in Chapter 2, one of the most 
important problems faced by the Bono Solidario programme since its early stages was the 
lack of an adequate information system for the administrative process (Schady & Araujo, 
2006). As a consequence, many of the beneficiary households were non-poor (i.e. leakage 
problems), and much of the poor population was not covered by the programme (i.e. poor 
focalization).  
The clear need for better information and targeting mechanisms led to the further 
implementation of surveys with national coverage in order to achieve a more accurate 
identification of households in poverty conditions. The first survey wave was conducted 
between June and August 2003 (before the launch of the BDH programme) and a second 
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wave was conducted between January and March 2005 (two years after the BDH 
programme’s application) (Schady & Araujo, 2006). However, it was not until August 
2009 that the continuous application of surveys was institutionalized, through an 
Executive Order delegating to the Ministerio Coordinador de Desarrollo Social (MCDS) 
the responsibility for the establishment and management of a national cadastral survey 
named Registro Social (Social Register) (MCDS, 2016b). 
The ultimate goal of the Registro Social (RS) was the formal establishment of a 
complete register –containing individualized social, economic and demographic 
information– which can be used as a recurring tool to determine the well-being situation 
of Ecuadorian families, so that they can have access to social programmes and different 
subsidies (MCDS, 2016). However, in order to create the necessary conditions for the 
integral protection of people throughout their life cycle, the state needs to have access to 
up to date data, with special attention to those individuals or groups who have been 
traditionally excluded (i.e. the poor, disabled, and elderly populations).  
For this reason, every six years a follow-up cadastral survey is carried out, 
covering more households in each round with the purpose of assessing whether families 
are still in a situation of poverty, as well as identifying potential beneficiaries of the 
different welfare programmes offered by the Ecuadorian Government. As a result, 
meaningful data is available for public sector management as a basis for decision-making. 
The academic use of these data is recent and limited because so far no RS database has 
been published for public review. Moreover, according to government officials, until 
recently the data collected through the RS surveys have been used exclusively by the 
State's social sector and some academic institutions (MCDS, 2016b).  
The quantitative data used in this thesis are constructed from the large-scale 
household surveys conducted as part of the last two RS rounds of data collection. These 
official records are distinctive in the sense that they are based on the direct registration of 
households’ conditions with the explicit purpose of knowing better the target population 
in order to focus resources to them, including factual information on access to welfare 
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programmes as well as individuals’ perception on their own poverty situation. More 
specifically, the datasets contain comprehensive information on social benefit recipient 
and applicant households, which allows easy recognition of those eligible to participate in 
the BDH and CDH cash transfer programmes (Palacio, 2014). 
Therefore, I use official records of the RS as the sampling frame in the process of 
implementing my research. Following Mortelmans and Pasteels (2013), there are 
significant gains of using official records (i.e. secondary data sources). The authors 
mention the following specific advantages: data on the target population is frequently 
accessible, comprehensive and structured, and what is more, almost without missing 
values.63 Thus, in general, the official nature of the data facilitates social research both by 
saving valuable time –given  that the necessary information has been already collected by 
public agencies– and by supporting any further analysis on formal institutional grounds, 
since the data has been gathered by the bureaucratic apparatus of the state.  
Nevertheless, relying on secondary administrative data has its own disadvantages 
and this case is no exception. Palacio (2014) identifies some of the problems of relying 
specifically on the RS official records for conducting social research. As the author fielded 
the survey and looked for some of the households selected from the sample, she noticed 
that the data is not fully accurate, important contact information is missing, addresses are 
sometimes obsolete and household composition data is in some cases outdated. For 
example, according to the author, certain groups –such as informal workers– were 
extremely difficult to find and remain misrepresented in the official records. Also, she 
points out that many new-borns are not registered, leading to an underestimation of the 
size of the household.    
But perhaps the most important shortcoming identified by Palacio (2014) is the 
potential presence of misreporting problems –mainly due to people's general knowledge 
about the final purpose of the surveys. The author notices that, for example, some people 
                                                             
63
 A full review on the missing values in the RS databases and the possible strategies for dealing with them 
is discussed in a later section. 
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were fully aware that the lack of formal employment is actually a good strategy to access 
social assistance benefits. Besides, a significant number of surveyed individuals know that 
cash transfer programmes are targeted exclusively to poor households, and therefore, they 
are quite reluctant to talk about income sources and other benefits at work (such as social 
security) so as not to reduce the chances of being selected. 
All considered, the RS remains the most complete and the most updated source of 
secondary information available in Ecuador. Note that the potential shortcomings 
described above are also common to most survey-based social research. As such, it is 
important to keep in mind the possibilities of misreporting and measurement error when 
interpreting the findings in order to avoid drawing incorrect conclusions. 
 
4.2 The Instruments of the Registro Social 
At this point, it is important to recognize that the term “Registro Social” can be understood 
simultaneously as a simple survey, a comprehensive database, or even as a complex 
system used to rank households within the country. Conceptually, the RS could be 
described as a national survey used to distinguish the socio-economic status of households 
and individuals –focusing particularly on the most vulnerable areas– with the purpose of 
guiding the coordinated actions of the social sector in order to respond efficiently to the 
constant needs of the population. Formally, the MCDS (2016) defines the RS as “a socio-
economic cadastre of Ecuadorian households and their members, which allows social 
assistance programmes to identify their target populations (i.e. a targeting mechanism), 
and thus articulate the actions necessary to achieve the upward social mobility of these 
households over time”.  
As a system, the RS is based on two main instruments: a record of socio-economic 
information from households known as RCS (Registro de Caracterización Socio-
económica); and a welfare index known as SELBEN (Sistema de Identificación y 
Selección de Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales) (MCDS, 2016b). The RCS record is 
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used to compile a database with individual and household level information (i.e. Registro 
Social administrative database). This database is used in turn to create the SELBEN 
welfare index, which ranks Ecuadorian households according to social, economic and 
demographic characteristics. As will  be explained in more detail in a later section of this 
chapter, the welfare score of a given household –according to the SELBEN– is computed 
using a nonlinear principal components analysis based on 59 different variables, including 
housing characteristics, household assets (television, car, telephone, etc.) and 
characteristics of the members of the household (schooling, ethnicity, illiteracy, 
employment status, etc.) (Fabara, 2009). 
The RS database is used to understand the well-being levels of Ecuadorian families 
on important issues such as health-care, education, housing, among others. This 
administrative database contains important human capital-related information, such as 
school enrolment, school assistance, educational attainment and child care (i.e. frequency 
of attendance at clinics for children’s medical check-ups). Additionally, it comprises some 
common poverty indicators related to living conditions, overcrowding, and access to basic 
services. There are also data on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 
households and individuals, such as region, province, city, district, identity number, age, 
marital status, language, economic activity, and labour supply (MCDS, 2013).  
However, perhaps the most important feature of the RS database –at least for the 
purpose of this paper– is that it includes information about engagement in social assistance 
programmes, such as having been a BDH or CDH beneficiary, and even the reported use 
of cash transfers (investment in health, education, household equipment, debt repayment, 
nutrition, business entrepreneurship, or personal expenses) (MCDS, 2013). Therefore, 
given the vast amount of available data, a comprehensive review of the survey 
questionnaire was necessary –as an important preparatory step– to determine the most 
appropriate outcome and explanatory variables for comparing the effectiveness of the two 
cash transfer programmes considered in this study. A complete list of the variables 
selected for the quantitative evaluation is included in the last section of this chapter.  
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The Registro Social’s instruments described above (namely, the administrative 
database and the SELBEN welfare index) are used together by government agencies to 
identify potential beneficiaries of the cash transfer programmes (MCDS, 2016b). More 
specifically, each social assistance programme independently sets the value of the index 
below which the registered households can receive state subsidies or social benefits. For 
example, until 2014, the BDH programme delivered cash transfers “as if” randomly but 
only to households with a score of 36.5 or lower according to the SELBEN (i.e. those in 
the first two quintiles of the poverty index). The individual evaluation aims to reduce the 
leakage of ineligible beneficiaries (for instance, those who are not in poverty).  
 
4.3 Methodology and Coverage of the Registro Social 
The Registro Social is, by definition, a cross-sectional survey that is used to gather 
information on a target population at a single point in time. The methodology used for 
data collection through field operations is of three types: by sweeping, by group call and 
by demand (MCDS, 2016b). The first method, known as “sweeping”, is the one used in 
most cases and consists in collecting information by visiting directly the households in 
their respective homes, which are located in each of the intervention sectors previously 
identified by the RS managers.  
On the other hand, the “group call” method is used when census districts are 
widely dispersed (as in the Amazon region) and it consists in gathering information by 
appealing to the resident populations of some selected sectors, and thus, concentrating the 
people in a certain place to be interviewed individually. One of the disadvantages of the 
surveys by group-call is that it is not possible to verify some information (e.g. the housing 
characteristics) by direct observation. However, this is not a major issue since the vast 
majority of records are obtained through the sweeping method. In fact, according to 
Martínez, Borja, Medellín and Cueva (2017), during the last RS process, less than 10 
percent of household information was collected through the method of group-call.   
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Alternatively, there is also the collection of data on-demand, which is requested 
by families who have not been properly registered during previous field operations. This 
may be due to circumstances such as: household members were not at home when they 
were visited; respondents were not qualified to provide information; interviewers did not 
reach a household due to difficulties in finding the residence where they live. Also, the 
on-demand registration procedure allows households residing in census districts that are 
not identified as poor to apply for participation in the BDH.  In order to be surveyed, 
families must voluntarily request a home visit contacting the MIES. This could be done 
by telephone –contacting the institutional call centre–, directly at MIES offices or by 
entering to the RS official web page and registering the household’s full address along 
with the individual information on the household members (MCDS, 2016). In these cases, 
the MCDS normally waits for several cases to accumulate in each census district to carry 
out an information gathering field operation.  
Remarkably, in the last RS process, electronic tablets were used for the first time 
to apply the surveys (Martinez et al., 2017). This important innovation allowed the MCDS 
to improve the level of planning of the field operations and their outcomes. For example, 
it was helpful for designing better routes and increasing the quality of the information. 
The use of tablets also permitted the collected information to be simultaneously compared 
with different administrative databases. Thus, for instance, it was possible to validate if 
the surveyed person had an updated identity card number. In the case of the families 
surveyed by the sweeping method, the location of the houses was geo-referenced and even 
a photograph of the house was added to each family's file, which makes it easier to follow 
up the surveyed households on future RS processes. In addition, through an application 
software specifically designed by the MCDS, the probability of common mistakes while 
implementing the surveys –such as filling errors and the omission of information by the 
interviewer– was reduced. Finally, at the end of the interview, the employed software 
generates an electronic document that was signed by the interviewee to confirm the 
veracity of the information. 
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The field operations of the Registro Social 2008 (namely, sweeping and group-call 
data collection methods) were carried out from December 2007 to June 2009 (MCDS, 
2016b). According to the MCDS official records, about 80 percent of the information was 
collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INEC) and the remaining 20 
percent by the MCDS. Moreover, about 70 percent of the first RS data was obtained 
through the sweeping methodology in the selected areas and 30 percent was collected by 
group call. Finally, between November and December 2009, the RS survey was carried 
out on demand. At the end of the on-demand field operations, it was estimated that 
approximately 180,000 new homes were incorporated into the database.  
The data collection process during the last RS in 2013-14 was conducted in a very 
similar way (i.e., emphasizing the first two types of field operations). As a result, 72 
percent of the data was gathered using the sweeping method in selected areas throughout 
the country. This represents nearly 1.44 million Ecuadorian households that were 
surveyed by the INEC and the MCDS from September 2013 to July 2014. Most of the 
remaining 28 percent of the data (representing 0.56 million households) was collected by 
group calls in those sectors that are more difficult to cover through direct visits to 
households (MCDS, 2016).   
For the application of the Registro Social survey process, the MCDS uses the 
recently established administrative division of the country into census districts. According 
to this division, the Ecuadorian territory is currently organized into 42,649 census districts, 
each of which contains approximately 100 to 150 households (MCDS, 2016b). Prior to 
the implementation of the first RS survey, it was estimated that a total of 3,392,851 
households (i.e. 14,321,699 individuals) were spread across the census districts at the 
national level. Moreover, it was also estimated that 38.3 percent of the total population 
were living in poverty or extreme poverty at that time (i.e. 1,319,819 poor households) 
(MCDS, 2016b).64 According to the INEC (2010), poverty in the country is almost equally 
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 The INEC traditionally determines the poverty status of each household by using the Unsatisfied Basic 
Needs Methodology (UBN). According to this approach, living conditions are measured with the help of 
the following indicators: 1) overcrowding: more than three people living in one room; 2) water: homes 
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distributed between the urban (48 percent of households are in poverty) and the rural areas 
(52 percent). However, it should be noted that rural areas traditionally include suburban 
sectors. 
Therefore, in order to efficiently carry out the first RS, the MCDS identified and 
selected 25,942 poor census districts (i.e. about 80 percent of the 32,129 districts that were 
established at that time). While in the last survey of socioeconomic information that was 
implemented in 2013 prior to the last RS process, 24,482 poor census sectors were 
identified out of a total of 42,649. These poor districts were chosen by using the 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) methodology, according to which a census district is 
considered poor –and therefore taken into account– when it presents a UBN score equal 
or higher than 50 percent (MCDS, 2016b). 
The MCDS (2016) reported that most of the households in the poor districts are 
visited during each RS survey wave. Typically, a high percentage of them are effectively 
surveyed at the end of the process, thereby obtaining the socio-economic characterization 
of nearly two million Ecuadorian families. For instance, between September 2013 and 
July 2014, the RS reached an outstanding daily production of 8,500 records. As a result, 
a total of 2.1 million households were visited and more than 2 million registers were fully 
completed along the national territory (MCDS, 2016). Figure 6 depicts the geographic 





                                                             
without access to water public system; 3) toilet facility: households without sewage; 4) schooling: 
households with children of school age (6-12years) without access to primary education; and 5) health: no 
household member has access to public health insurance. Note that this method allows defining the 
threshold for each indicator considering the surrounding environment, culture, and social conditions of 
each specific population (Feres & Mancero, 2001).  
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Figure 6: Geographic Localization of the Surveyed Poor Districts 
 
Source: MCDS (2016).  
 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the RS survey process covers a significant portion of 
the national territory. However, it is important to stress that the surveyed samples are not 
representative of the whole national population because, as explained above, the process 
is carried out mainly in the areas (or census districts) with the highest poverty rates within 
the country (i.e. focalized surveys). In other words, the surveys' target population –
represented by the RS samples– are only those individuals considered as potential 
beneficiaries of social assistance programmes and, therefore, the process is conducted 
only in zones with a high incidence of poverty (MCDS, 2016b). 
Remarkably, the last RS covered 2,130,765 households (i.e. 9,485,132 
individuals), each of which is consistently assigned a specific score in accordance with 
the methodology established for the SELBEN welfare index calculation (which is 
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explained in the section below). In this thesis, I use household- and individual-level data 
taken directly from the Registro Social’s 2008 and 2014 databases. However, as 
previously explained, an important technical issue –that must be considered for the 
quantitative part of the analysis– is that the RS is not a panel-type database. 
Fortunately, according to the Registro Social’s official administrators, the level of 
attrition between the last two cadastral surveys is relatively low. More specifically, it is 
argued that about 70 percent of the households registered in 2008 were interviewed again 
six years later in the survey wave conducted between 2013 and 2014 (MCDS, 2016). 
Besides, it is possible to identify the repeated respondents by using the identity number, 
which is conveniently coded and reported in both databases. These assertions are (for the 
most part) confirmed in a later section of this chapter when an artificial panel-type 
database is successfully created using the two available RS datasets.    
 
4.4 The SELBEN Welfare Index 
The SELBEN index (or Welfare Index) is frequently employed as an indicator or proxy 
for consumption poverty (MCDS, 2016). Since its implementation in 2008, many different 
variables have been used for the construction of the index, which are all obtained through 
the RS database. These variables are (to different extents) correlated with the level of 
household consumption and well-being. Moreover, the methodology used for the 
estimation of the SELBEN index is that of non-linear principal components (Fabara, 
2009). This methodology allows families (and their members) to be classified 
socioeconomically using a model based on a set of consumption-related variables.   
More specifically, the model used by the MCDS to construct the Welfare Index is 
based on six main components of households’ consumption levels, each of which has a 
different percentage of participation and includes several variables (MCDS, 2016). The 
specific weighting of each component is set in such a way that the poverty index presents 
values between 0 (for those households in worst poverty conditions) and 100 (for those in 
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the best conditions). In 2014, through the obtained values by the index, it was estimated 
that 11.5 percent of the households at the national level were living in extreme poverty 
(i.e. households with an index value less than or equal to 24.07 points) (MCDS, 2016).  
For the selection of the multivariate method that allows the formulation of the 
Welfare Index, the MCDS started analysing the results obtained with several 
multidimensional methods, including: regression analysis and discriminant analysis 
(Fabara, 2009). In fact, different theoretical models can be successfully applied to 
statistically classify households. For instance, the application of income-related models 
was initially considered by the MCDS statisticians. However, due to the great variability 
and temporality of the obtained results, this kind of models were discarded (Fabara, 2009). 
It should be noted that the main objective was to develop an index that is both stable over 
time and based on structural variables. Therefore, once the available information and the 
results obtained with different models were taken into account, the MCDS opted for the 
non-linear principal components analysis (PRINCALS), which has been widely used for 
its great power of discrimination in this type of classifications (MCDS, 2016).  
Initially, the MCDS used the Registro Social database to select a set of 59 variables 
to be part of the chosen PRINCALS analysis. Fabara (2009) points out in her institutional 
report for the MCDS –Reformulation of the Social Register Index of Socioeconomic 
Classification– that for the adequate design of the poverty index and the correct selection 
of the variables, the MCDS considered three elements: the academic literature on this 
subject, the level of linear association of each variable with per capita consumption at the 
national level (calculated using the Pearson's correlation test), and the social assistance’s 
beneficiary selection models applied in other countries (which are also based on the 
socioeconomic classification of households).65  
                                                             
65
 The Pearson correlation coefficient, whose value does not depend on the units of measure of the 
variables, is bounded by -1 and +1. The sign of the coefficient indicates the direction (positive or negative) 
of the linear association and the absolute value the intensity of it.  
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As a result of this analysis, the variables used in the model basically encompass 
housing characteristics complemented with some indicators related to the household’s 
composition, the characteristics of the head of household and the availability of goods. 
These variables have the peculiarity of being stable over time and they are mostly 
structural. In addition, the issue of territoriality is included in the model, thus it considers 
the geographical location of the household and the level of consumption poverty in each 
census district. The table below details the 59 variables considered by the non-linear 
principal components model for the elaboration of the Welfare Index in 2008. Here, these 
individual- and household-level variables are classified according to their nature or 
typology (e.g. discrete or continuous).   
 
Table 7: Variables of the Registro Social Employed for the Construction of the 





1. Geographical location 2. Reason why children are not 
enrolled in school 
3. Ethnic self-definition of the 
head of the household 
4. Educational attainment of the 
head of the household.   
5. Number of cell phones in the 
household 
6. Housing tenure 
7. Number of migrated household 
members 
8. Access to electricity 
9. Occupational category of head 
of household 
10. Ownership of land for agriculture 
11. Type of fuel used for cooking 12. Type of educational institution 
attended 
13. Use of cash loans 14. Type of toilet facility 
15. Availability of shower facility 16. Type of housing 
17. Marital status 18. Ownership (title) of the property 
19. Housing general condition 20. Type of water treatment system 
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21. Method of garbage disposal 22. Location of water and sanitary 
services 
23. Type of water source 24. Main access road to housing site 
25. Language spoken by the head 
of household 
26. Main type of floor material 
27. Main type of walls material 28. Main type of roof material 
Dichotomous 
(2 categories)  
29. Economic activity of the head 
of household 
30. Household receives pension 
income 
31. Access to insurance 32. Holding of farm animals 
33. Overcrowding status 34. Access to gas water heater 
35. Household receives rental 
income 
36. Access to internet service 
37. Household receives scholarship 
income 
38. Access to cable TV 
Continuous  
39. Years of schooling of head of 
household 
40. Number of colour televisions in 
the household 
41. Number of cars in the 
household 
42. Number of VHS/DVDs in the 
household 
43. Number of cooking appliances 
in the household 
44. Age of the Head of the Household 
45. Number of computers in the 
household 
46. Household receives income from 
family support services and NGOs 
47. Number of washing machines 
in the household 
48. Number of working children 
49. Number of food blenders in the 
household 
50. Number of people in the 
household 
51. Number of telephone land-lines 52. Number of people between the 
ages of 18 and 64 earning income  
53. Number of children under 6 
years old in the household 
54. Average consumption poverty of 
the census sector 
55. Number of microwaves in the 
household 
56. Access to cash remittances from 
abroad 
57. Number of irons in the 
household 
58. Number of refrigerators in the 
household 
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59. Amount of loans received in 
the last twelve months 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Fabara (2009).  
 
As can be observed, these variables are directly correlated with the household’s 
level of consumption and well-being. For the accurate estimation of the welfare index, the 
59 variables are grouped into six different components or categories. The number of 
variables included in each component is presented in Table 8. Additionally, Figure 7 
shows the percentages of participation (i.e. weighting rates) of each of these components 
in the Welfare Index. The percentages are institutionally determined by the MCDS as part 
of the PRINCALS methodology.    
 




Household members’ characteristics 6 
Head of the household characteristics 9 
Housing conditions 15 
Living conditions and access to basic services 15 
Availability of goods 12 
Territory 2 
TOTAL 59 
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Figure 7: Proportion of Each Component in the Welfare Index 2008 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on MCDS (2016).  
 
It should be noted that, in 2014, the MCDS changed the consumption-related 
variables and, thus, some of the components used for the construction of the Welfare 
Index. Specifically, for the non-linear principal components analysis, the number of 
variables was reduced to 34 and the participation percentages were also modified (MCDS, 
2016). Although the poverty index introduced in 2014 presents methodological 
advantages and may be more precise, this thesis uses only indexes constructed with the 
initial methodology for reasons of comparability. Note that while it is possible to apply 
the initial methodology in the 2014 database, the opposite is not feasible because the 2008 
survey includes a smaller number of questions (i.e. database variables). Fortunately, the 
latest Registro Social includes welfare indexes calculated with both methodologies (i.e. 
2008 and 2014). Nevertheless, as will be seen below, it was necessary to standardize (or 
make equivalent) the selected variables of the Registro Social 2008 and 2014, because in 







Household members’ characteristics Head of the household characteristics
Housing conditions Living conditions and access to basic services
Availability of goods Territory
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Finally, according to the general statistical theory of normally distributed samples, 
the distribution of the Welfare Index should be approximately normal given the large 
number of observations.  In order to verify this assumption, I present below the 
distribution of the survey sample –considered for the application of the Registro Social 
2008– according to the Welfare Index (see Figure 8). By plotting the histogram, it is 
possible to get quite a clear picture of the distribution of the index-estimator. As can be 
seen, the sample is normally distributed and the dispersion of data is significant throughout 
the index scale.  
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4.5 Creating a Panel-Type Database from Two Different 
Registro Social Datasets 
For the analysis to take place, I gained access to the two different RS databases available 
(i.e. 2008 and 2014). The Ecuadorian government, through the MCDS, approved and 
provided the necessary information to carry out this research project. However, the 
process of acquiring the data was not easy and (as expected) a series of difficulties arose 
during this stage, which was one of the first in the development of this thesis. First of all, 
the bureaucratic difficulties that typically arise when it comes to gaining access to data, 
especially in less developed countries with information systems that are not well 
integrated. Given that the information in the Registro Social is confidential and not open 
to the general public, it was necessary to begin by writing a formal letter to the Minister 
of Social Development in July 2014. This letter specifically explained the type of data 
needed and the purpose of the investigation. It was delivered through the Ministry of 
Education –which also financed my doctoral studies– with the aim of accelerating the 
process and minimizing the possibility of future complications. 
Once the request was approved by the end of 2014, I went to Mr. Reinaldo 
Cervantez, manager of the Registro Social, with whom I personally met on different 
occasions and exchanged some emails until we reached an agreement on important details, 
such as the quantity and quality of information that will be provided and the time it would 
take them to deliver the databases. Mr. Cervantez explained that the approximate waiting 
time would be between 4 and 6 months,  mainly due to the heavy workload that the MCDS 
had at that time and because it was necessary to carry out some previous work with the 
databases. More specifically, they had to codify in some way the identification number of 
the individuals, as well as to standardize the SELBEN Welfare Index so that it would be 
possible to compare it between two different years. In addition, he mentioned that the 
waiting time would be longer depending on the size of the databases requested, that is, the 
number of observations and variables. 
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Therefore, before making important structural decisions about the requested 
databases, it was necessary to perform a comprehensive review of the almost 300 variables 
that make up the full Registro Social databases. Note that when combining data from two 
timepoints, the number of variables is doubled. For example, we have the individual-level 
variable ‘educational attainment’ in both 2008 and 2014. Appendix C summarizes and 
categorizes some of the most important variables of the RS database, taking as a reference 
the survey questions in 2014. Of course, this summary includes all the independent and 
dependent variables that will be used in the regression analyses of this thesis (presented 
in later chapters) to estimate the effects of the BDH and CDH programmes. 
Due mainly to time constraints, a much smaller number of variables were 
eventually requested to the MCDS as part of the RS databases (those considered essential 
for the impact evaluations). In order to select (a priori) the best possible variables for the 
analysis, the main information needs were taken into account, as well as the specific 
regression models that were planned to be estimated. The selected variables and the type 
of data effectively available are described extensively in Section 4.7 and, subsequently, 
they are used as independent and dependent variables in the different regression analyses. 
However, as will be described in more detail below, some of these variables had to be 
reshaped or simply standardized for comparison reasons (see page 174). For the 
quantitative analysis, for example, it was necessary to derive some useful variables that 
were not included in the original datasets (such as a households’ unique identifier and the 
average educational attainment of the household). Moreover, it was important to 
standardize the variables of the Registro Social 2008 and 2014, because the response 
categories included in some variables were not equal in both databases. Therefore, I 
agreed with Mr. Cervantez that I was going to actively collaborate with the MCDS by 
writing the STATA codes needed to accelerate the process of preparing the databases and 
the selected variables. This was done through a joint work for a couple of months between 
an MCDS technician (Mr. Fernando Galvez) and me. 
After about 6 months (mid-2015), I finally had access to the two complete RS 
databases with the variables requested. At this point, some problems of a more technical 
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nature were presented (such as the construction of a panel-type database and the necessary 
variables for data analysis) that, fortunately, were resolved without major inconveniences. 
Note that the RS data is not strictly panel-type; therefore, respondents are not the same in 
both registers -which constitutes a clear first technical obstacle for the evaluation. 
Fortunately, each RS is so large (around 9 million people) relative to the whole population 
that certainly a considerably number of respondents will be surveyed in both years. This 
is even more likely to happen considering that most respondents live in areas considered 
“threatened” or poor and, consequently, it is expected that they present scores around the 
first and second quintile of the welfare index. It is possible to identify repeated 
respondents using the unique identity number coded and reported by all surveyed 
individuals in both databases. 
Once I managed to merge the two datasets in the program STATA, using the 
individuals’ unique identification code as the common variable between registers, I 
obtained a complete panel-type database of repeated individuals composed of 3,394,210 
observations for each measured variable. This total number of individuals corresponds in 
turn to 1,722,473 repeated households. In order to better understand the composition of 
the resulting panel data (for 2008 and 2014), individuals are classified according to 
different categories based on personal characteristics, such as age, race, gender, reported 
disabilities and poverty situation (i.e. welfare index score). The following table 
summarizes the distribution of individuals by age group (distinguishing between children 
and the elderly), by reported disability status, by poverty situation and by social assistance 
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Table 9: Distribution of Individuals by Category (Percentage in Parentheses) 
By Age Group 
Working-age adults (18 to 65 years old) in both timepoints  2,474,203 (72.89%) 
Children aged <18 in 2008 530,249 (15.62%) 
Elderly aged >65 in 2014 387,949 (11.42%) 
Missing in both timepoints 1,809 (0.05%) 
Total 3,394,210 (100%) 
By Disability Status 
Reported disabilities in 2008 or 2014 256,735 (7.56%) 
Without disabilities in both timepoints 3,135,666 (92.38%) 
Missing in both timepoints 1,809 (0.05%) 
Total  3,394,210 (100%) 
By Poverty Situation in 2008 (i.e. baseline year) 
First two quintiles of the poverty index 2,347,880 (69.17%) 
Above the poverty threshold   1,044,521 (30.77%) 
Missing 1,809 (0.05%) 
Total 3,394,210 (100%) 
By Social Assistance Programme Enrolment in 2014 
BDH beneficiaries 740,727 (21.82%) 
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CDH beneficiaries 382,074 (11.25%) 
No programme 2,012,396 (59.28%) 
Missing 66 259,013 (7.63%) 
Total 3,394,210 (100%) 
 
 
As this table indicates, 72.8 percent (2,474,203 individuals) of the two-times 
surveyed individuals are in adulthood in both timepoints and, therefore, they are part of 
the country's economically active population (EAP) for the entire period from 2008 to 
2014.67 For the purposes of this research, the economically active population is defined as 
those individuals (individuals between 18 and 65 years of age) who are working or are 
looking for work. This amount represents a considerable portion of the country’s total 
population taking into account that, according to the National Institute of Statistics and 
Censuses, the whole economically active population in Ecuador is approximately 8 
million people in 2016 (INEC, 2016). On the other hand, children, young adults and the 
elderly account for approximately 27 percent of individuals in the panel database. 
The distribution of individuals by disability status shows that there are over 
250,000 people (i.e. 7.5 percent) who reported any type of impairment or disability in at 
least one of the survey waves. The most commonly reported impairments are those that 
affect mobility and, although not included in Table 9, it can be pointed out that the 
prevalence of disability rises with age. Around 5 percent of children are disabled, 
                                                             
66
 In the case of variables indicating enrolment status in social assistance programmes, the number of 
missing values is somewhat higher (namely, 259,013 missing observations). However, almost all individuals 
with missed observations present well-being levels above the first two quintiles in 2008 and, as will be 
seen during the construction of the evaluation samples, these people are not relevant for the analysis 
since they are not potential beneficiaries of the programmes.   
67
 Those who transition between timepoints are not considered economically active in the entire period 
for the purposes of this thesis. 
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 169 
compared to 9 percent of working age adults. Moreover, according to this database, about 
3 million people -representing 92 percent of the surveyed population- reported no 
disabilities during the years 2008 and/or 2014. Therefore, the ratio of people without 
disabilities to those with disabilities is significantly large and, as will be seen in a later 
section, this fact is useful for the analysis of the data since it will not be necessary to 
eliminate many individuals during the construction of the sample for the evaluation.   
Individuals in the database are also classified according to their poverty situation 
into two broad categories: above or below the poverty line (set at 36.59 points of the 
SELBEN welfare index). In 2008, people with a score within the first two quintiles of the 
poverty index make up to about 70 percent of the surveyed population (2,347,880 
individuals). Meanwhile, individuals above the poverty line account for the remaining 30 
percent (about 1 million people). This percentage distribution seems very logical 
considering that the target population of the RS is mainly composed of those people living 
in marginal areas of the country, i.e. areas considered with a high incidence of poverty.  
This distribution is quite convenient for the subsequent quantitative analysis given 
that only those individuals in the first two quintiles are comparable (namely, potential 
beneficiaries of the cash transfer programmes), which represent about two thirds of the 
individuals in the panel database. Note also that Table 9 describes the distribution of 
individuals in 2008 because this year will be the baseline used for the evaluation. In other 
words, the distribution in 2014 may or may not change as a direct consequence of the 
application of social assistance programmes (i.e. BDH and CDH).  
At this point, it is also useful to describe the distribution of individuals according 
to their enrolment status in the cash transfer programmes offered by the government. The 
last section of Table 9 shows that almost a third of the people in the panel database 
reported having been beneficiaries of the BDH programme (i.e. about 1.1 million 
individuals). Of these, 382,074 people decided to join the CDH initiative sometime 
between 2008 and 2014. Therefore, about 2 million people reported never having 
benefited from social assistance programmes during the six-year period. This amount is 
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quite considerable taking into account that only 1 million people were above the poverty 
line in 2008. In other words, out of the 2.3 million potential programme beneficiaries 
initially identified (i.e. in the baseline year), only half of them reported in 2014 having 
received cash transfers at some point. 
The seeming low coverage can be explained by the strong budgetary constraints 
faced by the administration of these programmes. These budget constraints often prevent 
full coverage of the target population, as has historically been the case of the BDH and 
CDH initiatives. However, there is also the possibility that the problem of low coverage, 
reflected in the last distribution, is due to misreporting issues among surveyed individuals. 
It is important to recognize that sometimes people prefer not to report the benefits they 
receive from the government due to the justified fear of losing them in the near future if 
their answers are completely honest.  
In general, the usefulness of any survey or census data for evaluating social 
programme outcomes could be affected by misreporting of participation (Kirlin et al., 
2013). This is often solved by researchers using experimental research methods, which 
address misreporting problems by allowing the allocation of benefits in a controlled 
manner (Shady & Araujo, 2006). In the case that a controlled experiment is not an option, 
misreporting issues could be also addressed by combining administrative records with 
survey data. According to Kirlin et al. (2013), the potential advantages of such linkage are 
extensively acknowledged in social policy research. Nevertheless, this alternative to solve 
possible misreporting issues goes well beyond the practical possibilities of this thesis in 
terms of the available data and financial resources. I mention it simply as a future 
possibility to strengthen the validity of the obtained results.68 
 
                                                             
68
 Fortunately, the Registro Social process already gives special attention to verifying the accuracy of the 
information provided by the households. The information is cross-referenced with data from the social 
security administration, the public electricity company and the national credit bureau (De la O, 2015). 
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4.6 Missing Observations and Data Quality 
In principle, the amount of missing data does not seem to be an important problem for the 
quantitative part of the evaluation. In fact, for most of the variables considered in the 
analysis only 0.05 percent of the observations are missing (see Table 9). These missing 
data rates are a measure of the level of unit response and they are used as an indirect 
indicator of the quality of the data (Bouza-Herrera, 2013). Moreover, the missing values 
of these variables come mostly from the same 1,809 individuals, which makes it difficult 
to check whether the missing values follow a particular pattern or whether they respond 
to certain individual characteristics. However, in order to effectively deal with any 
potential problem due to non-responses, it is necessary to better understand the possible 
reasons why some of the information is lost and, as far as possible, the actual distribution 
of missing data. Only in this way, it is feasible to decide correctly on the best analysis 
strategy to yield the least biased estimates.  
Let's start by pointing out that missing observations and data quality improvement 
are well-recognized issues in statistical inference and quantitative data analysis (Hansen 
& Hurwitz, 1946). Missing data problems are present in social science surveying 
specifically because some interviewees are unwilling or unable to answer all the questions 
raised in the surveys (Särndal & Lundstrom, 2005). The reasons why some individuals are 
not available (or refuse giving information) may be several. However, they all of them 
have a common explanation, which has to do with the inherent complexity of survey 
research. Sampling and census survey practices involve a series of considerations that 
must be taken into account even before a survey can be developed.  
Definitions, concepts and methods (like those for collecting and processing data) 
must be determined beforehand and have important repercussions. All these factors 
together create a working system, which is shaped by the specific aims of the survey. As 
a result of such a complex process of preparation and application, it is common that survey 
data are not collected for all the units in the sample or population under study. In fact, full 
response surveys are rare –almost utopic– situations (Bouza-Herrera, 2013). The usual 
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set-up is to find that there are missing data for a part of the population and problems appear 
at the moment when conclusions are drawn on that population using statistical methods.     
Missing data is an umbrella concept under which are grouped all cases where the 
value of the variable of interest is not obtained. Following Bouza-Herrera (2013), in this 
thesis –like in any other survey-based research– missing observations are present when 
one or more of the following situations occur:   
1. An individual of the target population is not included on the survey’s sampling 
frame (non-coverage); 
2. A unit in the sample does not participate in the survey (total non-response); 
3. A sample unit fails to provide acceptable responses in some of the outcome 
variables (unit or item non-response).    
As can be noticed from Table 9, most of the identified missing observations in the 
constructed Registro Social panel database fall into the category of total non-response, 
which is important to consider in order to decide next the best strategy for handling the 
missing data. There are some cases of item or unit non-response, which correspond almost 
exclusively to the explanatory variable of BDH status (i.e. 259,013 missing observations). 
However, the vast majority of these missing sampled elements (individuals) are well 
above the poverty threshold, which prevents them from being potential beneficiaries of 
any social assistance programme (i.e. BDH or CDH cash transfers). Therefore, it will not 
be necessary to take them into account when trying to compensate for missing data, given 
that they will not be part of the final samples used for data analysis.69 
There are different possible ways to handle missing data, in order to ameliorate its 
impact on the accuracy of survey-based inferences (Bouza-Herrera, 2013). Actually, a 
number of statistical methods have been developed with the intention of compensating for 
                                                             
69
 Recall that, for comparison purposes, it is desirable to have two initially homogeneous groups (i.e. one 
treatment and one control) in terms of the outcome variables. 
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missing data.70 Case deletion (Enders, 2010), weighting adjustments (Heyting et al., 
1992), imputation of missing values (Peng & Zhu, 2008; Nakai & Ke, 2011) and 
subsampling the non-respondents (Hansen & Hurwitz, 1946), are four of the most popular 
approaches for dealing with the problem of non-responses. Each of these approaches is in 
turn subdivided into different methods, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. 
In this thesis, given the characteristics of the Registro Social’s data, the small 
amount of missing values (1,809 observations per variable) and the type of non-response 
(i.e., total non-response), the chosen method for handling missing data is complete case 
deletion (CCD).71 The described characteristics of the missing data in the Registro Social 
panel database indicate that the quality of the information does not represent a serious 
problem for the analysis. Therefore, the simplicity and comparability (across different 
kinds of statistical analysis) of this method has been preferred over other more complex 
methods that in this specific case would not provide significant benefits in terms of 
statistical inference testing. 
Complete case deletion, also known as list-wise deletion, analyses only cases 
(individuals) with available data on all the variables included in each model specification, 
while those with incomplete or non-existent data are dropped from further analysis (Little 
& Rubin, 2002). The main advantages of this method have to do with the simplicity in its 
implementation (i.e. does not require any special computation methods) and that it can be 
applied for any type of statistical analysis, allowing comparison between them because 
the sample base does not change from variable to variable (Enders, 2010). 
On the other hand, the principal disadvantage of the CCD method is that it does 
not use all the possible information. More specifically, it reduces the sample size, which 
in turn reduces the statistical power and precision of the estimates. Thus, if not sensibly 
and properly applied, it can result into biased estimates (Little & Rubin, 2002). Note, 
                                                             
70
 See Little and Rubin (2002) and Särndal & Lundstrom (2005) for a more detailed discussion on this topic.  
71
 The distribution of missingness and the pattern of the missing data cannot be analysed since there is 
practically no information on the lost units (i.e. total non-response).  
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 174 
however, that list-wise deletion normally produces unbiased regression slope estimates as 
long as the distribution of missingness is not a function of the outcome variable, which in 
this case will be assumed given the complete lack of information on missing units. 
Fortunately, since the amount of missing subjects is small, this assumption does not pose 
a significant threat to the validity of the estimates.   
An alternative method that also seems logical to use is pair-wise deletion (PD), 
generally known as available case analysis. The main difference of this method with the 
previous one is that it uses all the available information by incorporating vectors of 
repeated measures of uneven length in the analysis (Nakai and Ke, 2011). In other words, 
it keeps as many cases as possible for each analysis in which the variables of interest are 
present. Therefore, it could be more efficient than the CCD method since the sample size 
is larger and also because it incorporates partial information.  
Nevertheless, I have decided not to use pair-wise deletion because it does not allow 
comparison between different types of analysis. The reason is that the base sample 
changes from variable to variable according to the pattern of missing, which poses 
significant challenges in determining the sample size, degrees of freedom and combining 
different pieces of information (Enders, 2010). Since this thesis is based on different 
quantitative methods, and also due to the total non-response feature of the missing data, 
the PD method is no more useful in this case than the CCD alternative. 
 
4.7 Constructing Necessary Variables for Data Analysis 
I began the preliminary work with the data by creating a unique identifier of the 
households based on the existing identifiers of province, canton, parish, dwelling and 
household (i.e. database variables). This was done with the purpose of knowing the total 
number and composition of the households included in the panel-type database. More 
importantly, the households’ unique identifier allows the subsequent construction of other 
necessary household-level variables. Note that since the demographic information of a 
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given family may vary from 2008 to 2014, the household identifiers were matched in such 
a way that the most recent information prevails (i.e. demographic data collected in 2014).  
Next, I calculated age at survey date (i.e. 2008 and 2014) based on the moment on 
which the individuals were surveyed and the reported dates of birth. This may look as an 
easy task; however, it was necessary to correct possible age inconsistencies between both 
records, which added some complexity to this process. Note that this is a common aspect 
of the data cleaning and management process when working with survey data in general. 
In fact, many researchers have argued that it is essential to clean survey data prior to 
analysis to ensure accuracy and reliability (Barlas et al., 2016). The biggest concern has 
been about sub-optimal or less than accurate responses, which are direct consequence of 
a mistaken response (bias), an inattentive response (error), a recording error or an 
approximate response.  
More specifically, and focusing on this thesis, the first problem in this respect was 
that some of the dates of birth declared in 2008 do not coincide with those declared in 
2014. In order to correct for this misreporting error, the date of birth declared in 2008 was 
changed to the one declared in 2014, which is more recent and was obtained with better 
mechanisms of data collection. Nevertheless, there is a second and more important 
problem with this attempt to calculate simple ages of the individuals: there are some cases 
where the survey date in 2008 is not reported. Therefore, to correct this common problem 
of missing data, the survey date in 2008 was established as December 31 for those 
individuals without information. This simple change allows to obtain an approximate age 
of the person at that time.  
Another variable that had to be generated was the “households' average level of 
educational attainment”. This variable is no more than the average rounded levels of 
education considering all the members of the family. The generated variable is rounded 
up with the sole purpose of maintaining the discrete nature of educational achievement. 
This practice is used in different academic and policy-making contexts in which an 
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attempt is made to reflect the general socioeconomic level of people taking into account 
the whole family (Horowitz & Weinhold, 1998; Crespo et al., 2012; World Bank, 2016). 
According to the 2008 Registro Social survey questionnaire, there are ten different 
categories of educational level, which are ranked from lowest to highest being 
"uneducated" the lowest and "post-graduated" the highest category. On the other hand, 
there are just nine educational attainment categories in 2014 because two of them (namely, 
categories 2 and 4), which are related to basic education, were grouped into one. Thus, for 
the average variables of “educational attainment” in 2008 and 2014 to be comparable, it 
was necessary to recode the categories in such a way that they coincide in both registers. 
In other words, the standardization of derived variables (i.e. the average degree of 
education) was crucial for the subsequent comparison. 
Following a similar process, I constructed homogeneous indicators for the years 
2008 and 2014 of household floor material (as a proxy of income level), school enrolment 
of the first-born child, school attendance of the first-born child, unemployment status, 
BDH and CDH beneficiary status, individual educational level, access to credit, ethnicity, 
and marital status. As a result, from the nearly 150 variables included in each Registro 
Social, I ended up with about 30 variables that are used in the analysis. Recall that the 
panel data includes individual level observations for two time-points (2008 and 2014). 
The following table summarizes and describes each one of these variables.       
 
Table 10: Selected Variables from the Registro Social Panel-Database 
Variable (Years) Description Type of variable 
SELBEN index (2008 
and 2014) 
Overall welfare score calculated 





Variable constructed by MCDS 
using the existing identifiers of 
province, canton, parish, dwelling 
and household.  
Categorical (Discrete) 





(2008 and 2014) 
Variable constructed as the 
rounded average of the 
educational attainment 
considering all family members. 
Ordinal (Discrete) 
Household floor material 
(2008 and 2014) 
Homologated variable used as an 
income level proxy with eight 
different categories sorted from 
the lowest to the highest quality 
(i.e. soil, cane, wood, concrete or 
brick, marble, tile, plank or 
floating floor, other). 
Ordinal (Discrete) 
School enrolment of the 
first-born child (2008 
and 2014) 
Constructed dummy variable for 
the household's first-born child 
aged between 6 and 17 years old. 
Dichotomous 
(Discrete) 
School attendance of the 
first-born child (2008 
and 2014) 
Constructed dummy variable for 
the household's first-born child 




(2008 and 2014) 
Constructed dummy variable that 
takes a value equal to 1 if the 
person reported being 
unemployed and 0 otherwise. 
Dichotomous 
(Discrete) 
BDH Indicator (2008 
and 2014) 
Constructed dummy variable that 
takes a value equal to 1 if the 
person received BDH cash 




CDH Indicator (2008 
and 2014) 
Constructed dummy variable that 
takes a value equal to 1 if the 
person received CDH cash 





level (2008 and 2014) 
Homologated variable with nine 
different categories ranked from 
lowest to highest educational 
degree (i.e. none, literacy centre, 
primary, middle, secondary, post-
secondary, high school, bachelor, 
post-graduate). 
Ordinal (Discrete) 
Province (2008 and 
2014) 
Homologated variable with 
twenty-four different categories 
corresponding to each one of the 
Ecuadorian provinces.   
Categorical (Discrete) 
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Age (2008 and 2014) Constructed variable based on the 
survey dates and the reported 
dates of birth.   
Categorical (Discrete) 
Marital Status (2008 and 
2014) 
Homologated variable with six 
different categories (i.e. free 
union, married, widowed, 
separated, divorced, single). 
Categorical (Discrete) 
Ethnicity (2008 and 
2014) 
Homologated variable with seven 
different categories of ethnic self-
definition (i.e. indigenous, 
‘montubio’, white, mestizo, 
black, mulatto, other).  
Categorical (Discrete) 
Access to credit (2008 
and 2014) 
Constructed dummy variable that 
takes a value equal to 1 if the 
person has received loans from 
commercial banks or 





Some additional remarks should be made regarding the variables selected and 
constructed for the analysis. First, the household-level indicators of school enrolment and 
school attendance were constructed considering exclusively the information of the first-
born children aged between 6 and 17 years old (i.e. school-age children). In other words, 
when families have more than one child, only the first-born male or female is taken into 
account. As discussed next, since normally the first-born children are responsible for 
helping poor households financially, they are likely to interrupt their studies to achieve 
this purpose. For this reason, I consider it more useful to study the impact of cash transfers 
on the schooling situation of the household’s older child than on a rounded average of all 
children in each family. 
The claim that the first-born child of a poor household is the most exposed to 
replace (or accompany) the role of parents as breadwinners is supported by different 
empirical studies. In fact, birth order –as one of the family environment factors responsible 
for differences in child outcomes– is a recurrent topic in the economics and psychology 
literatures. The existing evidence on birth-order effects shows a clear and consistent 
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distinction between the developing world and the developed world: there are positive 
birth-order effects in developing countries, while there are negative birth-order effects in 
developed countries (De Haan et al., 2014). However, the specific mechanisms through 
which birth-order affects educational attainment are still unclear, and appear to be context-
specific (Moshoeshoe, 2016). 
For instance, applying a household fixed-effects estimation strategy on survey data 
from the Philippines, Ejrnæs and Pörtner (2004) find positive birth-order effects on 
educational attainment –measured by completed years of schooling of children aged 6 to 
18 years old–, and that these effects are more pronounced in low-educated (or low income) 
families. More importantly, De Haan, Plug and Rosero (2014) use Ecuadorian survey data 
on infants (children under six year of age) and teenagers (between 12 and 18 years of age) 
to estimate long-term effects of birth-order on human capital. They find positive and 
consistent birth-order effects: first-born children lag behind in educational attainment 
from infancy to adolescence. 
In addition, they show that first-born children are more likely to be involved in 
child labour than their younger siblings. According De Haan et al. (2014), these positive 
birth-order effects are in part explained by mothers' spending less quality time with first-
borns, and breastfeeding them for a shorter period than later-born children. As expected, 
these birth-order effects are larger in poor (or low-educated) households, but they are 
negative in rich (or high-educated) households. Overall, evidence from developing 
countries largely supports the positive birth-order effects on human capital and, at least in 
the case of Ecuadorian poor households, the idea that first-born children are the most likely 
to interrupt their studies to contribute economically to their families through work. 
Another observation to be made regarding the variables selected for the analysis 
has to do with the constructed BDH and CDH indicators. As explained above, both 
indicators are simply dummy variables that take values equal to 1 if the person has 
received monetary transfers and 0 otherwise for a given year. Note that by construction 
these variables do not indicate if a person was at that moment beneficiary of the 
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programmes, but if the person has ever received monetary transfers from a specific 
programme until the date of the survey. In fact, the questions asked by the Registro Social 
in 2014 were: have you been a beneficiary of the BDH? Have you received the CDH? 
Thus, the construction of the indicators for the year 2014 is straightforward. Nevertheless, 
some sort of difficulty arises because no questions were asked about the social welfare 
programmes in 2008. 
In the case of the CDH programme, this issue is not important because until that 
time it had not yet been implemented at the national level and, although the first 
accumulated transfers were made precisely in 2008, there is not enough time for outcome 
effects to be produced. Therefore, the 2008 CDH indicator will be equal to zero in all 
cases. On the other hand, in order to construct the 2008 BDH indicator, it is necessary to 
assume that those who reported receiving cash transfers in 2014 were already beneficiaries 
in 2008. This seems quite likely since the official government data indicate that from 2008 
to 2014 the number of beneficiary households of the programme increased by just about 
fifty thousand. This number is relatively small considering that in 2008 there were more 
than 1 million families receiving BDH cash transfers. However, it is necessary to 
emphasize that this assumption does not represent in any way a threat to the validity of 
the analysis, since the control group will be formed only by people who reported that they 
had never received the BDH. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that an attempt was made to generate a variable of 
frequency of attendance at health centres for infants. However, in 2008 these data are not 
recorded at all and in 2014 the variable only has 11 observations of children older than 5 
years of age. The existence of such a large amount of missing data may reflect people's 
unwillingness to report information related to health centre attendance, perhaps for fear 
that this will have a negative impact on the direct benefits they receive from the 
government (i.e. the BDH programme's cash transfers). Therefore, the impact of the 
programmes on this specific variable cannot be analysed in this thesis. 
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Throughout this chapter, the main characteristics of the Registro Social process 
have been examined, as well as the methodology and composition of the SELBEN welfare 
index. In addition, it was mentioned that two different datasets were used to construct a 
panel-type database that is essential for the quantitative analysis. Given the distribution of 
individuals and the quality of the information, the CCD method has been used to deal with 
the missing data and perform the analysis. The last section discussed the generation and 
derivation of those variables necessary for the BDH and CDH impact evaluations. The 
specific evaluation design for the BDH programme is described in the next chapter. 
 
 
































Bono de Desarrollo Humano Impact 
Evaluation Design and Measurement Models  
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the necessary foundations for the different impact evaluations of the Bono 
de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) programme are established. The chapter commences with 
a theory-based approach to the BDH evaluation that allows the obtaining of an in-depth 
understanding of the workings of the programme’s intervention. This is done through the 
inference and description of the Theories of Change (ToC) of the BDH together with a 
diagram depicting the design of the evaluation. This is followed by a thorough explanation 
of the sample selection process and the presentation of some descriptive statistics to 
explain the pre-treatment characteristics of the sample groups (i.e. BDH treatment and 
control groups), as well as to verify the assumption of “as if” random selection of 
beneficiaries (which is necessary for the validity of the natural experiment as discussed in 
Chapter 3). Finally, the last part of the chapter discusses the specific measurement models 
for data analysis. This section includes the identification strategies, the econometric 
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techniques to be used, and the specific regression models to be estimated as part of the 
BDH evaluation. 
 
5.2 Theory of Change of the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano 
Theories of change (also referred to as programme theories) address the need to depict the 
cause and effect relationship between an intervention’s activities and its intended results 
(i.e. the pathways to change) (Weiss, 1995). The use of a theory-based approach to 
evaluations allows us to consider the assumptions underlying causal chains from inputs to 
outputs. Therefore, the different impact evaluations in this thesis are structured around 
each programme’s Theory of Change (ToC) to assess the causal logic of the interventions 
and determine whether all external factors affecting the results, impact, sustainability and 
up-scaling have been taken into account (UN, n.d.). 
A ToC is essentially a methodology for planning, presenting and evaluating an 
intervention that is broadly used in different fields of research (Brest, 2010). Although 
there are different interpretations of this method, ToCs are generally understood as 
complete explanations and illustrations of how and why a desired result is expected to 
occur in a particular context. More specifically, it explains the process of change by 
outlining the causal linkages of an intervention, i.e., with its shorter-term, intermediate, 
and longer-term outcomes. This is achieved by representing the causal pathways from 
inputs to outcomes via intermediate states (Clark & Taplin, 2012). 
In practice, the ToC methodology maps out or “fills in” the “missing middle” 
between what a programme or intervention does (i.e. the specific actions of the 
programme) and how these actions lead to expected results being obtained. This is done 
by first stating the objectives and expected outcomes, and then mapping backward from 
these to identify all the necessary preconditions that must be in place for the objectives to 
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be achieved (Brest, 2010; CTC, n.d.). This is not a purely intuitive process, but an 
elaborate and reasoned one. All the necessary information to describe the theories of 
change of the programme is obtained both from official government sources (VAMS, 
2014; MIES, 2013; MCDS, 2013; Martinez & Rosero, 2007) and from international 
organizations, such as the Wold Bank, that have studied the BDH for several years and, 
therefore, have an in-depth knowledge of its internal functioning (Schady & Araujo, 
2006).  
There are endless variations in how ToCs are presented. In this case, I depict a 
diagram of the BDH programme dynamics of change (referred to as Outcomes 
Framework) and I complement it with a short narrative description. This diagram will 
guide the impact evaluations of the BDH cash transfer programme (see Figure 9). Once 
the effects of the BDH have been estimated in the next chapter, it will be important to get 
back to the theories of change described here to evaluate their relevance. More 
specifically, to compare the actual results obtained by the programme with the theoretical 
expected results. In other words, to contrast the levels of efficiency that the BDH 
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Figure 9: Outcomes Framework of the BDH Programme 
 
 
The aims and objectives of the Ecuadorian conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programme, as well as its most relevant characteristics which will be also helpful for 
developing the programme’s ToC, were already discussed in Chapter 2 (see page 64). The 
main goal is to help households overcome poverty by promoting investment in human 
capital (VAMS, 2014). Once the desired results of the programme have been established, 
it is necessary to determine which are the channels through which these results are 
expected to be obtained. The channels can be understood as changes in behaviour and 
attitudes, both in relation to the value given to education and health, and to the value that 
is given to the money available for spending. Moreover, the mechanisms used to promote 
these changes are varied, but undoubtedly the most important ones for this type of 
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As set out by the policy makers, discussed in Chapter 2, the activities carried out 
by the BDH programme to achieve the expected results are mainly: the provision of 
monthly cash transfers, the permanent search for means of payment of easy access for the 
beneficiaries, the continuous socialization of the programme seeking for the acceptance 
of the public, the establishment of direct communication mechanisms, and the attempt for 
an adequate monitoring and control (MIES, 2013; MCDS, 2013). 
Finally, this process allows us to identify the necessary preconditions or resources 
that must be in place at least theoretically for the intervention to be effective. In case the 
impact evaluation indicates that the BDH programme is not effective, the explanation may 
be that some of these conditions are not being met. Apart from the availability of sufficient 
funds by the government, it is necessary to fully identify the target population by 
developing targeting mechanisms based on up-to-date socio-economic information 
(VAMS, 2014). In addition, the eligibility conditions that a poor household must meet to 
be chosen must be clear and easily determined by the programme administrators. Political 
and institutional frameworks are also important for a successful implementation of the 
BDH programme and the adequate provision of public services (such as education and 
health), which is a necessary and crucial element for compliance with conditionalities 
(Martinez & Rosero, 2007). 
 
5.3 Evaluation Design 
Now that the necessary pre-conditions (activities and resources) for the BDH programme 
to obtain the expected results have been determined, it is time to focus on the impact 
evaluation design. A rigorous evaluation of the programme starts from the development 
of a design/scheme that summarizes the logical and observable process through which the 
results are expected to be obtained. This scheme starts from the verifiable interventions 
on a specific group of people that in this case make up the target population. 
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Therefore, in order to make a precise estimation of the effects that the BDH 
programme had on well-being until 2014 (year in which eligibility conditions changed), 
it is first necessary to clearly identify in the Registro Social database the potential 
beneficiaries of the BDH cash transfers. Afterwards, it is important to describe the specific 
treatment given to some of those individuals and the products arising from this treatment. 
Finally, as part of the evaluation design, it is required to enumerate the specific results 
expected from the treatment; and ultimately determine the foreseeable impacts of the 
programme. These are the steps followed below.  
As Figure 10 indicates, the potential beneficiaries of the BDH cash transfers are 
those poor households in the first two quintiles of the Welfare Index. The treatment itself 
is that the person gets a conditional monthly payment or not, so the product thereof is to 
participate in the BDH social assistance programme. The expected results, previously 
included in the Outcomes Framework, are described here in a more detailed way and then 
used to summarize the desired impacts of the programme. 
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5.4 Sample Selection Process 
After describing the characteristics of the constructed panel-type database and specifying 
the selected variables for the analysis (in Chapter 4), it is time to focus on the BDH 
evaluation sample and its selection process. Recall that previously it was obtained from 
two different Registro Social datasets a total of 3,394,210 repeated individuals, which 
correspond in turn to 1,722,473 repeated households. Now, in order to build the BDH 
evaluation sample, only individuals with the following characteristics should be taken into 
account: 
ü Individuals in poverty situation according to the SELBEN index in 2008.  
ü Working-age adults (individuals who have at least 18 years old in 2008 and at most 
65 years old in 2014) 
ü Individuals without disabilities (neither in 2008 nor in 2014) 
ü BDH beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (of any social assistance programme) in 
2014. 
 
Note that the elderly and disabled groups do not necessarily fall into the category 
of poor individuals, and since I am interested in the BDH's independent effects on well-
being among those in poverty, these groups should not be considered for the analysis. 
Moreover, those who report having participated in the CDH programme are not taken into 
account at this stage, because they constitute a different treatment group in a subsequent 
evaluation. This leaves us with a total of 1,994,965 individual observations.  
In addition, it is necessary to further limit the sample to ensure that all individuals 
are unequivocally in a situation of poverty at the baseline moment of the study (namely in 
2008). I use the SELBEN Welfare index to limit the sample only to those in poverty 
conditions prior to the intervention (i.e. potential BDH beneficiaries in 2008). Thus, only 
individuals in the first and second poverty quintiles are considered for the analysis. More 
specifically, if an individual has a welfare index equal to or lower than 33.5 points (i.e. 
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36.5 points minus a margin of 3 points that serves to reduce the possibility of taking into 
account cases of leakage), then she is considered a potential BDH beneficiary. This 
poverty threshold also ensures that the percentiles of well-being are similar between the 
pre-intervention treatment and control groups, which is desirable since both groups are of 
very different size (See Table 11). In fact, the control group is twice as large as the 
treatment group.72 The resulting welfare percentiles are summarized in the following 
table: 
 
Table 11: Welfare Percentiles at Baseline by Group 
Welfare Index in 2008 
 Percentiles by Group 
 Control73  BDH Treatment 
1% 4.396  4.17 
5% 8.203  7.844 
10% 10.908  10.457 
25% 16.301  15.65 
50% 22.797  22.058 
75% 28.173  27.328 
90% 31.393  30.423 
95% 32.482  31.562 
99% 32.997  32.472 
Smallest score 0  0 
Largest 
score 33.5  33.5 
                                                             
72
 Note that this does not necessarily mean that the coverage of the BDH is low. It simply indicates that of 
the individuals with observations at two different timepoints, most have not received the BDH. 
73
 Individuals categorized as living in poverty in 2008, but not receiving the BDH. 
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Observations 638,667  363,829 
Mean 21.84802  21.14754 
Std. Dev. 7.557734  7.407352 
 
As a result of the sample selection process, the control group will be made up of 
those working-age individuals without disabilities who, being potential BDH beneficiaries 
in 2008 (i.e. in a situation of poverty), reported not having participated in any social 
assistance programme until 2014 (neither BDH nor CDH). On the other hand, the 
treatment group is made up of those people who, being potential beneficiaries in 2008, 
reported having participated of BDH programme in 2014. Table 12 shows the number of 
individuals belonging to each sample group. 
 
Table 12: BDH Evaluation Sample Groups 
Groups Number of Individuals 
Control 638,667 




5.5 Pre-treatment Characteristics of the Sample 
For the natural experimental design to be valid, the assignment to the treatment and control 
groups should be entirely exogenous (or as-if random). Note that this premise constitutes 
the identifying assumption of the first proposed method of evaluation (i.e. natural 
experiment). In order to verify the assumed “as if” random selection of beneficiaries, it is 
necessary to perform a base-line comparison of the sample groups, which means to 
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compare them in terms of the observable pre-intervention characteristics. Table 13 
presents descriptive statistics of the outcome variables by sample group in 2008.  
 
Table 13: Pre-intervention Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group  
 Control  BDH Treatment 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs.  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Welfare Index 21.848 7.557 638,667  21.147 7.407 363,829 
Educational 
Attainment 
2.519 0.990 638,667  2.387 1.014 363,829 
Floor Material 3.964 1.136 638,667  3.896 1.165 363,829 
School Enrolment 0.772 0.419 198,839  0.771 0.420 98,443 
School Assistance 0.767 0.422 198,839  0.766 0.423 98,443 
Unemployment 0.014 0.119 638,662  0.006 0.080 363,829 
 
 Overall, we can see from Table 13 that both sample groups are fairly 
homogeneous before the BDH intervention (i.e. in 2008). The seeming homogeneity of 
the sample groups suggests that there is no selection bias stemming from the BDH cash 
transfers assignment to poor individuals. In fact, all outcome variables have similar mean 
levels except for the “probability of being unemployed” indicator, whose value is slightly 
higher for individuals in the control group (see Figures 11 to 16). Therefore, we must be 
cautious when interpreting the natural experiment effect of the BDH on the probability of 
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unemployment. Figures 11-16 clearly support the idea that the selection of programme 
beneficiaries was as-if random. 
 
Figure 11: Mean of Welfare Index in 2008 
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Figure 13: Mean of Households’ Quality of Floor Material in 2008 
 
Figure 14: Mean Probability of School Enrolment in 2008 (First-born Child) 
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Figure 16: Mean Probability of Unemployment in 2008 
 
 
5.6 Measurement Models for Data Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is possible to get inferences of treatment effects through 
randomization. More specifically, if treatment assignment is independent of individual 
characteristics, then it is possible to estimate treatment effects with a simple difference-
of-means test (Ho et al., 2007). Evidently, the same is true for natural experiments, whose 
only difference with randomized controlled trials is that researchers do not have the 
possibility to assign subjects to the ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups in advance. However, 
noticeable divergences in policy or practice offer the chance to study populations just like 
they had been part of a randomized or true experiment (McKenna & Morrison, 2009). The 
as-if random assignment avoids any omitted variable bias, even if the regression model 
does not include any controls. Therefore, in the case at hand, I could get valid estimates 
of the treatment effects using a simple regression model or a difference-of-means test if 
the assignment of BDH and CDH cash transfers was entirely random or as-if random (i.e. 
exogeneity condition), which fortunately can be argued to be the case.  
The exogeneity condition is fulfilled since the government’s budget for these 
programmes was insufficient to cover all households in the first and second poverty 
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selection of beneficiaries. I took advantage of two important elements characterizing cash 
transfer programmes in Ecuador. First, poor families that meet the requirements set by the 
BDH programme have been progressively and randomly selected to receive the cash 
transfers. Second, only beneficiaries of the BDH can switch to the CDH programme. 
These two facts constitute the basis for my natural experiment identification strategy. 
The identifying assumption would be, therefore, that assignment to treatment and 
control groups is random (or “as if” random). Note that this assumption has already been 
verified by comparing the BDH treatment group with the control group in terms of their 
observable pre-intervention characteristics, which are reasonably similar and, therefore, 
support the randomization hypothesis. Once there are sufficient grounds to believe that 
treatment status is exogenous (or randomly assigned), estimation of average treatment 
effects (ATEs) is straightforward. Figure 17 illustrates graphically the natural 
experimental design used to perform this evaluation.  
 






   
 
As part of this natural experiment, I use two different econometric techniques: a 
simple difference-of-means test and regression model analysis.  
Similar pre-treatment 












CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 197 
5.6.1 Difference-of-means Test 
For this evaluation, two independent groups of people in poverty and vulnerability 
conditions were chosen and, since treatment assignment was completely random, it is 
expected that they share similar observable characteristics before receiving the BDH cash 
transfers (i.e. in 2008).74 Individuals who have been at some point randomly selected to 
be part of the BDH programme conform the treatment group and the others who have not 
been beneficiaries of any kind of social assistance are the control group. Then, a set of 
dependent variables is chosen on which I want to know if the treatment has had a 
statistically significant effect.  
If the two previously homogeneous groups (beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of 
the BDH) have similar means in the dependent variable after treatment (i.e. in 2014), this 
would mean that receiving the cash transfers has not made any difference in their current 
poverty situation.  
Operationally, this approach consists of four steps: 1) state the hypotheses 2) 
formulate an analysis plan 3) analyse the sample data, and 4) interpret the results (Moore 
et al., 2009). First, every difference-of-means test requires stating a null hypothesis and 
an alternative hypothesis. These hypotheses must be stated in such a way that they are 
mutually exclusive. That is, if one of them is false, the other must be true; and vice versa. 
In this case, the null hypothesis states that there is no difference between the means of the 
treatment and control groups. Therefore, the hypotheses are formally stated in the 
following form: 
T,:	à- = à.	(c. i. 1ℎi	RST	ℎj?	@`	iMMif1) 
Tâ:	à- ≠ à.	(c. i. 1ℎi	RST	ℎj?	j@	iMMif1) 
 
                                                             
74
 This was already examined in the previous section as part of the sample selection process.   
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Evidently, µ represents the means of the dependent variable for the treatment and 
control groups. From these hypotheses, I can effectively verify if the difference between 
the two means is due to the fact that the BDH treatment has had the expected effect or, on 
the contrary, the observed differences could be explained simply by chance.  
Then, it is required to specify an analysis plan, which describes how to use the 
sample data in order to accept or reject the null hypothesis. The two main elements that 
make up the analysis plan are the test-method and the significance level (Moore et al., 
2009). Thus, this two-sample t-test will use a significance level equal to 0.05. 
Finally, in order to analyse the sample data and interpret the results correctly, it is 
necessary to calculate the t-statistic and the P-value associated with it (Moore et al., 2009). 
I have already indicated how the t-statistic will be calculated, while the P-value is defined 
as the probability of observing a sample statistic greater than the t-statistic. That is, 
pajhXi = Pr	(|Ä| > |1|) 
 
Therefore, if the P-value exceeds the significance level of 0.05, one cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the means of the treatment and control groups are equal. On the 
other hand, one must reject the null hypothesis when the P-value is less than the 
significance level, which indicates that the BDH has a statistically significant effect on the 
dependent variable under study.    
 
5.6.2 Multivariate Regression Model Analysis 
In order to obtain the effects of the BDH programme on different outcome variables (Y), 
I estimate different versions of the following specific regression model:   
NO = P + QRSTO + 52O + WO	,                    (5) 
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Where N is any of the outcomes under study, and Q is the parameters of interest, 
which capture the causal effects of BDH (a dummy variable that equals 1 for the poor 
households receiving cash transfers from the BDH programme, and 0 otherwise) on the 
outcome under consideration. 2 is a vector of individual and household level 
characteristics, and W is the error term. 
Specifically, I estimate different versions of Equation (5) via ordinary least squares 
(OLS), probit or logit regression models, depending on the type of explained variable	N.75 
Note that for the estimation to be accurate it was necessary restrict the sample only to 
potential BDH beneficiaries who do not benefited from other social assistance 
programmes.  
Although the treatment and control groups are quite homogeneous prior to the 
intervention, there may still be doubts about compliance with the exogeneity condition 
(i.e. “as if” random BDH treatment assignment). Therefore, I have decided to complement 
the analysis using a difference-in-difference quasi-experimental approach, which exploits 
the fact that the Registro Social process is repeated every 6 years. 
 
5.6.3 Difference-in-Difference 
In order to employ this method, it is necessary to take a step back and use the household 
unique identifier variable to convert the original constructed panel dataset from a wide 
format to a long format. This was not hard to do because all statistical program packages 
provide commands to convert data from wide to long format, and vice versa. More 
specifically, a reshaped database was created, which consists in adding all the variables in 
such a way that the 2008 and 2014 observations appear in a single column corresponding 
to each variable (e.g. SELBEN index, educational attainment, floor material, etc.).  
                                                             
75
 The outcome variables of interest could be continuous or categorical or ordinal, and different statistical 
models need to be used to analyse different types of explained variables.  
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Data organized in this type of format are also called pooled data. Andreß, Golsch, 
and Schmidt (2013) suggest that the reason for this name comes from the reflection that 
panel data can be thought of as consisting of many individual (unit-specific) time series 
that come together (pooled) in a single large data file. According to these authors, one 
could think of each panel wave as one cross-section, and of these different cross-sections 
as if they were grouped together (pooled) in one big file.  
This can be very useful, since by viewing panel data as a collection of n unit-
specific time series or, alternatively, as a collection of T cross-sections, one can understand 
why economists and political scientists also call panel data pooled time-series cross-
section (TSCS) data. However, Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt (2013) are also very 
emphatic stating that, TSCS data should not be confused with data sets that pool 
independent cross-sections. Note that, contrary to panel data, the cross-sections are 
sampled independently from one another and, therefore, they do not include identical 
individuals. 
In order to facilitate the subsequent analysis, the statistical package used in this 
thesis (STATA) automatically generates a pair of additional variables, which indicate the 
year of observation (i.e. panel wave) and were labelled as follows: 
 




Constructed dummy variable 
that takes a value equal to 1 if 
the observation is from 2008 





Constructed dummy variable 
that takes a value equal to 1 if 
the observation is from 2014 
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Moreover, for methodological reasons, the following variables were created and 
added to the reshaped dataset as group indicators: 
 




Constructed dummy variable 
that takes a value equal to 1 if 
the individual reported having 
received BDH cash transfers 
at some point (i.e. 2008 or 





Constructed dummy variable 
that takes a value equal to 1 if 
the individual reported having 
received CDH cash transfers 
at some point (i.e. 2008 or 




In terms of the selected BDH diff-in-diff evaluation sample, it is made up of 
exactly the same households used in the preceding natural experimental models so that 
the results can be comparable. Once again, I restricted the sample according to the 
previously specified individual basic characteristics (see page 189), which are in function 
of the intended target population of the analysis (i.e. poor working-age people without 
disabilities).  
As a result, the compared treatment and control groups are composed of the same 
individuals as in the previous methods, but with the important difference that this time I 
observe them at two different points of time (due to the employed TSCS data-set). 
Therefore, the number of observations would have doubled if it were not for the few but 
still existing missing observations in 2008. Some researchers argue that, since pooling 
increases the number of cases, it also does so with the statistical power of the analysis 
(Andreß et al., 2013). Instead of n units, they say, the data includes N = n * T “cases”, 
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where T is the number of panel waves. This argument is often used in economic, 
sociological, and political science research.   
As in the difference-of-means test and in the natural experimental models, the 
control group is made up of those individuals who did not receive cash transfers from any 
programme (despite being potential beneficiaries); while the treatment group is composed 
of those who were at some point beneficiaries exclusively of the BDH programme. Given 
that the pooled data includes information of two different panel waves –both for the BDH 
treatment and control groups– it is possible to use the diff-in-diff method to isolate the 
externalities correcting for any potential bias (namely, potential endogeneity problems 
caused by omitted variables) in order to calculate in a more accurate way the impact of 
the BDH treatment among poor households.  
By using the difference-in-differences method, it can be safely stated –with more 
certainty and less rigorous assumptions– that the estimated effects are effectively 
explained by the BDH treatment. The diff-in-diff estimation is by itself statistically 
rigorous enough to infer causality in the studied relationships, even in the absence of the 
so-called randomization assumption, which was essential for the validity of the natural 
experiment (Stuart et al., 2014). Actually, the main difference between these two 
quantitative evaluation methods is that in natural experiments control and treatment 
groups are assumed to be analogous before the intervention and evolved similarly in the 
absence of it. By using a difference-in-differences strategy, these assumptions do not need 
to hold priori because difference between groups are removed by subtracting the change 
in means of control group from the change in means of treatment group over the time 
period considered in the study (World Bank, 2013).  
Thus, the small pre-treatment differences between treatment and control groups 
that were described in this chapter would not be a major concern for the diff-in-diff 
estimation of the BDH effects. Although to guarantee parallel trends over time, it is still 
desirable to have groups as similar as possible. All the necessary assumptions for the 
validity of the diff-in-diff model used in this thesis will be further developed in the next 
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chapter, which analyses the impact evaluation results obtained for the BDH and its 
statistical significance (see page 233). 
In order to evaluate the effect of the BDH programme on the outcome variables, 
first I construct an indicator of whether an observation belongs to a “sometime” treated 
individual and was obtained in 2014. Since I have two groups (treatment and control) and 
two years (2008 and 2014), this indicator is constructed based on the interaction of an 
observation’s time and group indicators. However, note that it is important to include time 
and group indicators as separate control variables in the regressions, because they are 
likely to influence the outcome variables directly and independently of whether an 
individual was affected by the BDH cash transfers. In other words, I need to account for 
group specific characteristics and trends in time that could be affecting the estimated 
results. 
Formally, I would have a BDH treatment (} = 1) and a comparison (} = 0) group 
for both the before (1 = 0) and after (1 = 1) periods of time. Thus, the estimated 
regression model is the following:  
NO~







 is the level of the outcome variable of a given individual c in group } at 
time	1. RST  is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1, if the observed person 
belongs to the treatment group, and takes value equal to 0, if the person is in the control 
group. Ä+åt2014~ is another dummy variable, which takes a value equal to 1 in the post-
treatment period; and 0 otherwise. The diff-in-diff estimator is Å, the coefficient of the 
interaction between RST  and Ä+åt2014~. Note that this interaction term is also a 
dummy variable, which takes a value equal to 1, only for the BDH treatment group in the 
post-treatment period. Lastly, 2O~
  is a set of control variables and WO~
  is the error term.  
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The other terms in equation (6) are the coefficients (Q,, Q-, Q., Å, QÉ)	of the diff-
in-diff regression model, which help in deriving different effects for the treatment and 
control groups. Thus, this regression is useful in deriving the BDH effects, namely, 
whether this specific programme made a difference to NO~  in the treatment group after the 
intervention. Finally, recall that the employed regression models (OLS, probit or logit 
regression models) will depend on the type of explained variable	N (continuous, 
categorical ordinal or dichotomous). 
The different measurement models and econometric techniques presented in this 
chapter constitute an essential part of the BDH impact evaluation design. Now that the 
foundations for the analysis have been clearly established –taking into account the Theory 
of Change of the programme and the sample selection process–, it is time to present the 
obtained results. The following chapter describes the estimated effects of the BDH 


























In this chapter, the results of the different impact evaluations of the Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (BDH) programme are presented and discussed. More specifically, I will focus 
on analysing, through different statistical and econometric methods, the effects of the 
BDH programme on different measures of non-monetary poverty and human capital, 
which include the level of well-being, educational attainment, school enrolment, housing 
conditions and employment status. This chapter begins by analysing the post-treatment 
characteristics of the sample. This is followed by the results of the natural experimental 
method, which are obtained by two different econometric techniques. Finally, the last part 
of the chapter discusses the results obtained by the difference-in-differences method. 
The main purpose of these findings is to help propose a reasoned explanation of 
the role played in the fight against poverty by the main social assistance programme in 
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Ecuador and, of course, to answer that research question posed at the beginning of this 
thesis about the true effectiveness of the BDH conditional cash transfers. Understanding 
that this represents a necessary step to better comprehend the different effects that social 
assistance policies and practices have on different poverty measures (monetary and non-
monetary). In doing so, an attempt is made to fill the gap that evidently exists in the 
evaluative literature on these issues, implementing alternative methods of quantitative 
research and exploiting the availability of more recent data, for the benefit of the academic 
debate and policymakers.  
 
6.2 Post-treatment Characteristics of the Sample 
Before focusing on the results obtained from the regressions, it is useful to begin by 
showing the end-line descriptive statistics of the outcome variables by sample group (see 
Table 14). In this way, we can know if there has been a change in these variables over 
time and, more important, if there are actual differences between the treatment and control 
groups. Table 14 clearly shows that from 2008 to 2014 there has been a considerable 
improvement in all the outcome variables analysed. For example, the mean of the control 
(treatment) group's welfare index goes from 21.84 (21.14) to 32.51 (30.64) points. This 
means that after 6 years the welfare level of the sample increased by about 50 percent, 
which is consistent with different studies that indicate that in the last few years Ecuador 
has had a good performance in the fight against poverty (BCE, 2012; INEC, 2012). 
Similarly, the results show improvements –albeit smaller– in educational 
attainment, the quality of the home floor material, school enrolment, school attendance, 
and unemployment. However, it is important to note that these initial results tell us nothing 
about the different factors that have influenced the change and the improvement over time 
in the studied outcome variables. The application of the difference-in-differences method 
will be useful in this sense as will be seen later. 
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Table 14: Post-intervention Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group  
 Control  BDH Treatment 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs.  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Welfare Index 32.519 11.360 638,667  30.648 10.891 363,829 
Educational 
Attainment 
2.714 1.258 638,667  2.452 1.191 363,829 
Floor Material 4.514 1.212 638,667  4.40 1.247 363,829 
School Enrolment 0.805 0.395 86,220  0.791 0.406 50,549 
School Assistance 0.780 0.414 86,220  0.765 0.423 50,549 
Unemployment 0.015 0.122 638,667  0.006 0.082 363,829 
 
Moreover, it should be noted from Table 14 that in 2014 (i.e. after the BDH 
programme intervention) the treatment and control groups are no longer homogeneous 
and, in fact, there are considerable differences in some of the variables. Surprisingly, the 
end-line descriptive statistics indicate that the control group is in a better situation 
compared to the treatment group with respect to almost all outcome variables. For 
instance, the average welfare level in the control group is of 32.51 index points, while the 
BDH beneficiaries present an average welfare of 30.64 points. Therefore, under the 
assumption that the allocation of transfers is random among poor families, these initial 
results suggest that the BDH has not had a positive effect on the level of well-being and 
the human capital accumulation of the households. Actually, the impact seems to be 
slightly negative in almost all cases. Nevertheless, the magnitude and statistical 
significance of the BDH effects will be determined by the regression analysis that follows. 
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Remarkably, only the probability of being unemployed is greater in the control 
group with almost 1 perceptual point over the treatment group. Therefore, the BDH 
apparently has had a positive effect on the labour supply among beneficiaries. However, 
we must keep in mind that this was already happening in 2008 and, in fact, the difference 
between the groups is very small. Therefore, in this specific variable, we cannot (at least 
for the moment) attribute to the BDH effects the fact that if a person belongs to the 
treatment group she is less likely to be unemployed. Of course, this will be statistically 
determined later by the method of difference-in- differences.  
 
6.3 Natural Experimental Results  
As part of the natural experimental design, I use two different econometric techniques: a 
simple difference-of-means test (two-sample t test with equal variances) and regression 
model analysis. The results obtained from the difference of means tests for the outcome 
variables in 2014 are summarized below:   
 
Table 15: Difference-of-Means Tests (Control Group vs. BDH Treatment Group) 
 Group  
 Control  Treatment (BDH)  t-test for Equality of Means 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n 







Welfare Index 32.51 11.36 638,667  30.648 10.891 363,829 
 1.826, 
1.917 
80.510 1.0e+06 0.00 
Educational 
Attainment 
2.714 1.258 638,667  2.452 1.191 363,829 
 0.256, 
0.266 
101.99 1.0e+06 0.00 
Floor Material 4.514 1.212 638,667  4.400 1.247 363,829 
 0.108, 
0.118 
44.737 1.0e+06 0.00 





0.805 0.395 86,220  0.791 0.406 50,549  0.010, 
0.018 
6.515 136,767 0.00 
School 
Attendance 
0.780 0.414 86,220  0.765 0.423 50,549  0.010, 
0.019 
6.478 136,767 0.00 
Unemployment 0.015 0.122 638,667  0.006 0.082 363,829  0.007, 
0.008 
36.907 1.0e+06 0.00 
* p-value < 0.05. Ho: diff = 0.  
 
Table 15 shows that there is a statistically significant mean difference between the 
control group and BDH treatment group in all the outcome variables. At a confidence level 
of 95 percent, the p-values of these t-tests are 0.00 (which does not surpass the significance 
level of 0.05), and therefore, the null hypotheses of equality of means can be rejected.76 
Surprisingly, these results clearly suggest that benefiting from BDH cash transfer has no 
positive effects on the level of well-being, educational attainment, quality of the home 
floor material, school enrolment and school attendance. In fact, the effects appear to be 
negative –although small– except for the effect on the probability of being unemployed.  
For instance, BDH beneficiaries tend to have a slightly smaller welfare index than 
those in the control group. According to the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
estimated mean difference, this type of treatment decreases individual scores on the 
welfare index to a maximum of 1.91 points, that is, the BDH cash transfers worsen 
beneficiaries’ poverty situation in around two points. Similarly, the BDH treatment 
decreases the probability of school enrolment and school assistance of the first-born child 
in around 1 percentage point. On the other hand, the BDH programme seems to improve 
the labour supply of the beneficiaries. More specifically, the probability of being 
                                                             
76
 The two-tailed p-value is computed using the t distribution. It represents the probability of observing a 
greater absolute vale of t under the null hypothesis of equality of means, i.e. [Pr(|T|>|t|)]. If the p-value 
is less than the pre-specified level of significance (normally 0.05 or 0.01) it can be concluded that the mean 
difference between treatment and control groups is statistically significantly different from zero. On the 
contrary, if the p-value is greater than 0.05, we conclude that the mean difference is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.   
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unemployed decreases to a maximum of 0.8 percentage points among cash transfers 
recipients.   
In general, these t-tests reaffirm that the control group is in a better situation than 
the BDH treatment group after six years of intervention. However, in order to determine 
the independent effect that the BDH has had on the outcome variables (once different 
controls are included), it is necessary to carry out a more rigorous analysis through various 
regression models. These results are presented in Tables 16-20.  
 
6.3.1 The Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano on the 
Welfare Index 
The linear regression estimates of the impact of the BDH cash transfers on the SELBEN 
welfare index, as a measure of poverty reduction among the poorest households, are 
presented in Table 16. All the regressions in this table control for province of residence, 
marriage status, and self-defined ethnicity fixed-effects. In the first specification, the 
household’s educational attainment, the quality of floor material and the unemployment 
indicator are not considered.  
The first column indicates that with the mere inclusion of control dummies, there 
are sizeable negative effects of the BDH on welfare. Specifically, the BDH programme 
decreases the SELBEN welfare index by about 2.1 points, and the estimates are highly 
statistically significant. Note that these effects represent a relatively important decrease in 
welfare, since the mean welfare of the sample in 2008 (i.e. before the intervention) was 
21 index points and the difference between the lowest (i.e. the 1 percent poorest) and 
highest (i.e. the 1 percent less poor) percentiles was about 28 index points.   
Besides, the coefficient on the BDH indicator is relatively precisely estimated. 
Although not included in Table 16, the 95 percent confidence interval for the effect of the 
BDH cash transfers on the welfare index ranges from -2.22 to -2.14. The BDH coefficient 
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is somewhat different when the household’s average educational attainment is included in 
column (2). The estimate is still negative and significant, indicating that the BDH effect 
is not cancelled by the positive effect that each completed educational degree has on 
welfare. However, the impact of the BDH is smaller (-1.45), suggesting that some part of 
the negative effects can be linked to the direct effect that the BDH has on educational 
attainment (see Table 17).  
In column (3), when the household’s quality of floor material –a proxy of the 
household’s income level– is included as an explanatory variable for welfare, the BDH 
coefficient is again consistently negative and significant. However, in this specification, 
the coefficient on the BDH indicator is once again reduced in magnitude. Once the quality 
of floor material is included in the regression, the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
impact of the BDH cash transfers on the welfare index ranges from -1.19 to -1.12. This 
implies that a considerable part of the effects of the BDH on welfare may be due to a direct 
negative effect of the BDH programme on the household’s income level (see Table 18).  
The results of the BDH coefficient did not change significantly when I gradually 
included controls for individuals’ unemployment situation (column 4) and age (column 
5). In the fourth specification, the BDH estimate is again negative, highly statistically 
significant and slightly smaller. Specifically, with a confidence level of 95 percent, the 
coefficient lies between -1.19 and -1.11. Similarly, column (5) shows that the estimated 
effect of BDH cash transfers on welfare remains practically unchanged when the age of 
individuals is included in the regression.  
As before, the last results suggest that a small part of the BDH effects on welfare 
may be driven by the fact that cash transfers beneficiaries are less likely to be unemployed 
(see Table 20). However, the positive relationship that has been found between 
unemployment and well-being is somewhat disturbing. It is possible to explain this 
relationship by arguing that being unemployed gives people the possibility of performing 
other activities related to welfare, such as improving housing conditions. Another possible 
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explanation is that only people who reach a certain level of well-being can afford to be 
unemployed for long periods (i.e. reverse causality issues).   
Altogether, the linear regression results in Table 16 indicate that the BDH 
conditional cash transfers did affect individuals’ well-being, but the opposite way than 
expected. The obtained results suggest that the BDH has had a significant and negative 
impact on well-being among those in poverty. As different control variables are added to 
the least squares regressions, the magnitude of the BDH effect on the welfare index is 
gradually reduced until it reaches -1.1 points.  
Moreover, and as expected, the independent effects of household’s educational 
attainment, quality of floor material, and individual’s age (a labour experience proxy) on 
welfare are positive and significant. Since these predictors are ordinal independent 
variables, I decided to treat them as if they were continuous. This incorporates into the 
model the fact that the categories are ordered, but also assumes that equal changes in X 
mean equal changes in Y. Thus, the increase of a category in the average level of education 
of the family has an effect of 2.79 points on the welfare index. Similarly, the effect of 
floor material is interpreted as the difference in the predicted value of the welfare index 
for each-one unit difference in the predictor, if all other independent variables remain 
constant. Note that a one unit difference represents switching from one category to the 
other. Therefore, the average difference in welfare between floor material categories is 
3.93 index points. While the effect on the welfare index of each additional year of age is 
0.11.  
Finally, note that in my OLS regression analysis, I found R-squared values ranging 
from 18 percent in the first specification to 45 percent in the full specification (see last 
row of Table 16). The R-squared, or coefficient of determination, represents the 
proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is predictable from the 
independent variable(s) (Everitt & Skrondal, 2010). The concern that usually arises –when 
analysing the coefficient of determination– is whether the R-square is sufficiently high 
and, unfortunately, there is not easy answer to this question because it totally depends on 
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 213 
the context of each model (MacDonnell, 2010). The only possible answer is that the 
estimated R-square must equal the percentage of outcome variable variation that is 
explained by the specific linear model, no more and no less. Therefore, the key question 
is actually whether the estimated coefficients of determination are adequate given the 
major objectives of the linear regression models.  
For instance, if the primary objective would be to produce predictions of the 
dependent variable that are reasonably precise, then the estimated R-squared values would 
become a concern (Frost, 2014).77 The relatively low R-squared values obtained in the 
analysis indicate that the model has some “prediction error” and, thus, that making 
projections of the SELBEN welfare index would be very difficult –given the factors that 
I have included in the regressions (which seems understandable especially in Column 1 
when only the BDH indicator is included). In fact, in the initial specifications, it is evident 
that most of the variation in the outcome variable should be explained by unobserved 
factors.  
However, making predictions is not at all the goal pursued by the linear and non-
linear models in this thesis, but rather determining which predictors are statistically 
significant and how changes in the predictors relate to changes in the outcome variables. 
When the main objective is to analyse the relationship between the predictors and the 
response variable, the R-squared value is almost totally irrelevant (Frost, 2014). In other 
words, if the regression model is correctly specified, the R-squared doesn’t affect how you 
interpret the estimated results. The interpretation of the coefficients and their statistical 
significance is the same regardless of whether the coefficient of determination value is 10 
percent or 95 per cent. Therefore, in this case, the R-squared doesn’t need to be any 
particular value (low or high) to validate the employed models and the obtained estimates.  
Moreover, it is important to consider that in some studies, it is entirely expected 
that R-squared values will be low. More specifically, any field of research that attempts 
                                                             
77
 While high R-squared values are required for precise predictions, they are not sufficient by themselves 
(Frost, 2013).  
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to model human behaviour, such as psychology, normally presents estimates with R-
squared values lower than 50 percent (Chatterjee et al., 2014; Frost, 2013). The reason is 
that people are simply harder to predict than, for example, economic processes.  In this 
thesis, though the R-squared values are low, the F values of the models are significant. 
This denotes that together the explanatory variables used in the models have significant 
explanatory power.  
 
6.3.2 The Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano on 
Educational Attainment and Housing Conditions 
In order to determine which welfare components have been the most negatively affected 
by the BDH, I estimate the independent effects on other outcome variables considered in 
this thesis. As statistical modelling theory requires, depending on the type of dependent 
variable (i.e. ordinal categorical or dichotomous) different regression models are used in 
the analysis (i.e. ordered logistic or probit models). Specifically, in this section of results, 
I use Registro Social data to look at the impacts of the BDH on the household’s average 
level of education and income. The data set contains questions about self-rated educational 
achievement and housing conditions. I use this information to create some ordinal 
categorical measures of human capital and household income, and I run regressions with 
these as dependent variables. In general, ordinal discrete outcomes take on three or more 
values that can be rank ordered, but an assumption of equal-sized intervals between the 
response options is usually not warranted. This type of dependent variables is analysed 
via ordered logistic regression models (also known as ordered logit or proportional odds 
models), which predict the likelihood of an individual appearing in each successively 
higher category of the outcome variable.          
Tables 17 and 18 summarize the ordered logistic regression results for the effects 
of the BDH cash transfers on households’ education and floor material. Households’ 
education is a categorical response variable describing the self-reported educational 
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attainment of families (rounded average of all its members) into nine categories ranked 
from lowest to highest educational degree: 1 no education, 2 literacy centres, 3 primary 
education, 4 middle education, 5 secondary education, 6 post-secondary education, 7 high-
school education, 8 bachelor degree, and 9 post-graduate. Meanwhile, the floor material 
response variable specifically describes its self-reported quality into eight different 
categories classified from the lowest to the highest level: 1 soil, 2 cane, 3 wood, 4 concrete 
or brick, 5 marble, 6 tile, 7 plank or floating floor, and 8 other. All specifications in the 
tables control for reported province of residence, marriage status and ethnicity. In 
addition, different control variables –including an unemployment indicator and 
individual’s age– are progressively included in the regressions. Note that the first half of 
each column interprets the coefficients in terms of ordered log-odds (logits) and the 
second half interprets the coefficients in terms of proportional odds. Both interpretations 
are explained in detail below.  
According to the results in Table 17, the BDH cash transfers have negative and 
statistically very significant effects on the households’ educational attainment. In the first 
specification (column 1), with few control variables, the ordered log-odds (logit) 
coefficient on the BDH indicator is -0.3577. The standard interpretation of an ordered 
logit coefficient is that for a one unit increase in a given predictor, the outcome variable 
level is expected to change by its respective regression coefficient in the ordered log-odds 
scale, while the other variables in the model are held constant. For example, -0.3577 is the 
ordered log-odds estimate of comparing those affected by the BDH to those not affected 
on expected educational attainment. Therefore, the ordered log-odds for BDH-affected 
individuals of being in a higher education category are 0.3577 less than individuals not 
affected, when the other variables are held constant.  
The second half of column (1) displays the coefficients in terms of proportional 
odds ratios, which allow for the comparison of individuals in groups greater than a given 
level with individuals in groups less than a given level.78 The general interpretation would 
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 Proportional odds ratios are obtained by exponentiating the ordered logit coefficients (e
coef.
).  
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be that for a one unit change in the predictor variable, the odds for cases in a group that is 
greater than k versus less than or equal to k are the proportional odds times larger. In this 
case, 0.69 is the estimated proportional odds ratio of comparing individuals affected by 
the BDH to those not affected on education attainment of the household. This coefficient 
indicates, for instance, that for BDH-affected individuals, the odds of a higher than 
secondary education versus the rest of the categories combined are 0.69 times lower than 
for not-affected individuals, given that the other variables are held constant in the model.  
The impact of the BDH programme is still negative and statistically significant 
when floor material is controlled in column (2). Both, the ordered log-odds estimate and 
the proportional odds ratio, remain practically unchanged (although they slightly 
decrease). Specifically, the ordered log-odds for BDH-beneficiary individuals of being in 
a higher education category are -0.3369 less than for those not affected, given that the 
other variables are held constant. In terms of proportional odds ratio, the odds of a higher 
than secondary education versus the rest categories combined are 0.71 times lower for 
BDH-affected individuals. Apparently, some small part of the negative impact of the BDH 
was due to lower income levels faced by programme beneficiaries, since the findings 
suggest a positive and significant effect of the quality of floor material (income proxy) on 
educational attainment.    
Similarly, when the unemployment indicator is also included in the third 
specification (column 3), the negative impact of the BDH on education remains almost 
unaffected. Meanwhile, the unemployment indicator estimates are positive and 
significant, suggesting that being unemployed has a positive independent effect on the 
educational attainment of the households. Therefore, these results indicate that the BDH 
effects are not driven for the most part by possible differences in the probability of 
unemployment between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the cash transfers. In 
addition, although differences in the probability of unemployment are likely to be present 
(because the BDH effect slightly decreases), they should be relatively small in favour of 
the beneficiaries of the programme (i.e. less probability of unemployment for them).  
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Finally, when individuals’ age is controlled in the full specification (column 4), 
the negative effect of the BDH slightly decreases again (becomes less negative). To be 
more precise the ordered log-odds for BDH beneficiaries of being in a higher education 
category are -0.3171 less than for those who do not receive the transfers, given that the 
other variables are held constant. In terms of proportional odds ratio, the odds of a higher 
than secondary education versus the rest categories combined are 0.72 times lower for 
BDH-affected individuals. These results suggest that a small part of the BDH effect was 
due to relatively higher ages of individuals in the treatment group, since there is a negative 
and significant impact of individuals’ age on their households’ average educational 
attainment.  
Overall, the results in Table 17 indicate that the BDH has a significant negative 
effect on the average level of education of families. The magnitude of the effect is 
considerable, since the ordered logit probability that the BDH beneficiaries are in a higher 
category of instruction level is about -0.33 less than the individuals in the control group, 
given that the other variables in the model are held constant. One possible explanation for 
these findings is that the BDH recipients have less incentives to study and thus improve 
their skills and future income levels. Besides, it appears that the existing control 
mechanisms of conditionalities are not effective enough to ensure that families invest in 
their human capital. Meanwhile, the households' quality of floor material and the 
unemployment indicator have positive impacts on educational attainment, clearly 
reflecting that higher levels of income and more time available improve the probability of 
achieving a higher educational level.  
Moreover, the results reported in Table 18 show a significant negative effect of the 
BDH programme on the household’s quality of floor material. Controlling only for 
reported province, marriage status and ethnicity, the estimated ordered logit coefficient on 
the BDH indicator is sizeable at -0.2017 log-odds units and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. The same coefficient in terms of proportional odds ratio indicates that the 
odds of a better floor than concrete versus the rest categories combined are 0.81 times 
lower for BDH-affected individuals. Column (2) shows that including educational 
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attainment as a regressor leads to an important reduction in the impact of the BDH (i.e. 
the coefficient becomes less negative). However, the ordered logit estimate for the effect 
of the BDH is still negative and significant at -0.1380 log-odds units, while its respective 
odds ratio is 0.87. Apparently, a significant portion of the negative BDH impact on floor 
material (household’s income) was due to lower educational levels obtained by 
programme beneficiaries. These results are consistent with those that demonstrated 
previously (see Table 17) that the BDH has a significant negative effect on the average 
level of education.  
Additionally, the BDH coefficients are very similar when the unemployment 
indicator and individual’s age are taken into account progressively in the third and fourth 
specifications (columns 3 and 4). In both cases, the ordered log-odds of being in a higher 
floor material category are again 0.13 lower for BDH affected individuals than for those 
not affected, given that the other variables are held constant. In terms of proportional odds 
ratio, the odds of a better floor than concrete versus the rest categories combined are, 
therefore, 0.87 times lower for BDH beneficiaries. The rest of the coefficients in Table 18 
indicate that being unemployed has a positive independent effect on the quality of floor 
material, while there is a negative impact of individual’s age. Thus, these results indicate 
that the BDH effects are not driven for the most part by possible differences in the 
probability of unemployment and age between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the 
programme.  
In summary, the results in Table 18 show that the BDH programme has a 
significant negative effect on the household’s quality of floor material, which is used as a 
proxy for the income level. The magnitude of the effect is relatively small (-0.13 log-odds 
units) considering that the categorical ordinal outcome variable of floor material has eight 
different categories. On the other hand, the educational attainment of the family and the 
unemployment indicator have positive impacts on the floor material, reflecting a positive 
relationship between human capital and (perhaps) the available leisure time with the level 
of well-being. In the case of the unemployment indicator, the nature of this relationship is 
still unclear. As noted above, it is difficult to explain the mechanisms through which being 
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unemployed may have such positive impact on the household’s floor material, which is a 
common component of well-being. However, there may be a relationship between 
unemployment and well-being beyond the effect of contemporary income. A plausible 
explanation is related to the more available time the unemployed may have to carry out 
other activities, such as improving the housing conditions.  
In fact, some recent research suggests that the unemployed can spend more time 
in pleasurable leisure activities, hence increasing effective well-being (Powdthavee, 2012; 
Knabe et al., 2010).79 This points to the question whether unemployment impacts 
differently on different welfare measures. To answer this question, quantile regressions 
have recently been introduced to study subjective well-being (Binder & Freytag, 2012; 
Binder & Coad, 2011) and they provide evidence for considerable heterogeneity in the 
impact of unemployment on the well-being distribution. In any case, it is important to note 
that the results presented in Table 18 are consistent with those previously found in this 
thesis suggesting a positive relationship between unemployment and well-being. 
 
6.3.3 The Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano on Human 
Capital of the First-born Children 
A plausible explanation for the absence of positive effects of the BDH programme on 
welfare may be that, in this specific case, well-being differences are not yet reflected in 
the household’s average educational attainment and quality of floor material, which are 
two of the most important components of the SELBEN welfare index used in this analysis. 
However, there may be significant differences in the investment of human capital between 
beneficiary and non-beneficiary families, which for the moment are reflected only in 
school enrolment and school attendance of the first-born children. As mentioned above, 
they are the most exposed to replace (or accompany) the role of parents as the 
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 However, it runs counter to a considerable amount of research on long-term unemployment and health 
(Romeu, 2006).   
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breadwinner. For example, it could be the case that children who were affected by the 
BDH cash transfers have more probabilities of being enrolled and attending school, but 
this does not reflect yet in the household’s average level of human capital. Thus, in order 
to test this hypothesis, I use the Registro Social data to construct indicators of school 
enrolment and school attendance for the first-born at the cost of fewer observations 
because only a portion of the individuals in the sample have children.  
The data set contains information about school enrolment and school attendance 
at the time of the interview. This allows me to construct dummies with the purpose of 
using them as dependent variables in different regressions. Due to the binary nature of the 
outcome variables, I use probit regression models in the analysis. These models calculate 
the predicted probability of being enrolled and attending school on the basis of the 
regressors used. They do so using the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal. The probit regression results for the effects of BDH cash transfers on school 
enrolment and attendance status of the first-born children are presented in Table 19. Once 
more, all the specifications in the table control for individual's province of residence, 
marriage status and ethnicity fixed-effects. Meanwhile, household’s average educational 
attainment, quality of the floor material, unemployment status and age are progressively 
included in the specifications as regressors.   
The first half of Table 19 presents the BDH effects on the probability that the first-
born children are enrolled in school. In column (1), a dummy for being enrolled in school 
is regressed on the BDH indicator and on a set of control dummies. The initial results 
show a significant negative effect of the BDH programme on first-born children school 
enrolment, indicating that having been exposed to the BDH cash transfers decreases the 
predicted probability of being enrolled in school among first-born children. However, 
interpretation of the coefficients in probit regressions is not as straightforward as in linear 
regression models. Specifically, a decrease in the probability of school enrolment 
attributed to a one-unit increase in a given regressor depends both on the starting value of 
the predictor under study and on the values of the other predictors. Holding all control 
dummies (explanatory variables) constant at zero, the predicted probabilities of being 
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enrolled in school for those first-born children affected and not affected by the BDH cash 
transfers are  
pd`]j]chc1Z = '(f`@?1j@1 + 	RST	f`iM.∗ RST	c@Lcfj1`d) 
'(0.5432− 0.0313) = 0.6956		(jMMif1iL	]Z	1ℎi	RST) 
'(0.5432) = 0.7065	(@`1	jMMif1iL	]Z	1ℎi	RST) 
 
where F is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal. Therefore, 
according to these results, first-born children affected by the BDH are about 1 percentage 
point less likely to be enrolled in school.    
The results from including household’s average educational attainment as an 
explanatory variable are reported in the second column. Here, the coefficient on the BDH 
indicator becomes insignificant, suggesting that all the negative effect on the probability 
of school enrolment was driven by the lower educational attainment of BDH beneficiary 
households, which is consistent with the previously reported findings about the effect of 
the BDH on educational attainment (see Table 17). In particular, if we hold all the other 
regressors apart from the BDH indicator constant at zero, then the predicted probability 
of first-born children enrolled in school will be of about 34.14 percent	[F(−0.4084)] for 
both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the BDH. Note that, when household’s quality 
of floor material, the unemployment indicator and individual’s age are progressively 
included in the rest of the specifications (columns 3, 4 and 5), the BDH coefficient remains 
statistically insignificant.   
In the same table, I present estimates for the effect of the BDH programme on the 
probability of school attendance once the first-born child is enrolled using the same 
regression strategy. As shown in the second half of Table 19, these results are quite like 
those obtained in the previous section. In the most basic specification (column 1), the 
coefficient on the BDH indicator is again negative and strongly significant, showing that 
those first-born children affected by the BDH programme are about 2 percentage points 
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less likely to be attending school (holding all other explanatory variables constant at zero) 
['(0.4430 − 0.0328) − '(0.4430)].  
As before, when the household’s average educational attainment is included in the 
analysis (column 2), the estimated impact of the BDH on the probability of school 
attendance becomes economically and statistically insignificant even at the 10 percent 
level. Thus, indicating once more that the negative BDH effect is completely attributable 
to the lower educational level of the programme beneficiary families. Finally, in the rest 
of the specifications (columns 3, 4 and 5), the impact of the BDH remains insignificant. It 
seems therefore unlikely that there are any direct effects of the BDH cash transfers on 
school attendance of the first-born. Overall, these results suggest that the initially 
estimated impact of the BDH on school enrolment and attendance of the first-born is only 
due to differences in the other explanatory variables (between those affected and those not 
affected by the programme). However, it is important to mention that there is still a latent 
possibility that the effects of the BDH are reflected only in the educational outcomes of 
the younger siblings. 
 
6.3.4 The Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano on 
Unemployment80 
In order to estimate the effects of the BDH on the probability of unemployment, I use the 
Registro Social data on employment status of all sampled individuals in both registers, 
including of course households without children. The sample includes individuals 
employed in different economic activities and those who are not working –but are seeking 
employment– at the time of the interview. This information allows me to construct a 
dummy variable for being unemployed, which is used as the dependent variable in the 
unemployment regressions to estimate the effects of the BDH social assistance 
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 The unemployed are defined in Ecuador as those adult people (gender neutral) able, available and willing 
to work, but who cannot find a job despite an active search for work. 
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programme on labour supply behaviour. Recall that I use probit regressions for the 
analysis when the outcome variable is dichotomous as in this case. The probit regression 
results for the effects of BDH cash transfers on unemployment status are presented in 
Table 20. As in previous analyses, initially the set of control dummies includes 
individual's province of residence, marriage status and ethnicity fixed-effects. 
Household’s average educational attainment, quality of floor material and individuals’ age 
are progressively included in the specifications as regressors.   
In the first and most basic specification (column 1, Table 20), the estimated BDH 
coefficient is statistically significant (even at the 1 percent level) and negative, indicating 
that having been affected by these cash transfers in the past slightly decreases the predicted 
probability of being unemployed today. More specifically, holding all control dummies 
(explanatory variables) constant at zero, the predicted probabilities of being unemployed 
–for those individuals affected and not affected by the BDH cash transfers– are calculated 
as follows, drawing on the results presented in Table 20: 
pd`]j]chc1Z = '(f`@?1j@1 + 	RST	f`iM.∗ RST	c@Lcfj1`d) 
'(−2.4137 − 0.3721) = 0.0026		(jMMif1iL	]Z	1ℎi	RST) 
'(−2.4137) = 0.0078	(@`1	jMMif1iL	]Z	1ℎi	RST) 
 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Therefore, 
according to these results, individuals affected by the BDH are 0.52 percentage points less 
likely to be unemployed ['(−2.4137) − '(−2.4137 − 0.3721)]. 
The estimated impacts of the BDH programme are very similar when the 
household’s average educational attainment is incorporated in column 2; and when the 
quality of floor material (column 3) and age (column 4) are also included as explanatory 
variables in the regressions. In the second specification, the coefficient on the BDH 
indicator is again negative and strongly significant, showing that those individuals 
affected by this type of cash transfers are about 0.3 percentage points less likely to be 
unemployed (holding all other explanatory variables constant at zero) ['(−2.6197) −
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'(−2.6197− 0.3534)]. This result, somewhat smaller in magnitude compared to the one 
in the most basic specification, suggests that some part of the negative effect on the 
probability of unemployment was due to differences in the educational level of the 
households. More specifically, due to a lower educational attainment of BDH beneficiary 
households (given the positive relationship found between household’s educational 
attainment and the probability of unemployment), which is also consistent with the results 
reported in Table 17.  
In the third specification, when household’s quality of floor material is included 
in the analysis, the estimated effect of the BDH on unemployment is still economically 
and statistically significant. If we hold all the other regressors constant at zero, the 
negative impact of the BDH programme on the predicted probability of being unemployed 
will be of about 0.25 percentage points ['(−2.6669) − '(−2.6669 − 0.3524)]. Note 
that the BDH coefficient is slightly reduced in magnitude, indicating once more that part 
of the negative effect is attributable to the apparently lower income of households affected 
by this type of cash transfers (given the positive relationship found between household’s 
quality of floor material and the probability of unemployment). These results are 
consistent with the regression estimates presented in Table 18. 
Finally, in the full specification (column 4), the negative impact of the BDH cash 
transfers remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Once the age of individuals 
is controlled, those affected by the programme are about 0.52 percentage points less likely 
to be unemployed (holding all other explanatory variables constant at zero) 
['(−2.6197) − '(−2.6197 − 0.3534)]. The slight increase in the magnitude of the 
coefficient suggests that part of the negative effect was being cancelled by age differences 
among individuals in the treatment and control groups. Given the negative relationship 
found between age and probability of unemployment, it seems that those individuals 
affected by the BDH are somewhat younger. Thus, the inclusion of age as a regressor 
guarantees that the negative impact of the BDH on unemployment is not being driven by 
the less labour experience (approximated by age) of cash transfers-affected individuals.  
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6.3.5 Lessons from the Natural Experimental Results 
In general, the natural experimental results indicate that the BDH programme has had a 
small negative effect on welfare among those in poverty. Specifically, the negative impact 
is concentrated on two of the most important welfare components, such as the households’ 
level of education and quality of floor material. On the other hand, I didn’t find statistically 
significant effects of the BDH cash transfers on the probability of school attendance and 
school enrolment of the first-born child. Finally, the impact of the BDH programme on 
unemployment appears to be negative but small. The obtained results indicate that 
receiving the BDH cash transfers slightly reduces the probability of being unemployed. In 
statistical terms, the effect of the BDH programme on the probability of unemployment is 
around -0.5 and -0.3 percentage points on average for a given individual; and it remains 
practically unchanged as the number of controls increases in different regression 
specifications. 
The estimated results imply that the efficiency levels that the BDH programme 
presents are not, in any way, what should be according to the theories of change described 
in the previous chapter (see page 186). When comparing the estimated effects with the 
expected results of the BDH, in terms of the well-being of people living in poverty, we 
can notice that the programme does not really promote investment in human capital at the 
household level or improve living conditions of families. Similarly, the BDH does not 
meet the objective of improving income levels and, therefore, ameliorating consumption 
patterns. As for the inter-temporal transmission of poverty, cash transfers (and their 
conditions) are not sufficient to promote school enrolment and attendance, as they 
theoretically should. Only in terms of encouraging good habits and practices, it could be 
said that the programme at least meets to some extent with the expected results, since it 
slightly discourages the probability of being unemployed. Therefore, it is evident that both 
the type of intervention and the dynamics of change of the BDH programme may not be 
sufficient to achieve the expected results or, perhaps, they are not being applied correctly. 
Unfortunately, the scope of this research does not allow me to determine the specific 
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aspects (resources/inputs, activities, mechanisms or channels of change) that should be 
corrected so that the intervention works correctly or at least more efficiently. 
The overall findings of the proposed natural experiment largely discourage (at 
least in Ecuador) the implementation of traditional social assistance programmes to 
working-age families. Note that the estimated BDH effects on most outcome variables are 
insignificant or even negative, except for the impact on unemployment (which suggests 
that the BDH slightly reduces the probability of being unemployed). However, recall that 
although the BDH cash transfers are theoretically conditional on human capital 
investment, they do not impose work-related requirements. This means that even the 
optimistic unemployment regression results do not work in favour of conditional transfers 
that are exclusive to the working poor (as is the case in some developed countries). 
Therefore, the element of conditionality in social assistance, which has usually been 
thought of as indisputable, is seriously questioned in its effectiveness by these results. In 
other words, these findings are opposed to the idea of conditionalities as a necessary 
element to ensure the effectiveness of cash transfer programmes. 
The paternalistic view of social assistance programmes –which clearly emphasizes 
the need to implement human capital- or work-related conditions for the delivery of cash 
transfers– is seriously challenged by the obtained results. On the other hand, alternative 
approaches such as the rational choice theory or even the welfare trap theory seem to be 
supported by the results of this experiment. It is possible that the negative effects of the 
BDH are due to the imposition of conditionalities that do not allow people to decide what 
is best for them in a free and rational way. This will become clearer when evaluating the 
results of the CDH programme, which does not impose any type of conditionality. 
Moreover, apart from the findings in terms of labour supply, these results strongly support 
the welfare trap hypothesis –since those individuals affected by the BDH present lower 
welfare conditions compared to those who did not receive cash transfers. 
As a final remark, I reiterate the fact that although the treatment and control groups 
were virtually homogeneous in 2008, there were already some small differences between 
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groups, mainly in favour of the control group prior to the treatment implementation. These 
initial differences in the outcome variables are more visible in the case of the 
unemployment indicator (in this case favouring the treatment group). Thus, in terms of 
the unemployment indicator the control and treatment groups do not start from entirely 
similar situations. The BDH treatment group already had lower levels of unemployment 
in 2008. In other words, the groups are not homogeneous in terms of unemployment prior 
to the implementation of the BDH treatment. This circumstance could at least partially 
explain the estimated negative effects of the programme. This is a possibility that should 
be examined more closely using an alternative method that takes into account the data 
before treatment.   
However, in defence of the natural experimental results obtained in this section, 
the difference between groups slightly increases in 2014 (see Tables 13 and 14). 
Therefore, a slight negative effect of the BDH programme may be expected, although 
perhaps smaller in size than the one estimated by the natural experimental method. Recall 
that the estimated effect does not consider the initial differences between groups (i.e. 
differences over time). In order to take into account these differences, alternative 
measurement mechanisms are required –such as is the difference-in-differences 
technique– which takes into account both the initial and final differences between the 
groups, allowing a more accurate estimate of the effects of the BDH. In the section below, 
I present difference-in-differences results using the same individuals for comparison 
reasons.   
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Table 16: Regression Estimates of the Effect of the BDH on the Welfare Index 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 OLS OLS  OLS OLS OLS 
Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BDH Indicator  -2.1840***                      
(0.0220) 
-1.4584***           
(0.0209) 
-1.1593***              
(0.0183) 
-1.1549***        
(0.0183) 
-1.1912***        
(0.0181) 
Household’s Educational Attainment 
--- 2.7975***         
(0.0079) 
2.1759***         
(0.0070) 
2.1743***        
(0.0070) 
2.4617***        
(0.0073) 
Household’s Floor Material 
--- ---  3.9376***                      
(0.0071) 
3.9375***        
(0.0071) 
3.9616***        
(0.0071) 
Unemployment Indicator 
--- --- --- 0.5111***          (0.0767) 
0.7061***          
(0.0760) 
Age 
--- --- --- --- 0.1123***          (0.0007) 
Constant   23.3073***                      
(0.0666) 
17.4001***                      
(0.0650) 
2.9367***                      
(0.0628) 
2.9366***                    
(0.0628) 
-1.8771***                     
(0.0707) 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies      
Reported Marriage Status Dummies      
Ethnicity Dummies      
Number of Observations 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 
R-squared 0.1762 0.2666 0.4366 0.4366 0.4479 
Note: Estimates are from linear regression models. All specifications include a constant.  
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Table 17: Household’s Educational Attainment Regressions (BDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Average Educational Attainment 
BDH Indicator   -0.3577***                     
(0.0039) 
0.6992***                     
(0.0027) 
-0.3369***                     
(0.0039) 
0.7139***                    
(0.0028) 
-0.3322***                     
(0.0040) 
0.7172***                   
(0.0028) 
-0.3171***                     
(0.0040) 
0.7282***                  
(0.0029) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.2458***          (0.0015) 
1.2786***          
(0.0020) 
0.2455***          
(0.0015) 
1.2783***          
(0.0020) 
0.2285***          
(0.0015) 
1.2568***          
(0.0019) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.5156***                   (0.0168) 
1.6746***                   
(0.0281) 
0.4094***                   
(0.0168) 
1.5060***                   
(0.0254) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0492***                     (0.0001) 
0.9519***                    
(0.0001) 
Number of Observations 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
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Table 18: Household’s Quality of Floor Material Regressions (BDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Quality of Floor Material  
BDH Indicator  -0.2017***                     
(0.0040) 
0.8172***                     
(0.0033) 
-0.1380***                     
(0.0041) 
0.8710***                    
(0.0035) 
-0.1372***                     
(0.0041) 
0.8717***                   
(0.0035) 
-0.1361***                     
(0.0041) 
0.8726***                  
(0.0035) 
Household’s Educational Attainment --- --- 0.2667***          (0.0016) 
1.3056***          
(0.0020) 
0.2664***          
(0.0016) 
1.3052***          
(0.0021) 
0.2526***          
(0.0016) 
1.2873***          
(0.0021) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.1013***                   (0.0175) 
1.1066***                   
(0.0193) 
0.0920***                   
(0.0175) 
1.0963***                   
(0.0192) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0053***                     (0.0001) 
0.9947***                    
(0.0001) 
Number of Observations 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
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Table 19: Regression Estimates of the Effects of the BDH on School Enrolment and 
School Attendance of the First-born Child 












Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Enrolled in School Dummy 
BDH Indicator  -0.0313***          
(0.0084) 
0.0017            
(0.0087) 
0.0056          
(0.0087) 
0.0051            
(0.0087) 




--- 0.4219***          
(0.0046) 
0.4150***          
(0.0046) 
0.4151***          
(0.0046) 




--- --- 0.0426***         
(0.0033) 
0.0426***          
(0.0033) 
0.0419***          
(0.0033) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- -0.0636*          
(0.0405) 
-0.0658*          
(0.0405) 
Age --- --- --- --- -0.002***          
(0.0005) 
Constant  0.5432***          
(0.0226) 
-0.4084***                        
(0.0255) 
-0.5637***          
(0.0283) 
-0.5636***                        
(0.0283) 
-0.442***                        
(0.0381) 
Number of Observations 136,247 136,247 136,247 136,247 136,247 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Attending School Dummy 
BDH Indicator  -0.0328***          
(0.0082) 
-0.0016            
(0.0084) 
0.0032          
(0.0084) 
0.0027            
(0.0084) 




--- 0.3943***          
(0.0044) 
0.3859***          
(0.0045) 
0.3860***          
(0.0045) 




--- --- 0.0522***         
(0.0032) 
0.0522***          
(0.0032) 
0.0514***          
(0.0032) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- -0.0547*          
(0.0394) 
-0.0573*          
(0.0394) 
Age --- --- --- --- -0.002***          
(0.0005) 
Constant  0.4430***          
(0.0220) 
-0.4543***                        
(0.0247) 
-0.6449***          
(0.0275) 
-0.6448***                        
(0.0275) 
-0.498***                        
(0.0369) 
Number of Observations 136,247 136,247 136,247 136,247 136,247 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
    
Marriage Status Dummies     
Ethnicity Dummies     
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level (P value<=0.1) 
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Table 20: Unemployment Regressions (BDH) 










Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Being Unemployed 
BDH Indicator -0.3721***         
(0.0090) 
-0.3534***            
(0.0091) 
-0.352***          
(0.0091) 




--- 0.0903***          
(0.0026) 
0.0884***          
(0.0027) 
0.0748***          
(0.0028) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0123***          
(0.0031) 
0.0111***          
(0.0031) 
Age --- --- --- -0.006***          
(0.0003) 
Constant  -2.4137***          
(0.0261) 
-2.6197***          
(0.0270) 
-2.666***          
(0.0296) 
-2.395***                        
(0.0330) 
Number of Observations 997,437 997,437 997,437 997,437 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
   
Marriage Status Dummies    
Ethnicity Dummies    
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
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6.4 Difference-in-Difference Results 
Although the randomization assumption (which was essential for the previous natural 
experiment) can be somewhat relaxed when using this method, there are other important 
assumptions that must be taken into account for its implementation and correct 
interpretation of the results. In other words, even if the individuals in the sample have not 
been assigned to the treatment and control groups by the implementers of the BDH 
programme, using a formal randomized mechanism (like a randomized control trial), this 
analysis can be carried out provided that certain conditions are met (Munoz, 2010). 
As a general rule, several assumptions have to be made in order to allow for any 
consistent estimation of the causal effects. In this case, I will list the most important ones 
and those that we should keep in mind when analysing the results. First of all, the central 
assumption of the difference in-differences approach is that the underlying trends in the 
outcome variables (such as the welfare index, educational attainment or unemployment) 
would be the same for all individuals in the absence of the treatment, which is never 
possible to probe formally and constitutes a very strong and admittedly questionable 
assumption (Stuart et al., 2014). However, if the treatment effect survives even after 
controlling for individual- and group-specific characteristics, the identification strategy 
remains to be valid.  
A common way of checking if this assumption seems at least plausible is to see if 
the trends in the outcome variables were parallel before the BDH intervention, which was 
already done when the pre-treatment characteristics of the sample were analysed in 
Chapter 5 (see page 191). Note that it isn't necessary to have random assignment of 
individuals for this assumption to hold, but it is much more likely to fail if the assignment 
was based on some particular characteristics of the groups. 
Moreover, in the case of the present thesis, the validity of the identification 
strategy hinges as well on the assumption that interaction of group and time effects do not 
affect the outcome variables directly (only through the BDH effects). This assumption is 
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clearly more likely to be satisfied when, before the analysis, we restrict the sample to 
individuals with similar basic characteristics. Therefore, as explained in the sample 
selection process (see page 189), in order to estimate the regressions, I first restrict the 
evaluation sample to those working-age individuals without disabilities who, being in a 
situation of poverty, are potential beneficiaries of the BDH programme.  
Finally, it is important to note that, specifically in the case of the BDH evaluation, 
the regressor of interest ("#$%2014 ∗ +,-) –conditional on year and group– is 
considered as good as randomly assigned. In other words, it is assumed that individuals 
cannot choose only by themselves to be affected or not by the programme. A possible 
concern would be if the composition of the treatment and control groups changes as a 
result of the BDH cash transfers implementation (e.g. the existence of selective 
migration). More specifically, there might be a problem if individuals could decide for 
themselves if they are going to be programme beneficiaries in response to the government 
officials’ decision to introduce the BDH for those in poverty. 
However, as explained in depth in Chapter 2 (see page 70), it is the public 
institution in charge of the programme that exclusively decides the recipients and potential 
recipients of the BDH monetary transfers based on the poverty condition of the households 
and the budgetary restrictions of each administration. In addition, it is difficult to think 
that households will voluntarily reduce their welfare situation in order to have more 
chances of being chosen, or even more unlikely that individuals will reject monetary 
transfers once they have been assigned. Therefore, potential self-selection issues –like the 
mobility among groups– are not likely to occur invalidating the results of the natural 
experiment. In other words, it is unlikely that a problem of selection bias will arise. 
Anyway, an important advantage of the diff-in-diff strategy is that it would partly 
overcome this still potential problem in case it is happening. 
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6.4.1 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
on the Welfare Index 
The difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the BDH cash transfers on the 
SELBEN welfare index are presented in Table 21. As in the natural experimental method, 
all the regressions in this table control for province of residence, marriage status, and self-
defined ethnicity fixed-effects. The results are presented following a structure similar to 
that of the previous method, that is, the control variables are progressively included in the 
different specifications. In the first and most basic specification, the household’s 
educational attainment, the quality of floor material the unemployment indicator and 
individual’s age are not taken into account.  
The first column indicates that with the mere inclusion of control dummies, there 
is a negative effect of the BDH programme on welfare. However, this impact is reduced 
by almost 50 percent compared to that estimated by the natural experimental method. 
Specifically, the results in column (1) show that the BDH cash transfers decrease the 
SELBEN welfare index by about 1.23 points, and that all the diff-in-diff estimates in the 
specification are highly statistically significant. Besides, the coefficient on the BDH 
indicator is relatively precisely estimated. It is possible to claim this because, although not 
included in Table 21, the 95 percent confidence interval for the effect of the BDH 
programme on the welfare index ranges from -1.28 to -1.18.  
Before analysing the rest of the coefficients in the specifications, it is necessary to 
make some important general remarks. First, note that the number of observations has 
practically doubled (i.e. 1,989,708 observations), as was expected, since I have 
information at two different points of time. Moreover, the 2014-indicator and the 
treatment group indicator were included as independent explanatory variables in the 
regressions. It is important to include time and group indicators as separate control 
variables, because they are likely to influence the outcome variables directly and 
independently of whether an individual was affected by the BDH cash transfers. In other 
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words, I need to account for group specific characteristics and trends in time that could be 
affecting the estimated results. Finally, recall that the BDH indicator is constructed based 
on the interaction of an observation’s time and group indicators, under the assumption that 
the only way through which the interaction term affects the outcome variables is through 
the BDH effects.  
The estimated 2014-indicator coefficient is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that if the observation belongs to the post-treatment period, the welfare index 
increases drastically for all individuals. That is, regardless of whether an individual is 
affected by BDH cash transfers, the trend over time is that his level of welfare improves 
by about 10 index points due to a combination of exogenous factors, which include 
societal, familial, economical, political and other similar conditions. On the other hand, 
the impact of the treatment group indicator is negative and statistically significant, 
although small in magnitude. The estimated coefficient indicates that if the observation 
belongs to an individual among the treatment group, the welfare index slightly decreases 
by about 0.97 points, independently of whether the observation belongs to the post- or 
pre-treatment period.  
Therefore, there might be some intrinsic characteristics of the individuals that 
belong to the treatment group that negatively affect their level of well-being. These results 
suggest that both trends over time and group specific characteristics affect the results, and 
therefore, it is necessary to take them into account in order to obtain a more accurate 
estimator of the effect of the BDH cash transfers. Note that the reduction of the BDH 
coefficient is practically of 1 index point if we compare it with the one estimated by the 
previous method. This could be explained to a large extent by the inclusion of group-
specific characteristics in the diff-in-diff method, since the effect of the treatment group 
indicator is also negative and of a similar magnitude to the mentioned decrease in the BDH 
coefficient.  
The results obtained in the first specification do not vary much when the 
household’s average educational attainment is included in column (2). The BDH estimate 
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is still negative and highly statistically significant, showing that the impact of the BDH is 
not cancelled by the estimated positive effect that each completed educational degree has 
on welfare (2.39 index points per additional degree). Nevertheless, the BDH effect is 
reduced to -0.93 index points, indicating that a small part of the negative impact on welfare 
can be linked to the direct negative effect that the BDH cash transfers should have on the 
household’s average educational attainment, which will be confirmed in the next section 
of this chapter (see Table 22). 
Similarly, the treatment group indicator coefficient remains negative and 
significant, suggesting that individuals in the treatment group in general present slightly 
lower levels of well-being (-0.64 index points), regardless of whether they are 
beneficiaries of the BDH cash transfers. Note also that this coefficient has been reduced 
by the inclusion of average educational attainment in the regression, indicating that part 
of the welfare differences among groups could be explained specifically by differences in 
the level of instruction. In this case, the results show that individuals in the treatment group 
have a slightly lower level of education (as part of the group-specific characteristics), 
which in turn affects negatively their level of well-being. Moreover, the estimated impact 
of the 2014-indicator on well-being is practically the same as in the previous specification 
(i.e. 10 index points). In other words, the presence of the household’s average educational 
attainment does not change the fact that the welfare index increases considerably in the 
post-treatment period for all the individuals.  
In column (3), when the household’s quality of floor material (a common proxy of 
the income level) is included as an explanatory variable of the level of well-being, the 
BDH coefficient is once again negative and highly statistically significant. In fact, all the 
coefficients in this specification remain practically unchanged if not for a slight reduction 
in their magnitude. More specifically, the results show that the BDH cash transfers 
decrease the SELBEN welfare index by about 0.85 points (that is 0.08 index points less 
than in the previous specification). This small reduction in the BDH coefficient, together 
with the currently estimated positive impact of quality of floor material on well-being 
(3.15 index points), imply that there might be some direct negative effect of the BDH 
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programme on the household’s proxy of income level. This implication is going to be 
analysed in the next section, but these results already give us an idea of what we can find 
(see Table 23).  
Additionally, once the quality of floor material is included in the regression, the 
estimated coefficients of the treatment group indicator and the 2014-indicator do not vary 
too much. The results suggest that the trend over time is still that the level of welfare for 
all individuals improves by about 8.55 index points between 2008 and 2014, while the 
specific characteristics of the individuals in the treatment group affect negatively their 
level of well-being by about 0.46 index points, independently of whether the observation 
belongs to the post- or pre-treatment period (i.e. regardless of the BDH cash transfers 
effect). However, the magnitude of both indicators’ coefficients is slightly reduced by the 
inclusion of the household’s quality of floor material, indicating that some part of the 
welfare differences among groups and years could be explained specifically by differences 
in the income level.     
Finally, with regards to the BDH estimate, there are hardly any changes to 
coefficients when I gradually include controls for individuals’ unemployment situation 
(column 4) and age (column 5). In the fourth specification, the BDH coefficient is again 
negative, highly statistically significant and its magnitude is of about 0.85 SELBEN index 
points (less than one point). The same can be said about the fifth specification when the 
age of individuals is included in the diff-in-diff regression. As in the previous 
specifications, it can be stated that the coefficients in both regressions are relatively 
precisely estimated, given that with a confidence level of 95 percent the BDH effects lie 
between -0.89 and -0.81 points. Note that, given that the BDH coefficient is not altered by 
the inclusion of the unemployment indicator, the results suggest that the effects of the cash 
transfers on welfare do not channel through their independent effect on the labour situation 
of individuals. In fact, it is most likely that this time, contrary to the natural experimental 
findings, no direct effect at all (or a very small one) will be found of the BDH programme 
on unemployment status when analysed in depth later (see Table 25).  
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Also, the estimated impacts in columns (4) and (5) of the trends over time (i.e. 
2014 indicator) and group-specific characteristics (i.e. treatment group indicator) on the 
individuals’ welfare index are very similar to those found above. Specifically, the 
treatment group indicator coefficient is still negative and highly statistically significant, 
showing that individuals labelled as the treatment group in general present slightly lower 
levels of well-being (-0.46 index points). The small reduction of the coefficient, compared 
with those found in the previous specifications, implies that one of the specific 
characteristics of the groups –which affect their level of well-being– is related to the 
probability of unemployment. In this case, the results indicate that the treatment group 
presents lower levels of unemployment (regardless of the BDH cash transfers), and this 
fact could partially explain their estimated lower level of well-being. 
These latest findings are supported by the conducted analysis of the characteristics 
of the groups prior to the BDH treatment intervention (see Table 13) and they allow us to 
practically rule out the idea –suggested by the natural experiment– that BDH cash 
transfers beneficiaries are less likely to be unemployed. Granting practically all the credit 
of the differences in the level of unemployment to the intrinsic characteristics of the 
groups (and no longer to the BDH programme), which were of course omitted by the 
natural experimental approach.81 On the other hand, the effect of the 2014-indicator on 
well-being is almost the same as in the third specification (i.e. increase in SELBEN by 
about 8.55 index points). Thus, the presence of the unemployment indicator and 
individuals’ age does not change the fact that the welfare index increases considerably in 
the post-treatment period induced by external factors. Although, it is necessary to 
recognize that once age is controlled for in the last specification, there is a slightly 
reduction on the estimated impact of trends over time on welfare.  
Overall, the diff-in-diff regression results in Table 21 confirm that BDH 
conditional cash transfers had a slight but negative effect on the welfare level of those in 
                                                             
81
 The diff-in-diff effects of the BDH programme on unemployment status will be analysed in more detail 
in a later section of this chapter, where the probability of unemployment is taken as the outcome variable. 
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poverty. Although the effects are indeed small in magnitude, they represent a relatively 
significant decrease in the level of well-being considering that the average welfare of the 
sample in 2008 (i.e. before the intervention) was only 21 index points, and that the 
difference between the lowest percentile (i.e. the poorest 1 percent) and highest percentile 
(i.e. the 1 percent less poor among the poor) was about 28 index points.   
As more control variables are added to the diff-in-diff regressions, the magnitude 
of the BDH effect on the welfare index is gradually reduced from -1.23 points until it 
stabilizes (in the third specification) at about -0.85 points. Moreover, as was also the case 
in the natural experimental design, the independent effects of household’s educational 
attainment, quality of floor material (as an income proxy), unemployment status, and 
individual’s age (as a labour experience proxy) on welfare are positive and statistically 
significant.  
Note that the F values of the model are highly statistically significant as well. This 
denotes that the explanatory variables used in the specifications have a significant 
explanatory power as a whole. Nevertheless, the diff-in-diff model once again treats these 
explanatory variables as if they were continuous, despite the fact that some of them are 
ordinal discrete variables. As previously explained, the advantage of this technique is that 
it incorporates into the model the fact that each variables’ categories are ordered, but at 
the cost of assuming that equal changes in X mean equal changes in Y.  
For instance, in the specification with all controls included (Column 5), the effect 
of quality of floor material is interpreted as the difference in the predicted value of the 
welfare index for each-one unit difference in the predictor, if all other independent 
variables remain constant. In this case, note that a one unit difference in the predictor 
represents switching from one floor material category to the next higher or lower. 
Therefore, the average difference in welfare between floor material categories is 3.16 
index points. Similarly, the increase of a category in the average level of education of the 
household has an effect of 2.17 points on the SELBEN welfare index, while the effect of 
each additional year of age is only 0.07 points. 
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Finally, in my diff-in-diff regression analysis, I found R-squared values ranging 
from 34 percent in the first specification to 52 percent in the full specification (see last 
row of Table 21), which are considerably higher than those estimated in the natural 
experimental model. Thus, if the primary objective would be to produce predictions of the 
SELBEN welfare index that are reasonably precise, then the estimated R-squared values 
would be no longer an important concern. Specifically, the coefficient of determination 
obtained in the last specification indicate that the model has little “prediction error” and, 
thus, that making projections of the welfare index would be possible –given the 
explanatory variables that I have included in this regression. In fact, note that in this case 
less than half of the variation in the outcome variable should be explained by unobserved 
factors.  
However, as stated above, making predictions is not the objective of the diff-in-
diff model applied in this thesis. Actually, its main purpose is to determine which of the 
selected predictors are statistically significant and how changes in the explanatory 
variables relate to changes in the welfare index. Therefore, in this case, the R-squared 
values are again almost totally irrelevant, since they do not need to be above any particular 
value to validate the obtained results. In other words, once the regression model is 
correctly specified, the R-squared does not affect the way we interpret the estimated 
coefficients. Recall that the interpretation of the coefficients and their statistical 
significance is the same regardless of whether the coefficient of determination value is 10 
percent or 95 per cent.  
 
6.4.2 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
on Two Different Welfare Components 
The difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of the BDH cash transfers on the 
households’ average educational attainment and housing conditions are presented in 
Tables 22 and 23. The key results are that the BDH cash transfers cause a small reduction 
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in the average educational attainment of the household and in the quality of the floor 
material. As in all the regressions estimated in this thesis (irrespective of the statistical 
method), the specifications in these tables control for province of residence, marriage 
status, and self-defined ethnicity fixed-effects. Once again, the structure used for 
presenting the results is based on the progressive inclusion of more control variables, 
which include the unemployment indicator and individual’s age.  
Moreover, recall that the difference-in-differences method requires the inclusion 
of the 2014-indicator and the treatment group indicator as independent explanatory 
variables in the regressions in order to account for group specific characteristics and trends 
in time that could be affecting the estimated results. The BDH indicator is constructed 
based on the interaction of these two variables (i.e. an observation’s year and group 
indicators).  
As previously explained (see page 176), in this case the dependent variables (i.e. 
educational attainment and quality of floor material) are ordinal categorical (or ordinal 
discrete) measures of human capital and income. Households’ educational attainment is a 
categorical outcome variable describing the self-reported educational degree of the 
families as a rounded average of its members ranking it into nine categories. Similarly, 
the floor material outcome variable specifically describes its self-reported quality using 
eight different categories. Both rankings are classified from the lowest to the highest level.  
It has also been stated before that the theory of statistical modelling requires 
ordered logistic regression models –also known as ordered logit or proportional odds 
models– to analyse this type of dependent variables given their level of measurement. 
Recall that these models predict the likelihood of an individual appearing in each 
successively higher category of the outcome variable. Tables 22 and 23 summarize, 
respectively, the ordered logistic diff-in-diff regression results for the effects of the BDH 
cash transfers on the households’ level of education and on the quality of floor material. 
In each one of the tables, the first half of each column (or specification) interprets the 
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coefficients in terms of ordered log-odds (logits) and the second half interprets the 
coefficients in terms of proportional odds.  
The results presented in Table 22 confirm that the average educational attainment 
of households is one of the components of welfare on which the BDH has a negative and 
statistically significant effect. In the first and most basic specification (column 1), the 
ordered log-odds (logit) coefficient on the BDH indicator is -0.1754. Therefore, the 
ordered log-odds for BDH-affected individuals of being in a higher education category 
are 0.1754 less than individuals not affected, when the other variables are held constant. 
In terms of simple probability, this means that if an individual receives BDH transfers the 
probability (p) that his household is at a higher category of education is 0.4563. That is to 
say, it is slightly more likely for the household of a given individual to be at a higher 
education category if the individual is not affected by the BDH (p = 0.5437) (see Appendix 
D). 
The second half of column (1) displays the coefficients in terms of proportional 
odds ratios, which allow for the comparison of individuals in groups above a given level 
(k) with individuals in groups below the same level. In this case, 0.8390 is the estimated 
proportional odds ratio of comparing individuals affected by the BDH to those not affected 
in terms of educational attainment of the household. This coefficient indicates that for 
BDH-affected individuals the odds of being in a higher category than, for example, 
secondary education (k), versus the rest of the categories combined, are 0.8390 times 
(thus, lower) the odds for those not-affected individuals, given that the other variables are 
held constant in the model. Note that the ordered logistic estimates of the first column can 
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It is also worth noting that in column (1) the estimated ordered log-odds (logit) 
coefficient on the 2014-indicator is positive and significant (i.e. 0.2310), indicating that if 
an individual’s observation belongs to the post-treatment period, the probability (p) that 
his household is at a higher category of education is 0.5575. Therefore, it is more likely 
for the household of a given individual to be at a higher education category if the 
observation belongs to the post-treatment period. In fact, the proportional odds ratio shows 
that, for post-treatment observations, the odds of being in a higher education category are 
1.2598 times (therefore, greater) the odds for pre-treatment observations (p = 0.4425). 
These results may seem intuitive, but they imply that on average households in poverty 
improved their average levels of education over time, regardless of whether the individual 
is affected by the BDH cash transfers.   
Moreover, the impact of the treatment group indicator is negative and statistically 
significant. The estimated ordered log-odds coefficient (i.e. -0.2241) indicates that if the 
observation belongs to an individual among the treatment group, the probability that his 
household is in a higher category of education (p = 0.4442) is lower than the probability 
if the individual belongs to the control group (p = 0.5558). Thus, the proportional odds 
ratio (presented in the second half of the column) is 0.7992 (POR= 0.4442/0.5558), which 
means that the odds of being in a higher education category for individuals in the treatment 
group are 0.79 times the odds for individuals in control group. This is independently of 
whether the observation belongs to the post- or pre-treatment period and, of course, 
irrespective of receiving BDH cash transfers. Therefore, there might be intrinsic 
characteristics of the individuals in the treatment group that negatively affect the average 
educational attainment of their households.  
The ordered log-odds coefficients and the proportional odds ratios estimated in the 
first specification do not vary much when more control variables are included in columns 
(2), (3) and (4). More specifically, the impacts of the BDH programme, the 2014-indicator 
and the treatment group indicator on educational attainment are practically the same when 
floor material, unemployment and age are progressively included in the regressions. The 
small but existing reductions in the magnitude of the BDH log-odds coefficient indicate 
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that a very small part of the effect of the programme was due to the housing conditions, 
the employment status and the age of the individuals.  
Additionally, the diff-in-diff findings also suggest a positive and significant effect 
of the quality of floor material (income proxy) and unemployment on educational 
attainment, indicating that better housing conditions and being unemployed have positive 
independent impacts on the average level of education of the households. As previously 
mentioned, one possible explanation could be that higher levels of income and more time 
available improve the probability of achieving a higher educational degree. On the other 
hand, individuals’ age has a very small but negative effect on educational attainment.  
Overall, these results are consistent with those estimated using the natural 
experimental method. The statistical significance and direction of the explanatory 
variables’ coefficients are very similar in both methods. For instance, they indicate that 
the BDH has a significant negative effect on the average level of education of poor 
families. Although it is important to note that the magnitude of the BDH log-odds 
coefficient is considerably smaller using the diff-in-diff approach. Once again (like in the 
case of the welfare index), this suggests that both trends over time and group specific 
characteristics affect the results, and therefore, it is necessary to take them into account 
using a diff-in-diff technique in order to obtain a more accurate estimator of the effect of 
the BDH cash transfers. 
It is now the turn to analyse the effects of the BDH programme on another 
important well-being component, such as the housing conditions. More specifically, the 
quality of the floor material is taken as the dependent variable mostly because it is a good 
and commonly used proxy for the income level of the families.  The results reported in 
Table 23 show that the household’s quality of floor material is another component of 
welfare on which the BDH has a negative and statistically significant impact. However, 
the magnitude of the order logit coefficient is very small in absolute terms and close to 
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 246 
the log-odds scale centre of 0.0, suggesting that the BDH effect will also be small. This 
will be reflected clearly when interpreted in terms of probabilities.82  
In the first specification (column 1), the estimated ordered logit coefficient on the 
BDH indicator is -0.0775 log-odds units. Thus, the straightforward interpretation would 
be that the ordered log-odds for BDH-affected individuals of being in a higher floor 
material category are 0.0775 units less than individuals not affected, when the other 
variables are held constant. In terms of probabilities (which might be easier to interpret), 
this means that if an individual receives BDH transfers, the probability (p) that his 
household is at a higher category of floor material is 0.4806 probability units. That is to 
say, it is slightly less likely for the household of a given individual to be at a higher floor 
material category if the individual is affected by the BDH cash transfers. Note that if the 
probability were 0.5, this would mean that both (affected and unaffected) have the same 
probability of being in a higher category.  
The same BDH logit coefficient, but in terms of proportional odds ratio (presented 
in the second half of column 1) is 0.9253. Recall that the proportional odds ratio is 
obtained by dividing the probability of being in a higher floor material category for BDH-
affected individuals by the probability for those not affected. Therefore, this coefficient 
indicates that the probability for BDH-affected individuals will be slightly smaller and, 
more specifically, will be equal to 0.9253 times the probability for those not affected 
individuals. As you can see, both ordered logit and proportional odds models suggest 
small but significant negative effects of the BDH cash transfers on the quality of floor 
material.   
Besides, the estimated ordered logit coefficient on the 2014-indicator is positive 
and statistically significant, as was the case when analysing the impact of this indicator on 
the welfare index and the educational attainment of the households. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is very large (i.e. 0.9146 log-odds units), suggesting that if an individual’s 
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 Notice that a log-odds of 0 responds to a probability of 0.5 and that as probabilities increase, the log-
odds also increase.  
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observation belongs to the post-treatment period, the probability (p) that his household is 
at a higher category of floor material is 0.7139. An alternative way to see it is through the 
proportional odds ratio, which shows that the probability for post-treatment observations 
of being in a higher floor material category are 2.4959 times the probability for pre-
treatment observations. These results clearly indicate that poor households improved their 
housing conditions over time, regardless of whether they were affected by the BDH cash 
transfers.      
Similarly, the effect of the treatment-group indicator is negative and statistically 
significant, as was also the case when analysing the impact of this indicator on the welfare 
index and the educational attainment of the households. Specifically, the estimated 
ordered log-odds coefficient (i.e. -0.1344 log-odds units) indicates that if the observation 
belongs to an individual among the treatment group, the probability that his household is 
at a higher category of floor material is 0.4664 probability units, which therefore is slightly 
lower than the probability for individuals in the control group (i.e. 0.5336 probability 
units). In terms of the proportional odds ratio, the odds of being in a higher floor material 
category for individuals in the treatment group are 0.8741 times the odds for individuals 
in control group. Although the magnitude of the ordered logit coefficient is small, these 
results confirm that there are intrinsic characteristics of the individuals in the treatment 
group that negatively affect their level of well-being through more than one of its 
components.  
The progressive inclusion of more control variables (all of them statistically 
significant) in columns (2), (3) and (4) hardly reduces the magnitude of the ordered log-
odds coefficients, but it does not alter their interpretation at all. For instance, in the full 
specification (column 4), the estimated ordered logit coefficient on the BDH indicator is 
-0.0493 log-odds units (i.e. about 0.02 less negative than in the first specification). 
However, in terms of probabilities, there are no significant changes. This coefficient still 
means that if an individual receives BDH transfers the probability that his household is at 
a higher category of floor material is of about 0.48 probability units. The same applies to 
the rest of the estimated ordered log-odds coefficients and proportional odds ratios.    
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In general, the diff-in-diff results on quality of floor material are very consistent 
with those estimated using the natural experimental method. More specifically, the 
statistical significance and the direction of the estimated coefficients are the same with 
both methods. Being the small but negative effect of the BDH programme the most 
important finding. Note that although the magnitude of the BDH ordered log-odds 
coefficient is considerably smaller in the diff-in-diff approach (-0.0493 log-odds units) 
than in the natural experiment (-0.1380 log-odds units) –suggesting that trends over time 
and group specific characteristics should be taken into account–, the interpretation of these 
coefficients in terms of probability shows that there is not a significant difference between 
both results. In fact, the probability (of being in a higher floor material category for BDH-
affected individuals) that corresponds to each of the ordered log-odds coefficients is 48 
and 46 percent respectively.  
 
6.4.3 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
on Human Capital of the First-born Children 
In light of the previous results, it is still possible that the BDH beneficiary households are 
complying with the programme’s attached conditions related to the education of the 
children, although this is not yet reflected in the average educational achievement of the 
households. In order to test this hypothesis, using this time a quasi-experimental method, 
I estimate difference-in-differences regressions of the impact of the BDH cash transfers 
on school enrolment and school attendance of the first-born children.  
The obtained results are summarized in Table 24. All the specifications in the table 
control for individual's province of residence, marriage status and ethnicity fixed-effects. 
Moreover, household’s average educational attainment, quality of the floor material, 
unemployment status and age are progressively included in the specifications as other 
explanatory variables. As explained in the natural experimental approach (see page 219), 
I first constructed indicators (i.e. dummy variables) of school enrolment and school 
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attendance for the first-born children. Due to the binary discrete nature of these dependent 
variables, I use probit regression models for the analysis. Recall that these models 
calculate the predicted probability of being enrolled and attending school on the basis of 
the regressors used. They do so using the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the 
standard normal.  
The first half of Table 24 presents the probit diff-in-diff regression results for the 
effects on the likelihood that the first-born children are enrolled in school. In column (1), 
the BDH coefficient is statistically insignificant, suggesting that having been exposed to 
the conditional cash transfers does not affect the predicted probability of school enrolment 
of the first-born. Thus, in spite of the conditionalities to which the beneficiaries of the 
programme are tied, it is equally probable that both they and the non-beneficiaries are 
enrolling their children in school (at least their oldest child). The actual value of this 
probability will of course depend on the initial values of other predictors that are 
statistically significant. 
In the same column, the estimated coefficient on the 2014-indicator is positive and 
significant (i.e. 0.0751), indicating that if an individual’s observation belongs to the post-
treatment period, then the expected probability of his first-born being enrolled in school 
slightly increases. In other words, it is a bit more likely for the first-born of a given 
individual to be enrolled in school during the post-treatment period. However, recall that 
the interpretation of the coefficients in probit regressions is not as straightforward as in 
linear regression models. Using the CDF of the standard normal and holding the values of 
all the other predictors constant at zero, the predicted probabilities of the first-born 
enrolling in school for observations in the pre- and post-treatment periods are as follows:   
OPQRSRTUTVW = X(YQZ[VSZV + 	2014	YQ]^.∗ 2014	TZ_TYSVQP) 
X(0.4426 + 	0.0751) = 0.6976		(AQ[V– VP]SVa]ZV	A]PTQ_) 
X(0.4426) = 0.6709	(AP]– VP]SVa]ZV	A]PTQ_) 
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where F is the CDF of the standard normal. According to these results, first-born children 
in the post-treatment period are about 2 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in 
school, holding everything else constant. Therefore, the trend over time is for households 
in a situation of poverty to somewhat improve their behaviour towards their children's 
human capital, regardless of the BDH cash transfers.83 
  On the other hand, the impact of the treatment group indicator is negative and 
statistically significant. Although the magnitude of the effect is small, the estimated 
coefficient (-0.0350) suggests that if the observation belongs to an individual in the 
treatment group, then the expected probability of his first-born enrolling in school is 
slightly lower than the probability for individuals in the control group. In particular, if we 
hold all the other regressors constant at zero, then the predicted probability of the first-
born enrolling in school will be of about 65.82 percent	[F(0.4076)] for individuals in the 
treatment group and 67.09 percent	[F(0.4426)] for individuals in the control group. Thus, 
the negative effect of the treatment group indicator on the probability of school enrolment 
is of 2 percentage points. Of course, this impact is independent of whether individuals 
receive BDH cash transfers, and reflects the presence of intrinsic characteristics in the 
treatment group that negatively affect the likelihood of school enrolment. 
This last statement is confirmed in the second column when household’s average 
educational attainment is included as an explanatory variable. The coefficient on the 
treatment group indicator becomes statistically insignificant indicating that all the 
negative effect was driven by lower levels of education in the treatment group. Once this 
unobserved characteristic (in the first specification) is controlled for (in the second 
specification), the impact of the treatment group indicator disappears. Something similar 
happens with the 2014-indicator, whose effect was positive and significant until the 
educational attainment of households is included. In the second specification, this effect 
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 However, the effect of the 2014-indicator becomes negative and significant once educational attainment 
is controlled in the next specification. Thus, all the positive effect was due to the evidently higher levels of 
education in the post-treatment period and the actual trend over time is for households to worsen their 
probability of enrolling the first-born in school.   
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becomes negative indicating that all the positive effect was driven by higher levels of 
education in the post-treatment period.  
The coefficients in the rest of the specifications remain practically unchanged. In 
fact, the BDH indicator coefficient is still negative but insignificant in column (2) and 
when more control variables are progressively included in the other specifications. 
Although, it is worth noting that in the last specification a very small effect of the BDH 
programme becomes marginally significant (at the 10 percent level), suggesting that, if 
anything, being exposed to the BDH cash transfers could very slightly reduce the predicted 
probability of the first-born being enrolled in school (i.e. about 0.5 percentage points).   
In the second half of Table 24, I present (probit) diff-in-diff estimates for the 
effects of the BDH programme and the other regressors on the probability that the first-
born children are attending school. The overall results are very similar to those in the first 
half of the table for a similar outcome variable. More specifically, the coefficients on the 
BDH indicator are again small, negative and statistically insignificant in most of the 
specifications, with the exception of the full regression (column 5) where the BDH 
indicator is just marginally significant. Thus, these results suggest that those first-born 
children affected by the BDH programme are not more or less likely to be attending school 
despite of the cash transfers. If anything, they are about 0.5 percentage points less likely 
to be attending school (holding all the other explanatory variables in columns 5 constant 
at zero) [X(−0.3402) − X(−0.3402 − 0.0171)].  
Moreover, the coefficients on the 2014-indicator are again negative and significant 
once educational attainment is included in column (2) and also in the following 
specifications, confirming that the trend over time is for households to worsen their 
behaviour related to investment in human capital of children, specifically, to reduce their 
probability of sending the eldest son to school in the post-treatment period. Finally, the 
coefficients on the treatment group indicator are again statistically insignificant from the 
second specification. The inclusion of educational attainment (column 2) cancels the 
initially estimated negative effect of the treatment group (column 1). Therefore, there are 
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no intrinsic characteristics of the treatment group (beyond education levels) that are 
affecting the likelihood of sending children to school.  
Like the regression results obtained in the previous natural experiment, the diff-
in-diff results show that the BDH has no impact on the probability of school enrolment 
and attendance of the first-born children. If anything, there is a very small negative effect 
on both outcome variables (i.e. around 0.5 percentage points), but this effect is only 
marginally statistically significant. Therefore, the results obtained by both methods are 
consistent with each other and they at least question the efficacy of conditionalities related 
to the education of the children. According to these results, and contrary to what might be 
expected, being a beneficiary of the BDH conditional cash transfers does not increase the 
probability of enrolling or sending the first-born children to school.84  
In the case of this CCT programme, these results could be explained by inefficient 
monitoring and control of conditionalities, but it is important to note that there is also the 
possibility that this type of social assistance programme is not the most appropriate to 
modify the behaviour of those in poverty (at least in the Ecuadorian case). A greater 
investment in the human capital of the children could, in fact, be one of the consequences 
of having reached an adequate level of well-being by families, instead of a necessary 
condition to reach that level of well-being. In any case, attaching conditions to payments 
does not seem to be the most effective way to help families to overcome poverty in the 




                                                             
84
 However, there is still a latent possibility that the effects of the BDH are reflected in the educational 
outcomes of the younger siblings. 
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6.4.4 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
on Unemployment 
The diff-in-diff regression results for the effects of the BDH cash transfers on the 
probability of unemployment are presented in Table 25. Key findings are that BDH cash 
transfers cause a statistically significant reduction in the probability of unemployment, 
although the magnitude of the effect is not considerable. All specifications include a set 
of control dummies (i.e. individual's province of residence, marriage status and ethnicity 
fixed-effects). More control variables are progressively included as in the previous natural 
experimental models. An artificially constructed unemployment indicator is used as the 
dependent variable (see page 222) and, given its discrete and dichotomous nature, probit 
regression models are employed in the analysis to estimate the predicted likelihood of 
being unemployed on the basis of the different regressors in each specification.       
In the most basic specification (column 1), the BDH coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant (although its magnitude is quite small), indicating that having been 
affected by the conditional cash transfers slightly decreases the predicted probability of 
being unemployed. Using the cumulative distribution function (F) and holding all the 
other explanatory variables constant at zero, the predicted probabilities of being 
unemployed –for those individuals affected and not affected by the BDH cash transfers– 
are calculated as follows: 
OPQRSRTUTVW = X(YQZ[VSZV + 	+,-	YQ]^.∗ +,-	TZ_TYSVQP) 
X(−2.6455 − 0.0721) = 0.0032		(S^^]YV]_	RW	Vℎ]	+,-) 
X(−2.6455) = 0.0040	(ZQV	S^^]YV]_	RW	Vℎ]	+,-) 
 
Therefore, according to these results, individuals affected by the BDH are 0.08 percentage 
points less likely to be unemployed.  
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Moreover, the coefficient on the 2014-indicator is positive and significant (i.e. 
0.1004). Thus, indicating that, holding everything else constant, in the post-treatment 
period individuals are about 0.14 percentage points more likely to be unemployed 
[X(−2.6455 + 0.1004) − X(−2.6455)]. On the other hand, the coefficient on the 
treatment group indicator is negative and significant (i.e. -0.3010), suggesting that 
individuals in the treatment group are 0.24 percentage points less likely to be unemployed  
[X(−2.6455) − X(−2.6455 − 0.3010)]. 
The estimated coefficients do not vary much when household’s average 
educational attainment is included in column 2. Specifically, the statistical significance 
and direction of the coefficients remain unchanged, while their magnitudes are a little 
smaller. However, once expressed in terms of probability the effects of the BDH, 2104-
indicator and treatment group indictor are almost the same. This is true also for the 
following specifications (columns 3 and 4) when household’s quality of floor material and 
age are included in the analysis.    
Once again, these results are consistent with those obtained through the natural 
experiment. The main difference is that the impact of the BDH programme is much 
smaller when taking into account the trends over time and, above all, the unobserved 
characteristics of the groups. In other words, the diff-in-diff estimates show that although 
conditional transfers reduce somewhat the probability of being unemployed, the effect is 
much smaller than estimated by the previous method. Therefore, an important part of the 
BDH effect is explained simply by the intrinsic differences between the treatment and 
control groups. 
In recent years there has been a broad debate about whether the benefits of social 
assistance increase the unemployment rate or not. These results show that, at least in the 
Ecuadorian case, the BDH programme of conditional transfers does not negatively affect 
the labour supply of the beneficiaries. This is contrary to the ideas present in academic 
and political spheres that indicate that welfare programmes are an important source of 
persistently high unemployment rates (Ghayad and Dickens, 2012). Therefore, these 
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results provide interesting evidence for the discussion, since they are special in the sense 
that determine the effects on the probability of unemployment of a CCT programme 
different from those that imply benefits only for unemployed (e.g. unemployment 
insurance extensions). In this way, it is shown that welfare payments do not always reduce 
employment among those who can claim such payments. On the contrary, it seems that 
BDH payments somewhat increase employment (i.e. reduce the probability of 
unemployment).  
 
6.4.5 Lessons from the Diff-in-Diff Results 
Overall, the diff-in-diff results confirm that the BDH has had a small but significant 
negative effect on welfare among those in poverty. Specifically, the impact is concentrated 
on some of its components, such as the level of instruction and floor material. In other 
cases, as in the probability of school attendance and school enrolment of the first-born 
child, no type of effect of the BDH is found. Finally, the impact of the BDH on 
unemployment appears to be slightly negative. More specifically, the results indicate that 
the BDH transfers somewhat reduce the likelihood that individuals will be without a stable 
job. Once again, the estimated results imply that the programme does not achieve almost 
any of the expected objectives previously described as part of the BDH's theories of 
change (see page 184). Therefore, it is quite probable that the resources, activities, 
mechanisms (e.g.. conditions) and channels of change are not being sufficient to reach 
high levels of efficiency or are not being implemented correctly. 
As in the natural experiment, these results are inconsistent with the paternalistic 
idea that cash transfer programmes are effective when they are accompanied by a set of 
specific requirements related to desirable behaviours among those in poverty (i.e. when 
they are linked to conditions associated to human capital accumulation). Therefore, my 
diff-in-diff findings are also not contributing evidence in support of CCTs as the ideal type 
of welfare programmes in developing countries as discussed earlier in Chapter 1. On the 
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other hand, these results seem consistent with the idea that poverty is caused by the very 
efforts to alleviate it (i.e. welfare dependency or welfare trap theory) and even with the 
notion that simply giving money to the poor -no conditions attached- may be a better 
option in terms of poverty reduction (i.e. rational choice theory). 
However, we must be cautious when interpreting the theoretical implications of 
these results, since the fact that a traditional cash transfer programme does not have the 
expected results in Ecuador does not necessarily mean that any type of social assistance 
could actually be useful in this country, nor does it imply that these findings can be applied 
to other cases or countries. For example, it could be happening that the estimated negative 
effects are more associated with the implicit conditionalities rather than the cash transfers 
themselves. If this is the case, other types of programmes, which rely on the rationality of 
individuals and on trusting their own capacity to invest appropriately the available 
monetary resources, could present better results for people living in poverty (i.e. rational 
choice theory). 
In fact, unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programmes have their own advocates 
in the academic circles and also a large amount of empirical evidence supporting them 
(see Chapter 1, page 37). Thus, this awakens the notion that cash transfers with no 
conditions attached may be a better option in terms of poverty reduction for the 
Ecuadorian context. This of course will be properly evaluated in an upcoming chapter on 
the effects of the CDH programme, which in an innovative way presents different 
characteristics to the traditional CCT programmes. 
One important advantage of this thesis is that it analyses the effects of a traditional 
cash transfer programme taking into account a large part of the population of individuals 
in poverty situation at two different points of time (i.e. 2008 and 2014). Hence, in this 
case, it can be somewhat difficult to determine the type of treatment effect that is actually 
identified through the difference-in-differences strategy. In fact, the diff-in-diff approach 
as used in this thesis would in theory allow the estimation of two different types of 
treatment effect: the average treatment effect in the population (ATE) and the average 
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treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It all depends on the characteristics of the sample 
and, more specifically, on how close we think the selected sample is to encompass a 
substantial portion (if not all) of the population. In order to better understand the difference 
between both types of average causal effects, as well as where exactly the effects estimated 
on this thesis lie, it is important to outline a short explanation of their concepts and main 
assumptions in the context of the present study. 
Excluding the realm of science fiction –where parallel universes are sometimes 
imagined to be observable– it is not possible to calculate individual-level causal effects, 
because no individual can be in two different states of participation at the same point in 
time. In other words, the fundamental evaluation problem can be resumed in that we do 
not observe both possible outcomes, ygh and	ygi, for anyone. Thus, it is impossible to 
construct person-specific impact estimates just by looking at observational data. If we 
could construct these impacts, then we would simply have to aggregate them up to obtain 
any parameter we would like. As a result, instead of constructing individual impacts, 
researchers have focused on average causal effects. 
In order to further clarify the idea behind an average causal effect, recall that we 
are interested in the effects of the BDH cash transfer programme on the general well-being 
of poor individuals. Let i index individuals or the number of units, i = 1,2,…N. The binary 
“treatment” indicator is	Dg, where Dg = 1 denotes “affected by the BDH”. For each 
population unit, there are two possible outcomes: ygh denotes the potential well-being of 
individual i if he was affected by the monetary transfers (the outcome with treatment) and 
	yg
i denotes the potential well-being of individual i if not (the outcome without treatment). 
As stated above, both cannot be observed at the same time. Thus, one of them will be 
“counterfactual”: an outcome that would have occurred if a different treatment had been 
given. While, on the other hand, the observed outcome for individual i is given by 
Wm = ,mWm
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We are interested specifically in	ygh − 	ygi, the difference of the well-being 
outcome with and without BDH treatment, an object which is clearly not possible to 
identify. However, there are some moments in its distribution (because this difference is 
a random variable) that we are interested in estimating, which can be identified under 
certain conditions. Some of the most widely studied moments in the treatment effects 
context are the average treatment effect (ATE), and the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). 
An average treatment effect (ATE) parameter is the expected partial effect for a 
binary explanatory variable on a randomly selected individual from the population 





In the context of this thesis, the ATE parameter responds, for example, to the 
question of what would be the mean impact of the BDH programme if this type of cash 
transfers were delivered to the entire population of people living in poverty. Therefore, 
the underlying assumption is that the estimated effect of the treatment is the same for all 
poor individuals in Ecuador. This is the case even when the actual effect of the social 
assistance programme for some individuals may actually be very different from the 
average effect in that population. Overall, it can be interpreted as a causal effect in the 
sense that it is the best predictor of the treatment impact without further information. 
The estimation of an ATE requires addressing the fundamental problem of causal 
inference in observational studies (i.e. missing data due to counterfactual outcomes). In 
order to overcome this issue in this thesis, I compared a group of individuals exposed to 
the treatment with a non-experimental comparison or control group that was not exposed 
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to it. However, because of the potential selection bias, another important assumption 
required to estimate an ATE is the presence of “ignorable treatment assignment” (which 
means that the treatment and control groups are randomly drawn from the population) 
conditional on the observed covariates	(Xg)85: 
(Wm
h, 	Wm
i) ⊥ ,m	|	sm 
 
Therefore, relating these concepts and assumptions to the intended estimations by 
this thesis, the ATE would be defined as the expected effect of participation in the BDH 
cash transfer programme for a randomly selected member of the entire population under 
study; while, on the other hand, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) would 
be the mean effect for a randomly drawn individual from those who actually received the 
cash transfers:  
o"" = %(Wm
h − 	Wm
i	t,m = 1) 
o"" = 	%(Wm
h	t	,m = 1) − %(Wm
i	|	,m = 1) 
 
Despite having similar interpretations, these types of treatment effects have 
fundamental conceptual differences. In contrast to the ATE, the ATT answers the question 
of how do the BDH cash transfers change the well-being of those poor individuals affected 
by this type of treatment, compared to what they themselves would have experienced if 
they had not participated in the social assistance programme. Note that the last expression 
highlights the counter-factual nature of a causal effect. The first term,	E(ygh	t	Dg = 1), is a 
potentially observable quantity; while on the other hand, the second term, E(ygi	|	Dg = 1), 
cannot be observed. However, we can again use a non-experimental control group and 
condition on a set of pre-treatment characteristics (observed covariates	Xg) such that:  
%(Wm
h − 	Wm
i	t,m = 1, sm) = %(Wm
h	t,m = 1, sm) − %(Wm
i	t,m = 0, sm) 
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 See Brand and Halaby (2003) pp.10. 
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Hence, the ATT can be consistently estimated under a much weaker assumption 
than the one of “ignorable treatment assignment” (i.e. random selection), which was 
necessary for the ATE. Namely, the ATT is obtained under the assumption that the 
outcome without treatment (Wmi) is independent of being affected by the BDH cash 
transfers (,m), conditional on the observed covariates: 
	Wm
i ⊥ ,m	|	sm 
 
This simple assumption allows the use of a control group that is selected in such a 
way that it resembles the treated subjects as much as possible, which implies that the 
selection is not necessarily random. Nevertheless, it is important to note that if the stronger 
conditional statement [(ygh, 	ygi) ⊥ Dg	|	Xg] is true, then the ATT should be equal to the 
ATE. Generally, the ATE and ATT differ and only in some special cases they coincide 
(Brand & Halaby, 2003).  
I strongly believe that the identification strategy employed in this thesis allows the 
estimation of the average treatment effect (ATE). This means that the estimated effects 
constitute the mean impacts of the BDH cash transfers for a randomly selected individual 
from the entire (or almost entire) target population, which is composed of working-age 
adults in poverty and without disabilities. In fact, it was stated from the beginning that 
poor households were randomly chosen to be part of the programme by BDH 
administrators. That is, the households that received the transfers at least once until 2014 
were not chosen in a systematic manner or based on observable characteristics, once they 
met the fundamental requirement of being in the first two quintiles of the poverty index 
(i.e. being considered poor). This was effectively verified by comparing the characteristics 
of the treatment and control groups in 2008 prior to the intervention (see page 191). 
Therefore, the presence of “ignorable treatment assignment” is sufficiently credible since 
there is evidence supporting that the groups were randomly drawn from the population.  
It is important to mention at this point that difference-in-differences estimates are 
usually considered to be average treatment effects on the treated (ATT), rather than 
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average treatment effects (Ryan et al., 2015). This is because diff-in-diff estimates are 
typically thought of as applying exclusively to a particular group that was treated or 
intervened (rather than to a population that could have been treated). However, in this 
case, the analysed sample encompass a significant portion of the target population, which 
is made up of only potential beneficiaries of the BDH programme and who, therefore, 
could have been treated.  
Moreover, beneficiaries were randomly selected since there is no other 
requirement than being poor to receive the BDH cash transfers. Finally, individuals in the 
control group were not selected to resemble the treated subjects at all. Actually, they were 
all included in the analysed sample as long as they meet the characteristics of the target 
population. Thus, there are sufficient grounds to claim that the treatment effects found in 
this thesis are, in fact, average treatment effects (ATE).  
The results obtained show that the current effectiveness of the BDH conditional 
transfer programme to improve welfare conditions and boost the investment in human 
capital of the poorest would be, at least, below its potential. Although one of the objectives 
of social assistance programmes in the short term is the reduction of poverty by income, 
in the long term these seek to improve the living conditions of people, mitigate social risks 
that affect human capital and reduce unemployment providing poor families with the 
necessary tools to be self-sufficient. 
In this sense, the effectiveness of the BDH would not be fulfilling its expected 
objectives since the estimated effects - in this case on the welfare index (and its main 
components), enrolment and school attendance, and unemployment levels - suggest that 
the families that receive cash transfers are not in a better situation than those households 
that do not receive these benefits (in fact, they could be worse off). These results could 
easily be associated with the lack of control and monitoring of conditionalities, but it is 
much more likely that this type of programme is not really the most adequate to achieve 
the desired objectives, since no control mechanism would be sufficient to ensure the 
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fulfilment of any condition if the beneficiaries are not convinced of their importance or if 
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Table 21: Diff-in-Diff Regression Estimates of the Effect of the BDH on the Welfare Index 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 OLS OLS  OLS OLS OLS 
Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment Group Indicator  -0.9700***                      
(0.0187) 
-0.6475***           
(0.0179) 
-0.4669***              
(0.0161) 
-0.4627***        
(0.0161) 
-0.4670***        
(0.0160) 










BDH Effect (Treatment Group Indicator * 











Household’s Educational Attainment 
--- 2.3956***         
(0.0053) 
1.9722***         
(0.0049) 
1.9704***        
(0.0049) 
2.1729***        
(0.0050) 
Household’s Floor Material 
--- ---  3.1586***                      
(0.0046) 
3.1584***        
(0.0046) 
3.1679***        
(0.0046) 
Unemployment Indicator 
--- --- --- 0.6509***          (0.0493) 
0.8041***          
(0.0490) 
Age 
--- --- --- --- 0.0777***          (0.0005) 
Constant  14.8845***                      
(0.0406) 
10.1988***                     
(0.0401) 
0.3796***                      
(0.0390) 
0.3824***                    
(0.0390) 
-2.5928***                     
(0.0433) 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies      
Reported Marriage Status Dummies      
Ethnicity Dummies      
Number of Observations 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 
R-squared 0.3493 0.4080 0.5185 0.5185 0.5241 
Note: Estimates are from linear regression models. All specifications include a constant.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
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Table 22: Household’s Educational Attainment Diff-in-Diff Regressions (BDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Average Educational Attainment 
Treatment Group Indicator  -0.2241***                     
(0.0039) 
0.7992***                     
(0.0031) 
-0.2108***                     
(0.0039) 
0.8098***                    
(0.0031) 
-0.2077***                     
(0.0039) 
0.8124***                   
(0.0031) 
-0.2064***                     
(0.0039) 
0.8134***                  
(0.0032) 
















BDH Effect  

















Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.2058***          (0.0011) 
1.2286***          
(0.0014) 
0.2057***          
(0.0011) 
1.2284***          
(0.0014) 
0.1962***          
(0.0011) 
1.2168***          
(0.0014) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.4486***                   (0.0121) 
1.5661***                   
(0.0189) 
0.3416***                   
(0.0121) 
1.4073***                   
(0.0171) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0472***                     (0.0001) 
 0.9538***                    
(0.0001) 
Number of Observations 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
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Table 23: Household’s Quality of Floor Material Diff-in-Diff Regressions (BDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Quality of Floor Material  
Treatment Group Indicator -0.1344***                     
(0.0039) 
0.8741***                     
(0.0034) 
-0.1044***                     
(0.0039) 
0.9008***                    
(0.0035) 
-0.1038***                     
(0.0039) 
0.9013***                   
(0.0035) 
-0.1042***                     
(0.0039) 
0.9010***                  
(0.0035) 
















BDH Effect  

















Household’s Educational Attainment --- --- 0.2353***          (0.0012) 
1.2653***          
(0.0015) 
0.2351***          
(0.0012) 
1.2650***          
(0.0015) 
0.2254***          
(0.0012) 
1.2529***          
(0.0016) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.0941***                   (0.0125) 
1.0987***                   
(0.0137) 
0.0867***                   
(0.0125) 
1.0906***                   
(0.0136) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0036***                     (0.0001) 
 0.9963***                    
(0.0001) 
Number of Observations 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
 
 
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 266 
Table 24: Diff-in-Diff Regression Estimates of the Effects of the BDH on School 
Enrolment and School Attendance of the First-born Child 












Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Enrolled in School Dummy 
Treatment Group Indicator  -0.0350***          
(0.0058) 
-0.0011            
(0.0060) 




0.0022            
(0.0060) 










BDH Effect  
(Treatment Group Indicator * 














--- 0.5639***          
(0.0030) 
0.5586***          
(0.0030) 
0.5586***          
(0.0030) 
0.5461***          
(0.0031) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0388***         
(0.0019) 
0.0388***          
(0.0019) 
0.0370***          
(0.0019) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- -0.0172          
(0.0212) 
-0.0286          
(0.0212) 
Age --- --- --- --- -0.010***          
(0.0002) 
Constant  0.4426***          
(0.0126) 
-0.7027***                        
(0.0145) 
-0.8225***          
(0.0157) 
-0.8225***                        
(0.0157) 
-0.343***                        
(0.0203) 
Number of Observations 430,931 430,931 430,931 430,931 430,931 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Attending School Dummy 
Treatment Group Indicator -0.0349***          
(0.0057) 
-0.0018            
(0.0059) 
















BDH Effect  
(Treatment Group Indicator * 













--- 0.5402***          
(0.0030) 
0.5344***          
(0.0030) 
0.5344***          
(0.0030) 
0.5221***          
(0.0030) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0420***         
(0.0019) 
0.0420***          
(0.0019) 
0.0402***          
(0.0019) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- -0.0117          
(0.0209) 
-0.0232          
(0.0209) 
Age --- --- --- --- -0.010***          
(0.0002) 
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Constant  0.4086***          
(0.0125) 
-0.6910***                        
(0.0143) 
-0.8209***          
(0.0154) 
-0.8209***          
(0.0154) 
-0.340***                        
(0.0200) 
Number of Observations 430,931 430,931 430,931 430,931 430,931 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
    
Marriage Status Dummies     
Ethnicity Dummies     
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01) 
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Table 25: Unemployment Diff-in-Diff Regressions (BDH) 










Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Being Unemployed 
Treatment Group Indicator -0.3010***         
(0.0092) 
-0.2942***            
(0.0092) 
-0.2934***          
(0.0092) 
-0.2852***         
(0.0093) 








BDH Effect  
(Treatment Group Indicator 











--- 0.0853***          
(0.0021) 
0.0840***          
(0.0021) 
0.0683***          
(0.0022) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0107***          
(0.0023) 
0.0097***          
(0.0023) 
Age --- --- --- -0.0078***          
(0.0002) 
Constant  -2.6455***          
(0.0195) 
-2.8203***          
(0.0201) 
-2.8557***          
(0.0215) 
-2.5750***                        
(0.0236) 
Number of Observations 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 1,989,708 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
   
Marriage Status Dummies    
Ethnicity Dummies    
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
















Crédito de Desarrollo Humano Impact 
Evaluation Design and Measurement Models  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The time has come to lay the foundations for the various impact evaluation methods to be 
used for the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano (CDH) programme. In the same way that it 
was done for the other programme, this chapter commences with a theory-based approach 
to the CDH evaluation that allows the description of the steps that lead to the long-term 
objectives of the programme, and the connections between these activities. The Theories 
of Change of the CDH programme are represented in a diagram, which is then used to 
design the evaluation. This is followed by an explanation of the sample selection process 
and a review of the pre-treatment characteristics of the sample groups (i.e. CDH treatment 
and control). Finally, the last part of the chapter specifies the measurement models for 
data analysis, including the identification strategies, the econometric techniques, and the 
specific regression models to be estimated as part of the CDH evaluation. 
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7.2 Theory of Change of the Crédito de Desarrollo 
Humano   
In order to guide the impact evaluation of the CDH cash transfer programme, it is 
necessary to build an outcomes framework, which is the final product of the Theory of 
Change (ToC) methodology and describes the different channels of change through which 
the desired results are expected to be obtained. Remember that, using the ToC 
methodology, it is possible to evaluate to what extent the intervention has the potential to 
contribute to achieving the desired results. All the information necessary for the 
development of the outcomes framework of the CDH programme comes from different 
official sources. Several public institutions such as the Instituto de Economia Popular y 
Solidaria (IEPS), the Ministerio Coordinador de Desarrollo Social (MCDS) and the 
Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social (MIES) have developed reports and bulletins 
to inform on the process of implementation of the programme, as well as its expected 
objectives, activities and the necessary pre-conditions for its successful operation (IEPS, 
2014, MIES, 2013b, MCDS, 2010). In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) prepared a technical note that explains, at least partially, how this programme works 
in Ecuador (Martinez et al., 2017). The CDH outcomes framework is presented in Figure 
18.  
First, it is necessary to identify the specific aims and objectives of the CDH 
programme and then project them backwards, going through the mechanisms and 
activities of the intervention, to finally identify all the necessary preconditions that it is 
assumed must be in place for the goals to be met. The objectives and expected results of 
the CDH programme were already discussed in Chapter 2 (see page 89). The main goal is 
to improve the quality of life among the poorest families in the country by providing 
access to non-reimbursable microcredits for them to invest in productive activities that 
promote their economic capacity (IEPS, 2014). These and other specific programme 
objectives are summarized in the outcomes framework. 
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The channels of change through which the theoretical objectives of the programme 
are expected to be achieved are basically changes in the availability of productive credit, 
personal values and attitudes (IEPS, 2013). For example, the value that families place on 
knowledge (i.e. human capital) is important for them to be willing to acquire the necessary 
information to make good investments with their money. Only if poor households improve 
their ability to recognize investment opportunities, they will be able to take full advantage 
of the accumulated cash transfers and change the way they do business. 
Therefore, apart from the productive credit itself, the most important mechanisms 
to promote these changes are: trust in the poor and the knowledge that should be 
transmitted to them. Trust is a highly valued moral good and an essential element of all 
types of economic transactions, without it no bank (or government) would be willing to 
provide considerable amounts of capital to invest in productive activities and little 
commercial activity would be possible (Fukuyama, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997; 
Boatright, 2011). In this case,  trust is essential to satisfy the credit needs of poor families 
that almost always lack collateral, certifiable credit history or material goods. It is 
precisely because of the usual lack of confidence in them by private banks that poor 
households are often forced to accept high interest rates from local credit cooperatives or 
even resort to unscrupulous usurers to raise capital to invest in their small businesses.86 In 
addition, the other key mechanism is the possession and exposure to knowledge, which is 
arguably an effective way to increase the likelihood of engaging in business start-up 
activity and minimize the risks of any productive investment (De Clercq & Arenius, 2006; 
West & Noel 2009). 
The main activities or initiatives theoretically promoted by the CDH programme 
–which are of course linked to the mechanisms of change– are among others: the provision 
of lump-sum unconditional cash transfers, the availability of technical assistance and 
expert advice for the beneficiaries, the requisition of a savings account for the deposit of 
                                                             
86 See Boatright (2011) for an interesting discussion on the role played by trust in banking and Fukuyama 
(1995) for an analysis of the importance of trust in the development of social capital. 
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the transfer, the promotion of micro-entrepreneurship as a desirable practice that bears 
fruit when it is done responsibly, the monitoring and control of the results obtained by the 
investment initiatives to offer solutions and new opportunities, and the generation of social 
networks to take advantage of economies of scale and reduce the presence of 
intermediaries (Martinez et al., 2017; MCDS, 2010). 
Finally, the ToC methodology allows the identification of the necessary 
preconditions for the CDH programme to achieve all its objectives. Some of these are the 
same as those previously identified for the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) 
programme, such as having efficient targeting, payment and monitoring mechanisms 
(MIES, 2013b). However, this programme requires other resources that are perhaps a little 
more difficult to satisfy for the administrators, such as the right amount of people qualified 
to provide technical advice. For this innovative initiative to be successful, experts should 
be capable of meet the demand for assistance from the beneficiaries. In addition, an 
efficient consulting service requires adequate infrastructure (e.g. buildings, materials, 
books, etc.), technology (e.g. internet, computers, etc.) and people. Last but not least, 
given that the transfers are deposited in savings accounts, it would be important to provide 
the beneficiaries of banks and ATMs that are close to their locations (MCDS, 2010). 
Similar to what was done in the previous chapter, once the effects of the CDH have 
been estimated using different econometric techniques, they will be compared with the 
desired results of the programme (that is, those expected to be obtained) to assess whether 
the ‘change dynamics’ are in fact functioning as smoothly and efficiently as the CDH 
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Figure 18: Outcomes Framework of the CDH Programme 
 
 
7.3 Evaluation Design 
Now, in order to make a correct assessment of the impacts of the CDH programme on 
poverty and well-being –once 6 years have passed since its implementation (from 2008 to 
2014)–, it is essential to identify the potential beneficiaries of the cash transfers. Then, it 
is important to define the specific treatment given to those individuals who, in this case, 
self-selected to participate in the initiative and the products arising from this type of 
treatment. Finally, it is required to determine the expected results and impacts of the 
programme. All this is represented through an evaluation design/scheme that summarizes 
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The potential beneficiaries of the CDH cash transfers are only those poor 
households (i.e. in the first two quintiles of the Welfare Index) who are already 
beneficiaries of the BDH programme, and who typically have no access to formal credit 
(mainly due to the absence of transaction history and proof of stable income for 
assessment by banks). Note that the lack of access to formal credit is not a requirement to 
participate in the programme, but a characteristic that is normally shown by the 
beneficiaries of both programmes. The treatment itself is that the person gets a lump-sum 
unconditional payment or not, so the product thereof is to participate in the CDH social 
assistance programme. The expected results, described here in a more detailed way, are 
closely related to the desired impacts of the programme: reduce poverty and extreme 
poverty, improve the quality of life, encourage productive investments, reduce 
unemployment, etc. 
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7.4 Sample Selection Process  
The process of selecting the sample used for the evaluation of the CDH programme starts 
once again from the panel-type database that was artificially constructed with the Registro 
Social 2008 and 2014. Recall that this database is made up of more than 3 million people 
with different socioeconomic characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the sample 
(so that it is homogeneous) considering only those households that are part of the target 
population of the intervention (i.e. families in a situation of poverty). In addition, 
individuals in the sample must meet the single eligibility condition of the CDH 
programme (i.e. to be already beneficiaries of the BDH cash transfers) and must not be 
part of other social groups considered vulnerable (i.e. elderly or with disabilities). 
Specifically, only individuals with all of the following characteristics are taken into 
account:  
ü Individuals in poverty situation according to the SELBEN Welfare Index.  
ü BDH beneficiaries reported in 2014 (including those who chose the CDH 
programme at some point and those who did not). 
ü Working-age adults (individuals who have at least 18 years old in 2008 and at most 
65 years old in 2014) 
ü Individuals without disabilities (neither in 2008 nor in 2014) 
 
By including in the sample only those who reported in 2014 having received (or 
continue receiving) BDH cash transfers, one can almost guarantee that the sample is made 
up of people living in poverty and, more importantly, that it is entirely composed of 
potential beneficiaries of the CDH programme. That is, individuals who at least had the 
possibility to self-select themselves for the accumulated cash transfers. Note that only by 
limiting the sample in such a way is it possible to estimate the specific effects of the CDH 
programme, since if we include in the sample –as the control group– those individuals 
who did not receive any type of cash transfer (i.e. the non-beneficiaries), the estimated 
impact would actually be that of the combination of both programmes.   
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Moreover, the elderly and people with disabilities should not be considered for 
this analysis, mainly because they are not necessarily in a situation of poverty. Even if 
they were, they also receive more cash transfers from other social assistance programmes, 
which are targeted on groups with a higher level of vulnerability (see Chapter 2, page 67). 
Consequently, it is not possible to isolate the effect of the BDH or CDH programmes on 
their level of well-being, which would complicate the interpretation of the results. In the 
end, this process leaves us with a total of 719,987 individual observations.  
The selected sample could be defined as the group of those working-age 
individuals without disabilities who, being in a situation of poverty, reported having 
participated of the BDH cash transfers. This sample is divided into those BDH 
beneficiaries who opted (at least once) for the CDH programme and those who did not. 
As a result, the treatment and control groups are defined as follows: 
• Treatment group: BDH beneficiaries who reported having participated at 
least once of CDH cumulative cash transfers until 2014. 
• Control group: Individuals who reported having participated only of the 
BDH programme until 2014. 
Table 26 shows the number of individuals in each sample group.  
 
Table 26: CDH Evaluation Sample Groups 
Groups Number of Individuals 
Control 385,371 
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7.5 Pre-treatment Characteristics of the Sample 
The identifying assumption of the natural experimental method is that the CDH treatment 
assignment can be considered as having been randomized. This assumption requires that 
the treatment status be independent of the potential outcomes Y (conditional on a set of 
covariates X). In a Randomized Control Trial (RCT), this assumption is trivially satisfied 
because everything will be independent of the assignment. However, in observational 
studies (like this one), it is important to check whether the selection of beneficiaries could 
be actually considered “as if” random.  
Given that in this case, individuals self-select themselves to receive the 
accumulated cash transfers, a priori it is difficult to assume that the randomization 
condition is satisfied. The most probable is that exogeneity of treatment assignment does 
not hold and causal inference using standard methods (like the natural experiment) is 
likely to exhibit bias. Thus, alternative forms of quantitative evaluation that can more 
credibly claim exogeneity of treatment (such as instrumental variables and diff-in-diff 
methods) become necessary to apply.   
In order to verify whether there is a balance between the treated and non-treated 
groups on pre-intervention characteristics, a base-line comparison should be performed. 
Table 27 presents descriptive statistics of the outcome variables (and covariates) by 
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Table 27: CDH Pre-intervention Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group  
 Control  CDH Treatment 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs.  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Welfare Index 22.035 8.170 385,371  22.031 7.355 334,616 
Educational 
Attainment 
2.433 1.041 385,371  2.585 1.004 334,616 
Floor Material 3.956 1.182 385,371  3.988 1.120 334,616 
School Enrolment 0.773 0.418 102,377  0.807 0.394 93,077 
School Attendance 0.768 0.421 102,377  0.802 0.398 93,077 
Unemployment 0.007 0.083 385,371  0.007 0.088 334,616 
 
In general, we can see from Table 27 that the sample groups were quite 
homogenous before the implementation of the CDH programme. All variables considered 
in this descriptive statistics analysis have similar mean values for treatment and control 
groups. This is evident especially in the Welfare Index, the quality of floor material and 
the likelihood of unemployment. The average probabilities of school enrolment and 
attendance are fairly similar in both groups, however there is a very small difference in 
favour of the CDH beneficiaries. Something similar is observed with the average 
educational attainment of households. In this case, the difference between the groups is 
somewhat greater, but not enough to consider that the CDH beneficiaries are much 
superior in this regard and, therefore, that their decision to opt for the accumulated 
transfers is explained only by their higher educational level.  
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Surely there must be other unobserved characteristics that explain the self-
selection decisions of the individuals and that also affect the outcome variables. However, 
at least in terms of these variables, the descriptive statistics indicate that the natural 
experimental method can be quite useful for estimating the effects of the CDH. Other 
quasi-experimental methods will be important to address potential endogeneity and 
omitted-variable problems, which may arise as a result of self-selection. The small pre-
intervention differences between the treatment and control groups can be better noted by 
plotting the means of the outcome variables (Figures 20 to 25).  
 
Figure 20: Mean of Welfare Index in 2008 
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Figure 22: Mean of Households’ Quality of Floor Material in 2008 
 
Figure 23: Mean Probability of School Enrolment in 2008 (First-born Child) 
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Figure 25: Mean Probability of Unemployment in 2008 
 
 
7.6 Measurement Models for Data Analysis 
Even when it is likely that the assignment of CDH cash transfers was not entirely random 
or as-if random due to self-selection of beneficiaries, one can still get useful estimates of 
the treatment effects by using a natural experimental design. The homogeneity of the 
sample groups prior to the intervention supports the idea that perhaps there are no 
important omitted factors that affect both the treatment assignment and the outcome 
variables (i.e. endogeneity). Besides, this will serve as a preliminary step to the 
implementation of more sophisticated quantitative methods that obtain more reliable 
estimates by addressing the potential endogeneity problems (i.e. instrumental variable and 
difference-in-differences methods). 
As was done for the evaluation of the BDH programme, I start by using a simple 
difference-of-means test and multivariate regression model analysis. These two 
econometric techniques are part of the natural experimental design proposed in this thesis 
as a first method of evaluation. Figure 26 illustrates graphically the natural experiment 
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7.6.1 Difference-of-means Test 
In this case, two independent groups of beneficiaries of the BDH programme were chosen 
and, therefore, it is expected that they have alike observable characteristics prior to the 
implementation of the CDH initiative (i.e. in 2008).87  Individuals who have been self-
selected to receive CDH cash transfers -at some point between 2009 and 2014- constitute 
the treatment group, and the others who have not received them are the control group. As 
it was done in the evaluation of the BDH, a set of dependent variables is chosen on which 
I want to know if the CDH treatment has had a statistically significant effect.  
If the two previously homogeneous groups of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
of the CDH programme have similar means in the dependent variables after the treatment 
(i.e. in 2014), this would mean that receiving accumulated cash transfers beyond BDH has 
not made any difference in their current poverty situations.  
As in every difference-of-means test, it is required to state a null hypothesis and 
an alternative hypothesis. Thus, the null hypothesis will be that there is no difference 
                                                             
87 This was already examined and probed in the previous section as part of the sample selection process.   
BDH beneficiaries 
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between the means of the CDH treatment group and the control group. Both hypotheses 
are formally expressed as follows: 
%&:	)# = )$	(,. .. /ℎ.1.	,2	34	56%	.77.8/) 
%::	)# ≠ )$	(,. .. /ℎ.	56%	ℎ<2	<3	.77.8/) 
 
Note that µ represents the means of the dependent variable for the treatment and 
control groups and that this two-sample t-test will use a significance level equal to 0.05.  
 
7.6.2 Multivariate Regression Model 
In order to obtain the effects of the CDH programme on different outcome variables (Y), 
I estimate several versions of the following standard regression model via ordinary least 
squares (OLS), probit or logit regressions:   
=> = ? + A56%> + B!> + C>	,                    (7) 
 
Where = is any of the outcomes under study, and A is the parameter of interest, which 
captures the causal effects of the CDH cash transfers. The CDH indicator is constructed 
using a dummy variable that equals 1 for those BDH beneficiaries self-selected to be part 
of the CDH, and 0 otherwise. ! is a vector of individual- and household-level 
characteristics, and C is the error term.  
So far, I have proposed two different statistical methods as part of a natural 
experiment to determine whether there are significant differences between the means of 
the outcome variables for the CDH treatment and control groups. It was possible to exploit 
a natural experimental design given the characteristics presented by the CDH cash transfer 
programme and, also due to the availability of information, which includes pre- and post-
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treatment data. However, the limitations of this methodology must be also considered, 
since two of the most important assumptions for the validity of this method are that 
treatment assignment is "as-if" random and that the outcome variables follow a normal 
distribution.  
Particularly, when studying the effects of the CDH programme, there is a latent 
concern for a potential self-selection bias, arising from the fact that poor families are the 
ones who ultimately decide to switch programmes. The most certain is that this switching 
decision is based on individuals’ own motivations and interests. If this were the case, CDH 
treatment assignment would not be entirely random, and therefore, the exogeneity 
condition would not be satisfied (i.e. endogeneity problems). As explained in the 
methodology chapter (see page 129), self-selection based endogeneity makes 
determination of causality more difficult, especially in research about the effects of 
programmes and policies (like the CDH cash transfers) on socio-economic outcomes.    
Therefore, the results obtained in the natural experiment would be more reliable if 
we could control for all the factors that lead to self-selection among individuals. However, 
despite the number of controls included in my analysis, it is unlikely to take fully into 
account all the important characteristics influencing the selection process -mainly because 
some of the variables involved in such process are unobserved. Since I do not have 
information on key unobserved variables -such as the motivation of people when deciding 
whether to participate in the CDH programme and the skills required to implement a 
microenterprise- it is advantageous to implement alternative estimation methods (i.e. 
quasi-experimental designs), which are not based on a random selection of beneficiaries 
and can solve the self-selection problem applying statistical controls. 
 
7.6.3 Instrumental Variable Method 
One of the most common quasi-experimental designs is the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation. This method is generally used to estimate causal effects in contexts in which 
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controlled experiments are not available and to address typical endogeneity problems in 
empirical quantitative analysis (Imbens & Angrist, 1994). However, if I want to correctly 
assess the causal relationship of an endogenous predictor (like CDH treatment) on any 
outcome under study, I need to find first a variable that fully satisfies the instrumental 
variable conditions of relevance and exogeneity (see page 134). In this thesis, I intend to 
use “previous credit experience” as a valid instrument of CDH treatment status. This 
variable is an indicator equal to 1 if, in the twelve months previous to the 2008 interview, 
any member of the household received cash loans or commercial credit, and 0 otherwise.   
Specifically, I estimate different versions of the following two-stage regression 
model:  
 => = D#E> + D$56%> + CF>	,                        (8) 
56%> = G#E> + G$5HI6JK> + CL>	,             (9) 
 
Where = is any of the outcome variables under study; CDH is a binary variable 
representing the treatment status (i.e. a dummy variable that equals 1 for poor households 
who took the decision to switch to the CDH programme); CREDIT is the instrumental 
variable of previous credit experience; E is a vector of individual- and household-level 
characteristics; D′2 and G′2 are parameters to be estimated; and CF> and CL> are random 
errors that are uncorrelated with each other and with their respective independent 
variables. 
First, I estimate the second equation as a probit regression model (because the 
dependent variable is dichotomous) and, using the estimated equation, I calculate expected 
values for CDH:   
I(56%>|E>, 5HI6JK>) = 56%P
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Then, in a second stage of the estimation, I replace 56% with 56%Q  in the first 
equation and estimate the parameters of interest by a method suited to the measurement 
of Y according to the type of dependent variable (for example, ordinary least squares if the 
dependent variable is continuous, ordered logistic if it is an ordinal discrete variable, 
probit if it is a binary, etc.).  
 
7.6.4 Difference-in-Difference 
The other quasi-experimental design that I use is the difference-in-difference method. 
Since I have information at two different periods of time, both for the CDH treatment and 
control groups, it is possible to isolate the externalities correcting for potential self-
selection bias and endogeneity problems (associated with the CDH programme 
implementation). Thus, this method allows a more precise calculation of the effects of the 
CDH treatment among BDH beneficiaries.    
As explained above (see Chapter 5, page 183), to use this method it is necessary 
to convert the panel type database from a wide format to a long format and create 
indicators of observation year (2008 and 2014) and group (treatment and control). In this 
case, the control group is made up of those beneficiaries of the BDH programme who have 
not received CDH cash transfers, while the treatment group are those who decided to 
switch programmes at some point. Formally, we would have a CDH treatment (S = 1) 
and a comparison (S = 0) group for both the before (/ = 0) and after (/ = 1) periods. 




= D& + D#KJXIV + D$56%










W is the level of the outcome variable of a given individual , in group S at 
time	/. 56%W  is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1, if the observed person 
belongs to the treatment group, and takes value equal to 0, if the person is in the control 
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group. KJXIV is another dummy variable, which takes a value equal to 1 in the post-
treatment period; and 0 otherwise. The diff-in-diff estimator is Y, the coefficient of the 
interaction between 56%W  and KJXIV. Note that this interaction term is also a dummy 
variable, which takes a value equal to 1, only for the CDH treatment group in the post-
treatment period. Lastly, !
>V
W  is a set of control variables and C
>V
W  is the error term.  
Note that the sample used for the evaluation by this method is made up of the same 
individuals as by the previous methods, but with twice as many observations as we are 
going to compare them at two different time points. Now that the theory-based approach 
to the CDH evaluation has been carried out, the sample selection process has been 
explained and the different measurement models have been presented, it is time to describe 










































In this chapter, the results about the outcome effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano 
(CDH) on well-being, human capital and unemployment are discussed using different 
impact evaluation methodologies. The chapter begins by analysing the post-treatment 
characteristics of the sample. This is followed by the results of the natural experimental 
method, which are obtained by two different econometric techniques. Finally, the results 
obtained by the diff-in-diff and IV methods are presented and discussed as two different 
possibilities to address the potential self-selection problems. 
The results presented below will serve to better understand whether it is effective 
to set aside conditionality and trust those in poverty with lump-sum cash transfers. 
Empirical evidence can contribute to an understanding of whether the CDH cash transfers 
are as or more efficient than traditional conditional cash transfers (CCTs). In addition, 
these results could make a significant contribution to the future design of social assistance 
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programmes, the development of more precise targeting methodologies, and the 
understanding –on the part of programme administrators– of the importance of a 
systematic collection of longitudinal data to facilitate the quasi-experimental evaluation 
of the programmes. 
 
8.2 Post-treatment Characteristics of the Sample 
The end-line descriptive statistics by sample group are presented in Table 28. This 
information is useful to have an idea if there were changes in the outcome variables after 
6 years of the baseline and, above all, if there are differences between the treatment and 
control groups in the period after the intervention. When comparing the pre- and post-
treatment characteristics of the sample, it is clear that poor people presented a considerable 
improvement in their level of well-being and in most of the outcome variables. For 
instance, the mean of the whole sample’s welfare index goes from 22.033 points in 2008 
to 32.052 points in 2014. This means that, after 6 years, the level of well-being of the 
individual sample members increased by approximately 45 percent. 
 
Table 28: Post-intervention Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group  
 Control  CDH Treatment 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs.  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Welfare Index 31.284 11.128 385,371  32.821 10.595 334,616 
Educational 
Attainment 
2.501 1.216 385,371  2.693 1.182 334,616 
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Floor Material 4.443 1.254 385,371  4.556 1.180 334,616 
School Enrolment 0.790 0.406 52,947  0.808 0.393 49,041 
School Attendance 0.765 0.423 52,947  0.784 0.411 49,041 
Unemployment 0.007 0.085 385,371  0.008 0.091 334,616 
 
The results also show improvements over time in the households’ educational 
attainment, the quality of the floor material and the first-born’s probability of school 
enrolment. On the other hand, the probabilities of school assistance and unemployment 
appear to be slightly lower and higher respectively in the post-treatment period. These 
descriptive statistics are important for the quantitative analysis because they give us a 
general idea of trends and basic features of the data. They provide simple summaries about 
the sample and the outcome measures; however, they do not determine the factors that 
have influenced the change over time in the outcome variables. Therefore, in order to 
know if the CDH programme has had any effect on the level of welfare of the families, it 
will be necessary to use more advanced econometric techniques. 
Moreover, it is also evident from Table 28 that in 2014, after the treatment group 
received the CDH transfers (at least once), the sample groups were no longer practically 
homogeneous because some significant differences are visible in the means of the 
outcome variables. In this case, the end-line descriptive statistics indicate that the 
treatment group is in a better welfare situation in relation to the control group. For 
example, the mean of the welfare index in the control group is 31.28 points, while the 
CDH beneficiaries present a mean welfare of 32.82 points. Therefore, without considering 
that beneficiaries self-select themselves to participate in the programme (i.e. assuming 
that the allocation of transfers would be random) and not taking into account possible 
omitted variables, these results at least suggest that the CDH had a positive effect on the 
level of well-being of those in poverty. Anyway, only through regression analysis can we 
be sure of the magnitude and statistical significance of the association between the CDH 
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programme and well-being, since only in this way the possible problems of endogeneity 
are addressed. 
It is finally worth noting that in this case the control group is in a very slightly 
better position only in terms of the probability of unemployment. More specifically, the 
probability of being unemployed in the post-treatment period is 0.1 percentage points 
lower in the control group. This was not the case in the period before the CDH treatment 
implementation, when the two groups presented the exact same levels of unemployment. 
Nevertheless, it is not possible, at least for the moment, to attribute this small difference 
to the effect of the CDH transfers on labour supply. Once again, this will be statistically 
determined by the different quantitative evaluation methods presented below. 
 
8.3 Natural Experimental Results 
The natural experimental design starts with difference-of-means tests (two-sample t tests 
with equal variances) in order to confirm that after the intervention there are significant 
differences in the means of the outcome variables between both sample groups. The results 
obtained from a series of t-tests are summarized below:  
 
Table 29: Difference-of-Means Tests (Control Group vs. CDH Treatment Group) 
 Group  
 Control  Treatment (CDH)  t-test for Equality of Means 
 Mean SD n  Mean SD n 







Welfare Index 31.284 11.128 385,371  32.821 10.595 334,616 
 -1.58,        
-1.48 
-59.78 719,985 0.00 
Educational 
Attainment 
2.501 1.216 385,371  2.693 1.182 334,616 
 -0.19,        
-0.18 
-67.57 719,985 0.00 
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Floor Material 4.443 1.254 385,371  4.556 1.180 334,616 
 -0.11,       
-0.10 
-39.1 719,985 0.00 
School 
Enrolment 
0.790 0.406 52,947  0.808 0.393 49,041  -0.02,       
-0.01 
-7.00 101,986 0.00 
School 
Attendance 
0.765 0.423 52,947  0.784 0.411 49,041  -0.02,       
-0.01 
-7.27 101,986 0.00 
Unemployment 0.007 0.085 385,371  0.008 0.091 334,616  -0.001,     
-0.0007 
-5.41 719,985 0.00 
* p-value < 0.05. Ho: diff = 0.  
 
In all cases, the null hypothesis of equality of means can be rejected because, at a 
confidence level of 95 percent, the p-values of the t-tests are 0.00 (which does not surpass 
the significance level of 0.05). Thus, these results confirm that there are statistically 
significant mean differences between the control group and CDH treatment group in all 
the outcome variables. More specifically, they suggest that opting for CDH cash transfers 
has positive effects on the level of well-being, educational attainment, quality of floor 
material, school enrolment and school attendance. In fact, the only negative effects of this 
type of cash transfers seem to be on the probability of unemployment, although the 
magnitude of the impact (if any) should be very small. 
In terms of the welfare index, CDH beneficiaries present a higher mean than those 
in the control group. According to the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimated 
mean difference, the CDH treatment increases individuals’ scores by a maximum of 1.58 
points. Therefore, this programme considerably improves the well-being situation of those 
in poverty, since an increase of almost two points of the SELBEN Welfare Index is not 
easy to achieve in such a short time,  much less with a change that at least operationally 
is simple. In this case, it is basically achieved by delivering cash transfers in a different 
way (i.e. accumulated) and without conditions, contrary to what the paternalistic vision of 
poverty indicates.  
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Moreover, the results also indicate that switching programmes for at least one year 
increases the probability of school enrolment and attendance of the first-born in around 2 
percentage points. This is despite the fact that there is no way to condition the delivery of 
transfers to beneficiaries sending their children to school. On the other hand, the CDH 
programme seems to increase the probability of unemployment in 0.1 percentage points. 
Overall, the t-tests confirm that people who received CDH cash transfers (one or more 
times) are in a better situation than those who chose to stay with the traditional programme 
for the whole time period. However, there may be omitted variables problems, thus, in 
order to determine the causal effects of the CDH, it is necessary to employ different 
regression models (i.e. OLS, probit and ordered logistic) as econometric methods. The 
estimations of regression analysis (assuming random selection of CDH beneficiaries) are 
presented below. 
 
8.3.1 The Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano on the 
Welfare Index 
The OLS regression estimates of the impact of the CDH cash transfers on the SELBEN 
Welfare Index are presented in Table 30. All the regressions in the table control for 
province of residence, marriage status, and self-defined ethnicity fixed-effects. In the first 
and most basic specification, with the mere inclusion of control dummies, there are 
sizeable positive effects of the CDH on the level of well-being. More specifically, the 
decision to switch to the CDH programme to receive the transfers accumulatively 
increases the beneficiaries' welfare index by about 1.5 points and the estimate is highly 
statistically significant.  
The magnitude of the CDH coefficient is reduced when the household’s average 
educational attainment is included as a regressor in column (2). Thus, part of the CDH 
effect was driven by higher education levels of those who opted for the new programme, 
which may also be due to the accumulated transfers. Note that the effects of the CDH 
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programme on the level of welfare can be direct, but also indirect through some of its 
components. These indirect effects will be further analysed in the next section of this 
chapter. 
Something similar happens in column (3), when household’s quality of floor 
material is included in the analysis. The CDH coefficient is still positive and significant, 
but it is once again reduced in magnitude. Apparently, another part of the effect of the 
CDH on welfare may be due to the direct effect of the alternative cash transfers on the 
household’s floor material (a proxy of income level), which is also a component of the 
Welfare Index. This will also be confirmed in the next section.   
The estimated coefficients and their statistical significance remain practically 
unchanged when the unemployment indicator is included in column (4), while their 
magnitudes somewhat increase when the age of individuals is included in the last 
specification (column 5). The latter seems to indicate that a small part of the effects of the 
CDH on the level of welfare were being offset by the age of individuals. Furthermore, 
given that the inclusion of the unemployment indicator does not alter the CDH coefficient, 
it seems that changing the programme does not affect (or only slightly affects) the 
probability of being unemployed. This will also be discussed in depth in Section 8.3.4. 
Overall, the obtained results indicate that the CDH programme has a positive and 
significant effect on the level of well-being among the poor. As different control variables 
(including two components of well-being) are added to regressions, the magnitude of the 
CDH coefficient is gradually reduced until it stabilizes at 1.1 points. Moreover, and as in 
the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) impact evaluation, the independent effects of 
household’s educational attainment, quality of floor material, unemployment and 
individual’s age (a labour experience proxy) on welfare are positive and significant.  
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8.3.2 The Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano on Two 
Different Welfare Components 
In order to determine if the CDH cash transfers also affect the level of well-being 
indirectly through some of its components, I estimate the independent effects of this 
programme on the educational attainment of the households and the quality of the floor 
material. As previously explained, both dependent variables are ordinal categorical that 
take on three or more values and, therefore, their analysis requires ordered logistic 
regression models. These models predict the probability of an individual appearing in each 
successively higher category of the outcome variable. 
The results summarized in Table 31 indicate that the effect of the CDH programme 
on the households’ educational attainment is positive and statistically significant. In the 
first specification (column 1), which includes only few control dummies, the ordered log-
odds (logit) coefficient on the CDH indicator is 0.2631. Recall that this estimate results 
from the comparison between those affected by the CDH and those not affected in terms 
of expected educational attainment. Thus, the ordered log-odds for CDH-affected 
individuals of being in a higher education category are 0.2631 more than for individuals 
not affected, when the other variables are held constant. This is perhaps easier to 
understand when expressed in terms of simple probability (see Appendix D), according to 
which, if an individual receives CDH transfers, the probability (p) that his household is at 
a higher category of education is 0.5654. While, on the other hand, if an individual only 
receives the BDH transfers, the probability (p) that his household is at a higher category 
of education is 0.4346 [p (BDH) = (1-p (CDH)].  
In terms of proportional odds ratios (second half of column 1), the interpretation 
of the CDH coefficient would be that for individuals affected by this programme the odds 
of being in a higher education category are 1.3010 times the odds for those not-affected 
individuals, given that the other variables are held constant in the model. Thus, the chances 
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of being more educated are greater for people who receive CDH cash transfers. This 







The impact of the CDH programme is still positive and significant when more 
control variables are progressively included in the regressions (column 2 to 4). In fact, the 
ordered log-odds estimate and the proportional odds ratio remain practically unchanged 
when floor material –another component of well-being– is controlled in column (2) and 
when the unemployment indicator is included in column 3. These results suggest that the 
CDH effects on educational attainment are direct and not through the proxy of income 
level. Moreover, the estimated impact of the CDH programme is not driven by possible 
differences in the probability of unemployment between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries of the cash transfers.  
Similarly, the results reported in Table 32 show a significant positive effect of the 
CDH programme on the household’s quality of floor material. In the most basic 
specification, the estimated ordered logit coefficient on the CDH indicator is of 0.1977 
log-odds units. Therefore, if an individual receives CDH cash transfers, the probability (p) 
that his household is at a higher floor material category is 0.5493. Evidently, this 
probability is greater than that of individuals who receive only BDH transfers (i.e. 0.4507). 
By relating these two probabilities, the proportional odds ratio coefficient is calculated. 
One knows that the effect of the CDH is positive since this coefficient is greater than 1. 
The specific interpretation is that the probability of being in a higher category of floor 
material for a person affected by the CDH is 1.2185 times the probability for an unaffected 
person, given that the other variables remain constant in the model. 
The estimated coefficients are somewhat reduced, but not significantly, when more 
control variables are added. By including educational attainment as a regressor, the most 
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considerable reduction of the CDH coefficient occurs (i.e. 0.1586 log-odds units). 
Apparently, a small part of the effect on the proxy of the income level occurs through 
educational attainment. These results are consistent with those previously calculated and, 
in addition, with the notion that higher levels of education lead to better levels of income 
and well-being. On the other hand, the effect of the CDH remains almost constant when 
the unemployment indicator and the age of the individuals are included, indicating that 
the results are not driven by differences in the probability of unemployment and labour 
experience.      
Overall, the results presented in Tables 31 and 32 show that the CDH programme 
effects on welfare are not only direct, but also indirect. Its impact on the level of welfare 
occurs through its main components, improving the educational achievement and quality 
of life of poor families. One possible explanation for these findings is that CDH recipients 
have more incentives to study and improve their skills. It seems quite likely that those in 
poverty are aware that in order to get the most out of their productive investments, it might 
be essential to acquire knowledge through formal education. 
 
8.3.3 The Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano on 
Human Capital of the First-born Children 
Apart from the positive effects of the CDH programme on the general welfare of poor 
families, it is possible that –unlike the BDH and in spite of the absence of conditionalities– 
cumulative cash transfers do have an impact on the investment decisions in the human 
capital of the children. Given that according to the results estimated above, there is an 
impact on the average educational attainment of the households, it remains to be known 
which family members are those who decided to improve their educational level as a result 
of the money available for productive investments.  
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Specifically, in this thesis I focus on the effects on school enrolment and school 
attendance of first-born children, who, as explained in Chapter 4, are the most exposed to 
drop-out from school in order to work with their parents (see pages 178 and 179 for a 
detailed justification). One might think that the greater availability of monetary resources 
should encourage parents to send their children to school, but it is also likely that if they 
decide to invest a considerable amount of money (and time) in their business, they would 
need the help of other family members to reduce the inherent risks and increase the 
chances of success. That is why it is necessary to determine with certainty if the CDH 
programme affects this decision in any way. 
Table 33 presents the CDH effects on the probabilities that the first-born children 
are enrolled in school (first half) and attending school (second half). Recall that due to the 
binary nature of the outcome variables (i.e. dichotomous variables), I use probit regression 
models in the analysis, which predict the likelihood of an event to occur on the basis of 
the included regressors. They do so by using the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal. Note that for this analysis, a smaller sample is employed, since not all 
beneficiary families have children.  
In column (1), the outcome variables are regressed only on the CDH indicator and 
the set of basic control dummies. This probit regression results show significant positive 
effects of the programme on first-born children school enrolment and attendance. 
Actually, both estimated CDH coefficients are very similar in magnitude and they suggest 
that those first-born affected by the CDH programme are about 2 percentage points more 
likely to be enrolled and attending school (holding all other explanatory variables constant 
at zero). More specifically, the predicted probabilities are the following:  
w14x<x,y,/z	47	.314yy{.3/ = |(8432/<3/ + 	56%	84.7.∗ 56%	,3},8</41) 
|(0.4702 + 0.0430) = 0.6960		(<77.8/.}	xz	/ℎ.	56%) 
|(0.4702) = 0.6808	(34/	<77.8/.}	xz	/ℎ.	56%) 
 
w14x<x,y,/z	47	<//.3}<8. = |(8432/<3/ + 	56%	84.7.∗ 56%	,3},8</41) 
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|(0.3644 + 0.0405) = 0.6572		(<77.8/.}	xz	/ℎ.	56%) 
|(0.3644) = 0.6422	(34/	<77.8/.}	xz	/ℎ.	56%) 
 
where F is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal.  
However, when more regressors are included progressively in the specifications 
(columns 2 to 5), the coefficients on the CDH indicator become statistically insignificant. 
These results indicate that all the positive effect on the probabilities of school enrolment 
and attendance was driven by differences in educational and income levels of parents, 
their employment status and age. Therefore, there are other factors that affect both 
positively and negatively the decision to send the first-born children to school, but not the 
CDH programme.  
So far, both cash transfer programmes evaluated in this thesis (the one with and 
the other without conditions) seem little or no effective in meeting the goal of promoting 
investment in children's human capital – at least with respect to the eldest child, since it is 
still possible that there are effects on the other children (i.e. younger siblings). In fact, this 
was precisely the answer they gave me as a possible explanation when I briefly comment 
on the results of this analysis to the Ministerio Coordinador de Desarrollo Social (MCDS) 
officials. Of course, it is understandable that they support this argument, since it is 
important for them to promote and maintain the idea that both social assistance 
programmes impact somehow the school attendance of the children. This is the easiest 
way to justify and legitimize their implementation before public opinion.  
 
8.3.4 The Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano on 
Unemployment 
In order to determine if the CDH programme has created employment disincentives, and 
if the absence of work-related conditionalities has affected the labour market engagement 
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of the beneficiary households, I estimate the effects of the CDH on the probability of 
unemployment. The probit regression results are presented in Table 34.  
In the first specification, the estimated CDH coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant (even at the 1 percent level). Although the magnitude of the effect is very small 
(i.e. less than one percentage point). Holding all control dummies constant at zero, the 
predicted probabilities of being unemployed –for those individuals affected and not 
affected by the CDH cash transfers– are calculated as follows: 
w14x<x,y,/z	47	É3.{jy4z{.3/ = |(8432/<3/ + 	56%	84.7.∗ 56%	,3},8</41) 
|(−3.1748 + 0.0524) = 0.0008		(<77.8/.}	xz	/ℎ.	56%) 
|(−3.1748) = 0.0007	(34/	<77.8/.}	xz	/ℎ.	56%) 
 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal. Therefore, 
according to these results, individuals affected by the CDH are only 0.01 percentage points 
more likely to be unemployed.  
The estimated positive impacts of the CDH are very similar and also little 
considerable –despite being statistically significant– when more control variables are 
added to the probit regression. In the second and third specifications, the coefficients on 
the CDH indicator show once again that those individuals affected by this type of cash 
transfers are about 0.01 percentage points more likely to be unemployed (holding 
educational attainment, floor material, and all other explanatory variables constant at 
zero). The effects are calculated by [|(−3.3831 + 0.0385) − |(−3.3831)] for column 
(2) and by [|(−3.451 + 0.0377) − |(−3.451)] for column (3).  
Finally, in the full specification (column 4), the positive effect of the CDH 
programme remains statistically significant and its magnitude is a little more considerable. 
Once the age of individuals is controlled, those affected by this programme are about 0.02 
percentage points more likely to be unemployed (holding all other explanatory variables 
constant at zero) [|(−2.899 + 0.0210) − |(−2.899)]. The slight increase in the 
magnitude of the effect may suggest that part of the CDH impact was being cancelled by 
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age differences among individuals in the treatment and control groups. Besides, the 
inclusion of age as a regressor guarantees that the positive impact of the CDH on 
unemployment is not being driven by the labour experience (approximated by age) of cash 
transfers-affected individuals. 
In general, the unemployment regression results indicate that the CDH 
unconditional cash transfers programme did not create strong disincentives to work among 
the beneficiaries. Although the programme slightly increases the probability of being 
unemployed, this increase is not significant. The evidence, in this case, does not show that 
the recipients of the accumulated transfer have reduced their intensity of job search or 
their willingness to accept a job. Therefore, these results contrast with the paternalistic 
and welfare trap approaches, according to which these programmes create perverse 
incentives not to work, and much more when there are no conditionalities. It seems that, 
at least in Ecuador, the conditions related to work are not necessary to indicate that the 
CDH programme is effective reducing poverty without affecting the labour participation 
of the beneficiaries.  
 
8.3.5 Lessons from the Natural Experimental Results 
Overall, the natural experimental results suggest that the CDH programme has had a 
positive effect, both directly and indirectly, on the level of welfare among the poor. The 
indirect effects occur through some of the most important components of well-being, such 
as the educational attainment of the household and the level of income, which are 
positively affected when the BDH beneficiaries opt instead for this alternative programme. 
In addition, no evidence was found that the CDH has a negative impact on the probability 
of school enrolment and school attendance of the first-born. On the other hand, a very 
small but statistically significant positive effect on the probability of unemployment was 
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estimated, indicating that receiving the cash transfers in a single lump sum payment could 
generate some disincentive to work.88 
These results imply that the efficiency levels presented by the CDH programme 
are, to a large extent, aligned with the theories of change described in the previous chapter 
(see page 270), that is, the observed results are similar to what is expected to be obtained 
of the programme or to what in theory it should offer. In terms of well-being, when 
comparing the estimated effects with the expected results, we can see that the programme 
improves the quality of life, reduces poverty and increases the economic capacity of the 
beneficiary households. On the other hand, in terms of the inter-temporal transmission of 
poverty, the non-conditional cash transfers are not enough to promote school enrolment 
and attendance of the first-born children. However, the CDH partially fulfils the objective 
of facilitating access to knowledge, since the average educational attainment of the 
households is affected in a substantial and positive way by the programme. Finally, in 
terms of significantly reducing unemployment and underemployment, it seems that the 
results of the CDH are scarce or even slightly counterproductive. It could be said that the 
programme does not meet the expected results in terms of unemployment, but it will be 
necessary to confirm this and the other findings through the subsequent use of more 
adequate quantitative methods. In general, it seems quite likely that both the type of 
intervention and the dynamics of the CDH programme are sufficient to achieve at least 
the majority of the desired results. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that perhaps 
some aspects of the intervention thoroughly described by the theories of change 
(resources/inputs, activities, mechanisms or channels of change) must be corrected or 
adjusted so that the CDH functions more efficiently in the near future. 
So far, the estimated results clearly indicate that the beneficiaries of the CDH 
programme have experienced much better outcomes in terms of welfare and poverty 
reduction than those who received the traditional cash transfers. Thus, the element of 
                                                             
88 The last finding will be discarded when the problems of endogeneity are solved using alternative quasi-
experimental methods. 
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conditionality in social assistance practices is once again challenged by the obtained 
results. While the BDH evaluations suggest that conditions alone do not guarantee the 
success of a programme, the natural experimental evaluation of the CDH shows that the 
expected results can be achieved even with (and perhaps due to) the absence of conditions. 
In other words, these findings are opposed to the widespread idea that conditionality is a 
necessary (and even sufficient) element for cash transfers to effectively reduce poverty 
and improve the quality of life of families. On the contrary, at least in the Ecuadorian case, 
higher levels of efficiency are achieved with an unconditional programme. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the validity of these results is threatened in 
some way by the possible presence of endogeneity problems. One of the features of the 
CDH programme is that poor families self-select themselves to receive the accumulated 
transfers, so the treatment group could have more things in common than just participating 
in this initiative. Actually, there might be other characteristics that explain their decision 
to opt for this programme. Thus, it is possible that these unobserved characteristics are 
those that actually have the positive effect on well-being. For that reason, it becomes 
imperative, as part of the evaluation of the CDH , to complement the analysis with 
alternative quasi-experimental methods that address the potential problems of omitted 
variables and reverse causality. In the following section, I present difference-in-
differences results using a sample composed of the same individuals, but at two different 
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Table 30: Regression Estimates of the Effect of the CDH on the Welfare Index 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 OLS OLS  OLS OLS OLS 
Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CDH Indicator  1.4548***                      
(0.0237) 
1.0576***           
(0.0227) 
0.7967***              
(0.0199) 
0.7967***        
(0.0199) 
1.0717***        
(0.0197) 
Household’s Educational Attainment 
--- 2.4883***         
(0.0095) 
1.9286***         
(0.0084) 
1.9285***        
(0.0084) 
2.2526***        
(0.0086) 
Household’s Floor Material 
--- ---  3.8819***                      
(0.0083) 
3.8819***        
(0.0083) 
3.9242***        
(0.0081) 
Unemployment Indicator 
--- --- --- 0.0306          (0.1112) 
0.4512***          
(0.1096) 
Age 
--- --- --- --- 0.1390***          (0.0009) 
Constant   21.6176***                      
(0.0785) 
17.2098***                      
(0.0770) 
3.1772***                      
(0.0738) 
3.1775***                    
(0.0738) 
-2.8563***                     
(0.0834) 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Reported Marriage Status Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ethnicity Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Number of Observations 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 
R-squared 0.1781 0.2486 0.4238 0.4238 0.4408 
Note: Estimates are from linear regression models. All specifications include a constant.  
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Table 31: Household’s Educational Attainment Regressions (CDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Average Educational Attainment 
CDH Indicator   0.2631***                     
(0.0044) 
1.3010***                     
(0.0057) 
0.2461***                     
(0.0044) 
1.2790***                    
(0.0056) 
0.2456***                     
(0.0044) 
1.2784***                   
(0.0056) 
0.1521***                     
(0.0044) 
1.1643***                  
(0.0052) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.2213***          (0.0018) 
1.2476***          
(0.0023) 
0.2210***          
(0.0018) 
1.2474***          
(0.0023) 
0.2019***          
(0.0018) 
1.2237***          
(0.0022) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.6519***                   (0.0253) 
1.9192***                   
(0.0486) 
0.4898***                   
(0.0254) 
1.6320***                   
(0.0416) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0469***                     (0.0002) 
0.9541***                    
(0.0002) 
Number of Observations 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
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Table 32: Household’s Quality of Floor Material Regressions (CDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Quality of Floor Material  
CDH Indicator  0.1977***                     
(0.0045) 
1.2185***                     
(0.0055) 
0.1586***                     
(0.0045) 
1.1719***                    
(0.0053) 
0.1585***                     
(0.0045) 
1.1718***                   
(0.0053) 
0.1445***                     
(0.0045) 
1.1555***                  
(0.0053) 
Household’s Educational Attainment --- --- 0.2466***          (0.0019) 
1.2797***          
(0.0025) 
0.2464***          
(0.0019) 
1.2794***          
(0.0025) 
0.2287***          
(0.0020) 
1.2570***          
(0.0025) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.0953***                   (0.0260) 
1.1***                   
(0.0286) 
0.0723***                   
(0.0260) 
1.0750***                   
(0.0279) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0073***                     (0.0002) 
0.9926***                    
(0.0002) 
Number of Observations 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
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Table 33: Regression Estimates of the Effects of the CDH on School Enrolment and 
School Attendance of the First-born Child 












Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Enrolled in School Dummy 
CDH Indicator  0.0430***          
(0.0091) 
-0.0030            
(0.0095) 
-0.0052          
(0.0095) 
-0.0051            
(0.0095) 




--- 0.4510***          
(0.0054) 
0.4460***          
(0.0055) 
0.4462***          
(0.0055) 




--- --- 0.0342***         
(0.0038) 
0.0342***          
(0.0038) 
0.0336***          
(0.0038) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- -0.1154*          
(0.0629) 
-0.1190*          
(0.0629) 
Age --- --- --- --- -0.002***          
(0.0006) 
Constant  0.4702***          
(0.0267) 
-0.5153***                        
(0.0300) 
-0.6361***          
(0.0330) 
-0.6369***                        
(0.0330) 
-0.535***                        
(0.0454) 
Number of Observations 101,586 101,586 101,586 101,586 101,586 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Attending School Dummy 
CDH Indicator  0.0405***          
(0.0089) 
-0.0021            
(0.0092) 
-0.0049          
(0.0092) 
-0.0048            
(0.0092) 




--- 0.4221***          
(0.0052) 
0.4159***          
(0.0053) 
0.4160***          
(0.0053) 




--- --- 0.0425***         
(0.0037) 
0.0426***          
(0.0037) 
0.0418***          
(0.0037) 




Age --- --- --- --- -0.002***          
(0.0006) 
Constant  0.3644***          
(0.0260) 
-0.5675***                        
(0.0291) 
-0.7180***          
(0.0320) 
-0.7186***                        
(0.0320) 
-0.594***                        
(0.0441) 
Number of Observations 101,586 101,586 101,586 101,586 101,586 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
    
Marriage Status Dummies     
Ethnicity Dummies     
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level (P value<=0.1) 
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Table 34: Unemployment Regressions (CDH) 










Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Being Unemployed 
CDH Indicator 0.0524***         
(0.0103) 
0.0385***            
(0.0104) 
0.0377***          
(0.0104) 




--- 0.1081***          
(0.0038) 
0.1060***          
(0.0039) 
0.0844***          
(0.0040) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0177***          
(0.0045) 
0.0144***          
(0.0045) 
Age --- --- --- -0.014***          
(0.0005) 
Constant  -3.1748***          
(0.0449) 
-3.3831***          
(0.0460) 
-3.451***          
(0.0493) 
-2.899***                        
(0.0541) 
Number of Observations 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
   
Marriage Status Dummies    
Ethnicity Dummies    
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01) 
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8.4 Difference-in-Difference Results 
As explained in Chapter 3, the self-selection of beneficiaries can become a problem for 
the estimation and inference of the results if the decision to request the CDH is correlated 
with the outcome variables. Therefore, it is necessary to address this potential endogeneity 
issue by proposing alternative methods of evaluation. In this section, I present the results 
of one of the simplest but most powerful econometric techniques to estimate the effects 
of the CDH treatment while addressing self-selection bias: the “difference-in-differences” 
estimator. The models presented below include different specifications with relevant 
independent variables that could vary over time (i.e. educational attainment, housing 
conditions, employment situation, etc.) for the estimation to be more reliable. 
     
8.4.1 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo 
Humano on the Welfare Index 
The diff-in-diff model used to estimate the effects on the Welfare Index employs the 
ordinary least squares estimator. The model is very flexible and reasonably easy to 
interpret. Moreover, it allows for the inclusion of additional regressors that are thought to 
influence the amount of change predicted by the CDH treatment. Different variables that 
vary over time such as household’s educational attainment, the quality of floor material, 
the unemployment indicator and individual’s age are progressively included to minimize 
the possibility that self-selection biases the obtained results. The difference-in-differences 
estimates are presented in Table 35.   
In the first specification, the interaction coefficient (CDH x Post-treatment period) 
confirms that there is a positive effect of the CDH programme on the level of welfare. The 
magnitude of the effect is even greater than that estimated by the previous method, which 
does not take into account the selection problems. More specifically, the diff-in-diff results 
in column (1) show that the accumulated cash transfers directly increase the Welfare Index 
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by about 1.56 points. In addition, as demanded by this econometric technique, both time 
and group indicators are included as independent explanatory variables. This is done to 
account for the specific characteristics of each group and the trends over time that are 
likely to affect the outcome variable and skew the impact of the cash transfers. 
The 2014-indicator coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that the trend over time is for all individuals to improve their welfare situation 
considerably. In the post-treatment period, individuals improve their level of well-being 
by about 9 index points due to unmeasured factors that vary over time. Remember that 
this trend is the same for both groups (i.e. treatment and comparison). On the other hand, 
the treatment group indicator coefficient is negative and significant, indicating that the 
fixed traits of the individuals that receive the CDH cash transfers actually negatively affect 
their level of well-being. However, the magnitude of the effect of the treatment group 
intrinsic characteristics on the welfare level is small, reflecting that these unobserved 
variables –correlated with the decision to opt for CDH transfers– were not biasing the 
estimated impact of the programme significantly. Specifically, the welfare index is 
reduced by just 0.05 points due to the specific characteristics of those who prefer to receive 
the accumulated transfers. 
The results do not vary much when adding regressors that vary over time in order 
to minimize the possibility of the assumption of common trends being violated. In column 
(2), when household’s average educational attainment is included, the CDH estimate is 
still positive and its magnitude is hardly altered. The impact of the CDH programme is 
only slightly reduced by the positive effect that each completed educational degree has on 
the level of well-being (2.25 index points). Moreover, the coefficients on the 2014-
indicator and the treatment group indicator are still positive and negative respectively. 
Although their magnitudes change a bit, they still strongly suggest that the trends over 
time and the group specific characteristics affect the level of well-being. Therefore, the 
presence of the household’s average educational attainment does not change the facts that 
the welfare index increases considerably in the post-treatment period for all the individuals 
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and that the fixed traits in the treatment group slightly (and negatively) affects the level of 
well-being.  
Something similar occurs in columns (3), (4) and (5) when the quality of the floor 
material, the unemployment indicator and the age of the individuals are progressively 
added to the model. The magnitude of the CDH coefficient is reduced a little in each 
specification, but maintains its positive sign and its statistical significance. In fact, in the 
full specification all the explanatory variables are significant, the model has a considerable 
predictive power (R-squared) and the estimated effect of the CDH programme is 1.21 
index points. This indicates that there was indeed a small selection bias and, once it is 
addressed, the impact of the CDH is somewhat greater (around 0.14 index points more 
than the impact estimated with the previous method). 
Additionally, according to these specifications, the trend over time is for the 
welfare index to increase by around 7 points in the post-treatment period for both groups. 
While the specific (fixed) characteristics of the treatment group maintain their small 
negative effect (between 0.30 and 0.11 index points) once more control variables are 
included. Finally, as expected, the effects of educational attainment, floor material (proxy 
of income level), unemployment situation and age on the Welfare Index are positive, as 
indicated also by the previous econometric method. The proxy of the income is the one 
that has the greatest impact on welfare, increasing the index by 3.23 points each time the 
quality of the floor material rises one category. On the other hand, the impact of each 
additional year of age is only 0.08 index points. 
 
8.4.2 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo 
Humano on Two Different Welfare Components 
In this section, I intend to confirm the indirect effect of the CDH programme on the level 
of welfare through two of its most important components. The diff-in-diff models used to 
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estimate the CDH effects on households’ average educational attainment and quality of 
floor material employ the ordered logistic estimator. Tables 36 and 37 summarize the diff-
in-diff regression results in terms of ordered log-odds (logits) and proportional odds.   
The results presented in Table 36 corroborate that the CDH programme has a small 
but positive effect on the average educational attainment of the households. According to 
the first specification, the ordered log-odds for CDH-affected individuals of being in a 
higher education category are 0.0706 more than for people affected by the BDH 
programme. In terms of proportional odds ratios, the coefficient indicates that for CDH-
affected individuals the odds of being in a higher category of education are 1.0732 times 
the odds for those BDH-affected individuals. Therefore, by interpreting these coefficients 
in terms of simple probability, it is slightly more likely that an individual's household is 
in a higher education category if he receives CDH transfers (p = 0.5177) than if he decides 
to remain enrolled with the other programme (p = 0.4823). 
The ordered log-odds coefficients and the proportional odds ratios of the CDH 
indicator do not vary much when more control variables are included in the model. The 
same is true for the treatment group indicator log-odds coefficient, which is positive and 
statistically significant in all the specifications. In the full regression (column 4), it 
suggests that if an individual belongs to the treatment group, the probability that his 
household is in a higher category of education (p = 0.5301) is higher than the probability 
if the individual belongs to the comparison group (p = 0.4699). Thus, the fixed 
characteristics in the treatment group positively affect the average educational attainment 
of their households. On the other hand, the magnitude and the sign of the 2014-indicator 
coefficient vary from one specification to another. The most important change occurs 
when the age of the individuals is added to the model (column 4). In the end, the trend 
over time is for households to improve their average education levels, but this positive 
effect was being offset by the negative effect of age. The estimated ordered log-odds 
coefficient is 0.1890, indicating that it is more likely for a given household to be at a 
higher education category if the observation belongs to the post-treatment period (p = 
0.5471).           
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Similarly, the results reported in Table 37 confirm that the CDH programme also 
positively affects the household’s quality of floor material. In the most basic specification, 
the estimated ordered logit coefficient on the CDH indicator is 0.1823 log-odds units and 
thus its proportional odds ratio is 1.20. The interpretation, in terms of simple probabilities, 
would be that the odds of being in a higher floor material category for CDH-affected 
individuals (p = 0.5455) are higher than for those affected only by the BDH (p = 0.4545). 
Note also that the inclusion of more control variables does not significantly influence the 
magnitude of the CDH log-odds coefficient. In the second specification, with the inclusion 
of educational attainment, the CDH coefficient is reduced a little, but from there it remains 
almost constant. 
The effect of the 2014-indicator is positive and significant in all the specifications. 
In fact, the magnitude of the logit coefficient is consistently large (around 0.80 log-odds 
units), indicating that the probability of being in a higher floor material category is higher 
in the post-treatment period (p = 0.69) than in the pre-treatment period (p = 0.31). 
Therefore, the trend over time was that poor households improved their housing 
conditions (and income level) considerably. Recall that this effect is due to unobserved 
variables that vary over time and has nothing to do with CDH cash transfers. On the other 
hand, in this case, the estimated ordered logit coefficient on the treatment-group indicator 
changes noticeably with the inclusion of more control variables. Although the effect of 
the fixed characteristics is always statistically significant, in any specification the 
magnitude of the effect is important. Specifically, the odds of being in a higher floor 
material category is almost equal for individuals in the treatment and comparison groups.         
 
8.4.3 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo 
Humano on Human Capital of the First-born Children 
The results found with the previous method (i.e. natural experiment) indicate that, despite 
the absence of conditionalities related to human capital, the CDH programme has no effect 
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(positive or negative) on the probability of enrolling and sending the first-born children to 
school. However, given the problems of self-selection, it is necessary to corroborate these 
results through a more advanced econometric strategy. I estimate difference-in-
differences regression models of the impact of the CDH programme on  two different 
binary dependent variables by using the probit estimator. As a result, these models 
calculate the predicted probability of children being enrolled and attending school on the 
basis of the regressors used in each specification. 
The obtained diff-in-diff regression results are summarized in Table 38. The first 
half of the table presents the effects on the probability that the first-born child is 
matriculated in school, while the second half on the probability that he/she is attending 
classes. Note that the results for both outcome variables are very similar. In general, it is 
estimated that the CDH programme actually has statistically significant negative impacts, 
although the magnitudes of the effects in all the specifications are quite small. More 
specifically, it is a bit less likely for the first-born of a given individual to be enrolled and 
attending school if the household is affected by the CDH cash transfers. Taking as 
reference the last specifications and holding the values of all the other predictors constant 
at zero, the predicted probabilities of the first-born enrolling and attending school for 
individuals affected and not affected by the CDH are as follows:   
!"#$%$&'&()	#+	,-"#''.,-( = 0(2#-3(%-( + 	567	2#,+.∗ 567	&-:&2%(#") 
0(−0.088 − 	0.082) = 0.4325		(%++,2(,:	$)	567) 
0(−0.088) = 0.4649	(%++,2(,:	$)	E67) 
 
!"#$%$&'&()	#+	%((,-:%-2, = 0(2#-3(%-( + 	567	2#,+.∗ 567	&-:&2%(#") 
0(−0.087 − 0.080) = 0.4336		(%++,2(,:	$)	567) 
0(−0.087) = 0.4653	(%++,2(,:	$)	E67) 
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where F is the CDF of the standard normal. Therefore, the programme of 
unconditional and accumulated cash transfers reduces both the probability of being 
enrolled in school and attending classes in around 3 percentage points. 
The estimated coefficients on the 2014-indicator are also negative and significant 
in all the specifications for both outcomes variables, indicating that it is less likely for the 
first-born of a given individual to be enrolled and attending school during the post-
treatment period. In the full specifications (Column 5), the predicted probabilities of the 
first-born enrolling and attending school for observations in the pre- and post-treatment 
periods are as follows: 
!"#$%$&'&()	#+	,-"#''.,-( = 0(2#-3(%-( + 	2014	2#,+.∗ 2014	&-:&2%(#") 
0(−0.088 − 0.092) = 0.4285		(I#3(– (",%(.,-(	I,"&#:) 
0(−0.088) = 0.4649	(I",– (",%(.,-(	I,"&#:) 
 
!"#$%$&'&()	#+	%((,-:%-2, = 0(2#-3(%-( + 	2014	2#,+.∗ 2014	&-:&2%(#") 
0(−0.087 − 0.161) = 0.4020		(I#3(– (",%(.,-(	I,"&#:) 
0(−0.087) = 0.4653	(I",– (",%(.,-(	I,"&#:) 
 
Thus, according to these results, first-born children in the post-treatment period 
are about 4 percentage points less likely to be enrolled in school and 6 percentage points 
less likely to be attending school (holding everything else constant). As also indicated by 
the diff-in-diff results of the BDH programme, the trend over time is for households in a 
situation of poverty to worsen their behaviour towards their children's human capital. This 
is regardless of whether they are beneficiaries or not of social assistance programmes. The 
results of both evaluations (i.e. BDH and CDH) are consistent in this regard. 
On the other hand, the impact of the treatment group indicator on both dependent 
variables is positive and statistically significant. Although the magnitudes of the estimated 
effects are small and they are reduced a little in each specification –due to the inclusion 
of more control variables–, all the probit coefficients suggest that the fixed characteristics 
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of the treatment group make it slightly more likely that their first-born children are 
enrolled and attending school.  For example, in the last specifications, the predicted 
probabilities of the first-born enrolling in school will be of 47.54 percent	[F(−0.0616)] 
for individuals in the treatment group and 46.49 percent	[F(−0.088)] for individuals in 
the control group; while the predicted probabilities of the first-born attending school will 
be of 47.55 percent	[F(−0.0614)] for individuals in the treatment group and 46.53 
percent	[F(−0.087)] for individuals in the control group. Therefore, first-born children in 
the treatment group are about 1 percentage point more likely to be enrolled and attending 
school due to the intrinsic characteristics of the individuals belonging to each group 
(holding everything else constant).    
 
8.4.4 The Diff-in-Diff Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo 
Humano on Unemployment 
The diff-in-diff regression results for the effects of the CDH programme on the probability 
of unemployment are presented in Table 39. The models used in the analysis to estimate 
the predicted likelihood of being unemployed employ the probit estimator. In all the 
specifications, the CDH coefficients are statistically insignificant, indicating that having 
been affected by the unconditional cash transfers does not affect the predicted probability 
of being unemployed.  
Therefore, despite the arguments of those who think that social assistance 
programmes without work-related conditions generate disincentives in the supply of 
labour, at least in this case, the evidence suggests that when an individual decides to 
change the programme opting for the accumulated transfers, the probability of being 
unemployed does not change. Taking into account the previously estimated results for the 
BDH (see page 253), according to which the conditional cash transfers positively impact 
labour supply, it is possible to infer that the CDH transfers would have the same positive 
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(although very small) effect if the comparison were with the individuals in poverty 
situation not affected by any of the programmes.  
Moreover, the coefficients on the 2014-indicator are statistically insignificant in 
most of the specifications. It is only in the last one (Column 4) –with the presence of all 
the control variables– that the estimated probit coefficient is positive and significant 
(although small in magnitude), indicating that the trend in time is that the probability of 
being unemployed somewhat increases in the post-treatment period.89 More specifically, 
holding everything else constant, individuals are about 0.03 percentage points more likely 
to be unemployed in the post-treatment period [0(−3.0118 + 0.0635) − 0(−3.0118)].  
The opposite occurs with the coefficients on the indicator of the treatment group. 
In this case, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant in most specifications, 
with the exception of the last one (Column 4). In any case, the effect of the fixed 
characteristics of the group on the probability of unemployment is so small that, once 
expressed in terms of simple probability, it does not exceed 0.01 percentage points. These 
results indicate that the intrinsic features of the treatment group have little or no influence 
on their labour supply. 
 
8.4.5 Lessons from the Difference-in-Differences Results 
In general, the results obtained by the difference-in-differences method are consistent with 
those found by the natural experiment. Once the possibility of self-selection bias has been 
addressed, the statistical significance and the direction of the effects of the CDH on most 
of the outcome variables remain unchanged. However, the estimated effects specifically 
on unemployment and investment in human capital of the first-born change considerably 
with this more advanced econometric technique. The most important diff-in-diff results 
are summarized below and they are compared with those obtained previously. This is done 
                                                             
89 Recall that this same trend over time in relation to the probability of being unemployed is estimated in 
the evaluation of the BDH (Chapter 6, page 254). 
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to understand the importance of using different quantitative methods in order to obtain 
more reliable estimates that allow reaching the correct conclusions.  
The diff-in-diff regression results confirm that the CDH programme has a positive 
effect on the level of welfare of the poor. People who opted for the CDH at some point 
have on average 1.4 index points more in the SELBEN Welfare Index due specifically to 
the programme. Note that the effects on the Welfare Index estimated by both quantitative 
methods are quite similar. According to the natural experiment, the CDH programme 
increases welfare by about 1.2 index points, while according to the diff-in-diff method the 
impact is slightly higher.  
Something similar happens with the estimated effects on the two welfare 
components that were analysed individually: households’ average educational attainment 
and quality of floor material. The statistical significance and the positive direction of the 
CDH effects are the same with both quantitative methods. All the estimates reflect that 
when an individual receives the CDH cash transfers, the likelihood increases that their 
family will be more educated and their living conditions will be better. However, the 
magnitudes of the CDH ordered logit coefficients are considerably smaller when using the 
diff-in-diff approach. Apparently, self-selection problems were slightly biasing the initial 
estimation. Therefore, although the results are similar, it was necessary to take into 
account both trends over time and group specific characteristics –by using a more 
advanced evaluation technique– in order to obtain more accurate estimators of the effects 
of the CDH cash transfers. 
The need to use more than one quantitative method, when there is only 
observational data to evaluate the effects of the CDH programme, is even more evident in 
the case of the outcome variables related to the investment in human capital of the first-
born. The results of the differences-in-differences method reveal that the CDH programme 
of unconditional and accumulated cash transfers reduces the probability of the first-born 
being enrolled and attending school in around 3 percentage points. These findings contrast 
with those estimated using the simplest econometric method proposed in this thesis that 
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assumes a random allocation of transfers (i.e. natural experiment). According to this 
method, the effects of the CDH are also negative, but statistically insignificant; thus, 
indicating that the unconditional programme does not affect the human capital investment 
practices of those in poverty. The differences between the results found by both methods 
are very likely due to the self-selection of beneficiaries. The initially estimated absence of 
CDH effects was probably due to structural differences between the groups, which are 
later taken into account by the diff-in-diff method in order to reduce the possibility of 
biases. 
Similarly, self-selection problems are somewhat more evident when estimating the 
effects of the CDH on unemployment. The diff-in-diff results indicate that having received 
unconditional cash transfers does not affect at all the predicted probability of being 
unemployed. While, according to the natural experiment, individuals affected by the CDH 
are 0.01 percentage points more likely to be unemployed. Although the magnitude of this 
effect is very small (i.e. less than one percentage point), it is statistically significant. 
Therefore, the slight effect might be explained simply by the intrinsic differences between 
the treatment and control groups. In any case, the findings of both methods are consistent 
in pointing out that the CDH programme did not create strong disincentives to work nor 
did it reduce the intensity of job search among the beneficiaries. 
Therefore, once again, the estimated results imply that the programme achieves 
most of the expected objectives described as part of the theories of change (see page 270). 
This means that it is quite probable that the resources, activities, mechanisms and channels 
of change used are sufficient for the CDH to achieve high levels of efficiency in the 
medium and long term. However, it is also clear that there is still plenty of room for its 
implementation mechanisms to improve and achieve even better results, especially in 
terms of human capital investment and unemployment reduction. 
By means of two different quantitative methods, it has been confirmed that people 
who opted for the CDH programme (on at least one occasion) have experienced 
improvements in terms of welfare, generation of human capital and housing conditions; 
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while they practically have not reduced their willingness to work and send their children 
to school at all. In short, these results suggest that the presence of conditionalities is not 
necessary for social assistance programmes to achieve most of their expected goals. At 
least in the Ecuadorian case, the recent implementation of a programme of unconditional 
cash transfers, as an alternative to the traditional CCT programme, has had very good 
results and has far exceeded expectations. The presence of conditions can only be justified 
by the estimated 3 percent reduction in the probability that the first-born children enrol 
and attend school when people choose the CDH programme.  
In order to strengthen the findings of this research, the analysis is complemented 
in the next section by measuring the effects of the CDH on welfare level and the other 
outcome variables using an alternative quasi-experimental method that also addresses the 
possible endogeneity problems (i.e. instrumental variable technique).
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Table 35: Diff-in-Diff Regression Estimates of the Effect of the CDH on the Welfare Index 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 OLS OLS  OLS OLS OLS 
Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment Group Indicator  -0.0539***                      
(0.0207) 
-0.3342***           
(0.0199) 
-0.3005***              
(0.0178) 
-0.3007***        
(0.0178) 
-0.1154***        
(0.0178) 










CDH Effect (Treatment Group Indicator * 











Household’s Educational Attainment 
--- 2.2533***         
(0.0064) 
1.8386***         
(0.0058) 
1.8376***        
(0.0058) 
2.0480***        
(0.0059) 
Household’s Floor Material 
--- ---  3.2147***                      
(0.0054) 
3.2147***        
(0.0054) 
3.2337***        
(0.0054) 
Unemployment Indicator 
--- --- --- 0.3947***          (0.0721) 
0.6319***          
(0.0716) 
Age 
--- --- --- --- 0.0843***          (0.0006) 
Constant  14.3519***                      
(0.0489) 
10.3913***                     
(0.0483) 
0.5050***                      
(0.0465) 
0.5086***                    
(0.0465) 
-2.7192***                     
(0.0517) 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Reported Marriage Status Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Ethnicity Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Number of Observations 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 
R-squared 0.3442 0.3958 0.5134 0.5185 0.5199 
Note: Estimates are from linear regression models. All specifications include a constant.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
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Table 36: Household’s Educational Attainment Diff-in-Diff Regressions (CDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Average Educational Attainment 
Treatment Group Indicator  0.2209***                     
(0.0043) 
1.2472***                     
(0.0054) 
0.2212***                     
(0.0043) 
1.2476***                    
(0.0054) 
0.2209***                     
(0.0043) 
1.2472***                   
(0.0054) 
0.1207***                     
(0.0044) 
1.1283***                  
(0.0049) 
















CDH Effect  

















Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.1978***          (0.0013) 
1.2187***          
(0.0016) 
0.1976***          
(0.0013) 
1.2185***          
(0.0016) 
0.1837***          
(0.0013) 
1.2017***          
(0.0016) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.6134***                   (0.0183) 
1.8467***                   
(0.0338) 
0.4660***                   
(0.0183) 
1.5936***                   
(0.0293) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0463***                     (0.0001) 
 0.9546***                    
(0.0001) 
Number of Observations 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
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Table 37: Household’s Quality of Floor Material Diff-in-Diff Regressions (CDH) 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
  Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic Ordered Logistic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent variable  Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio Ordered Logit  Odds Ratio 
Dependent Variable: Household’s Quality of Floor Material  
Treatment Group Indicator 0.0242***                     
(0.0043) 
1.0245***                     
(0.0044) 
-0.0053                     
(0.0043) 
0.9946                    
(0.0043) 
-0.0054                     
(0.0043) 
0.9945                   
(0.0043) 
-0.0177***                     
(0.0044) 
0.9823***                  
(0.0043) 
















CDH Effect  

















Household’s Educational Attainment --- --- 0.2278***          (0.0014) 
1.2559***          
(0.0018) 
0.2276***          
(0.0014) 
1.2556***          
(0.0018) 
0.2128***          
(0.0015) 
1.2372***          
(0.0018) 
Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- ---  0.0871***                   (0.0185) 
1.0910***                   
(0.0201) 
0.0705***                   
(0.0185) 
1.0731***                   
(0.0198) 
Age --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.0057***                     (0.0001) 
 0.9942***                    
(0.0001) 
Number of Observations 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 
Reported Province of Residence Dummies         
Reported Marriage Status Dummies         
Ethnicity Dummies         
Note: Estimates are from Ordered Logistic models. All specifications include a constant. Odds ratio interpretation is included. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
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Table 38: Diff-in-Diff Regression Estimates of the Effects of the CDH on School 
Enrolment and School Attendance of the First-born Child 












Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Enrolled in School Dummy 
Treatment Group Indicator  0.0922***          
(0.0065) 
0.0560***            
(0.0068) 




0.0264***            
(0.0068) 










CDH Effect  
(Treatment Group Indicator * 














--- 0.5741***          
(0.0037) 
0.5696***          
(0.0037) 
0.5696***          
(0.0037) 
0.5446***          
(0.0038) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0330***         
(0.0023) 
0.0330***          
(0.0023) 
0.0293***          
(0.0023) 




Age --- --- --- --- -0.016***          
(0.0003) 
Constant  0.3832***          
(0.0156) 
-0.7406***                        
(0.0178) 
-0.8392***          
(0.0192) 
-0.8393***                        
(0.0192) 
-0.088***                        
(0.0252) 
Number of Observations 295,206 295,206 295,206 295,206 295,206 
Dependent Variable: First-born Child Attending School Dummy 
Treatment Group Indicator 0.0901***          
(0.0065) 
0.0551***            
(0.0067) 
















CDH Effect  
(Treatment Group Indicator * 













--- 0.5498***          
(0.0036) 
0.5449***          
(0.0037) 
0.5449***          
(0.0037) 
0.5202***          
(0.0037) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0361***         
(0.0023) 
0.0361***          
(0.0023) 
0.0324***          
(0.0023) 




Age --- --- --- --- -0.016***          
(0.0003) 
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Constant  0.3491***          
(0.0154) 
-0.7297***                        
(0.0175) 
-0.8379***          
(0.0188) 
-0.8379***          
(0.0188) 
-0.087***                        
(0.0248) 
Number of Observations 295,225 295,225 295,225 295,225 295,225 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
    
Marriage Status Dummies     
Ethnicity Dummies     
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
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Table 39: Unemployment Diff-in-Diff Regressions (CDH) 










Independent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Dummy for Being Unemployed 
Treatment Group Indicator 0.0358***         
(0.0106) 
0.0250**            
(0.0106) 
0.0254**          
(0.0106) 
0.0065         
(0.0107) 








CDH Effect  
(Treatment Group Indicator * 











--- 0.1039***          
(0.0030) 
0.1024***          
(0.0030) 
0.0808***          
(0.0031) 
Household’s Floor Material --- --- 0.0143***          
(0.0033) 
0.0113***          
(0.0033) 
Age --- --- --- -0.0126***          
(0.0004) 
Constant  -3.2189***          
(0.0325) 
-3.4065***          
(0.0332) 
-3.4534***          
(0.0350) 
-3.0118***                        
(0.0377) 
Number of Observations 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 1,428,790 
Province of Residence 
Dummies 
   
Marriage Status Dummies    
Ethnicity Dummies    
Note: Estimates are from probit models. All specifications include a constant. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01) 
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8.5 Instrumental Variable (IV) Results 
While repeated pre- and post-treatment measures of household well-being can provide 
unbiased estimates under relatively weak assumptions, such data was difficult to obtain 
and it was only possible through the artificial construction of a panel type database (at the 
expense of fewer observations), and the re-calculation of the Welfare Index using the same 
non-linear principal component method in both periods. Consequently, an alternative 
approach to addressing self-selection bias is often required. This thesis develops for the 
first time a strategy of instrumental variables that can be used to estimate the effects of 
the CDH programme when only post-treatment well-being measures are available. Using 
only welfare data from the Registro Social 2014, I show that the instrumental variable 
strategy can provide estimates of model impacts that confirm the results of the difference-
in-differences estimator provided that a valid instrument is used in the analysis.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, instrumental variables (IV) estimators seek to overcome 
self-selection problems by identifying a source of enough variation in who decides to 
receive the accumulated cash transfers that is unrelated to the unobserved variables that 
influence the outcome measure. This requires an instrument that meets two specific 
identifying conditions. First, it should provide an adequately precise prediction of whether 
or not an individual has opted for the CDH programme. Second, the instrumental variable 
should be uncorrelated with the unobserved factors that influence the outcome variable, 
which in this case is the level of well-being.  
Intuitively, it seems quite likely that credit experience in the past can provide an 
adequate instrument for the analysis. Fortunately, the 2008 Registro Social asked 
individuals if they had received private financial credit at any time until that date. Given 
that this occurred long before the implementation of the CDH treatment, it can be expected 
that this variable complies with the conditions to be a valid instrument. More specifically, 
those with previous experience in requesting and receiving credits from private banks will 
surely be more willing to leave the conditional transfer programme to request the transfers 
in an accumulated manner. Thus, becoming a good predictor of whether individuals opt 
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for the CDH programme. Moreover, the experience with credits in 2008 will hardly be 
correlated with factors that influence the level of well-being six years later.  
There is one more thing worth noting about the instrumental variable strategy 
suggested in this thesis. The IV estimators can provide consistent estimates of CDH 
impacts, but these estimates may still be somewhat biased in finite samples. The 
magnitude of this bias depends on the size of the sample and, even more, on the amount 
of variation in CDH treatment status explained by credit experience. For example, Bound, 
Jaeger and Baker (1995) show that the bias can be quite considerable when the instrument 
is a weak predictor of treatment status. Therefore, in this case, the IV estimates of the 
impacts of the CDH are very sensitive to the choice of the instrument, and if this variable 
(i.e. credit experience) is poorly correlated with the treatment status, the IV estimates can 
be misleading. In view of this, I decided to complement the following analyses by 
performing statistical tests that verify the relevance and validity of the chosen instrument. 
The results of endogeneity- and weak instrument-tests are presented in the following 
section together with the IV estimates obtained from the model.   
 
8.5.1 The IV Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano on 
the Welfare Index 
As explained in the Measurement Models section in Chapter 7 (see page 284), I present 
here the results of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure with a probit model in the 
first-stage regression using a credit experience dummy (i.e. access to credit before 2008) 
as the instrument.  
!"#$ = &'($ + &*!+,"-.$ + /0$ 
 
Then, I estimate the main regression using the probit fitted values of the CDH 
indicator as an IV, rather than the usual linear projection.  
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1$ = 2'($ + 2*!"#34 + /5$	, 
!"#34 = &7'($ + &7*!+,"-.$ 
 
This two-step procedure is first described by Wooldridge (2002), who claims that 
it produces a more accurate and unbiased estimate of the treatment effect (and one notably 
larger in magnitude).90 Note that the first-stage regression could also be estimated by OLS. 
It would be a linear probability model and the coefficients could be theoretically 
interpreted as with other OLS models. However, since the dependent variable is binary, 
the OLS estimates will suffer from heteroscedasticity and would not constrain the 
predicted values to lie between 0 and 1. Therefore, it is better to use a probit model that 
explicitly models the probability and does not suffer from heteroscedasticity.   
The regression results of four different specifications (which include different 
control variables) show that, once the endogeneity problems are addressed by using an IV 
strategy, the CDH programme has positive and statistically significant effects on well-
being (see Table 40). In fact, the IV estimates of the CDH effect are quite large in terms 
of magnitude (specifically, between 22 and 15 index points). This is in line to the statement 
by Wooldridge (2002), who points out that the usual IV estimate is much larger in 
magnitude than the OLS estimate (but sometimes only marginally significant). However, 
the interpretation of the coefficients is somewhat different as will be seen later.  
The effects of the instrumental variables on the probability of choosing the CDH 
are calculated in the first-stage of the model. Credit experience, educational attainment, 
floor material and unemployment have positive and significant effects according to all the 
specifications. The interpretation of the probit coefficients is not straightforward, but it is 
easy to note that the proposed credit experience indicator has the greatest effect on the 
probability of being affected by the CDH. Thus, it seems to be a valid instrument and its 
                                                             
90 See Wooldridge (2002), pages 625-635.  
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coefficient indicates that an individual is more likely to opt for the CDH programme if he 
previously had access to some private credit. Moreover, in the second stage of the model, 
the estimated coefficients show that –apart from the positive effect of the CDH– 
educational attainment and floor material also positively affect the level of well-being. 
While, on the other hand, being unemployed has a negative effect, but statistically 
insignificant.  
The magnitudes of the CDH coefficients are large because the estimated CDH 
variable (!"#34 ) that is used in the second-stage of the model is no longer a dichotomous 
variable, but a continuous one. That is, the probit fitted values of the CDH indicator no 
longer take values of 0 or 1, but any value between 0 and 1. Since it is an estimation based 
on the indicator of credit experience (and other instruments), the values taken by the 
estimated CDH variable are equal to the predicted probability of an individual choosing 
the CDH programme. Therefore, to calculate the estimated effect of the CDH or the 
estimated Welfare Index of a given individual, the CDH coefficient must be multiplied by 
his predicted probability of requesting the programme (e.g. 15.07 x Probability of CDH). 
The greater the predicted probability of requesting the CDH, the greater the estimated 
effect of the CDH on the Welfare Index.  
For example, in the first stage of the model, taking as a reference the last 
specification and holding the values of all the predictors –apart from credit experience– 
constant at zero, the predicted probability of choosing the CDH programme for individuals 
that had access to private credit in the past is given by 
8(:;<=>?<> + 	!@ABC>	,DEA@CA<:A	:;AF. ) = 	8(−0.9254+ 0.2799) = 0.2593 
 
where F is the CDF of the standard normal. Now, in order to calculate the estimated 
effect of the CDH on well-being, this probability should be multiplied by the CDH 
coefficient estimated in the second stage of the model: 
,FFA:>	;F	>ℎA	!"# = 	15.0717 ∗ 0.2593 = 3.90	C<BAD	E;C<>= 
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Thus, the IV effect of the CDH on welfare is quite consistent with that estimated 
by the diff-in-diff method. Note, however, that the estimated effect will depend on the 
values of all the predictors in the first stage of the model. 
One thing that I might want to check after having fitted my model is whether or 
not the probit fitted CDH treatment is an endogenous variable. Therefore, I complement 
the analysis performing two different tests of endogeneity using the Durbin score and the 
Wu-Hausman statistics. The null hypothesis of these tests is that all explanatory variables 
are exogenous, in which case I could have used the regular OLS regression instead of the 
IV method. Both statistics have very small P-values (i.e. close to zero), which indicates 
that the null hypothesis that dependent variables are exogenous should be rejected. 
Consequently, the implementation of an IV strategy was necessary since it is confirmed 
that CDH treatment is an endogenous regressor due to self-selection of beneficiaries.  
Finally, I would like to know if the chosen instrument (i.e. credit experience) is 
weak or not. This can be done by looking at the correlation between the instruments and 
the instrumented endogenous variable, and also by performing an F-test that indicates 
whether a group of variables are jointly significant. Basically, the F-test compares the 
estimated model with a model that contains no predictor variables (also known as an 
intercept-only model), and decides whether the added regressors improved the model. The 
F-statistic is the result of this test where the null hypothesis is that all of the regression 
coefficients are equal to zero. Therefore, the null hypothesis in this case is that the chosen 
instruments are weak (i.e. that the model has no predictive capability).  
As can be seen in Panel B of Table 40, although the R-squared of the regressions 
is not very high (around 0.03), the estimated F-statistics are much larger than any of the 
critical values found in an F-table and conveniently calculated by the STATA statistical 
package. In addition, the P-value of the F-statistic is very close to zero. Thus, we can 
safely reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak (i.e. the fit of the intercept-
only model and model are equal). The results of the test suggest that credit experience 
before 2008 is a valid instrument for CDH treatment. 
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Table 40: IV Regressions of the Effect of the CDH on the Welfare Index 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Two-Stage Least Squares 


















Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- -0.2146 
(0.1458) 
Panel B: First Stage Probit for CDH Indicator  
 


















Unemployment Indicator --- --- --- 0.0481*** 
(0.0169) 
     
R-squared 0.0305 0.0346 0.0352 0.0353 









Reported Province of Residence Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Reported Marriage Status Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ethnicity Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Number of Observations 716,497 716,497 716,497 716,497 
Note: All specifications include a constant.  
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8.5.2 The IV Effects of the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano on 
Other Outcome Variables 
In order to estimate the IV effects of the CDH programme on the other outcome variables 
considered in this thesis, I use different two-stage procedures depending on the type of 
dependent variable (i.e. binary discrete or ordinal discrete). The instrument used in all 
cases remains the indicator of credit experience. Therefore, the first stages of the 
estimations will be similar to what was done in the previous section for the Welfare Index 
(i.e. probit models), while the second stages present different regression models (i.e. probit 
or ordered logistic) given that the analysed outcome variables are not continuous (see 
Table 41). 
In the case of the indicators of school enrolment and attendance (which are 
dichotomous variables) it is necessary to use probit models in the second stage regressions. 
The most popular IV estimate for probit models with an endogenous binary regressor (i.e. 
CDH indicator) is the bivariate probit (also known as biprobit). This procedure fits 
maximum-likelihood two-equation probit models – either a bivariate probit or a seemingly 
unrelated probit (two equations) (StataCorp, 2015). The biprobit model can be used as an 
instrumental variable approach when both the outcome variable and the endogenous 
regressor are binary. In this case, I use a ‘seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression’ 
to estimate the effects of the CDH treatment on the probabilities of school enrolment and 
school attendance of the first-born. Specifically, what I do is to jointly estimate the probit 
models of two equations using the ‘biprobit’ command in Stata. 
The IV estimates presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 41 suggest that the 
effects of the CDH on the probabilities of school enrolment and attendance of the first-
born are actually statistically insignificant. In other words, being a beneficiary of the CDH 
programme does not seem to affect the likelihood of enrolling and sending the first-born 
to school. Moreover, the regression results show that the employed instrument is valid. It 
can be seen in the first-stage of both biprobit models that the coefficient of the instrumental 
CASH TRANSFERS AND CONDITIONALITY  
 
 335 
variable (i.e. credit experience) is positive and statistically significant, indicating once 
more that it is a good predictor of CDH treatment. In addition, the second-stages of the 
biprobit procedures indicate that both the household’s educational attainment and the 
income proxy (i.e. floor material) positively influence the outcome variables. These results 
are quite consistent with the estimates obtained by previous methods (i.e. diff-in-diff and 
natural experiment) in the sense that the CDH programme does not present a considerable 
effect on the human capital investment of the first-born children, especially if we compare 
it with the estimated effects of other explanatory variables, such as the level of education 
or income.  
Each biprobit model is complemented with the results of two different endogeneity 
tests. In column (1), one can see that rho (ρ), which describes the correlation between the 
error terms, is insignificant (P-value > 0.05). In other words, ϵ1 and ϵ2 are independent, 
which suggests that in this case there is no evidence of endogeneity problems. Therefore, 
this joint probit model could be collapsed into two separate models: one for the probability 
of school enrolment and another one for the probability of receiving the CDH treatment. 
This means that the IV estimates of this model could be actually interpreted as of two 
regular independent probit models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Besides, the absence of 
endogeneity in the first biprobit (column 1) is confirmed by a likelihood-ratio test that 
ρ=0, which compares the likelihood of the full bivariate model with the sum of the log 
likelihoods for the univariate probit models. Since the estimated Chi-Square statistic is 
not larger than the critical values (and its P-value is greater than 0.05), it is not possible to 
reject the null hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated or independent. Knapp and 
Seaks (1998) show that this test of whether ρ=0 can be used as a Hausman endogeneity 
test to confirm (or discard) the appropriateness of the biprobit IV method. 
On the other hand, when the dependent variable is the indicator of school 
attendance in the second biprobit model (column 2), both the likelihood-ratio test and the 
statistical significance of rho (ρ) suggest the presence of endogeneity problems. More 
specifically, the error terms (ϵ1 and ϵ2) are not independent, which indicates that in this 
case CDH treatment should be effectively treated as endogenous. Therefore, these tests 
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confirm the pertinence of the biprobit model and the regression coefficients must be 
interpreted as of a joint bivariate model composed of two correlated probit models.   
The same two-stage procedure is used in the case of the unemployment indicator 
as the outcome variable (column 3). The biprobit IV estimates show that apparently the 
impact of the CDH programme on the probability of being unemployed is negative and 
statistically significant. In other words, being a CDH beneficiary reduces somewhat the 
likelihood of unemployment. The interpretation of the coefficients of a bivariate probit 
model in terms of probabilities is a bit complicated. The specific effect of the CDH 
depends on the predicted probability of requesting the programme. However, by using the 
CDF of the standard normal and making some assumptions, it is possible to calculate the 
effect of the CDH manually and determine that the accumulated cash transfers in fact 
decrease the probability of being unemployed, but only in around 0.094 percentage points 
[8(−3.0624) − 8(−3.0624 − 	0.7688)]. This is, of course, assuming that the 
probabilities of requesting the programme could be only 1 or 0, and holding the values of 
all the other predictors in the second-stage probit model constant at zero. These results are 
once again consistent with those previously obtained by other methods. The natural 
experiment, diff-in-diff and IV estimates indicate all that the effect of the CDH on 
unemployment is too small to be taken into account or/and statistically insignificant. 
In the first-stage of this model, the coefficients of the instrumental variable and the 
other regressors are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that they are valid 
predictors of the CDH indicator. The different endogeneity tests confirm the presence of 
an endogenous binary regressor due to self-selection. Thus, coefficients must be 
interpreted together as of a joint bivariate model. In the second-stage, the IV results also 
indicate that the household’s educational attainment and floor material positively affect 
the probability of unemployment. Although the magnitudes of the effects are small, these 
estimates suggest that individuals with a higher level of income or educational attainment 
seem to be more unemployed. One possible explanation could be that only people with a 
certain level of well-being can afford to be unemployed for long periods of time. Most 
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individuals in a situation of extreme poverty would settle for almost any job after some 
time of being looking for an opportunity in the labour market.  
Finally, I estimate the IV effects of the CDH on two of the main well-being 
components (i.e. household’s educational attainment and floor material). Given the 
ordinal discrete nature of the outcome variables, in this case it is necessary to use ordered 
logistic models with an endogenous dichotomous variable in the second-stage regressions. 
More specifically, I use the probit fitted values of the CDH indicator as an IV, and then, 
the effects of the programme are estimated using the standard two-step procedure in 
ordered logistic models. The IV estimates in columns (4) and (5) confirm that the 
cumulative cash transfers considerably improve the probabilities of being in higher 
educational and floor material categories. The CDH coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant in both cases. However, it is important to keep in mind that they 
must be interpreted as ordered log-odds estimates and the CDH effect depends also on the 
estimated probability in the first-stage of the model, for example, the odds of being in a 
higher educational category increases in 0.18 times the predicted probability of requesting 
the CDH.       
Overall, the IV results suggest that, once the possible endogeneity problems are 
solved by different two-step estimation procedures, there are significant positive effects 
of the CDH programme on the Welfare Index and its components. On the other hand, the 
IV effects on the probability of unemployment, school enrolment and school attendance 
are insignificant (either statistically or economically). Besides, most of the endogeneity 
tests support an endogeneity condition of the CDH indicator. Thus, failing to control for 
endogeneity would yield biased estimates on the effects of the programme so the 
introduction of quasi-experimental estimation methods in this thesis is largely justified.  
Note that these results are for the most part very similar to those obtained using 
the difference-in-differences method. Moreover, the results of the three different methods 
used (i.e. natural experiment, diff-in-diff and IV) are consistent with the rationalist 
perspective on cash transfers. In general, all of them support the notion that people living 
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in poverty should be trusted in their ability to choose rationally what is most convenient 
for them and, therefore, social assistance should be in the form of unconditional cash 
transfers. On the other hand, the results are inconsistent with the widespread notion that 
cash transfer programmes need attached conditions in order to be effective (i.e. 
paternalistic approach) and, even more opposed, to the idea that poverty is caused by the 
very efforts to alleviate it (i.e. welfare dependency theory). 
However, apart from the absence of conditions, there are other important elements 
that characterize the CDH programme and where their strengths may lie. Instead of forcing 
poor households to modify their behaviour, as a mechanism to overcome poverty, the 
accumulated cash transfers aim to generate productive processes that help them to link to 
the formal economy and develop their investment capacity. Besides, a true productive 
inclusion of those in poverty may only be achieved through confidence in their own 
capabilities. This element of trust is accompanied by different complementary policies 
(such as technical assistance and public education) that allow their rapid integration into 
the market economy and ensure their access to knowledge and technology. It could be the 
combination of these three elements (i.e. lump-sum cash transfers, trust and 
complementary practices) together with unconditionality that make the real difference. 
This possibility and the different conclusions that can be inferred from this research 
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Table 41: IV Regressions of the Effect of the CDH on Different Outcomes 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 











      









































Panel B: First Stage Probit for CDH Indicator  
 








































      
Rho (ρ) -0.0816 -0.1529** 0.5242*** --- --- 













Reported Province of 
Residence Dummies 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Reported Marriage 
Status Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Ethnicity Dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Number of 
Observations 101,595 101,595 716,497 716,497 716,497 
Note: All specifications include a constant.  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (P value<0.01)  
** Significant at the 5 percent level (P value<0.05) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level (P value<=0.1) 
 
   
 











Conclusions: Does Trust Make a Difference? 
 
9.1 Introduction 
After taking the reader on a long journey of discovery about cash transfer programmes 
and conditionality, this expedition draws to an end. The aim of this final chapter is to 
summarize the content, recapitulate the most important findings, examine the 
methodological, empirical and theoretical contributions, as well as draw conclusions of a 
more general nature that can be inferred from this thesis. A more detailed explanation of 
the impact evaluations conducted and the estimates obtained has been provided in each 
substantive chapter, and therefore, these will not be repeated here.  
This chapter begins by comparatively analysing the effectiveness of the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano (BDH) and the Crédito de Desarrollo Humano (CDH) programmes. 
The empirical evidence obtained is analysed together to determine which of them has 
achieved the best results in terms of welfare generation, human capital investment (i.e. 
investment in children’s education) and labour supply. Moreover, the policy implications 
of these results are discussed, with special emphasis on the political and academic debates 
about the true efficacy of these welfare programmes and the issue of conditionality. 




Specifically, practical importance of attaching conditions to cash transfers is examined in 
depth and some general conclusions are drawn.   
This is followed by the analysis of whether it is effective to set aside conditionality 
and trust those in poverty. In fact, trust could be a key element for the design of new and 
improved forms of social assistance. Therefore, this discussion will be important in 
determining whether programmes such as the CDH –which introduce elements of trust 
together with complementary policies within social assistance practices– actually 
represent a step forward in the global challenge of designing and implementing more 
efficient mechanisms to fight poverty and make the poor self-sufficient. 
The third part of the chapter discusses the methodological limitations of this 
research project. Like all quantitative impact evaluations, the most important constraint of 
this study is that it only quantifies observable changes in the outcome variables, but does 
not explain the treatment effects. In other words, although the estimates obtained indicate 
whether a policy is effective, they do not explain in detail the underlying reasons behind 
the relative success (or failure) of social assistance programmes. Nevertheless, as will be 
seen below, some significant conclusions can be made. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations for future research. 
 
9.2 Effectiveness and Policy Implications 
The data used in this thesis comes directly from two Registro Social databases (i.e. 2008 
and 2014). The Registro Social is an information system for public policies that processes 
data collected every six years by the Ministerio Coordinador de Desarrollo Social 
(MCDS), mainly in the areas with the highest poverty rates within the country. It provides 
comprehensive information on individual- and household-level socio-economic 
characteristics, enrolment in social assistance programmes and labour supply. 
Undoubtedly, this information system has had very important developments in terms of 
technology, methodology and implementation capacity during the last decade. However, 




the difficulties encountered in this research project to artificially build a panel-type 
database of individuals, and to construct the necessary variables for the analysis, highlight 
the importance of developing better information systems (i.e. unified, continuous and with 
higher levels of coverage) that allow a more effective targeting of social programs for 
poverty reduction, more accurate and frequent evaluations of their results and, 
consequently, substantial saving of resources for the government. 
Different quasi-experimental methods (i.e. natural experiment, difference-in-
differences and instrumental variable) were proposed to estimate the effects of the 
programmes on a number of outcomes related to well-being, human capital investment 
and labour supply. The use of these methods, together with specific evaluation designs for 
each programme, constitute the methodological contribution of this project to an 
evaluative literature where experimental methods have predominated. Through them, the 
impacts of the traditional BDH programme and the non-conditional CDH programme 
were estimated and discussed at length in Chapters 6 and 8 respectively. This body of 
empirical evidence responds to the first research question that guided this enquiry.91  
Building on previous chapters, we can now compare the effectiveness of these two 
types of cash transfer programmes. By contrasting the estimated effects on different 
outcomes, it is possible to empirically contribute to the policy debate about the true 
efficiency of these welfare interventions as mechanisms to help overcome poverty. In 
addition, these findings have important implications on the long-standing debate about 
conditionality. More specifically, taking into account the estimates obtained, the role that 
conditions play for the success of social assistance programmes is also analysed below. 
This analysis constitutes one of the most important theoretical contributions of this thesis 
and, at the same time, responds to the second research question regarding the 
necessity/sufficiency of conditionality.  
First, the empirical results consistently show that the BDH programme of 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) has no effects (or even has small negative effects) on 
                                                             
91 The research questions addressed in this research project are laid out on page 58.  




the Welfare Index, the average educational attainment of the households and the housing 
conditions of the people living in poverty (i.e. quality of floor material as an income 
proxy). On the other hand, the different methods indicate that the CDH programme has 
considerable positive impacts on the overall welfare situation of the poor and on the two 
components of welfare considered in this thesis. Table 42 summarizes regression 
estimates on welfare-related outcomes.  
It was established in Chapter 2 that there is some evidence in the existing 
evaluative literature suggesting that the BDH programme had significant positive 
outcomes –during the first half of the past decade– in terms of reducing monetary poverty 
(León et al., 2001) and improving food consumption (Ponce, 2008) (see page 65). 
However, it has also been pointed out that no studies have been conducted lately on the 
impact of the BDH programme on welfare, mainly due to the lack of experimental data 
and possibly also because its effectiveness has been taken for granted. The findings of this 
research project visibly indicate that at least in the current decade the traditional CCT 
programme in Ecuador has failed to deliver the promised results in terms of welfare, 
namely, it has not improved lately the quality of life of those in poverty. Instead, it seems 
that it has been the recently implemented programme of unconditional and cumulative 
cash transfers that has brought about several promising results in this respect, despite the 
short time that has passed since its implementation and the little (or non-existent) 
attention/support it has received from a considerable portion of tax-payers, politicians and 
multilateral development institutions. 
Regarding the current policy debate on the effectiveness of the CDH, these results 
strongly support the arguments in favour of the implementation of this programme made 
by the Ecuadorian government through different institutional reports (IEPS, 2014; MIES, 
2013b) – and reinforce the evidence presented by a few existing perception studies 
(Martínez & Mariño, 2013; Coba & Diaz, 2014) (see page 101). Although there were no 
significant impact evaluations on this programme, government officials and some 
academics have argued that the CDH builds capacities and provides opportunities to 
overcome poverty. Indeed, the findings of this thesis indicate that the CDH cash transfers 




(along with their complementary policies) are significantly improving both the living 
standards of poor households and their average educational attainment. Moreover, as 
suggested by the government and most perception studies, beneficiaries seem to be 
effectively using the transfers (e.g. in productive investments), which would explain their 
improved levels of well-being. 
On the other hand, those concerns about the operability and efficiency of the CDH 
programme raised by Maldonado and Moreno (2011) and Ponce (2013) –and supported 
by the evidence put forward by Bermeo (2013) and Castillo et al. (2017)– do not find 
sustenance in my results (see page 103). From a paternalistic perspective, they argue (for 
example) that transfers may not be used in productive activities and, therefore, they 
recommend implementing control mechanisms (i.e. conditions). These ideas presuppose 
that those in poverty are not capable enough to manage accumulated cash transfers or start 
their own businesses. However, in the light of the findings of this thesis, it seems quite 
unlikely that a significant part of the money is not being used productively (e.g. in 
consumption of temptation goods or debt payment). Thus, it does not seem necessary to 
implement any type of investment-related conditions. Similarly, other practical concerns 
found in the literature seem to be put to rest: transfers assignment through self-selection 
and without major requirements (apart from being poor) seems to be an appropriate 
targeting mechanism because the transfers are reaching the target population; the quality 
and frequency of the training workshops seem to be at least sufficient for the beneficiaries 
to start a business or improve their living conditions; and the absence of education-related 
conditionalities does not seem to be a major problem (at least) in terms of welfare 92.   
From a broader perspective, my results have important implications on the social 
policy debate about conditionality discussed in Chapter 1 (see page 45). Contrary to the 
paternalistic arguments in favour of conditions in anti-poverty programmes made by 
Bastagli (2008) and Fiszbein et al. (2009) –and to the evidence put forward by Rawlings 
                                                             
92 In fact, the CDH programme positively affects investment in human capital (i.e. household’s average 
educational attainment), possibly because beneficiaries acknowledge the importance of education for 
success in family businesses. 




and Rubio (2005), Danvers (2010) and Behrman et al. (2010)–, these findings indicate 
that forcing or manipulating individuals to change their behaviour is not beneficial to 
them. More specifically, conditionality as a policy mechanism has not been effective for 
promoting well-being in recent years in Ecuador. Not only have the conditions not 
provided significant additional effects, but they seem to have been detrimental to the 
beneficiaries. The entire positive ‘income effect’ of the cash transfers (i.e. the fact that 
incremental income allows itself poor households to improve their quality of life) seems 
to be offset by a negative effect of conditionality. Since only the conditional BDH 
programme did not have a positive well-being effect, the ‘conditionality effect’ of the cash 
transfers must be negative or non-existent. 
These results support the rationalist arguments against conditionality made by 
Freeland (2007), Hanlon et al. (2010) and Myamba and Ulriksen (2016) – and add to 
evidence presented by De Carvalho (2008), Haushofer and Shapiro (2013), Blattman and 
Niehaus (2014). In accordance with their ideas about conditionality, the findings of this 
thesis reflect that people living in poverty know better than the state how best to use their 
scarce resources and, therefore, they should be trusted in their knowledge and ability to 
make decisions that promote their own well-being. In fact, conditions seem to be imposing 
costly distortions (in terms of well-being) on people's rational behaviour and unjustified 
restrictions on their freedoms.  
Hence, the empirical evidence clearly suggests that, in the case of Ecuador, the 
presence of conditionalities in social assistance programmes is neither necessary nor 
sufficient to ensure that families overcome poverty in a sustainable manner reaching 
higher levels of well-being, increasing their human capital and improving their housing 
conditions. In other words, conditions seem to play only a secondary (or even harmful) 
role in relation to the promotion of well-being among the poor, compared to other 
constituent elements of antipoverty programmes (such as the amount of the transfers, the 
trust between the parties, and the complementary policies).  
 




Table 42: Summary of Regression Estimates on Welfare-Related Outcomes (Full 
Specification Results) 
Method Outcome Effect of the BDH Effect of the CDH 
Natural 
Experiment 


































Second, regression estimates on children’s human capital investment outcomes are 
quite consistent among the different evaluation methods. On the one hand, the estimated 
effects of the BDH programme are always neutral or insignificant. On the other hand, the 
effects of the CDH programme are neutral according to two of the three methods used. 
The only method that estimates some statistically significant effect is that of difference-
in-differences, according to which the non-conditional programme reduces somewhat the 
probabilities of school enrolment and attendance of the first-born child. However, it is 




important to note that the magnitudes of these negative effects are quite small (i.e. less 
than 3 percentage points). Broadly speaking, the results show that neither of the two cash 
transfer programmes has a significant impact (positive or negative) on the probabilities of 
school enrolment and school attendance of the first-born child. Table 43 summarizes 
regression estimates on human capital investment outcomes. 
The estimated neutral effects of the BDH may be surprising in light of the evidence 
in the evaluative literature supporting that this programme helped to increase school 
enrolment (Schady & Araujo, 2006; Dobronsky & Rosero, 2007) (see page 66). However, 
the previous impact evaluations were carried out before the most significant changes in 
the programme with respect to the amount of the transfers, the eligibility conditions of 
beneficiaries and the verification process of conditionalities (as explained in Chapter 2). 
Besides, there is also evidence indicating that the BDH has no effects on school enrolment 
in the second poorest quintile (Oosterbeek et al., 2008) and that the  impacts on other 
children-related outcomes, such as their attendance at health centres, have been limited 
(Paxson & Schady, 2007). 
The findings of this thesis in terms of school enrolment/attendance are consistent 
with (and could even explain) the estimated absence of positive effects of the BDH on 
well-being. If the conditional programme is not even ‘positively modifying’ the behaviour 
of those in poverty in the first place, it would be more difficult to observe long-term 
improvements in their welfare situation. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize once 
again that the estimated results are based on investment decisions in the human capital of 
the first-born, who are traditionally responsible for helping parents to work (see page 178). 
Therefore, it could be the case that some effects of the BDH on schooling fall on the other 
children in the household.   
In relation to the effectiveness of the CDH, most of the findings indicate that 
unconditional cash transfers improve the welfare level of the poor without negatively 
affecting the level of schooling of the children. The estimated neutral effects of the 
programme on children’s human capital investment are contrary to the arguments 




formulated by some critics of the CDH initiative (see page 103). Specifically, it has been 
posed in the academic literature that the accumulated and unconditional cash transfers of 
the CDH may be encouraging children not to attend school or health centres, since there 
are no control and enforcement mechanisms to modify parent’s behaviour. In addition, the 
new businesses undertaken by the parents need cheap labour that the children (especially 
first-born) could be providing (Maldonado & Moreno, 2011; Ponce, 2013). 
Thus, the estimated results suggest that this practical concern about the CDH does 
not represent a serious problem. However, the somewhat different findings obtained using 
the difference-in-differences method show that the possibility of negative repercussions 
on children’s schooling is not an unfounded concern that should be taken lightly either. 
According to these specific results, it is possible that the delivery of cash transfers without 
education-related conditionalities, together with the promotion and support of productive 
business activities among the poor, have a slight but negative effect on the schooling of 
the children. Consequently, it will be important to continue evaluating the impacts of the 
CDH programme on human capital investment decisions and child labour in the near 
future. 
The results on school enrolment also have implications in the debate on 
conditionality. Contrary to the evidence put forward by Fiszbein et al. (2009) and Danvers 
(2010) –and adding to evidence presented by Ozler et al. (2010) and Arnold et al. (2011)– 
these findings indicate that conditionality alone doesn’t always have additional effects on 
parental decisions regarding the schooling of their children. In this case, cash transfers 
attached to conditions have not even been sufficient to achieve its objective to “positively 
modify” the behaviour of the beneficiaries. Therefore, if we assume that influencing the 
decision-making of those in poverty is the right path, it would be important to accompany 
conditions with complementary policies, such as constant awareness campaigns or better 
control and verification mechanisms, which in Ecuador have been insufficient. Moreover, 
conditionality might be necessary in order to increase the probability of sending children 
to school (at least in the short-term), since the pure ‘income effect’ of unconditional cash 
transfers is not achieving it by itself.  




The issue is that, although conditions may be necessary to compel the poor to send 
their children to school, this obligatory act does not guarantee improvements in well-being 
(apart from being ethically questionable) due to the opportunity costs and the shortage of 
public services. In other words, more children attending school does not necessarily mean 
that they are receiving a quality education that will make a difference in the future. 
Besides, it is necessary to take into account that increasing children's school enrolment is 
not the mechanism through which the new generation of social assistance programmes 
(like the CDH) seek to provide sustained escapes from poverty. This is undoubtedly a 
desirable long-term outcome, but one that is easier to achieve as a result of productive 
inclusion and higher well-being levels among those in poverty. It could be that what is 
perceived socially as 'better decisions' about schooling is a result and not a cause of well-
being. 
 
Table 43: Summary of Regression Estimates on Human Capital Investment 
Outcomes (Full Specification Results) 
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Finally, the estimated results show that neither of the two cash transfer 
programmes considerably affects the probability of being unemployed. In other words, 
social benefits are not generating noteworthy differences in the labour supply of BDH and 
CDH beneficiaries with respect to poor individuals who do not receive any type of benefit. 
Although some statistically significant effects were estimated, their magnitudes are very 
small. The impacts of the BDH on unemployment are consistent among the different 
evaluation methods, while those of the CDH are somewhat heterogeneous. Overall, the 
results suggest that these welfare programmes do not create strong work disincentives 
among people living in poverty. If anything, they are slightly decreasing the probability 
of being unemployed. Table 44 summarizes regression estimates on labour supply. 
It has been established that there is not much empirical evidence about the 
disincentive effects of welfare programmes on adult labour supply in developing countries 
(see page 57). The lack of sufficient evidence has led to a broad debate about labour 
market engagement of cash transfers beneficiary households. Proponents of the welfare 
trap perspective argue that beneficiaries develop a ‘culture of dependency’, since they get 
used to the state providing for them. As a result, there may be less job search intensity or 
less willingness to accept low-paying jobs among cash transfer recipients (Blank, 2003). 
Contrary to these well-known assertions of the welfare trap (also known as the 
unemployment trap) theory made by Gilder (1981), Danziger et al. (1981), and Guzi 
(2013) among others –and reinforcing the evidence against them put forward by Moffitt 
(1992) and Bourguignon et al. (2003)–, the findings of this thesis indicate that cash 
transfer programmes in Ecuador do not encourage inactivity or foster dependency on 
public assistance. 
Moreover, the presence of work-related conditions has been widely suggested, 
specifically by supporters of the paternalistic approach, as a necessary element to ensure 
the effectiveness of social assistance programmes. This is why even traditional CCT 
programmes, which are almost always unconditional to work and time-unlimited, have 
also been accused of generating perverse disincentives to work (Guzi, 2013). However, 
the estimated results imply that conditions related to work are not always necessary. In 




this case, no evidence was found that the traditional cash transfers of the BDH or the 
unconditional transfers of the CDH have a detrimental effect on labour force participation. 
 
Table 44: Summary of Regression Estimates on Labour Supply (Full Specification 
Results) 






















* The magnitude of the effect is less than 0.09 percentage points. 
** The magnitude of the effect is less than 0.02 percentage points. 
 
9.3 Conditionalities vs Trust: What do Those in 
Poverty Need? 
The evidence presented in this thesis shows that the non-conditional CDH programme has 
considerably superior effects compared to the conditional BDH programme in terms of 
well-being and, thus, it represents a much more effective alternative to fight poverty in 
Ecuador. Contrary to the traditional paternalistic approach, according to which 
conditionality constitutes the key element for the success of any cash transfer programme, 
it has been demonstrated that behavioural conditions are not always necessary or sufficient 
to achieve the desired objectives. In other words, conditionality actually plays a secondary 
role compared to the function played by other constituent elements of the programmes. 
However, if conditions are not so important, what is the element that makes the difference? 




That is, what is the possible mechanism through which the differences in the estimated 
effects of both programmes can be explained? 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to begin by determining the main 
differences between the BDH and CDH programmes. There are at least three fundamental 
features that radically differentiate the CDH from traditional CCTs (such as the BDH): 
the amount and scheduling of the payments, the complementary services of technical 
assistance and training, and the implicit presence of trust between the parties. Out of these 
elements, what most attracts attention is undoubtedly the achievement of mutual trust 
between the state and the beneficiaries. Not only because it comes directly to replace the 
highly valued element of conditionality, but because –contrary to what one might 
suppose– trust is a very uncommon feature in most social assistance initiatives that have 
been recently implemented around the world, given that the implementation of different 
types of conditions has clearly prevailed. Therefore, although it is by no means the only 
possible scenario, it is quite probable that in this case the development of an element of 
trust (manifested through the cancellation of behavioural conditions) represents the main 
mechanism to explain the positive effects of the CDH programme. 
The implications on conditionality of this thesis contrast with the great popularity 
of social assistance programmes linked to conditions, and the common presumption that 
they are “one of the most effective ways” to reduce poverty in less-developed countries 
(The Economist, 2005; World Bank, 2009). As established in the theoretical framework, 
there are indeed some theoretical arguments supporting conditionality and a good amount 
of empirical evidence that corroborates that CCTs have improved the quality of life of the 
poor (Fiszbein et al., 2009; Danvers, 2010). However, it has also been established that the 
problem has long been to determine the specific contribution of conditionalities, which 
has led to a broad debate – what portion of the effect on well-being is due to the 
requirement on CCT programmes that parents send their children to school (and health 
centres), and what portion is due to the ‘income effect’? (Freeland, 2007; Myamba & 
Ulriksen, 2016).  




The findings of this research indicate that when cash transfers in Ecuador cause 
improvements, it is definitely not due to conditionality. More specifically, in this case, the 
presence of conditionalities does not positively contribute to promoting well-being (i.e. it 
is not sufficient). This means that, in general, conditions do not always guarantee that anti-
poverty programmes are successful or effective. Conversely, conditioning transfers could 
even be counterproductive, as indicated by the rationalist perspective. Therefore, the 
continuous implementation of the conditional BDH programme for about 20 years –and 
the marked preference for it in terms of budget allocation, coverage and institutional 
support– is better explained by factors (i.e. theoretical arguments) not related to its actual 
effectiveness.  
The political economy of funding the programme might be a good explanation in 
this case, given that international organizations –such as the World Bank or the IMF–often 
condition their financial support in developing countries to the exclusive implementation 
of CCT programmes, arguing that poor households maintain incorrect ideas about the 
profitability of investing in the human capital of their children (Freeland, 2007; Fiszbein 
et al., 2009). If the effectiveness of conditional or tied aid is highly questionable, the ethics 
of this practice of foreign intervention is even more doubtful. At least, it can be said that 
the World Bank is consistent in its institutional policies: they promote the implementation 
of conditions for the poor who receive the cash transfers, much as they impose conditions 
on the less-developed countries that receive their economic aid.  
The influence of international organizations goes far beyond the choice of the type 
of programme. Most of the impact evaluations of CCTs conducted in the Latin American 
countries have been carried out by the same institution that finances these programmes, 
following always the same premises and normally using the same experimental method 
of evaluation (i.e. randomized control trials). This is precisely the case of Schady & Araujo 
(2006) and Oosterbeek et al. (2008) –two of the most well-known quantitative studies on 
the BDH programme in Ecuador– which were financed by the World Bank and, using the 
same experimental data, both supported the dominant policy paradigm. 




If the evaluators are not precisely the most suitable, the appropriateness of the 
random evaluation method also raises some doubts. As reviewed in the methodological 
framework, randomized control trials (RCTs) have been subject to extensive criticism in 
recent years, due mainly to ethical and methodological considerations (Devereux et al., 
2013) (see page 111). In this sense, the different quasi-experimental methods used in this 
thesis constitute in themselves a methodological contribution for the appropriate and 
principled evaluation of social assistance programmes. At least in the case of Ecuador, 
there is no other such exhaustive impact evaluation of the BDH programme, or that uses 
the same methodological approaches. While in the case of the CDH, it is –as far as I know– 
the first quantitative evaluation that employs such an extensive sample of individuals and 
that takes into account different outcome variables.  
Another consideration of political economy that could partially explain the 
continued implementation of the conditional BDH programme –and the marked 
preference for it– is the common impression among Ecuadorian policymakers that 
taxpayers are more likely to support the delivery of transfers or subsidies to the poor if the 
aid is (at least theoretically) linked to some kind of compulsory effort on the part of the 
programme beneficiaries to eradicate poverty on their own (Adato & Hoddinott, 2007; 
Fiszbein et al., 2009). These conditions are thought to be more popular and to receive 
greater acceptance by the general public and the media when the required obligations have 
something to do with the children. Therefore, it is probable that the continuous 
implementation of the BDH programme in Ecuador, as well as the popularization of CCTs 
in Latin American countries, respond more to a political or electoral calculation than to 
the actual outcomes of these programmes in terms of poverty and inequality reduction.  
Now, if the imposition of conditions that seek to modify the behaviour of those in 
poverty does not always guarantee the promotion of well-being, what is the alternative? 
Is it more effective to set aside conditionality and start trusting the poor? Note that the 
answers to these questions are part of the theoretical contribution of this thesis and respond 
to the third and last research question that guided this enquiry.  




The findings show that the Ecuadorian anti-poverty programme that eschews 
conditionality and combines accumulated cash transfers with complementary public 
services, obtained much better results in terms of well-being promotion. The presence of 
conditions has not been necessary in this case, since the combination of different 
components (including an element of trust) has proven to play a much more important 
role. Therefore, in general, traditional conditions are not always indispensable for 
programmes to be successful or effective. In fact, it is possible to obtain better results by 
trusting people living in poverty. 
It has been established that the CDH is part of a new generation of integrated social 
assistance programmes that have adopted an alternative approach to facilitate the 
sustained escape from poverty via productive inclusion, which is sought by linking 
different public sector policies and interventions (see page 15). The evidence suggests that 
the CDH programme has been successful in its aim to promote well-being among the poor 
through the combination of unconditional cash transfers and complementary policies. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, each of the programme’s distinctive 
components may be responsible for a portion of the effects on the different outcomes. 
First, the delivery of accumulated (or lump-sum) cash transfers for an entire year allows 
beneficiaries to make productive investments –such as starting a business or buying a 
costly asset–, which in turn improve their income (approximated by household’s quality 
of floor material) and living conditions. Thus, it is probable that access to lump-sum cash 
transfers is covering (at least partially) the great credit and financial needs of those in 
poverty, given that normally they do not meet the formal credit requirements demanded 
by private banks.   
Moreover, the professional technical assistance –focused on the generation of 
knowledge and human capital– seems to be reducing the skills gap between those in 
poverty and the rest of the population, caused mainly by inequities in access to education. 
This would explain the estimated positive effect of the CDH not only on well-being, but 
also specifically on households’ average educational attainment. However, the limited 
magnitude of the effect on education (and the null effect on unemployment) points to the 




need to continue improving the training process and the technical support, so that the poor 
can develop competitive advantages that allow them to participate more actively in the 
labour market and be more successful in their ventures by investing more efficiently.   
Finally, there is an implicit element of trust (reflected through the unconditional 
nature of the transfers) that might be responsible for most part of the effects. If 
conditionality has an effect, why not the absence of it? Much more when it is replaced by 
another element of a more positive nature. As stated in the theoretical framework, building 
a relationship based on trust is not easy, but it could be very beneficial (Bachmann & 
Zaheer, 2006). Trust is a complicated concept that depends on the actors (e.g. government 
and poor families), rules of the game (e.g. lump-sum cash transfers for productive 
investments), and context (e.g. Ecuadorian economic and political situation). Thus, the 
mere absence of rules (or conditions) does not necessarily imply the presence of trust.  
However, it has been also established that when the decision to remove these rules 
is clearly voluntary and based on positive expectations, it is much easier to build trusting 
relationships between the programme implementers and beneficiaries. In this case, those 
in poverty may have noticed that there is actually trust in them by the government when 
they were offered an alternative social assistance programme that delivers cash transfers 
without demanding anything in return. In addition, the possibility of choosing between the 
traditional and the new programme without conditionalities is a clear invitation to modify 
the relationship between the parties and to generate mutual trust. Moreover, the necessary 
conditions for trust postulated by Bachmann and Zaheer (2006) (i.e. interdependence, 
vulnerability and risk) are met between the parties, and the decision to trust each other 
was taken voluntarily by all parties accepting the typical risks (i.e. opportunistic behaviour 
or non-compliance). Therefore, I strongly believe that a trusting relationship was built in 
the case of the CDH, which made people living in poverty more responsible and, 
subsequently, positively influenced well-being outcomes.    
After all, the basis of social protection should be the transmission of a sense of 
partnership or inclusion (Freeland, 2007). Therefore, more attention should be given to 




the element of trust in social assistance practices. Only in this way, future research will be 
able to determine the independent effects of trust and economic inclusion (instead of 
conditions) on poverty reduction, as well as the relative importance of building trusting 
relationships between programme implementers and beneficiaries, which are not achieved 
simply by eliminating traditional conditionalities of anti-poverty programmes. 
Although greater emphasis has been placed on the potentially key role played by 
the trust element (and the absence of conditionalities), it is important to note that each of 
the constituent elements of the CDH programme (i.e. the amount/schedule of payments, 
the complementary services and the implicit presence of trust) represents in turn a 
different mechanism that could possibly explain the estimated effects on the well-being 
of people living in poverty. However, these mechanisms are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and, therefore, each one could be responsible for a greater or lesser part of the 
effect. Therefore, the conclusion that positive and even better results could be obtained by 
leaving aside conditionalities and trusting the poor does not mean in any way that the mere 
presence of trust guarantees these better results, but that conditionality is not so 
fundamental as it has traditionally been considered. In other words, although there are 
some possible scenarios (or mechanisms) to explain the positive effects of the CDH 
programme in Ecuador, in none of them does conditionality play a key or important role. 
 
9.4 Limitations of this Research 
Like all statistical methods, the difference-in-differences and the instrumental variable 
approach used in this thesis have considerable limitations. Perhaps the most important is 
that although they measure the observed changes in the dependent variables, they cannot 
explain these outcomes. “The diff-in-diff methodology only quantifies observable 
changes over time; it does not put this ‘treatment effect’ into its full and proper context” 
(Devereux et al., 2013). Consequently, the findings of this thesis cannot determine with 
certainty, for example, the underlying reasons for the positive effect of the CDH on well-




being and whether the relative success of this programme is due exclusively to the absence 
of conditions.  
As discussed previously, there are at least three CDH programme components that 
may have played a fundamental role for the achievement of the expected results: the lump-
sum cash transfers, the complementary policies, and the trust between the parties. It is the 
combination of these constituent elements which seems to be helping people to escape 
poverty in a cost-effective and scalable way. Thus, it might not be just the absence of 
conditions that generates improved well-being results. It could be the impulse that those 
in poverty get by the accumulated cash transfers, or it could be the complementary 
practices that give them a real advantage, or it could simply be the introduction of an 
element of trust (which is not necessarily the same as the lack of rules) that signals to the 
poor the importance of making the right decisions for themselves, so they try harder to 
make sure that the transfers are used correctly.  
These components are common in the new generation of social assistance 
programmes in developing countries. Unfortunately, the portion of the effects that 
corresponds to each one of them cannot be easily determined by quasi-experimental 
research designs. Therefore, the possibility arises of a new policy debate, opposite to that 
of conditionality, which I would call the ‘trust debate’ – what proportion of the increase 
in well-being is due to the lump-sum cash transfers, what proportion is due to the 
complementary services, and what proportion is due to the trusting relationship between 
parties? In order to answer these questions, it would first be necessary to take a closer look 
at the role played by trust in social affairs and study the circumstances under which it is 
possible and effective to build relationships based on trust.  
Similarly, the results of the quantitative evaluation do not explain the reasons 
behind the null or negative effects of the conditionality on well-being in the case of the 
BDH programme. There is a possibility that the conditions attached to the transfers are 
not even modifying the behaviour of the poor. In fact, the results on school enrolment and 
attendance support this hypothesis. If this is the case, the control mechanisms for 




compliance with conditionalities would not be working properly and it would be necessary 
to monitor whether the sanctions are actually being applied. However, rather than having 
a null effect, the conditionalities seem to be offsetting the positive ‘income effect’ of the 
BDH cash transfers, in which case the explanation could be completely different. A 
negative impact of conditionality on well-being could be explained by the financial and 
opportunity costs of compliance with conditions faced by those in poverty and/or by the 
scarce provision of public services. For example, due to the limited provision of public 
services, conditionalities could have an adverse effect by compelling beneficiaries to make 
decisions that go against their best interests, such as attending crowded health centres or 
spending considerable amounts of money on transportation.  
Another important limitation of this thesis is related to the natural experiment that 
is proposed to estimate the effects of the BDH programme. The fundamental problem is 
that, in this particular case, the selection of beneficiaries may not be as random as it seems. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the key identification assumption (and the starting point) for 
the evaluation of the BDH is that the assignment to the treatment and control groups is "as 
if" random. Although some kind of empirical verification of the “as if” randomness 
assumption was carried out (comparing the treatment group with the control group in 
terms of its observable characteristics before the intervention), this test does not allow 
ruling out the existence of unobservable differences between the groups. In other words, 
it is still possible that, instead of relying on a randomization process, the allocation of 
transfers is actually the product of the interaction of actors in the social and political 
spheres. In fact, Chapter 2 identified some geographic, political and socioeconomic factors 
that possibly affect the programme’s targeting process, thus generating considerable 
potential selection biases (see page 75). 
Far from being something of little importance, this latent concern about the 
selection issue certainly casts doubt on the validity of the natural experimental proposed 
for the BDH and, therefore, that of its estimates. It could be argued that in a non-controlled 
experiment (such as this) it is almost never known with certainty that the mechanism that 
assigns treatments to individuals is purely random (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). 




Additionally, in order to corroborate and strengthen in some way the results obtained, 
different econometric techniques were used as part of the natural experiment (such as the 
difference-in-differences and the IV). Unfortunately, adding controls, using instrumental 
variables or controlling for baseline values is not enough to completely solve the 
potentially significant self-selection and/or biased selection problems. Therefore, it is not 
possible to effectively solve this problem as part of this thesis and more research (perhaps 
of the qualitative type) is necessary on beneficiary self-selection and biased selection. 
However, there are certainly some solid reasons to consider that the estimated results do 
reflect the real effects of the BDH and CDH programmes, the main one being that the 
estimates are robust to the different specifications and techniques; specially the IV, which 
proposes an alternative and effective way of dealing with the endogeneity issues. 
Although this research project is based on the Ecuadorian case and it cannot be 
guaranteed that the results will be repeated under different circumstances, the implications 
of the findings are largely generalizable. By saying that conditions are not necessary or 
sufficient, it does not mean that they are never effective, but that conditionality is not the 
only alternative to promote well-being and probably it is not the best either. The CDH 
programme represents, above all, a sign that better results can be obtained by trusting the 
poor and seeking their productive inclusion. Its positive outcomes show us that there are 
alternative ways to help those in poverty without imposing ethically-questionable rules 
that violate their fundamental rights. Undoubtedly, this initiative represents a step forward 
in the global challenge of designing more efficient mechanisms to overcome poverty and 
make people self-sufficient. Therefore, it will be important to continue evaluating, 
perfecting and replicating this type of social assistance policies in other developing 
countries, always taking into account that the design of programmes must respond to the 








9.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
As part of a future research project, it will be important to determine exactly how BDH 
and CDH beneficiaries are using the monetary transfers; how does a trust-based 
relationship influence their behaviour; and to what extent the training workshops, 
professional assistance and technical support offered by CDH programme administrators 
are helping beneficiaries to succeed in their ventures.  
These issues are important because in order to explain the positive impacts of the 
CDH programme and the absence of effects of the BDH programme, I have to know first 
if poor households are actually using the money “correctly” (for example, in their 
productive investments) or if they are spending it on day-to-day consumption (e.g. food, 
debts, temptation goods, etc.). There is the possibility that families are wasting a 
considerable part of the money on temptation goods, and therefore, the effects of the 
programmes on their well-being could be underestimated. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to have a better understanding of the beneficiaries’ perception about both cash 
transfer programmes and the additional services offered by CDH programme 
administrators, since this is one of the most innovative features of this programme. 
More specifically, there are a series of questions that arise from this analysis and 
that the quantitative evaluation methods used in this thesis cannot answer due to their 
natural limitations. Therefore, it will be important to complement this research in the near 
future with other type of evaluation methods that seek to clarify these topics. The most 
important questions worth considering for future research are the following: 
• Are poor families actually using most part of the cash transfers for investments 
in productive activities or are they using them to buy consumption goods or to 
pay debts? 
• How do they perceive the action of eliminating conditionalities once they enrol 
in the CDH programme? Do they see it as an act of trust from the government?  




• Are beneficiaries attending the offered workshops regularly? Do they think 
that the complementary benefits of the CDH are necessary?  
• Are the instructors sufficiently trained to deliver basic courses in finance and 
entrepreneurship? Do transfer beneficiaries feel that it is useful to ask for 
professional assistance?  
 
Note that in order to answer these questions, it will be necessary to use qualitative 
methods of evaluation. In fact, interviewing some beneficiary families and programme 
managers could help to better explain the quantitative results of the study and to better 
answer the key questions of this research. Unfortunately, this could not be done as part of 
this thesis for time reasons, but I believe that this could be a good way to continue my 
research in the near future and that it is important to suggest these topics to other 
researchers interested in social assistance practices. 
Qualitative research about the BDH and CDH programmes will be important 
because it will attempt to provide an accurate description of how people experience cash 
transfers. It will provide information about the "human side" of these social assistance 
programmes represented by people's beliefs, opinions, emotions and behaviours. 
Moreover, it will be helpful identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, gender 
roles, ethnicity, and culture, which might play an important role in determining the way 
people spend the money from the transfers and the way in which trust influences their 
well-being. Consequently, qualitative and quantitative research could be used together to 
help interpret and better understand the complex reality of social assistance in developing 
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Appendix A: Public Spending on Social Assistance 
Programmes in Ecuador 
According to the latest available data from the Atlas of Social Protection - Indicators of 
Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE) database, the public spending on social assistance 
programmes in Ecuador (as percent of GDP) has recently experienced a reversal showing 
a considerable decrease since 2011 (see Figure A1), which surprisingly (or not) is contrary 
to the trend observed over the last years in most of the other countries in Latin America. 
The ASPIRE database is the World Bank's compilation of Social Protection and 
Labour (SPL) indicators gathered from officially-recognized international household 
surveys in order to analyse the distributional and poverty impact of Social Protection and 
Labour programmes. ASPIRE includes a set of indicators based on nationally 
representative household surveys and administrative data. Programme-level 
administrative data on spending and number of beneficiaries in ASPIRE include both 
primary and secondary sources: official government reports; data provided directly by 
government officials; published World Bank country reports; and other international 
databases (World Bank, 2015b). The ASPIRE indicators based on household surveys are 
available for 112 countries and their sources include: household income expenditure 
surveys, Welfare Monitoring Surveys, Living Standard Measurement Surveys, and 
Surveys on Income and Living Conditions. 
Social assistance (SA)/Social safety nets (SSN) expenditure imply the total cost of 
the programmes, including spending on benefits as well as administrative costs. The 
ASPIRE indicator captures both the capital and recurrent programmes’ budgets and it is 
based on the administrative records of the programmes. The data on programme-level 
expenditure is available for 124 countries and it is presented as a percentage of GDP of 
the respective year. Expenditure indicators are usefully aggregated by type of programme 
categories (CCTs, UCTs, social pensions, in-kind transfers, school feeding, public works, 




fee waivers, and other social assistance) for all social assistance programmes available in 
each country. 
 
Figure A1: Public Spending Over Time on Social Assistance Programmes in 
Ecuador, as a Percent of the GDP 
 
Source: Data from The Atlas of Social Protection - Indicators of Resilience and 
Equity ASPIRE database (Last Updated: 02/01/2018) 
 
Looking at this data, it is apparent that between 2005 and 2010, Ecuador incurred 
an (average) expenditure on SA programmes of around 1.45 percent of GDP, which at 
that time placed this developing Latin American country above the average expenditure 
among the countries in its region (i.e. 1.3 percent of regional GDP). Moreover, as shown 
in Figure A1, the evolution of social assistance spending in Ecuador presented a fairly 
stable upward trend until 2010, so that its growth rate was one of the highest in South 
America, being surpassed only by the unusual rate shown by Colombia.   
In fact, Ecuador's total social public expenditure maintained a growing trend in the 
























Amongst this public spending, one of the components that grew the most was the spending 
on SA programmes, which include CCTs (i.e. BDH), UCTs (i.e. CDH, welfare pensions, 
and transfers for people with disabilities), and direct in-kind subsidies (mainly, school 
feeding programmes). At that time, Ecuadorian social assistance expenditure experienced 
a substantial increase, going from 0.6 percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.8 percent in 2010. 
Thus, at the end of the decade, the expenditure on social safety nets was around 60 percent 
higher than the average spending in Latin America, placing Ecuador in first place among 
the region.  
However, as of 2011, an important decline in public spending on SA programmes 
has been experienced that currently places the country below the regional average for the 
period 2014-2015 (see Figure A2). More specifically, the ASPIRE data shows that social 
assistance spending in Ecuador was of 1.23 percent of GDP in 2015, while the average 
expenditure in Latin America was of about 1.6 percent. Therefore, it can be noted that 
recent spending trends in this type of programmes were contrary between Ecuador and the 
rest of the region or, put it another way, the visible reduction in SA spending that occurred 
in the last few years in Ecuador was not widespread in Latin America, but occurred 
specifically in this country, either for budgetary or strategic reasons.  
In this regard, it should be noted that the recent trend of public spending on social 
assistance programmes (and in general in social protection) in the countries of Latin 
America has been ascending –or at least stable– in most cases, with Ecuador being the 
only country in the region that shows a persistent downward trend in social safety nets 
expenditure over the last few years. This reduction in public spending had, of course, its 
most significant repercussions on the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), since it is the 
main social assistance programme in the country (at least in terms of budget and number 
of beneficiaries).  
 
 




Figure A2: Public Spending on Social Assistance Programmes in Some Selected 
Countries of Latin America (year 2015)  
 
Source: Data from The Atlas of Social Protection - Indicators of Resilience and 
Equity ASPIRE database (Last Updated: 02/01/2018) 
 
Given that the amount of BDH cash transfers actually increased in 2013 from 35 
to 50 US dollars (see page 79), it was the level of coverage of the programme that was 
used as the adjustment mechanism, and therefore, the dimension most affected by the 
budgetary reduction. Recall that the number of beneficiaries of the BDH programme 
increased steadily since its implementation until 2011, when the level of coverage of the 
BDH began to experience a significant decrease precisely along with the reductions in 
public spending on this type of programmes. Specifically, the number of households 
receiving BDH cash transfers went from 1.21 million in 2011 to 1.05 million in 2013. 
Apparently, the level of coverage of the main social assistance programme declined 
progressively as of 2011 due to the constant reductions in the budget allocated to social 
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Nevertheless, contrary to what might be expected, the considerable reduction in 
social assistance spending in Ecuador –and jointly in the coverage level of its main 
programmes–, which began in 2010 and has been maintained up to the present, did not 
lead to a significant reduction in the efficiency level of SA programmes. In fact, the 
effectiveness of these programmes in Ecuador – measured as their impact on the 
percentage reduction of poverty and inequality– remained practically unaffected until very 
recently (namely 2016), and it could even be said that the performance of social assistance 
slightly improved during the first years after the downward trend in public spending on 
SA programmes (see Figure A3).93 
The ASPIRE data described in Figure A3 show that Ecuador's social assistance 
spending has maintained a good and almost constant performance in terms of poverty and 
inequality reduction from 2008 until at least the end of 2012, which is the last year with 
comparable information over time. During these five years, the reduction of the poverty 
headcount due to social assistance programmes in the first income quintile (poorest) was 
always between 12.6 and 13.6 percent. In addition, the reduction of the poverty gap due 
to SA throughout this period was between 22.1 and 23.9 percent. Finally, the decrease in 
the Gini inequality index was the most constant of all, maintaining an annual reduction 
caused by SA programmes of between 2.8 and 3.4 percent. 
 
 
                                                             
93 In 2016, there was an important economic contraction in Ecuador -produced by exogenous factors and 
natural disasters- that caused serious social problems and, evidently, affected the percentage reduction 
of poverty and inequality (not only that caused by social assistance programs but in general). Thus, the 
efficiency in absolute terms of social assistance and social protection programs (percentage contribution 
to poverty reduction) was affected as well. However, its importance in relative terms (that is, with respect 
to other antipoverty policies) remained unchanged.  




Figure A3: Poverty Headcount, Poverty Gap and Gini Inequality Index Reductions 
Over Time due to Social Assistance Programmes in Ecuador (latest years 
available), as Percentage of Pre-transfer Poverty and Inequality. 94 
 
Source: Data from The Atlas of Social Protection - Indicators of Resilience and 
Equity ASPIRE database (Last Updated: 02/01/2018) 
 
In order to better understand the outstanding performance that the social assistance 
programmes implemented in Ecuador apparently had until 2012, it is useful to compare 
these figures with those of other countries in the region with similar characteristics and in 
the same period of time. According to the latest comparative data available for a group of 
eight countries chosen for this analysis (most corresponding to 2012), Ecuador's SA 
programmes achieved contributions to poverty reduction well above the group averages. 
Specifically, their estimated impacts were 13.6 percent on poverty headcount reduction, 
                                                             
94 The three measures are percentage reductions calculated in relation to the counterfactuals values, 
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23.9 percent on the reduction in the poverty gap and 3.4 percent on the reduction of 
inequality.  
These results placed Ecuador (together with Mexico, Chile and Uruguay) among 
the countries with the most efficient social assistance programmes, at least in this group 
of countries for which comparable information is available (see Figure A4). In fact, it is 
interesting to note that what Ecuador achieved in 2012 in terms of poverty reduction is 
very similar to what was achieved by Chile –one of the most developed countries in the 
region–, but only using half of the Chilean public spending on SA, since in Ecuador it did 
not exceed 1.3 percent of the GDP.  
Although the latest data available for Ecuador suggest a drastic reduction in the 
efficiency of social assistance programmes in 2016, these figures are not comparable with 
those of the previous years, since after 2015 the country went through a severe economic 
and social crisis, whose effects are still present. In fact, in the last few years, an unexpected 
process (for some people) of deceleration of the economic growth began –which later led 
to a prolonged economic recession– mainly caused by the international fall in oil prices, 
the appreciation of the US dollar (which is the currency used in Ecuador since 2000), the 
lack of a national monetary policy, and the different natural disasters that seriously 
affected the population (especially those in poverty) and the national economic 
performance (Pinza & Martín-Carrillo, 2016). Undoubtedly, all these external factors 
negatively affected the complicated process of poverty and inequality reduction that until 
then had been improving, as well as they limited the capacity of social assistance 









Figure A4: Impact of Social Assistance Programmes on the Percentage Reduction 
of Poverty Headcount, Poverty Gap and Gini Inequality Index (Latest Available 
Comparative Data). 
 
Source: Data from The Atlas of Social Protection - Indicators of Resilience and 
Equity ASPIRE database (Last Updated: 02/01/2018) 
 
The fact that the level of efficiency of social assistance programmes was not 
affected at least 3 years after the considerable reductions in public spending and in the 
level of coverage of the BDH programme, makes one question about the absolute and 
relative importance that CCTs have in the fight against poverty and inequality in Ecuador. 
In other words, given that social assistance in general –and BDH transfers in particular– 
apparently have been having a significant impact on different income poverty measures, 
the logic indicates that we should observe a significant reduction in their efficiency levels 
shortly after the number of beneficiaries of the programme was suddenly reduced by 
around 650,000 people (160,000 households). Since this does not happen, serious doubts 









Gini inequality index reduction (%) -  All Social Assistance
Poverty Gap reduction (%) -  All Social Assistance -1st quintile (poorest)
Poverty Headcount reduction (%) -  All Social Assistance -1st quintile (poorest)
Public spending on Social Assistance (percent of GDP)




arise about the true effectiveness of CCT programmes (at least in Ecuador) and about the 
way in which this effectiveness is commonly measured.  
There are some different alternatives to explain that the measured levels of 
efficiency of social assistance programmes have remained almost constant, despite the 
reduction in spending and coverage of the BDH. One possibility is that, in spite of reaching 
a smaller number of people, the targeting and selection mechanisms of the beneficiary 
households would have been improved in some way. However, this would mean that the 
filtering and under-coverage problems, which characterize this type of programmes, have 
been at least partially resolved in the last few years. This seems somewhat difficult to 
imagine when, according to different studies (e.g. Gutiérrez et al., 2013), these issues were 
notoriously present at least until 2011. Actually, the need to develop more sophisticated 
strategies so that CCTs reach the right people is considered a challenge that Ecuador still 
shares with other countries in the region (Ribe et al., 2010). 
A second, much simpler, possible explanation could be that basically not enough 
time has passed -between the reduction in BDH spending and coverage levels and the 
latest available comparative data about SA efficiency- to be able to observe the real effect 
that these policy measures have had on the percentage reduction of poverty and inequality. 
However, we must bear in mind that, in this case, income poverty measures are used to 
determine the levels of efficiency; and also, that although CCT programmes are conceived 
as programmes that contribute to the alleviation of poverty in the long term, in the short 
and medium term they are important mechanisms to cope with price volatility by 
increasing the purchasing power of the families (Araya & Lizano, 2000).  
Therefore, the effects of monetary transfers on the level of income (and 
consequently on income poverty) should have been present both in the short and long 
term, considering also that the participation of transfers in the monthly income of poor 
households in real terms is close to 23 percent (Gutierrez et al., 2013). In other words, 
such a significant reduction in the number of beneficiaries (around 160,000 households) 
of a transfer that provides families with an amount equivalent to 15 percent of the 




minimum living wage in Ecuador (375 US dollars per month in 2017) should have had an 
almost immediate impact on any measure of poverty by income, especially in the first 
quintile of poverty. This is, of course, if other factors remain constant, including changes 
or implementations of other social assistance programmes at the same time, which 
evidently did not happen and this fact leads to a third and final possible explanation.  
It is quite probable that the reduction of public spending has been accompanied by 
the inclusion of other social assistance programmes and policies, which in some way 
diminished the effect on income poverty. In fact, it is at the end of 2008 that the Crédito 
de Desarrollo Humano (CDH) programme was officially implemented in Ecuador with 
features that are very different from those of traditional cash transfer programmes. 
Besides, the number of beneficiaries of this programme increased precisely during the 
years in which the BDH coverage level decreases. According to the data published by the 
IEPS (2014), from 2008 to 2012, this programme delivered 1,025,348 credits throughout 
the Ecuadorian territory, which in monetary terms represented a total amount of 
579,367,141 US dollars.  
Therefore, this last explanation implies that the important role played by the BDH 
conditional cash transfer programme in Ecuador, at least in terms of monetary poverty 
reduction, was covered and perhaps surpassed by other social assistance practices that 
emerged precisely during the first years of reduction of public spending on SA. In other 
words, this would mean that, although the popular CCT programmes have proven to be 
effective in reducing certain poverty measures at least in the short term, they are not 
irreplaceable. Much less that their efficiency levels cannot be overcome by other types of 
programmes that do not currently have the same acceptance in governmental and 
international organization circles.  
In the Ecuadorian case, the emergence of innovative policies and programmes that 
address other needs of poor families (for example, the need for productive credit, labour 
activation, technical assistance) as well as the immediate need for income, seems to show 
us a path different from that commonly used in developing countries (specially in Latin 




America) to combat poverty in its different dimensions. The CDH is perhaps in this sense 
the most relevant of the recently implemented programmes, given that it presents a 
ground-breaking structure, which is very different from the one that has dominated for 




   
 
 




Appendix B: Main Impact Evaluations of the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano 
Impact Evaluations 
Author(s) Year of 
Application 
Evaluation Effect Type of 
Effect 
Level Method 










2006 Impact of the 
BDH 
Effect on school 
enrolment 
Positive High Experimental 
Shady & 
Araujo 
2006 Impact of the 
BDH 
Effect on child 
employment 
Negative High Experimental 
León & 
Younger 
2007 Impact of the 
BDH 





& Rosero  
2007 Impact of the 
BDH 
Effect on 





& Rosero  












Positive Low Experimental 
Paxon & 
Shady  






Positive Medium Experimental 
Paxon & 
Shady 









---  Experimental 
Dobronsky 
& Rosero 
2007 Impact of the 
BDH 
Effect on school 
enrolment 
Positive Medium Experimental 




















2008 Impact of the 
BDH 
Effect on school 
enrolment 




2008 Impact of the 
BDH 












2008 Impact of the 
BDH 


















Appendix C: Summary of Individual- and Household-
Level Variables Included in the Constructed Registro 
Social Panel Dataset 
 
Category Variable of 
interest 
Name of Variable in 
Database 




Section 5, Question 36: 
Can you read and write? 





















Section 5, Question 37: 
Are you enrolled in an 
institution of regular 
education? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 38: 
If the answer is no, why 
did you not enrolled 
during the current school 
year? (Age, lack of 
economic resources, work, 
domestic labour, studies 
completed, no interest, 
disease, lack of facilities 




Section 5, Question 39: 
The establishment where 
you are enrolled is… 
(Public; private; municipal 




Section 5, Question 40: 
Do you normally attend 
the school where you are 





Section 5, Question 41: 
                                                             
95 The term "fiscomisional" relates to the financing sources of certain educational institutions. In this case, 
funding is shared by the government and a religious institution. 




What is the highest level 
of instruction that you 
achieved and in what 
year? (None, literacy 
centre, primary, basic 
general education, 















Section 5, Question 28: 
Does the child attend a 
public or private 
Development Centre? (yes 
or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 29: 
The development centre 
where the child attends 
is… (public funded by 
MIES, public financed by 
other government 
institution, private, funded 
by the church, ONG 
financed) 
Health Status presenciaenfermedad 
Section 5, Question 21:  
During the past month did 
you have an illness, 
accident, burn, toothache, 
ear pain or any other 
discomfort, although it 
has been momentary 
(except symptoms of 
pregnancy)? (yes or no) 
Disability  discapacidad 
Section 5, Question 18: 
Do you have a permanent 
disability, such as 
blindness, paralysis, 
amputation, deafness, 
mentally retarded, insane, 







5 Years Old) 
frecuenciacontrol 
Section 5, Question 26: 
How often do you take the 
child to medical control? 
























Section 3, Question 6a: 
Condition of the roof 
(good, regular, or bad) 
 
Section 3, Question 6b: 
Condition of the floor 
(good, regular, or bad) 
 
Section 3, Question 6c: 
Condition of the walls 
(good, regular, or bad) 
 
Section 4, Question 1: 
The house occupied by the 
household is... (own and 
fully paid; own and still 
paying; antichresis; 
leased; transferred or free; 











Section 4, Question 5: 
How many rooms has this 
household excluding 
kitchen, bathrooms, 
garages or those 
dedicated to business? 
(number #) 
 
Section 4, Question 6: 
Among these rooms, how 
many are used exclusively 
for sleeping? (number #) 



















Section 4, Question 7: 
Where does the water 
come from? (Public 
network; fountain or 
public tap; another 
pipeline source; delivery 
truck; pit; river or canal; 
rain water; other) 
 
Section 4, Question 10: 
The type of toilet facility 
available is… (sewage; 
septic tank; cesspool; 
direct download to ocean, 
river, lake or stream; 
latrine; or do not have) 
 




























Section 4, Question 12: 
The shower service 
available is… (exclusive, 
shared, or do not have) 
 
Section 4, Question 13: 
How is it eliminated most 
of the garbage? 
(municipal service; 
thrown into the street or 
river; burned; buried; 
recycled; hired service; 
other)  
 
Section 4, Question 14: 
What kind of lighting 
system has this 
household? (public utility; 
private power generator; 
solar panel; candle/oil 
lamp/gas burner; or do not 
have) 
 
Section 4, Question 16: 
In this household, food is 
cooked mainly using… 
(Gas; wood/coal; 






 Section 6, Question 10a: 
Does this household have 
a colour TV working? (yes 
or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10b: 
Does this household have 
a refrigerator working? 
(yes or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10c: 
Does this household have 
a stove working? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10d: 
Does this household have 
a sound system working? 
(yes or no) 
 




Section 6, Question 10e: 
Does this household have 
a blender working? (yes 
or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10f: 
Does this household have 
a telephone line working? 
(yes or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10g: 
Does this household have 
a DVD working? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10h: 
Does this household have 
a vehicle working? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10i: 
Does this household have 
a washing machine 
working? (yes or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10j: 
Does this household have 
a computer working? (yes 
or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10k: 
Does this household have 
a microwave oven 
working? (yes or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10l: 
Does this household have 
a food processor 
working? (yes or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10m: 
Does this household have 
an iron working? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10n: 
Does this household have 
an activated cell phone? 
(yes or no) 





Section 6, Question 10o: 
Does this household have 
Internet service? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 6, Question 10p: 
Does this household have 



























Section 3, Question 1: 
Type of house (house, 
apartment, room(s), shack, 
or hut) 
 
Section 3, Question 2: 
Main access road 
(pavement, cobbled, dirt, 
path, river/sea, or other)  
 
Section 3, Question 3: 
Main material of the roof 
(concrete, asbestos, zinc, 
tile, palm/straw, or 
another material) 
 
Section 3, Question 4: 




wood, cane, soil, or 
another material) 
 
Section 3, Question 5: 
Main material of the walls 
(concrete, block/brick, 
asbestos/cement/fibrolite, 
adobe, wood, bahareque, 
cane/reed, or another 
material) 
Overall welfare* SELBEN welfare index96 --- 
                                                             
96 The information collected by the Registro Social is used to create the SELBEN welfare index, which ranks 
Ecuadorian households according to their economic and structural characteristics. The score of a given 
household is computed using a nonlinear principal components analysis based on 27 variables, which 
include living conditions,  household assets (television, car, telephone, etc.), access to basic services, 
human capital, socio-economic characteristics (employment, ethnicity, literacy, access to credit, etc.), and 
household size. 








Province idprovincia Section 1, Question 3 (24 provinces) 
Canton idcanton Section 1, Question 4 (221 cantons) 
Parish idparroquia Section 1, Question 5 (1,149 parishes) 
Census Area zona Section 1, Question 7 
Census District sector Section 1, Question 8 (32,129 districts) 
Housing Unit 
(Dwelling) vivienda 
Section 1, Question 12 
(number #) 
Household Unit hogar1 hogart 






























Section 5, Question 46: 
What did you do last 
week? (worked at least 
one hour; did not work but 
has a job; at least one hour 
manufactured a product or 
provided a service; at least 
one hour helped at some 
family business; at least 
one hour performed 
agricultural labour or took 
care of farming animals; 
‘unemployed’ looked for a 
job having worked before 
and being available to 
work; did not work) 
 
Section 5, Question 47: 
If you have not worked… 
(looking for a first time 
job and available for 






Section 5, Question 48: 
If unemployed, how long 
have you been looking for 
a job? (less than a year; or 






Section 5, Question 51: 
In this job you are 
working as…(public 





























unpaid home worker; 
unpaid worker in another 
home; unpaid assistant of 
a laborer; domestic 
employee) 
 
Section 5, Question 52: 
If you are self-employed 
or patron, your business 
is… (family, partnership, 
or individual business)  
 
Section 5, Question 53: 
If you are self-employed 
or patron, what do you 
need to improve your 
business? (credit; market 
access; assistance and 
training; other) 
 
Section 5, Question 54: 
If you are self-employed 
or patron, where your 
business operates? (in the 
place where you live; in 
its own place; in a leased 
place; in a borrowed or 
community-owned place; 






Section 6, Question 3: 
In the last twelve months, 
have you received 
remittances from relatives 
or friends who are living 
abroad and are not 
household members? (yes 
or no) 
 








Section 6, Question 4: 
In the last twelve months, 
did any member of the 
household receive cash 
loans, credit cards or 
commercial credit to buy: 
furniture, domestic 











vehicles, among others? 
(yes or no) 
 
Section 6, Question 5: 
How did you mainly use 




land; health; vehicle; 
appliances and furniture; 
travel; food; studies; 




Gender genero Section 5, Question 3 (male or female) 
Age edad 
Section 5, Question 4: 
How old are you? 
(number #)  
Kinship parentescojefe 
Section 5, Question 7: 
What is the relationship of 
each household member 
with respect to the head of 
household? (Head of 
household, spouse or 
partner, child, stepchild, 
parent, father in law, son 
or daughter in law, 
grandchild, brother, 
brother in law, other 
relative, not relative, or 
domestic service) 
Marital Status estadocivil 
Section 5, Question 8: 
What is the current 
marital status of each 
household member? (Free 
Union, married, widowed, 
separated, divorced, or 
single) 
Nationality  nacionalidad 
Section 5, Question 12: 
What nationality is each 
member? (Ecuadorian, 
Colombian, American, 
Peruvian, Spanish, Cuban, 
Venezuelan, or another 
nationality) 





Section 5, Question 13: 










































Section 5, Question 61: 
Have you received the 
CDH? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 62a: 
Did you use the money for 
health expenses? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 5, Question 62b: 
Did you spend the money 
in education? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 62c: 
Did you spend the money 
in household equipment? 
(yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 62d: 
Did you use the money to 
pay debts? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 62e: 
Did you spend the money 
in food? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 62f: 
Did you spend the money 
in your business? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 5, Question 62g: 
Did you spend the money 
in personal expenses? 






Section 5, Question 58: 
Have you been a 
beneficiary of the BDH?97 
(yes or no) 
                                                             
97 Social assistance transfers for older adults and people with disabilities are also included.  




































Section 5, Question 59a: 
Do you use the BDH for 
health expenses? (yes or 
no) 
 
Section 5, Question 59b: 
Do you use the BDH for 
education? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 59c: 
Do you spend the BDH in 
household equipment? 
(yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 59d: 
Do you use the BDH to 
pay debts? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 59e: 
Do you spend the BDH in 
food? (yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 59f: 
Do you use the BDH for 
other personal expenses? 
(yes or no) 
 
Section 5, Question 60: 
Approximately how long 
does it take you to get to 
where the BDH is 
handed? (less than 30 
minutes; 30 minutes; 45 
minutes; 1 hour; or more 




























Appendix D: Relationship Among the Probability, Odds 
and Log of Odds 
The transformation from probability to odds is a monotonic transformation, meaning the 
odds increase as the probability increases or vice versa.  Probability ranges from 0 to 1, 
while odds range from 0 and positive infinity. The transformation from odds to log-odds 
is simply a log transformation, which is  again monotonic. The table below shows the 
relationship among the probability, odds and log of odds. 
 
           Probability (p)      odds      log-odds 
               .001           .001001    -6.906755 
               .01            .010101    -4.59512 
               .15            .1764706   -1.734601 
               .2             .25        -1.386294 
               .25            .3333333   -1.098612 
               .3             .4285714   -.8472978 
               .35            .5384616   -.6190392 
               .4             .6666667   -.4054651 
               .45            .8181818   -.2006707 
               .5                1          0 
               .55            1.222222    .2006707 
               .6             1.5         .4054651 
               .65            1.857143    .6190392 
               .7             2.333333    .8472978 
               .75            3          1.098612 
               .8             4          1.386294 
               .85            5.666667   1.734601 
               .9             9          2.197225 
               .999           999        6.906755 






   
 
 
 
 
 
